Central Administrative Tribunal - Mumbai
R.B. Kamble vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 23 July, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)SLJ389(CAT)
ORDER Muzaffar Husain, Member (J)
1. The applicant has approached this Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to challenge the order dated 10.12.2001 of Disciplinary Authority imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement, which was upheld by order dated 26.2.2002 of the Appellate Authority and order dated 19.6.2002 of the Revisional Authority and has prayed for quashing and setting aside the above orders.
2. The applicant at the relevant time was working as Junior Booking Clerk at the booking office of Vikhroli on 29.10.1997 in shift 0700 hours to 1500 hours on window No. 5, was involved in a trap by the vigilance team. A memorandum was issued on 19.1.1998 by Assistant Commercial Manager on the following charges:
"Article I: He irregularly overcharged the decoy passengers by Rs. 8/- (Rs. Eight) on the sale of one II/O/Retn. ticket Ex. VK to ABH and one II/O/Retn. VK to Shelu/ Vashind.
Article II: He was found with an excess of Rs. 21.75 (Rs. Twenty one and paise seventy five) in the Railway cash in his possession, which is highly irregular."
The enquiry was conducted. Enquiry Officer submitted enquiry report holding applicant guilty of charges. On receipt of enquiry report applicant submitted representation. The Disciplinary Authority after going through the entire proceedings and representation of the applicant imposed penalty of compulsory retirement. The appeal as well as Revision submitted by the applicant against the order of Disciplinary Authority were also rejected. Hence this O.A.
3. The respondents have countered the pleas and stated that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority were strictly in accordance with the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. The applicant was afforded sufficient opportunity to defend his case. The punishment order was passed on the basis of evidence on record and the same is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. Therefore, there is neither any violation of procedure nor violation of law and therefore the O.A. being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed with costs.
4. We have heard learned Counsel for the applicant as well as respondents and gone though the material placed on record.
5. Learned Counsel for the applicant has putforth the following major points:
(i) The vigilance check was conducted without having any independent witness and all the staff are from RPF cadre on deputation to vigilance department. The vigilance check was not conducted in accordance with the direction in Paras 704 and 705 of Indian Railway Vigilance Manual.
(ii) The inquiry was conducted by the Vigilance Inspector on deputation to Vigilance Organisation and conducted in Vigilance Cell.
(iii) The charge sheet was issued by Assistant Commercial Manager (Coaching) and punishment was imposed by DCM (Goods) whereas the applicant belong to commercial cadre and therefore. The authorities initiating the disciplinary proceedings as well as imposing the penalty are not competent.
(iv) The findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse and based on no evidence and impugned orders are liable to be quashed based on perverse findings.
(v) The Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority have not passed the speaking order and the impugned orders are passed by the authorities without application of mind.
6. The first contention raised by the applicant is that the vigilance check was not conducted in accordance with the direction in Paras 704 and 705 of the Indian Railway Vigilance Manual. Learned Counsel has also contended that this being the case of trap, the provisions laid down in Paras 704 and 705 of Indian Railway Vigilance Manual were required to be observed by the Officer concerned, before laying the trap. According to him these provisions being mandatory in nature the non-observance of procedure prescribed therein vitiates the whole trap. Learned Counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1498/02 in Union of India v. M. Anjaneyulu and decision of CAT Bombay Bench rendered in O.A. 837/99 Mohan H. Raut v. Union of India decided on 21.3.2003. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that Paras 704 and 705 are not mandatory, these are enabling provisions in the form of direction as has been held by CAT Bombay Bench in O.A. 219/01 and O.A. 671092 decided on 04.7.2003 and 24.10.2003 respectively. He has also submitted that the procedure for laying trap is in conformity with the relevant guidelines and the relevant rule of principle of natural justice. He has also submitted that evidence of RPF constable before Inquiry Officer is an independent evidence. The Inquiry Officer considered the material on record and arrived at conclusion and it is not open for the Tribunal to interfere with the same as the Tribunal is not appellate body. He has further submitted that unless applicant shows that he was prejudiced by not following the procedure the omission would not be fatal to the impugned orders. In this regard, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, 2001 SCC (L&S) 959=2001(3) SLJ 421 (SC), learned Counsel also submitted that the points not raised before the Appellate Authority cannot be argued before this Tribunal. In this regard he has placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Deokinandan Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., 2001 SCC (L&S) 1079. He has further contended that utilisation of non-gazetted official does not violate credibility of check. This principle has also been indicated in further correction slip to Para 705(a) vide Board's letter dated 14.3.2001 wherein it is now provided that the Investigation Officer/Inspector should immediately arrange one or more gazetted or non-gazetted officer or a combination of gazetted and non-gazetted officer to act as independent witness/witnesses.
7. Now we have to examine the facts of the present case in the light of the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court and other relevant decision of different Benches of the CAT. In the present case, we find, on 29.10.1997 the applicant was functioning as booking clerk from 07 hours to 15 hours shift on window No. 5. We find that the decoy check was conducted and constable S.D. Sharma was utilised as decoy passenger and he handed over currency note of Rs. 100/- and instructed to tender the GC note to purchase the ticket. Shri K.K. Pawar was utilised as independent witness and the transaction which took place between the booking clerk and the decoy passenger was recorded in check Memo No. 1. After purchasing the ticket from window No. 5 the decoy passenger along with independent witness reported the transaction to the Chief Vigilance Inspector standing in some distance out of the booking hall and told that the booking clerk has returned him Rs. 60/-. The fare printed on the ticket is Rs. 18/- and Rs. 14/- and the total is Rs. 32/-and thereby booking clerk had over charged Rs. 8/-. It is seen that as per cash memo prepared and signed by the applicant shown an amount of Rs. 3177.75 P as against the DTC accountal of Rs. 3156/-. Thus, Rs. 21.75 were found excess in Railway cash. The plea taken by the defence that there was a heavy rush due to Diwali and therefore, the applicant returned Rs.8/- short. The possession of excess cash in his custody in Government cash establishes the factum of over charging. The evidence before the Inquiry Officer is that the applicant was found in possession of Rs. 21.75 P. excess and did not return the balance amount of Rs. 8/- to the decoy passenger. The amount over charged by the applicant is reflected in the excess Railway cash. This was the evidence before the Inquiry Officer, simply because the vigilance team was not consisted by a gazetted officer as per Rule 705 the evidence adduced before Inquiry Officer cannot be brushed aside for simple reason that while conducting vigilance trap Para 705 of the Indian Railway Manual was not observed. No prejudice has been shown by the applicant because of non-observance of the rule. The explanation submitted by the applicant is that due to heavy rush he could not return the balance cannot be relied upon, being cooked up to make defence and shall be deemed to be after thought. In view of this distinct factual position, the applicant cannot get the benefit of ratio laid down in Union of India v. M. Anjaneyulu (supra). In case of State of U.P. v. Herendra Arora, (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court held:
"Moreover every infraction of statutory provisions would not make the consequent action void and/or invalid. The statute may contain certain substantive provisions e.g., who is the Competent Authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee. Such provision must be strictly complied with as in such a case the theory of substantial compliance may not be available. But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied with and not be available, but the question of prejudice may be material. In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The test would be whether the delinquent officer had or did not have a fair hearing."
Paragraph 705 reads as under:
"For Departmental traps, the following instructions in addition to those continued under Paragraph 704 are to be followed:
(a) The Investigating Officer/Inspector should arrange two gazetted officers from Railways to act as independent witnesses as far as possible. However, in certain exceptional cases where two gazetted officers are not available immediately. The services of non-gazetted staff can be utilized."
As per Para 705 the Investigating Officer/Inspector should arrange two gazetted officers from Railway to act as independent witnesses as far as possible. Further in certain cases where gazetted officers are not available, the services of non-gazetted officer can be utilised. Plain reading of Para 705 reveals that the provision for arranging two gazetted officers is not mandatory but it is only an enabling provision in the form of directions.
8. Learned Counsel for the applicant has also argued that there was no independent witness and RPF personnel cannot be treated as independent witness. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that in order to have an independent witness, the procedure being followed in the Central Railway to call a staff from RPF who are not under the administrative control of the vigilance department. The RPF staff is utilised for trap who are rotated frequently. In order to meet the requirement of being independent and important witness, RPF personnel are utilised whenever required at the time of arranging check. The check cannot be postponed for want of gazetted officer. In our view the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents has some force because it is the known fact that RPF is an independent establishment and it cannot be in any way under the control of Vigilance Department. The RPF personnel utilised in vigilance check and trap whenever required at the time of arranging check. Sometimes it happen that gazetted officers are not available, the check cannot be postponed for want of gazetted officer. Applicant has not shown any thing against RPF staff that they were not impartial or inimical towards him. Therefore, the argument of learned Counsel for applicant that the independent witness was not taken and RPF constable were not independent witness has no force.
9.The second contention raised by learned Counsel for the applicant is that the enquiry was conducted by the Vigilance Inspector or deputation to Vigilance Department and conducted in Vigilance Cell. It is not disputed the Inquiry Officer Shri. V.A. Jawale was deputed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Inquiry Officer has conducted the inquiry in accordance with the Railway Servant (Disincline & Appeal) Rules and afforded sufficient opportunity to the applicant to defend his case and applicant has never raised this objection before Inquiry Officer. Therefore, the present contentions are after thought. Moreover, no prejudice has been caused to applicant by conducting inquiry by the Inspector, who was on deputation to Vigilance Organisation. There is nothing on record to show that the Inquiry Officer has any grudge or ill will towards the applicant. In Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 there is no bar regarding appointment of Inquiry Officer from the Vigilance Department. It is the sole discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a proper person to conduct the inquiry. In absence of any evidence to the contrary the appointment of Inquiry Officer, cannot be challenged on the ground that he belongs to Vigilance Department. Therefore, the contention raised by the applicant has no force.
10&11. The third contention raised by the applicant is that the chargesheet was issued by the Assistant Commercial Manager (Coaching) who is not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the penalty was imposed by the Divisional Commercial Manager (Goods) CSTM whereas the applicant belong to commercial department and working under Assistant Commercial Manager and therefore, penalty cannot be imposed by Divisional Commercial Manager (Goods). Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that according to Railway Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, an officer of the rank of ACM is the Disciplinary Authority of the applicant by virtue of being Appointing Authority and therefore, the order passed by DCM (G), CSTM is in order. He has further stated that DCM (G)/DMM (C) both are Competent Authorities to impose penalty in accordance with the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. In this context, we would like to refer relevant provision of Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, which is reproduced below:
"2(1)(a) 'Appointing Authority', in relation to Railway servant means :
(i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the service of which the Railway servant is, for the time being, a member or to the grade of the Service in which the Railway servant is for the time being, included, or
(ii) the authority, empowered to make appointments to the post which the Railway servant, for the time being holds, or
(iii) the authority which appointed the Railway servant to such Service, grade or post, as the case may be, or
(iv) where the Railway servant having been a permanent member of any other Service or having substantively held any other permanent post, has been in continuous employment under the Ministry of Railways, the authority which appointed him to that Service or to any grade in that Service or to that post whichever authority is highest authority.
2(1)(c) 'Disciplinary Authority' means
(i) in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a Railway servant, the authority competent, under these rules, to impose on him that penalty;
(ii) in relations to Rule 9 and Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 in the case of any gazetted Railway servant, an authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 6:
(iii) in relation to Rule 9 in the case of any non-gazetted Railway servant, an authority competent to impose any of the major penalties, specified in Rule 6:
(iv) in relation to Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11, in the case of a non-gazetted Railway servant, an authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule-6.
7. Disciplinary Authorities--
(1) The President may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 on any Railway servant.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-rule (1), any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 may be imposed on a Railway servant by the authorities as specified in Schedules I, II and III.
(3) The Disciplinary Authority in the cases of a Railway servant officiating in a higher post, shall be determined with reference to the officiating post held by him at the time of taking action.
8. Authority to institute proceeding--
(1) The President, or any other authority empowered by him, by general or special order, may :
(a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant;
(b) direct a Disciplinary Authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant on whom that Disciplinary Authority is competent to impose, under these rules, any of the penalties specified in Rule-6.
(2) A Disciplinary Authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 6 may, subject to the provisions of Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2, institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant for imposition of any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 6, notwithstanding that such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under these rules, to impose any of the latter penalties."
12. In the case of P.N. Lal v. General Manager, N.E. Railway, Gorakhpur and Ors., 1975 LAB. I.C. 1027 the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held:
"Where in a writ petition against the continuance of domestic enquiry it was contended that the Divisional Safety Officer had no authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner or to appoint an Enquiry Officer because he was not the Disciplinary Authority competent to impose major penalty and the enquiry proceedings were in regard to the imposition of a major penalty under Rule 9, it was held that only those authorities who were competent to impose all the minor penalties under Rule 6 were contemplated as disciplinary proceedings for imposition of major penalties notwithstanding that such authorities were not competent to impose the major penalties. The expression "subject to the provisions of Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2" referred to Sub-clause (i) of Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 and not to Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (c) of that rule. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the enquiry proceedings."
13. In the case of Steel Authority of India Limited v. Dr. R.K. Diwakar and Ors., 1998 SCC (L&S) 1588=1998(1) SLJ 57 (SC), Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 4 held as under:
"4. Before us, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, apart from bringing to our notice the relevant proceedings duly delegating the power to the Director, Medical and Health Services, invited our attention to a recent decision of this Court in Director General, ESI v. T. Abdul Razak. In that case, in answering an identical question, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 716 Para 13)
13.... with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Regional Director, we find that the legal position is well settled that it is not necessary that the authority competent to impose the penalty must initiate the disciplinary proceedings and that the proceedings can be initiated by any superior authority who can be held to be the Controlling Authority who may be an officer subordinate to the Appointing Authority. (See State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General and Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan) The Regional Director, being the officer-in-charge of the region, was the Controlling Authority in respect of the respondents. He could institute the disciplinary proceedings against the respondents even in the absence of specific conferment of a power in that regard."
14. In the case of Scientific Adviser to Ministry of Defence and Ors. v. S. Danial and Ors. 1991 (3) SLJ 29 (SC)= 1991 SCC (L&S) 374 at page 376 in Para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed:
"The whole intent or purpose of the definition to safeguard against an infringement of Article 311(1) and ensure that a person can be dealt with only by either a person competent to appoint persons of his class or the person who appointed him, whoever happens to be higher in rank. That rule is not infringed by the interpretation placed by the appellants. The provisions of Schedule II in the case of the Railways which specify the Appointing Authority or an authority of equivalent rank or any higher authority as the Disciplinary Authority are also consistent with this interpretation. Fourthly, the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents on Rule 2(a) is artificial and strained. It amounts to saying that a person who is empowered to appoint a Government servant (as the Director DERL, for example, undoubtedly is) and who has also appointed him will not be the Appointing Authority, because, theoretically, even a more superior authority could have appointed him despite having delegated his authority in this regard to a subordinate. On the contrary, the interpretation urged by the Union will not adversely affect the few employees, if any, who may be appointed by a superior scheduled authority despite delegation of such power to a subordinate authority, for, in such a case, the superior authority would be the person who has factually appointed such an employee and he will clearly be the Appointing Authority by virtue of Rule 2 (a). Lastly, the interpretation sought for by the Union is consistent with practical consideration. The Appointing Authority under the Schedule is a high-ranking authority and, in an organisation like the Railways for instance, it will be virtually impossible for him to consider each and every case of appointment of or disciplinary action against all the Class III or Class IV employees in the organisation of the power of appointment and cannot be ignored, in the absence of compelling reasons, in the matter of disciplinary powers."
15. It is not disputed that the applicant at the relevant time was working as junior booking clerk, Vikhroli under ACM (C) who was the Controlling Authority. Applicant has not filed any document to show that he was appointed by any authority higher than the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, general rule will apply in absence to the contrary. Schedule of power of establishment provide that the junior scale officer has full power in respect of non-gazetted staff class-Ill staff in grade raising upto Rs. 560/- and he can initiate the departmental proceedings. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that ACM (C) was not having the power to impose the major penalty, even then he can initiate the proceedings in view of principle laid down by Allahabad High Court in P.N. Lal's case. So far as order of DCM (G)/DA regarding imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement is concerned, both are Competent Authorities to impose the penalty in accordance with Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules as both are senior scale Group A officer and it cannot be said that the DCM (G) is the authority lower than the Appointing Authority in respect of applicant, who is junior booking clerk in view of Schedule II referred to in Rule 7, it lays down that an order of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service may be ordered in the case of Group C or D servant by the Appointing Authority or authority equivalent rank of any higher authority. The argument raised by the applicant that he was booking clerk in commercial department and the DCM (G) is not competent to impose major penalty upon him is misconceived as the DCM (G) and DCM(C) are having the same power for the purpose of imposing the penalty as well as appointment of staff. Thus, the argument raised by learned Counsel for the applicant in this regard has no substance.
16.The fourth contention raised by learned Counsel for the applicant is that findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse and are liable to the quashed based on perverse finding. In this context learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the evidence of Shri. S.D. Sharma, RPF Constable that during the examination in chief that he told Shri Mirdha that Booking Clerk had overcharged a sum of Rs. 10/- whereas the charge is for Rs.8/- only. He further stated that Shri Mirdha took the ticket and balance from him and also came inside the booking office for checking and he was not searched after purchasing the ticket. After checking was over, the applicant was called inside and check memo No.2 was prepared and later on his statement was recorded. So far as the submissions of learned Counsel on the evidence of Shri. S.D. Sharma is concerned it is matter of appreciation of evidence and in judicial review, we are conscious of the limitation of the Tribunal that we cannot go into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence.
17. We have gone through the inquiry proceedings in judicial review, we are conscious of the limitation of the Tribunal that we cannot go into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence and we cannot reappreciate the evidence adduced in the inquiry. The Apex Court in Union of India v. B.K. Srivastava, 1998 SCSLJ 74 held the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal against the order of Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority in exercise of powers of judicial review. In case of Union of India v. Nagamaleswar Rao, 1998 (1) SCSLJ 78 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "It is really surprising that inspite of clear position of law in this behalf and as regards the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in such cases, the Tribunal thought it fit to examine the evidence produced before the Enquiry Officer as if it was a Court of appeal." In the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chovra, AIR 1999 SC 625=2000(1) SLJ 65 (SC), Hon'ble Apex Court held:
"In departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or indadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities."
The latest view of the Apex Court is that the Tribunal in the matter like this, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority. It cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding in place of finding of Competent Authority. In the light of decision of Apex Court. We cannot go into the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence. We find that there is sufficient evidence on record to support the findings of Inquiry Officer and we do not find any fault with the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
18. The fifth contention raised by the applicant is that the orders of Disciplinary, Appellate and Revisional Authorities are non-speaking order. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand had contended that the order passed by the authorities are strictly in accordance with the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules and the punishment order is based on evidence on record and the same is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and there is no flaw or any violation of the Rules. We have gone through the order dated 10.12.2001 of Disciplinary Authority, order dated 26.2.2002 of the Appellate Authority and order dated 19.6.2002 of Revisional Authority. It is seen that the applicant has never asked for personal hearing with the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, the contention of the applicant that he was not given personal hearing cannot be accepted in the judicial review. The Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order has considered the inquiry report and the points raised by the applicant in his representation and accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer and imposed the penalty. The Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, 1995(4) SCT 672=1996(1) SLJ 145 (SC), wherein it was held that the Disciplinary and Appellate Authority is not required to record reasons in support of the punishment order except where it directs fresh or further enquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. If the Punishing Authority is concurring with the findings of the Inquiry Officer after going through entire proceedings and applied its mind thereto the penalty order cannot be held to be bad. So far as the Appellate/Revisional order is concerned the Appellate/Revisional Authority after agreeing with the Disciplinary Authority they rejected the appeal. Since the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority were in agreement with the Disciplinary Authority, they need not to record detail reason. In case of State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal 1994 ATC 834 in Para 8 observed as follows:
"The High Court has taken the view that the rule requires the Appellate Authority to pass a speaking order even if it is in an order of affirmance. For the purpose of this case, we shall assume the said view to be the correct one. Even so we are not satisfied that the appellate order is not a speaking order. We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the Appellate Authority (sic Disciplinary Authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The Appellate Authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the Appellate Authority to say more than this as the order as it shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterised as a non-speaking order."
In S.N. Mukharji's case it was held in Para 35 as follows:
"It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of Law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The Appellate of Revisional Authority, if it affirms such as order, need not give separate reason to the Appellate or Revisional Authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge."
19. We have gone through the orders passed by the authorities and there is no infirming in the impugned orders of the authorities. They have passed the orders keeping in view as the aspects of the matter.
20. The last point raised by the applicant is that the punishment is too harsh and disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 has held that "if the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, it would properly mould the relief In view of the decision of the Apex Court, there appears no ground to interfere with the quantum of punishment.
21. We have gone through the enquiry proceedings. There is neither any flaw in the enquiry proceedings nor is there any violation of principles of natural justice or violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry. The Disciplinary and the Appellate Authorities have passed speaking orders and the decisions of the authorities are not vitiated by consideration extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case. The punishment is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this O.A. being devoid of merit fails and is dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.