Punjab-Haryana High Court
Parkasho Devi And Ors. vs Tarsem Lal And Anr. on 21 November, 2002
Equivalent citations: AIR2003P&H245, AIR 2003 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 245
Author: V.M. Jain
Bench: V.M. Jain
JUDGMENT V.M. Jain, J.
1. This Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs, against the judgment and decree, passed by the Additional District Judge, whereby the Appeal, filed by the defendants, was accepted, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, were set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed.
2. The facts, in brief, are that the plain tiffs, Smt. Parkasho Devi, etc., filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants, restraining them from interfering or forcibly dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit land. It was alleged that Chuni Lal, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was in cultivating possession of the suit land under the owners, namely Ajit Singh, etc., and that after the death of Chuni Lal, the plaintiffs were in cultivating possession of the suit land, being the widow and sons of Chuni Lal and they were paying rent to the landowners. It was alleged that the defendants had no right, title or interest in the suit land and were threatening to take forcible pos-session of the suit land from the plaintiffs. In the written statement filed by the defendants, it was alleged that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land. It was alleged that the suit land was declared sur-plus in the hands of the owners and the land vested in the State Government and the Punjab State became the owner of the suit land. It was alleged that the defendants were in cultivating possession of the suit land and the suit land was allotted to them on payment of compensation, under the orders of the Collector. Agrarian dated 17-5-1985. It was denied that Chuni Lal was in cultivating possession of the suit land or that after his death, the plaintiffs were in cultivating possession of the suit land and were cultivating the suit land on payment of batai. It was alleged that in fact, the defendants were in possession of the suit land since Rabi 1983, after the earlier occupant of the suit land had left its possession. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed various issues.
3. After hearing both the sides, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land and were entitled to injunction. However, the appeal, filed by the defendants, was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, were set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs, was dismissed, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession over the suit land. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiffs filed Regular Second Appeal in this Court.
4. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record, in my opinion, the following substantial question of law is involved in this appeal:--
"Whether the subsequent revenue entries in favour of the defendants could be made the basis for holding the defendants to be in possession of the suit property, even though the later revenue entries had come into existence without any notice to the previous occupiers".
5. In the present case, as referred to above, the trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiffs holding the plaintiffs to be in possession of the suit property. While coming to this conclusion, the learned trial Court had ignored the later revenue entries from Rabi 1983 onwards, whereby the names of the defendants, for the first time, were recorded being in cultivating possession of the suit land, even though prior thereto, in all the revenue entries, Chuni Lal, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was recorded in possession of the suit land. While coming to this conclusion, the learned trial Court had placed reliance on the law laid down by this Court, in the ease reported as Sadhu Ram v. Jagdish, 1982 Pun LJ 371, in which it was laid down that where the Khasra Girdawari entries had been corrected, behind the back of the tenant, who was recorded in possession in the revenue records, such revenue entries would have no effect on the rights of the tenant, especially when no ejectment order had been passed against the tenant. However, the learned Additional District Judge, placing reliance on the later revenue entries, reversed the findings of the learned trial Court and held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession over the suit property, whereas the possession of the defendants was proved on the record, in view of the later revenue entries. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge, while accepting the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, had erred in law in placing reliance on the later revenue entries, which had come into existence since Rabi 1983, in favour of the defendants, whereas the earlier revenue entries were in favour of Chuni Lal, pred-ecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. Nothing has come on the record to show that the change in the Khasra Girdawaries, in Rabi 1983, had come into existence after the issuing of notice to the plaintiffs, who are the successors-in-interest of Chuni Lal, who was recorded in possession of the suit property, as tenant.
6. Ex. P-7 is the copy of the jamabandi for the year 1979-80, wherein, Chuni Lal has been recorded in possession of the suit property as Gair maroosi under the owners on payment of 1 /3 batai. Ex. P-8 is the copy of the Khasra Girdawaries for the years 1980-81 to 1984-85, wherein as well Chuni Lal was recorded in possession of the suit property under the owners, till the entry was changed for the first time in Rabi 1983 in, favour of the defendants, Tarsem Lal and Som Nath and the said entry continued thereafter. Merely because the suit land was declared surplus in the hands of the previous owners, as alleged, and was subsequently allotted to the defendants, as claimed by the defendants, still in my opinion, this would not show that the defendants were in possession of the suit property since Rabi 1983. Similarly, the subsequent entries in the revenue record, including the Khasra Girdawaries, Exs. D-3 and D-5 for the years 1985-86, would be of no help to the defendants, especially when nothing has come on the record to show that the change in the Khasra Girdawari in Rabi 1983 had taken place after the issuance of notice to the successors-in-interest of Chuni Lal, i.e. the plaintiffs. Similarly, in my opinion, the mutation. Ex. D-7, vide which the land in question was mutated in the name of the Punjab Govt. in lieu of the previous owners, by virtue of the land having been declared surplus, would be of no help to the defendants to prove their possession over the suit property. Similarly, Khasra Girdawari entries from 1981-82 to 1984-85, Ex. D-6, would be of no help to the defendants. Similar would be the position in respect of the consolidation record of the year 1984-85. Ex. D-4, showing the possession of the defendants under the Punjab Govt. Similarly, the deposit of instalment in respect of the surplus area allotted to Tarsem Lal, defendant, would be of no help to the defendants, with regard to their possession over the suit property and similar would be the position in respect of the certificate of allotment. Ex. D-1, showing the allotment of the land to Tarsem Lal, defendant, by the Collector Agrarian on 16-11-1984. The allotment and the deposit of money at the most would show that the suit land was allotted by the Punjab Govt. to Tarsem Lal, defendant, and that the suit land having been declared surplus, had vested in the Punjab Govt. from the big land-owners. However, none of these documents would show the defendants' possession since Rabi 1983, except the Khasra Girdawari entry made in Rabi 1983 which, as referred to above, had come into existence without any notice to the plaintiffs, who were the successors-in-interest of Chuni Lal, who was previously recorded in possession of the suit land as Gair maroosi on payment of 1/3 batal. The lower appellate Court had failed to take all these documents into consideration while reversing the findings of the trial Court.
7. In Durga v. Milkhi Ram, 1969 Pun LJ 105, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change was effected without any mutation and there was no order of the revenue authorities showing as to how the change was made, the presumption in favour of the later entries in the revenue record would stand rebutted by the fact that the alteration in the latest revenue entries were made unauthorisedly, there being no material to justify the change of entries. Similarly, in Amal Kumar v. Bhupinder Singh, 1976 Pun LJ 26, it was held by this Court that the Financial Commissioner had prescribed the mode for effecting the changes in the existing Khasra Girdawaries. As per the instructions, it was the duty of the Patwari, before making any change in the existing entries at the time of harvest inspection, to notify in writing the person or persons likely to be adversely effected by such a change of entries and to retain on record the proof of the notification. It was further held that the changes so made, should be attested by the Lambardar or the Panch of the Village. It was further held that the entries made in violation of the said instructions, shall be treated as null and void, at the time of attestation of the jamabandi or at an earlier stage. It was held that the instructions, issued by the Financial Commissioner in this regard, had been issued to put a curb on the unrestricted powers of the Patwaris to manipulate the Khasra Girdawaries in the way they desired. Similar view was taken by this Court, in the cases, reported as Sadhu Ram v. Jagdish, 1982 Pun LJ 371 and Khushi Ram v. Hans Raj, 1980 Pun LJ 337.
8. In view of the facts referred to above, and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this Court, in my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge had erred in law in placing reliance on the revenue entries in favour of the defendants, merely on the ground that those entries were subsequent in point of time. As referred to above, there is no material on the record to show that the changes, made in the Khasra Girdawaries in Rabi 1983, had been made by the Patwari after the issuance of notice to the plaintiffs, being the successors-in-interest of Chuni Lal and after following the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner, in this regard.
9. With regard to the oral evidence, the learned Additional District Judge ignored the statements of the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs, by picking-up one line from the statements of each of the witnesses. However, if the statements of the witnesses, produced by the plaintiffs, are read as a whole, it could not be said that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession over the suit property. In fact, it appears that the learned Additional District Judge had ignored the oral testimony of the witnesses produced by the plaintiffs because the learned Additional District Judge had placed reliance on the later revenue entries and for that reason, some fault or the other, was found in the statements of the witnesses, to ignore the same. In fact, the oral evidence of the plaintiffs could not be brushed aside. On the other hand, from the oral evidence, it stands proved that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property. Furthermore, in my opinion, from the oral testimony of the statements of the witnesses, examined by the defendants, it could not be said that the defendants were in possession of the suit property, especially when the later entries in the revenue record in their favour would be of help to prove their possession, in view of the reasons already detailed by me above.
10. In view of my detailed discussion above, the substantial question stands answered in favour of the appellants and it is held that the later entries in the revenue record have to be ignored, as those entries had come into existence without notice and without following the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner.
11. For the reasons recorded above, the present appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree dated 6-8-1987, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-appellants, is decreed and the defendants are restrained from interfering into the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property, except in due course of law. No costs.