Punjab-Haryana High Court
Hari Ram vs Bhagwan Dass on 21 April, 2025
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Karnal, as detailed in para 1 of the plaint, and described in the jamabandi for
the year 1979-80.
3.2 As per the plain ffs, their predecessor-in-interest, Shri Parma Lal
son of Darya Baksh, was recorded as a co-sharer in the shamlat deh land.
A*er his death, the plain ffs succeeded to his share. The defendants'
predecessors were allegedly recorded as gair maurusi tenants on 1/3 batai
under Parma Lal, and this arrangement con nued with the plain ffs.
However, Sheo Ram and Jawala Singh, predecessors of defendant Nos. 4 to
17, obtained an order dated 06.09.1983 from the Tehsildar, Karnal, declaring
that no landlord-tenant rela onship existed between the par es. Ac ng upon
this, the defendants had their names recorded as co-sharers in the Rapat
Roznamcha No. 50 dated 14.10.1984. The plain ffs challenged the said order
and entry, contending that the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector Grade-II lacked
jurisdic on to decide the issue of tenancy and that the revenue entries were
illegal and void. Plain ffs sought decree of declara on to be owners of the
suit land and further prayed for consequen al relief of possession thereof.
3.3 The defendants contested the suit on various preliminary grounds,
including lack of locus standi, maintainability, limita on, estoppel, and ab-
sence of cause of ac on. They alleged that the plain ffs had already been al-
lo>ed more land than due at the me of consolida on and had manipulated
revenue entries through one of the plain ffs, who was a Patwari. They
claimed that the land was originally submerged due to river ac on and later
reclaimed by them through personal effort, thereby giving them possessory
rights. The defendants also denied any tenancy under Parma Lal and asserted
that the Tehsildar's 1983 order was passed under Sec on 14-A of the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, and upheld in appeal by the Collector.
3.4 The plain ffs, in replica on, reiterated their stand. The trial
Court framed the necessary issues and recorded evidence from both sides.
4. The learned Trial Court held the Tehsildar's order dated 06.09.1983
to be legal and binding. It found that the plain ffs had failed to prove the de-
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fendants as tenants, and further noted that possession was admi>edly with
the defendants and that plain ffs had not been dispossessed. The plain ffs
were held to lack locus standi, and the suit was found to be me-barred.
However, jurisdic on of the Civil Court was upheld. The suit was accordingly
dismissed on 17.03.1997.
5.1 On appeal, the learned First Appellate Court found that Shri Parma
Lal was recorded as a co-sharer. It held that the Assistant Collector Grade-II,
Karnal had no jurisdic on to decide the ques on of tenancy, which could only
be determined by a Civil Court. Further, no specific direc on had been given
by the Assistant Collector for change of revenue entries, rendering the sub-
sequent Rapat Roznamcha entry illegal. The Court concluded that the de-
fendants and their predecessors were not co-sharers, and their possession
was therefore, unauthorized. Reference was made to Wazib-Ul-Arz (Ex.P5)
and Missal Burdagi Bramadgi (Ex.P7 & P8) to support the conclusion that
land belonging to the plain ffs and other co-sharers had submerged in the
Yamuna River and later re-emerged, while no por on of the defendants' land
was affected.
5.2 The Appellate Court further held that even a single co-sharer is
en tled to seek possession from a trespasser, and that it was not mandatory
to implead all co-sharers. The suit was held to be within limita on, being
based on tle. Consequently, the findings of the trial Court were set aside,
the Tehsildar's order dated 06.09.1983 and the subsequent Rapat Roz-
namcha No. 50 were declared null and void, and a decree for possession was
passed in favour of the plain ffs, direc ng the defendants to hand over va-
cant possession within one month of the judgment dated 10.12.1999.
6. Assailing the appellate judgment, learned senior counsel for
the appellants argued that the suit land had re-emerged following river ac-
on and remained unpar oned. It was contended that the plain ffs them-
selves admi>ed the defendants' possession and that all proprietors of the
shamlat deh land, including the defendants, retained rights therein. It was
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also argued that plain ffs failed to prove tenancy, and that the Assistant Col-
lector's order, upheld by the Financial Commissioner on 15.01.1990, re-
mained binding. The counsel challenged the appellate court's applica on of
the principle that a tenant denying tenancy becomes a trespasser. He further
submi>ed that only 16 bighas 2 biswas of land belonging to the plain ffs had
submerged, whereas they already possessed a larger extent of land and could
not claim suit land measuring 192 kanals 10 marlas as of right.
7. In response, learned senior counsel for the respondents poin-
ted to Ex.P7 and Ex.P8 to assert that the defendants' land had not sub- merged, while the plain ffs' land and that of other co-sharers had indeed gone under river ac on and subsequently, re-emerged. As per the Wazib-Ul- Arz (Ex.P5), such re-emerged land is to be par oned only among those, whose holdings were affected. The mere ownership of other lands in the vil- lage did not confer co-ownership over the suit land upon the defendants. Thus, the judgment of the First Appellate Court was supported and a prayer was made for dismissal of the appeal.
8. I have considered submissions of learned counsel for both the sides and have appraised the record carefully.
9. During the pendency of this appeal, defendants-appellants have moved an applica on bearing CM No.5753-C of 2003 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to produce addi onal evidence in the form of documents Annex- ures A-1 to A-10. No reply to the said applica on has been filed by plain ffs- respondents. The documents proposed to be produced have come from the revenue record and are found to be relevant to decide the controversy. As such, the applica on is allowed. Annexures A-1 to A-10 are taken on record.
10. Before considering the conten ons raised by learned senior counsel for the defendants-appellants, it will be relevant to reproduce the observa ons as made by the First Appellate Court in para No.14 of the judg- ment, which read as under:-
Page 4 of 164 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 "14. A*er hearing the learned counsel for both the par es, I am of the view that the appeal is liable to be accepted for the reasons hereina*er men oned. A perusal of the copy of the jamabandi for the year 1979-80 Ex.P1 shows that Parma Lal i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of plain ffs has been shown as a hissedar in the shamlat-deh of the village and the predecessor-in-interest of defendants have been shown to be tenants.
Though the version of defendants is that entries recorded in this regard in the revenue record were factually incorrect and they challenged the same before the revenue authori es and their plea was accepted up to the highest revenue hierarchy. But the conten on raised in this regard is untenable. Vide order dated 6.9.83 (copy Ex.P4), Assistant Collector lInd Grade, Karnal, held that there was no rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es. This order was upheld in appeal and the same was confirmed even in revision. But the moot point in those proceedings was with regarding the rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es. Admi>edly, there was no direc on for the revenue authori es to change the status of defendants while preparing Jamabandis for the subsequent period. However, ignoring the spirit of order dated 6.9.83, the revenue authori es entered Rapat no.50 dated 14.10.84 and on the basis of which the status of defendants was changed from tenants to co-sharers as evident from copy of Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 as Ex.P3. Then, the plain ffs have placed on file copy of Wazub-ul-Arz, Hadbast No.10 of village Chandrao as Ex.P5 and wherein it has been men oned that the land which has been sub-merged in the Yamuna river shall be called Shamlat-deh a*er it has re-emerged and the persons whose land was sub-merged in the Yamuna river would be called hissedar. If the defendants or their predecessor-in-interest had been co- sharers in the Khewat of land in dispute, then their names would have been certainly men oned in the Missal Burdagi Bramadgi (copies Ex.P7 and Ex.8). A perusal of these documents shows that the name of Parma Lal i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of plain ffs has been men oned as one of the person, whose land was sub-merged in the Yamuna river. Thus, it shows that the defendants or their predecessors in-interest were not co-sharers in the land in dispute at that me. Then, there is also no oral or documentary evidence on the file to show that defendants were co-sharers in the land in dispute. PW1 Jagir Singh Patwari categorically stated in his statement that Page 5 of 16 5 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 there is no such record vide which a direc on was given by Tehsildar Karnal to change the revenue entries in the name of defendants showing their status as co-sharers instead of tenants over the land in dispute. Even DW2 Hari Ram also admi>ed the factum that by virtue of order dated 6.9.83, they become owners of the land in dispute. Thus, it shows that except oral pleas, they are not in possession of any cogent evidence to show that they are in possession of the land in dispute as owners. Moreover, the defendants also denied their rela onship as tenants with the plain ffs. So in such a situa on, the plain ffs being co-sharers have a right to seek decree for possession of the land in dispute. The ra o of law down in case of Ajmer Singh and others Vs. Shamsher Singh alias Sher Singh and others (Supra) is fully applicable to the facts of the present case."
11. This Court finds that the above-said observa ons and findings as recorded by the First Appellate Court are based upon proper apprecia on of evidence on record. Not only this, these findings are further strengthened from the documents Annexures A-1 to A-10, which have been produced in addi onal evidence by defendants-appellants themselves, instead of weakening the case of the plain ffs-respondents.
12. It is the admi>ed case of the par es that land of village Chandraon is subject to river ac on, i.e. alluvium and diluvium. Ex.P7 & P8 are the copies of Missal Burdagi Bramadgi, detailing the land which had been submerged in river Yamuna. The details of that land alongwith the names of co-owners, whose land was submerged also find men on therein. The name of Parma Lal, the predecessor-in-interest of the plain ffs also find men on therein, whose land had been submerged in the Yamuna river.
13. As contended by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants by poin ng out towards Annexures A-1 to A-3 that in the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69, total land measuring 2833 kanals had emerged out of the river Yamuna, which also included large chunk of the suit land. Annexure A-8 is Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, which would reveal that 176 kanals 12 marlas of land out of the suit land, is recorded in the ownership of Page 6 of 16 6 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 shamlat deh. As far as the details and names of cul vators men oned in column No.5 of the jamabandi are concerned, the said entry reads as under:
"Makbooja Charand Sheo Ram - Mukanda sons of Chamaila S/o Devi Ram in equal share - ½ share Beeja - Jawala - Mihan Singh sons of Nihal Singh son of Devi Singh equally, in half share, residents of village Gair Maurusi through Parma Lal co-sharer."
14. In the next jamabandi for the year 1979-80 (Annexure A-9), also produced in evidence as Ex.P1 and which is with regard to en re suit land, the entry in column No.5 giving details and names of cul vators are as under:-
"Parma Lal Mazkoor co-sharer through Sheo Ram - Mukanda son of Chamaila S/o Dhani Ram, in equal share - half share Beeja - Jawala - Mihan Singh sons of Nihal Singh son of Dhani Ram equally, in half share residents of village Gair Maurusi."
15. Thus, in both the above Jamabandis, Parma Lal, the predecessor of plain ffs is recorded as co-sharer; whereas, Sheo Ram etc, the predecessors of defendants are recorded as Gair Maurusians. The conten on of learned senior counsel for the defendants-appellants is that the words "Gair Maurusi through Parma Lal co-sharer" as men oned in jamabandi for the year 1969-70 (Annexure P-8); and similar entry as men oned in next jamabandi for the year 1979-80 (Annexure A-9) showing the defendants as Gair Maurusi are illegal and in fact, they have been manipulated by one of the plain ffs, who was revenue official. Though no such stand was taken by the defendants-appellants in pleadings, but by way of the applica on under order 41 Rule 27 CPC, defendants-appellants want to contend that though in the jamabandi for the year 1969-70, name of Parma Lal as co-sharer is shown in the last, but in the next jamabandi for the year 1979-80, the name of Parma Lal as co-sharer has been shown in the top of the column No.5. It is Page 7 of 16 7 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 argued that these circumstances in themselves indicate that these entries have been manipulated.
16. This Court is unable to accept the above conten on as raised by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants. As per the se>led posi on of law, there is presump on of correctness a>ached to the entries contained in record of rights, which include jamabandi. There is absolutely no cogent evidence on record to support the case of the defendants that the aforesaid entries as pointed out by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants have been manipulated by one of the plain ffs as is alleged. As per own conten on of learned senior counsel, the entry to show the defendants as gair maurusi was made for the first me in jamabandi for the year 1969-70. Later on, it was repeated in the next jamabandi for the year 1979-80. By producing jamabandi for the year 1969-70, the defendants-appellants have strengthened the case of defendants in order to show that in fact the defendants were recorded gair maurusi tenants on the suit land and not the co-sharers as being claimed by the defendants-appellants.
17. It is important to no ce that in column No.9 of jamabandi for the year 1969-70 as well as in jamabandi for the year 1979-80, there is an entry of batai 1/3, which reveal that defendants-appellants were tenants on payment of batai to the extent of 1/3. In case, the said entries were null and void and had been illegally manipulated by the plain ffs-respondents as is alleged by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, nothing had stopped them to challenge those entries by bringing any ac on in the Civil Courts. No such ac on was brought, despite the fact that entry for the first me had emerged in the jamabandi for the year 1969-70. Even in the present li ga on, the entry appearing for the first me in jamabandi for the year 1969-70 has not been challenged.
18. As has been no ced by the First Appellate Court that one of defendants during his tes mony had clearly admi>ed that the names of the defendants as co-sharers was recorded for the first me in jamabandi for the year 1984-84 based upon the order dated 06.09.1983 of the Assistant Page 8 of 16 8 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 Collector Grade-II, Karnal. Plain ffs had brought ac on against the defendants to claim arrears of rent by bringing a pe on under Sec on 14-A Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 in 1982. In that pe on, defendants had denied the tenancy. The Assistant Collector Grade-II, Karnal held that there was no such rela onship, despite the fact that he was not at all competent to adjudicate the said issue.
19. In this regard, reference can be made to "Jia Lal and another v. The State of Haryana and others", 1971 RLR 490, wherein ejectment applica on under Sec on 14-A of Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 was filed on the ground of non-payment of rent. The respondent had denied the rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es. It was held by this Court as under:-
"5. Shri Mi>al, the learned counsel for the pe oners, has himself argued that the disputed ques ons of tle could not be decided by respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in these proceedings. He has cited Mahi Dass v. Nagar Mal, 1965 Punjab Law Reporter 35, in this connec on. This argument may, however, suggest that the disputed ques ons of tle were to be decided by the Civil Court. The respondents' counsel, Shri Goyal, has also urged the same proposi on of law before me but he does not see eye to eye with Shri Mi>al as to the consequences that should follow. As soon as the rela onship of landlord and tenant was disputed by respondent No. 6, the Revenue Officers. respondent Nos. 1 to 5, should have stayed their hands leaving the par es to have the disputed ques ons of tle determined by a Civil Court. In Magi, Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi and others. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 547, the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court paid due regard to the beneficent object of the Legislature in passing the Orissa Tenants Protec on Act and its inten on that disputes of the nature enumerated in Sec on 7 of that Act were to be taken out of the jurisdic on of the ordinary Civil Courts and that Tribunals specially designated in the Act had the right to deal with ma>ers enumerated and that the sec on was to receive a liberal construc on. It was, however, observed that while bearing these principles in mind, the Courts must also have regard of another important principle of construc on that where a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdic on of Civil Page 9 of 16 9 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 Court, it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. The Hon'ble Judges then went on to observe as follows:-
"Sec-on 7(1) postulates the rela-onship of tenant and landlord between the par-es and proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdic-on of the Collector to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject-ma6er of Sec-on 7(1) must be in regard to the five categories. That is the plain and obvious construc-on of the words "any dispute as regards". On this construc-on it would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said sec-on. The scheme of Sec-on 7(1) is unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, even on a liberal construc-on of Sec-on 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the rela-onship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under Sec-on 7(1)."
6. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others, 1962 P.L.R. 837, which is a case under Sec on 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act rela ng to disputes between tenants and landlords. It was observed that the Legislature barred only those suits from the cognizance of a Civil Court, where there was no dispute between the par es that the person cul va ng the land or who was in possession of the land was a tenant. The Supreme Court ruling in Raja Durga Singh's case was then followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Khazan Singh and another v. Dalip Singh and another, 1969 P.L.J. 459.
7. It may, therefore, appear that respondent Nos. 1 to 5 had no jurisdic on to go into ques ons of tle as to the effect of the declaratory decree on the rights of the par es................."
20. Thus, the ra o decidendi is that when the rela onship of land- lord and tenant is disputed in proceedings under Sec on 14-A of the Punjab Page 10 of 16 10 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, the Revenue Authori es (including Assis- tant Collectors) have no jurisdic on to adjudicate upon such disputed ques- ons of tle. These ma>ers must be referred to and decided by a competent Civil Court, as the Revenue Officers cannot assume jurisdic on unless the ex- istence of the landlord-tenant rela onship is admi>ed or undisputed.
21. In view of the legal posi on as above, there can be no dispute in holding that Assistant Collector Grade-II, Karnal and the higher revenue authori es were not at all competent to adjudicate the issue of rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es and as such, the order dated 06.09.1983 passed by Assistant Collector Grade-II, Karnal and the subsequent orders dated 17.01.1985 of the Collector (Ex.D5); and dated 15.01.1990 of the Financial Commissioner (Ex.D6) have been rightly held by the first appellate court to be null, illegal and void and not binding on the Civil Courts.
22. It will not be out of place to men on that though by way of the order dated 06.09.1983, the Assistant Collector Grade-II, Karnal observed that there was no rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es but he did not order for recording the name of the defendants in the revenue record as co-sharers. However, the revenue officials at their own recorded Rapat Roznamcha No.50 (Annexure A-10), in which the defendants were replaced as co-sharers. Said ac on has been rightly held by the First Appellate Court to be absolutely unwarranted and illegal.
23. Another conten on raised by learned senior counsel for the defendants-appellants is that in the revenue record, suit land is recorded to be owned by shamlat deh. With the help of jamabandis for the year 1964-65 (Annexure A-4 to A-7) pertaining to Sheo Ram, Beeja Singh, Mihan Singh and Jawala Singh, i.e. predecessors of defendants, it is contended that defendants/their predecessors have been recorded to be owner of the land in village Chandrao and as such, they have right in the shamlat deh land of the village. It is contended that since the defendants are also co-owners of the shamlat deh land, therefore, they will also deemed to be co-sharer in the suit land.
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24. There is absolutely no merit in the aforesaid conten on. Learned First Appellate Court has rightly referred to Wazib-Ul-Arz (Ex.P5) of Hadbast No.10 of village Chandrao, wherein it is clearly men oned that the land which had been submerged in Yamuna river shall be called shamlat deh a*er it has emerged and that the persons whose land was submerged in the Yamuna river would be called the hissedar. It is thus clear that a*er emergance of such a land, though it will be recorded in the name of shamlat deh, but it will belong only to those hissedars/co-sharers, whose land had been submerged.
25. As has already been no ced that as per Ex.P-7 and Ex.P-8, the Missal Burdagi Bramadgi, the names of defendants/their predecessors do not find men on therein; whereas name of Parma Lal, the predecessor of plain ffs finds men on therein, revealing that part of land of said Parma Lal had been submerged in the Yamuna river. No doubt that the suit land is more than the land belonging to Parma Lal, which had submerged, but defendants cannot challenge the locus standi of the plain ffs to claim possession of the en re suit land, considering that one co-sharer can seek possession on behalf of all the other co-sharers. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court tled "Ajmer Singh v. Shamsher Singh alias Sher Singh", 1983 PLR 786, wherein it was held that a suit filed by one co- sharer for possession against trespasser in respect of en re property, even without impleading other co-sharers is maintainable.
26. The conten on of the learned senior counsel for the defendants- appellants that merely because the defendants have denied the rela onship of landlord and tenant between the par es, will not make them as trespasser over the suit land, is also devoid of any merit. A similar ques on was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in case tled "Sada Ram v. Gajjan", 1970 PLR 223, wherein it was held as under:-
"5. The only point that was argued before the learned Single Judge was whether by denying the tle of the landlord and seRng up a tle in themselves in the wri>en statements filed in the suits, the defendants had Page 12 of 16 12 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 forfeited their tenancy and were, therefore liable to be ejected This point was decided against them by the learned Single Judge. Before us the same point has been argued and the learned counsel has placed his reliance on a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pa:amahdevi, AIR 1919 P.C. wherein it was held that denial in the suit will not work a forfeiture of which advantage can be taken in that suit, because the forfeiture must have accrued before the suit was ins tuted. This judgment was followed by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mussammat Gindori v. Sham Lal allas Maman Mal and another, ILR 1947 Lahore 235. The main judgment in that case was delivered by Din Mohammad J. The learned Judge, no ced that there were a number of reported Judgments of various High Courts of this country in which it had been held that a denial of the rela onship of landlord and tenants by the tenant in a suit filed against him by the landlord worked as forfeiture of his tenancy. But in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Maharaja of Joepore (supra), the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the disclaimer of the landlord's tle by a tenant does not work a forfeiture of tenancy unless there has been such a disclaimer in clear and unmistakable terms prior to the ins tu on of the suit by ma>er of record as the term is understood in English law. This rule of law was stated to apply to the territories to which the provisions of Sec ons 111 to 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, do not apply in terms.
6. The binding nature of the two judgments referred to above has been taken away by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1923, wherein it was held "No doubt the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not it is stated in terms, applicable to the area in ques on, but it has been laid down that the principles embodied in sec on 111 (g) are equally applicable to tenancies to which the Act does not apply on the ground of the same being in consonance with jus ce, equity and good conscience."
In paragraph 15 of the report, their Lordships further observed :-
Page 13 of 1613 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 "We consider the law to be that unless there is a disclaimer or renuncia on in clear and unequivocal terms, whether the same be in a pleading or in other documents, no forfeiture is incurred.
From this observa on it is clear that a disclaimer or renuncia on in clear and unequivocal terms, in the wri>en statement to the suit can also result in the forfeiture of the tenancy. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the denial of the tenancy in the wri>en statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord, does not appeal to us. It will lead to unnecessary mul plicity of legal proceedings if the landlord is obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by his denial of his character a as a tenant in the wri>en statement and not allowed to avail of that plea in the suit in which the wri>en statement has been filed especially when it has been pleaded in the plaint that the defendant had denied his character as a tenant of the plain ff orally before the ins tu on of the suit as was pleaded in the two suits out of which the present appeals have arisen.
7. The relevant por on of Sec on 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:
"a lease of immovable property would be determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by se=ng up a -tle in a third person or by claiming -tle in himself."
According to this sec on it is not necessary that the renuncia on of the character as lessee should be in wri ng before the ins tu on of the suit. It is correct that no cause of ac on will accrue to the landlord to eject the tenant on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy unless the forfeiture had taken place prior to the ins tu on of the suit. That renuncia on can be either in wri ng or verbal as has been men oned in Paragraph 1391 at page 666 of Volume 23 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edi on. The material por on of that paragraph reads as follows:
"There is implied in every lease a condi-on that the tenant shall not do anything that may prejudice the -tle of the landlord; and that if this is done, the landlord may re-enter for breach of this implied condi-on. Thus it is a Page 14 of 16 14 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 cause of forfeiture if the tenant denies the -tle of the landlord by alleging in wri-ng or, in the case of a tenancy from year to year, either in wri-ng or verbally that the -tle to the land is in himself or another; or if he assists a stranger to set up an adverse -tle, as where he acknowledges the freehold
-tle to be in him or delivers the premises to him in order to enable him to set up a -tle. In the case of a tenancy from year to year, the effect of such denial of -tle is that the tenancy may be forthwith determined by the landlord without no-ce to quit."
8. The, ma>er can be looked at from another angle. When the tenant denies his character as the tenant of the landlord in his wri>en statement, he can be taken to be puRng an end to the tenancy, thus giving right to the landlord to claim-possession from him. This principle is expressed thus in pla> on Leases:-
"The holding being from year to year subject to the mutual will of landlord and tenant to determine it on giving the usual 6 months no-ce evidence of a disclaimer....... ........... is evidence of an elec-on to put an end to the tenancy and supersede the necessity for such no-ce. Hence verbal or wri6en denials of a tenancy have rendered a no-ce to quit unnecessary, but it does not appear that they have effected a forfeiture of the term."
The denial of the rela onship of landlord and tenant by the tenant in his wri>en statement to a suit for ejectment determines a tenancy forthwith, thus giving the right to the landlord to the possession of the leased property, when the lease is not for a fixed period but from year to year or at will as in the present cases."
27. Thus, a tenant's clear and unequivocal denial of the landlord's tle or of the landlord-tenant rela onship in the wri>en statement to a suit for ejectment can result in forfeiture of tenancy under Sec on 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provided that such denial occurred prior to the ins tu on of the suit, either orally or in wri ng. Furthermore, the land- lord need not file a separate suit for ejectment based on such forfeiture; the same suit in which the denial is made can be relied upon to seek the tenant's evic on. This avoids unnecessary mul plicity of proceedings. This posi on aligns with jus ce, equity, and good conscience, and has been upheld by the Page 15 of 16 15 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 23-04-2025 02:26:17 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:050546 RSA No.3314 of 2022 (O&M) 2025:PHHC:050546 Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923.
28. Applying the above ra o to the factual matrix of this case, it is held that the First Appellate has rightly decreed the suit for declara on with consequen al relief of possession over the suit land, in favour of the plain ffs-respondents.
29. The last conten on raised by learned senior counsel for the defendants-appellants is that suit land is much more than the land of plain ffs, which had submerged, is devoid of merit, considering the fact that none of the por on of the land belonging to the defendants-appellants had submerged in the river ac on. It is the land of the plain ffs along with other persons, which had submerged and therefore, a*er re-emerging of the same, plain ffs being one of co-owners has a right to seek the possession thereof against the trespassers - defendants, having no right in that land.
30. On account of en re discussion as above, this Court does not find any merit whatsoever in the present appeal, as there is no scope for interference in the well reasoned judgment as passed by the First Appellate Court. As such, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.
April 21, 2025 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Sarita JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes
Whether reportable? Yes
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