Delhi District Court
Shri Budhu Pal vs M/S. Convest Buildcon (P) Ltd on 7 August, 2010
1
IN THE COURT OF SHRI SURINDER S. RATHI:ADJ:07
CENTRAL :ROOM NO.32:TIS HAZARI COURTS :DELHI
CS NO: 398/08
ID NO: 02401C0920842008
IN THE MATTER OF :
SHRI BUDHU PAL
S/o SHRI DHANI RAM,
VILLAGE TIKARIA JAIT PUR,
P.S. AJNAR, TEHSIL KULPAR,
DISTT. MAHOBA, U.P. ................ (PLAINTIFF)
VERSUS
1. M/s. CONVEST BUILDCON (P) LTD.
AT 138488, NICHOLSON ROAD,
KASHMERE GATE, DELHI110006,
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
S. GURCHARAN SINGH
2. SHRI NARESH YADAV
S/o SHRI TEK CHAND,
R/o 5537, GALI NO. 5,
NEW CHANDRAWAL,
NEAR KAMLA NAGAR,
DELHI110007
3. SHRI BHIM SEN
S/o SHRI RAJPAL
R/o N16A/108, SANJAY BASTI
TIMAR PUR, DELHI ................... (DEFENDANTs)
@contd/...
2
SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF Rs. 4,00,000/ AS COMPENSATION
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 09.07.2008
DATE OF ARGUMENTS : 22.07.2010
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 07.08.2010
JUDGMENT
1. This suit seeking compensation of Rs. 4 lacs has been filed by father of deceased labourer Late Sh. Rajjan against defendant no.1 company and other co defendants.
2. Short pleaded case of the plaintiff as per plaint that his son Sh. Rajjan, who used to work as a labourer, died on 13.01.08 while working at the site of defendants. Defendant no.1 company, which is engaged in construction business, engaged defendant no. 2 and 3 as agents/ contractors for job of demolition of old structure at UA 37, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi was assigned by defendant no.1 to defendant no. 2 & 3 for Rs. 27,000/ on 30.12.07. The demolition work was to be completed by 18.01.08. Defendant no.2 & 3 further engaged deceased Sh. Rajjan apart from labourers Sh. Manoj Kumar, Sh.
@contd/...
3Rakesh, Sh. Surender, Sh. Naresh and Sh. Dau. The demolition work started on 31.12.07 labourer were asked to work day and night, but an objection was raised by the labourers that no work can be carried out in the night as no light was provided on account of disconnection of electricity connection. Even safety devices like helmets and face masks were also not provided. Still defendants insisted that work shall be carried out day and night and the entire demolition should be completed by 18.01.08 positively or else they would not be paid anything.
3. Whenever objection was raised qua unsafe working condition, labourers were rebuked. During this period, visits were made on behalf of defendant no.1 for insisting the speeding of demolition work. Defendants used to tell all the labourers that in case demolition is not completed by 18.01.08 they shall not be paid even a single penny. On 13.01.08 at around 5:00 PM the demolition work was stopped as light was very dim. Upon receiving information of halt in demolition work defendants reached the site and insisted on carrying out a @contd/...
4further demolition. Under pressure and compulsion the work was restarted. Due to poor light conditions labourers Sh. Naresh, deceased Sh.Rajjan, Sh.Manoj and Sh. Rakesh could not have proper estimation of the length of the wall and while they were demolishing it, the entire wall fell down suddenly. Although other labourers could save their lives but unfortunately deceased Sh. Rajjan was crushed under the debris and died at the spot. Police was called by labourer Sh. Naresh and FIR U/s 302 IPC was registered with PS Roop Nagar as FIR No. 11/08. Offence was changed later on to U/s 288/304 A IPC . Body of deceased Sh. Rajjan was subjected to Post Mortem on 15.01.08. It is case of the plaintiff that had the defendants provided proper lighting working conditions and adequate safety devices, life of Sh. Rajjan, a young boy of 1920 yrs. could have been saved . While loosing his young son aged plaintiff father has suffered a great mental and financial loss. The trauma of loosing his sole bread earner son was immense in this old age. For this reason he issued a legal notice to defendant on 02.05.08 followed by filing of this suit in hand.
@contd/...
5
4. Upon service of summons of this suit it was contested by defendant no.1 by filing a detailed WS. Defendant no.1 company prayed for dismissal of this suit on a plea that suit is covered under Workmen's Compensation Act and this court has no jurisdiction. The suit claim of Rs. 4 lacs is termed to be hypothetical and arbitary. Objection qua non joinder of LR's of deceased Rajjan was also raised. It was alleged that deceased did not die at the work site during the course of his duties but died due to personal enmity with labourer Naresh Gupta with whose wife decease had illicit relations.
5. On merits defendant no.1 admitted that it had assigned a contract of demolition of UA 37, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi property to defendant no. 2 and the job was to be completed within 60 days and not by 18.01.08 as mentioned in the plaint. It was denied that an employee of the defendant visited the spot and insisted for fast pace demolition. It is contended that there was no privily of contract between deceased and the company and as such no financial claim can lie against it. With these pleas dismissal of the suit is prayed.
@contd/...
6
6. In separate replication contents of the plaint were reiterated and averments of the defendant were denied.
7. Separate WS was filed by defendant no. 2 Sh. Naresh Yadav wherein he prayed for dismissal of the suit on a plea that he had no concern with the incident in so far as he was only a care taker of defendant no.1 company and had simply introduced defendant no. 3 Sh. Bhim Sen to defendant no. 1 company for demolition work. As per him the demolition work was being carried out by defendant no. 3 on the instructions of defendant no.1. On merits he contended that he had not engaged the services of deceased Sh. Rajjan and that the work was being carried out at the site of defendant no.1. He denied that he took contract for demolition from defendant no.1 for Rs. 27,000/ as alleged. He denied that the labourers ever raised any objection qua working in night in the absence of light or that they were not provided helmets and face masks or that work was to be completed by 18.01.08. As per him all the labourers, as mentioned in the plaint were engaged by @contd/...
7defendant no. 3 on the asking of defendant no.1.
8. Separate replication was filed to this WS wherein these pleas were denied by the plaintiff and contention raised against him were reiterated.
9. Separate WS was filed by defendant no.3 Sh. Bhim Sen. In his WS he prayed for dismissal of the suit on a plea that plaintiff has no cause of action against him since he had not given any contract to deceased Rajjan. It is case of defendant no. 3 that actually it was defendant no. 2 who approached him for arranging some labourers for demolition of a building and construction on behalf of defendant no.1. Initially defendant no. 3 stated that he is not aware of any such labour but later on he introduced Sh. Naresh to defendant no. 2. Thereafter defendant no.2 contracted Sh. Naresh after negotiations and assigned the job of demolition at terms and conditions not known to him. On merits he denied that he is a contractor or had undertaken a job from defendant no.1. He admitted that defendant no.1 company was interested in @contd/...
8demolition of UA37, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi or that the contract was assigned to him for Rs. 27,000/ or that demolition was to be completed on 18.01.08. He denied that labourers ever raised an objection of working in night without electricity or qua non provision of helmets and masks. He prayed for dismissal of this suit since there was no negligence which can be attributed to him qua the site where the incident happened.
10.Separate replication to this WS was filed wherein plaintiff reiterated its pleaded case and denied the averments of the defendant no. 3.
11.Upon completion of pleadings following issues were framed by Ld. Predecessor of this court on 17.03.09.
ISSUES
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to monetary decree of Rs. 4 lacs as claimed by him, if so against which of the defendants? (OPP)
2. Whether suit of the plaintiff is barred before the civil court in the light of the preliminary objection no.2 taken in the written statement of defendant @contd/...
9no.1? (OPD 1)
3. Whether suit is bad for non joinder of the necessary parties in view of preliminary objection no. 5 raised in the WS of defendant no.1, if so, its effects ? (OPD
4. Whether there is no relationship of employer and employee between defendant no.1 and Sh. Rajjan deceased son of the plaintiff herein in the suit?
(OPD 1).
5. Whether the defendant no. 2 has no concern with the present suit as alleged in the preliminary objection no. 3 of the WS of the defendant no. 2 ?
(OPD 2)
6. Whether the suit has not been properly verified, if so, its effects ? (OPD 2)
7. Whether the plaintiff is not a competent person to file the present suit in the light of the preliminary objection no. 5 of the WS of defendant no. 2? (OPD
2)
8. Relief.
12. To prove his case plaintiff examined Dr. Akash Jhanjhi , Post Mortem Doctor as PW1 , Sh. Naresh Gupta, Co labourer as PW2, himself as PW3 apart from examining PW4 Inspector Jarnail Singh, the then SHO @contd/...
10PS Roop Nagar. On the contrary no witness was examined by defendant.
13. I have heard arguments of Sh. Ashok Mahey LD. Counsel for plaintiff, Ld. Counsel for defendant no.1 Sh. V.P. Malik & LD. Counsel for defendant no. 2 & 3 Sh. Santosh Pandey. I have also perused the case file carefully.
14.In his deposition as PW1 Dr. Akash Jhanjhi has proved the post mortem report of deceased Sh. Rajjan as PW1/1. As per the post mortem report deceased Sh. Rajjan died of crush injuries on the head and face apart from other injuries suffered all over the body. He opined the cause of death as crush injury suffered on head and face regions due to blunt force impact. These injuries caused cerebellar damage and hemorrhagic shock. He was cross examined at length. He denied the suggestion of the defence that he prepared the report only on the basis of police report. Witness insisted that he himself conducted the post mortem. He deposed that initially police @contd/...
11suspect the deceased with culpable homicide but later on he opined that the injuries are possible by fall of wall over the deceased. He denied that he is in collusion with the plaintiff or in collusion with police.
15. PW2 Sh. Naresh Gupta, Colabourer supported the case of the plaintiff in totality vide his affidavit Ex. PW 2/A. In his detailed cross examination he stated that he knew deceased Rajjan as they working together at site. He categorically stated that he was engaged by defendants Sh. Naresh and Sh. Bhim on 31.12.07 and total remuneration for demolition was fixed as Rs. 27,000/. It was to be divided in the labourers. He reiterated that the work was to be completed by 18.01.08 . As per him no amount was paid to them till the incident dated 13.01.08 when it took place around at 56 PM. He replied that even though there was no electricity on the spot on 13.01.08 they were made to work and demolish the wall. He denied that suggestion of the defence categorically that deceased Sh. Rajjan had illicit relations with his wife. He expressed his unawareness qua reasons why police registered 304 IPC . He @contd/...
12accepted that no written contract was given Sh. Naresh and Sh. Bhim qua non arrangement of light at spot. He denied the suggestion that on the date of incident there was proper lighting at the spot.
16. In his deposition as PW3 plaintiff Sh. Buddhu Pal deposed on the lines of plaint vide affidavit Ex. P3. He has proved on record copy of notices as Ex. PW 3/A to C & replies as Ex. PW 3/D to F. In his detailed cross examination he stated that he is a illiterate man. His son was engaged for demolition work at Jawahar Nagar. He had visited the property where his son died three days after his death. As per him contractor Sh. Naresh Yadav had engaged him at Rs. 125/ per day. He was unaware if any employment register was maintained at spot. He denied the suggestion that his son was murdered . He denied the suggestion that there was adequate lighting at the spot and all safety measures were present. As per him contractors used to make labourers work late in the evening. He accepted that he was not present at the spot when his son died. He denied the suggestion that defendant no.1 @contd/...
13company was not responsible for ensuring safety at the work site.
17. PW4 Inspector Jarnail Singh was posted at PS Roop Nagar and prepared the chargesheet Ex. PW 4/A. As per him deceased died due to fall of wall over him. He accepted that initially 302 IPC was registered but upon discussion of Senior officers after sharing the investigation material it was changed to 304 IPC. As per him he recorded the statement of all the labourers at the spot.
18. Now I shall dispose off individual issues framed in this case.
19. ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether suit of the plaintiff is barred before the civil court in the light of the preliminary objection no.1 taken in the written statement of defendant no.1? (OPD 1) As far as issue qua lack of jurisdiction of this court under Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, a separate application dedicated to this objection was moved by defendant no.1. After detailed hearing the @contd/...14
same was dismissed by this court just two days ago on 20.07.2010 with cost of Rs. 6,000/. As such this issue already stands disposed off and no repeated finding is required to be given.
20.ISSUE NO. 3 :
Whether suit is bad for non joinder of the necessary parties in view of preliminary objection no. 5 raised in the WS of defendant no.1, if so, its effects ? (OPD 1) This issue was framed on an objection raised by defendant no.1 company to the effect that other LR's of deceased Rajjan have not joined the proceedings as coplaintiffs. It is argued by Ld. Counsel Sh. Malik on behalf of defendant no.1 company that deceased must be having his mother, brother and sisters and they too should have joined the proceedings as coplaintiffs.
Admittedly, defendant company has not put forth any particulars of any person who can be said to be LR's of deceased Sh. Rajjan other than his plaintiff father. This objection is apparently taken under a presumption that deceased Sh. Rajjan must be having other LR's , I see no legal infirmity in filing of the suit by father of deceased. Alleged non joining of presumptive @contd/...15
LR's does not in any manner caused prejudice to the defendant company. It is not the case of the defendant company that it has been sued by alleged LR's under a separate suit. As such I see no merits in this issue and same is decided in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant.21.ISSUE NO. 4
:
Whether there is no relationship of employer and employee between defendant no.1 and Sh. Rajjan deceased son of the plaintiff herein in the suit? (OPD 1) As far as plea of defendant no.1 company that there was no relationship of employer and employee between defendant no.1 and deceased Rajjan. This scenario is admitted by the plaintiff in the plaint as well. It goes without saying that the relationship of an Employer and Employee in terms of Workmen's Compensation Act is a special legal relation between an individual or a company which under a law, appoints an Employee under its roles of employees with a fixed monthly salary. It is case of the plaintiff that deceased was not a regular employee of the defendant and as such according to them as well deceased was not employee of defendant @contd/...16
no.1 company. As per plaintiff deceased was working as a casual labour.
Hence this issue stands disposed off accordingly.22.ISSUE NO. 7
:
7.Whether the plaintiff is not a competent person to file the present suit in the light of the preliminary objection no. 5 of the WS of defendant no. 2?
(OPD2)
23.A plea was taken by defendant no.2 in his written statement that plaintiff was not dependent upon deceased and as such he is not competent to file this suit. It is admitted case of the parties that deceased Sh. Rajjan was son of plaintiff Sh. Budhu Pal . As per plaint as well as evidence lead by plaintiff , deceased was sole bread earner in his family and plaintiff was totally dependent upon him in his old age. In this backdrop, I find the plea of defendant no.2 that aged plaintiff was not dependent upon his deceased son is absurd.
24. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled "C.K. Subramania Iyer and others v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and Six others, 1969(3) SCC 64", while dealing with the @contd/...
17matter of fatal accidents laid down certain relevant guidelines for the purpose of assessment of entitlement for compensation. Paragraph 13 of the report would be relevant on this score and the same is set out hereinbelow :
"The law on the point arising for decision may be summed up thus : Compulsory damages under Section 1A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is @contd/...18
inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the Appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by the courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration." (Emphasis supplied) The observations as above, undoubtedly lays down the basic guidance for assessment of damages but on redeeming feature ought to be noted that compensation or damages cannot be awarded as a solatium but to assess the same with reference to loss of pecuniary benefits. In the decision last noted (1969)3 SCC 64, this Court placed strong reliance on two old decisions of the English Courts to wit : Franklin v. The South East Railway Company, 1957 English Reports 3 H & N, p. 448, wherein Pollock, C.B. stated :
"We do not say that it was necessary that actual benefit should have been derived, a reasonable expectation is enough and such reasonable expectation might well exist, though from the father, not being in need, the son had never done anything for @contd/...19
him. On the other hand a jury certainly ought not to make a guess in the matter, but ought to be satisfied that there has been a loss of sensible and appreciable pecuniary benefit, which might have been reasonably expected from the continuance of life."
25. Since onus of proving this issue was laid upon the defendant, it was incumbent upon them to lead evidence in support of this issue. Such has been the conduct of defendant no.2 that he not only failed to lead any evidence, but also did not cross examine the plaintiff and his witnesses. As such the onus to prove this issue has remained undischarged. This issue is accordingly decided in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants. ISSUE NO.6
26. :
6.Whether the suit has not been properly verified, if so, its effects ? (OPD 2)
27.Perusal of the plaint shows that not only it has been properly verified but it is also supported by the affidavit of plaintiff. I see nothing wrong in the @contd/...
20verification as objected by defendant no.2. No evidence has been led by the defendant no.2 in support of this issue. Also this issue was not agitated or pressed during the final arguments even. As such this issue is decided in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants.
28.ISSUE NO.5 :
Whether the defendant no. 2 has no concern with the present suit as alleged in the preliminary objection no. 3 of the WS of the defendant no. 2 ?
(OPD 2)
29.It was pleaded by defendant no.2 that he was only caretaker of defendant no.1 and had simply introduced defendant no.1 company to defendant no.3 for carrying out the demolition of the building in question and for this reason only , he could not have been sued by the plaintiff. This plea contains a very important admission on the part of defendant no.2 of the fact that he had a fiduciary relations with defendant no.1 company and was involved in the process of demolition of the building in question. It is important as well as interesting to observe that as per the defendant no.1 company, it had given @contd/...
21contract of demolition of the suit property to defendant no.2. Under an independent contract who in turn engaged defendant no.3 and deceased Sh. Rajjan for the purpose. This plea in the written statement as well as final arguments nails the role of defendant no.2 in the fatal mishap. In his written statement , defendant no.3 has also stated on record that it was defendant no.2 who approached him for demolition of the building on behalf of defendant no.1. As per him he simply introduced defendant no.2 to Sh. Naresh and other workers including Sh. Rajjan who agreed to carry out the demolition. These pleas evidently show that all the the three defendants were involved in the whole process. In their separate written statements all that has been endavoured is just to pass the buck so as to shirk from the financial liability which has arisen out of loss of a precious human life. It is evident in the deposition of all the witnesses as claimed supra, that defendant no.2 Sh. Naresh Yadav took the contract of demolition of the building and also used to visit the spot regularly. He was also informed about the evident danger in continuation of demolition work during late hours, in the absence of proper @contd/...
22arrangements of light. Instead of taking remedial steps with the help of defendant no.3 and defendant no.1 company, he used to insist for continuation of demolition work even in the dark. As referred to supra, defendant no.2 has led no evidence to discharge the onus of proving his claim that he has no concern with the present suit or the fatal mishap or the demolition of the property in question. As such I have no hesitation in concluding that defendant no.2 was consciously involved in the entire process. As such this issue is decided in favour of plaintiff and against defendants ISSUE NO.1
30. :
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to monetary decree of Rs. 4 lacs as claimed by him, if so against which of the defendants? (OPP)
31.As discussed supra, and out of the material available on record, it is evidently proved that deceased Sh. Rajjan lost his life on 13.1.2008 while he was working as a labourer engaged in demolition of property belonging to @contd/...
23defendant no.1 at UA37 Jawahar Nagar. AS per the defendant no.1 company, the work of demolition of the old house / building was assigned to defendant no.2 who in turn engaged defendant no.3 apart from the deceased Sh. Rajjan and other labourers. It has come in the deposition of PW2 Sh. Naresh Gupta, PW3 Sh. Budhu Pal that due to darkness at the spot, they were unable to have correct estimation of length and size of the wall and as such while it was being demolished , it fell down crushing deceased Sh. Rajjan under the debris.
32.While taking the decision on tortuous liability of the defendants qua claim of compensation by father of deceased Sh. Rajjan, it has to be appreciated as to who is responsible in such a scenario for grant of compensation. As per Ld. Counsel for defendant no.1 Sh. Malik, his client company is not at all responsible for the simple reason that it had given a contract to defendant no.2. As per defendant no.2 , he is not liable because as per him defendant no.1 company gave the contract directly to defendant no.3. As per defendant @contd/...
24no.3 he is not at all liable since as per him contract of demolition of the building was given by defendant no.1 and 2 to the labourers directly.
33.The legal position in such a scenario is clear and unambiguous . Although the basic rule of Torts is that once an independent contractor is engaged and assigned a job for attaining a particular result, then employer of such an independent contract is not liable for the torts committed by the contractor. But it is well established by plethora of case laws that this basic rule has to be read an appreciated and in conjunction with important exceptions. The most important exception relevant for the case in hand is that mere assignment of a work to a contractor does not absolve the employer of the contractor of his duties and liabilities altogether. If the facts of a particular case signifies that the employer was privy or party to a tort committed by the contractor or was negligent in selecting a proper contractor, he is equally liable for a tort committed by the contractor. The legal duty to take reasonable care and adopt safe methods and procedures are not only applicable to the contractor @contd/...
25but are also applicable to the employer of the contractor. Duties to select competent, skilled and technically sound contractor primarily lies upon the employer and he can not divest himself of this duty or delegate this duty to the contractor simply by assignment of a contract or even by taking written assurance from such a contractor.
34.In case titled BURGESS VS. GRAY (1845 ) 1 CB 578, it was held :
"where the employer retain his control over the contractor and personally interferes with the works, he makes himself a party to the act which occasions the damage."
35.In case titled MATANIA vs. NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK (1936) 2 ALL ER 633, it was ruled that :
" where the legal or statutory duty is imposed on the employer, he is liable for any injury that arises to others in consequence of its having being negligently performed by the contractor."
36.In case titled " BOWER vs. PEATE (1876) 1 QBD 321 " it was held :
"No one can rid of such a duty by imposing it upon an @contd/...26
independent contractor. The employer remains liable to those who are injured by the non performance of the duty, even though the contractor has agreed to indemnify. "
37.In case titled HUGHES vs PERCIVAL (1883) 8 App CAS 443, where a person employed a contractor to pull down his house and rebuild it, it was held that:
"such an employer was liable on the ground that the work ordered by him was necessarily attended with risk to the plaintiff's house (neighbour), and that it was, therefore, the defendant's (house owner) duty to see that proper precautions were taken to prevent injuries to that house, and that he could not get rid of the responsibility by delegating the performance to a third person."
38.In another case titled "Mc ARDEL vs ANDMAC ROOFING COMPANY (1967) 1 ALL ER , 583" while deciding a case where a sub contractor was involved and a person was injured due to negligence of the employee of the sub contractor and it was found that no safety arrangements were made either between the employer and the contractor or between the contractor and @contd/...
27sub contractor, it was held that :
"the defendant as well as the contractor and sub contractor owed the duty of care to the plaintiff and were liable to him for negligence, each having left to others the taking of necessary safety precautions."
39. In Krishna Bus Service Ltd. v. Smt. Mangli, (1976) 1 SCC 793 . (AIR 1976 SC 700), their Lordships have stated the principle as under (at p. 704 of AIR) : "Where in an action for negligence the thing causing fatal injury to the deceased and consequent pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servant and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, that affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care."
40. In Sham Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 1 SOC 690 : (AIR 1974 SC
890), their Lordships held that the maxim did not embody. any rule of @contd/...
28substantial law nor a law of evidence; it was simply the caption to an argument on the evidence. Their Lordships further held (Paras 9, 10 and
11): "The maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering the damages, it the proper inference to be drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The fact of the accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of negligence and then the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies."
41.The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice, ,which ,would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendant responsible for it even when the facts bearing on these matters are at the outset unknown to him and often within the @contd/...
29knowledge of the defendant."
"The plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. If the result, in the circumstances in which he proves it, makes it more probable than not that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability."
42. Once a special obligation on the owner to take care of the safety of the structure has been shown to exist then as held in MCD v. Subhag Wanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750 (at p. 1753): "It is no defence for the owner to prove that he neither knew, nor ought to have known of the danger. In other words the owner is legally responsible irrespective of whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect."
43.In Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme Court discussed @contd/...
30the applicability of the maxim Res Ipsa Loquitur in civil as also criminal cases in the light of the provisions of the Evidence Act. In the case the Supreme Court observed as follows :
"The rule of Res Ipsa Loquitur, in reality, belongs to the law of torts where negligence is in issue. But the peculiar circumstances constituting the event or accident, in a particular case, may themselves proclaim in concordant, clear and unambiguous voices the negligence of somebody as the cause of the event or accident. It is to such case that the maximum Res Ipsa Loquitur may apply, if the cause of the accident is unknown and no reasonable explanation as to the cause is coming forth from the defendant. To emphasise the point, it may be reiterated that in such cases, the event or accident must be of a kind which does not happen in the ordinary course of things if those who have the management and control use due care. Further the event which caused the accident must be within the defendant's control. The reason for this second requirement is that where the defendant has control of the thing which caused the injury, he is in a better position than the plaintiff to examine how the accident occurred."
44. Though the learned Counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in M.C. Melita v. Union of India (supra) and Charanlal (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that the rule Sahu v. Union of India @contd/...
31of strict liability laid down in the decision of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL
330) was not applicable in India and the Supreme Court evolved a new principle of liability which is more in tune with the modern society, it may not be necessary to go into that question for the purpose of the present case. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 34, on negligence in paras 35 and 36 at page 31 and 32, it is pointed out that the performance of dangerous work and the possession, use or supply of dangerous things impose a duty to take special precautions. It is further observed in para 36 that operations connected with the handling of petroleum and the distribution of gas and electricity also call for special precautions and are in addition subject to statutory provisions for safety. Persons who leave dangerous things where they are likely to be used or affected by others, and particularly by young persons, are responsible if the interference should reasonably have been foreseen and results in injury. It is also stated in para 57 of the same volume that under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence where (1) it is not possible for him to prove precisely what @contd/...
32was the relevant act or omission which set in train the events leading to the accident, and (2) on the evidence as it stands at the relevant time it is more likely than not that the effective cause of the accident was some act or omission of the defendant or of someone for whom the defendant is responsible, which act or omission constitutes a failure to take proper care for the plaintiff's safety. There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. However, where the thing which causes the accident is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his employees, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
45.Coming to the facts of the case in hand it has come in evidence that there was no arrangement of electricity at the site. Workers including deceased Sh. Rajjan were compelled to work round the clock. MidJanuary when the mishap happened on 13.1.2008 was peak winter in Delhi and the day light is shortest in duration. The incident took place at around 5.30 Pm when it starts @contd/...
33getting dark and foggy. It was primary duty of the defendant no.1 company to make arrangements of adequate lighting at the spot apat from ensuring that the workers have adequate safety gadgets and arrangements for ruling out any mis happening. It has also come on record that before the demolition of the building was undertaken, there was no electricity connection at the spot which could have been used to arranging lighting. Since the site belonged to defendant no.1 company, it was their duty to have a temporary electricity connection and adequate arrangements of lights. As contractor it was duty of defendant no.2 and 3 as well to press for arrangements of lights through defendant no.1. Had all the defendants taken due care, the mishap could have been averted and a precious human life in form of deceased Sh. Rajjan aged around 1920 years could have been saved. Plaintiff lost his only bread earning young son and that too at a ripe age when he needed his son the most. It is unfortunate that even though a poor boy died working for defendants , instead of owing liability and compensating the deceased family, defendants are engaged in passing the buck to each other so as to avoid the @contd/...
34payment of compensation.
46.In view of this discussion, in my considered view, all the defendants are jointly and severely responsible for compensating the plaintiff in for death of his young son. I find absolutely no strength in the pleas of Ld. Counsel for defendant no.1 that the death of deceased Sh. Rajjan was an act of culpable homicide. This plea is baseless and is not supported by the conclusion arrived at after through police investigation.
47.As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned i.e. Rs.4 lacs, multiplies method can be taken recourse to in case titled, "M.S. Grewal Vs. Deep Chand Sood, (SC) 2001 AIR (SC) 3660: 2001 (8) Hon'ble Supreme Court held, " the adaptability of the multiply method and its acceptability without any exception cannot just be given a go by. This Court in a long catena of cases and without mixing word did apply the multiply method to decide the @contd/...
35question of compensation in the cases arising out of Motor Vehicles Act. It is in this context the view of British Law Commission may be noticed and which indicates "
the multiplier has been, remains and should continue to remain, the ordinary, the best and the only method of assessing the value of a number of future annual sums".
48. On the acceptability of the multiplier method, the court observed :
" The multiplier method is logically sound and legally wellestablished method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. A departure from this method can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases."
49.It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally wellestablished. In the case in hand deceased is a daily wage earner. At the modest rate of Rs. 200/ a day his average monthly income comes to rd Rs. 6,000/ . IF 1/3 is spent by him, his contribution to his father & family comes to Rs. 4,000/ a month i.e. Rs. 48000/ a year. As per multiplies method plaintiff age will have to be reckoned & not age of deceased i.e. 18 @contd/...
3619 yrs. Plaintiff must be at the most aged 50 yrs. with life expectancy of 70 years couple with uniform exigences and mishaps a multiplies of at least 10 12 can be applied. If taken compensation amount of Rs. 4. 80 to Rs. 5.76. Claim is only of Rs. 4 lac and as such I find it is just and reasonable one even if no break up akin to a claim under MACT are raised. Plaintiff is a poor illiterate man and his right to seek compensation qua death of his young son can not be allowed to fail on account of trivial procedural and technical issues. As such in my considered view plaintiff is entitled to compensation of Rs.4 lacs . Hence this issue stands decided in favour of plaintiff and against defendants.
50.In view of the above discussion suit of the plaintiff stands decreed for a sum of Rs.4 lacs with cost jointly and severely against all three defendants. No separate prayer has been made qua interest.
@contd/...
37
51. In case titled , "Shanta Devi v. Charchal Singh Chadha", (Delhi) 1992 AIR (Delhi) 373, Hon'ble Delhi High Court held, "The last question which remains to be considered is about the grant of interest. No interest was claimed or has been awarded by the Tribunal.
Award of interest under S. 110CC of the Act is discretionary. In the present case the deceased died in 1970. The compensation was assessed by the Tribunal after about ten years. There is good ground for grant of interest as an adhesive to the amount of compensation determined. The absence of a claim for interest in the petition is no ground to disallow it. The Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandera v. Randhir Singh, 1990 ALJ 777, has held that the claim for interest needs no pleadings and can be allowed on an oral submission.
52. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and rate of interest from the Government securities like National Saving Certificates, long term fixed deposits in banks, in my opinion an interest at the rate of 12% per annum will be reasonable in the instant case."
53.In the light of prayer clause 2 & above case laws the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of considered opinion that plaintiff shall be granted interest @contd/...
38@12% per annum pendentilite and till the date of realisation jointly and severally. Ordered accordingly. Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to record room.
ANNOUNCED AND DICTATED IN OPEN COURT: 7.8.2010 ( SURINDER S. RATHI ) ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE:07 CENTRAL : DELHI @contd/...
39In Krishna Bus Service Ltd. v. Smt. Mangli, (1976) 1 SCC 793 . (AIR 1976 SC 700), their Lordships have stated the principle as under (at p. 704 of AIR) : "Where in an action for negligence the thing causing fatal injury to the deceased and consequent pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servant and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, that affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care."
54. In Sham Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 1 SOC 690 : (AIR 1974 SC 890), their Lordships held that the maxim did not embody. any rule of substantial law nor a law of evidence; it was simply the caption to an argument on the evidence. Their Lordships further held (Paras 9, 10 and 11): "The maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering the damages, it the proper inference to be drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The fact of the accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of negligence and then the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice, ,which ,would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendant responsible for it even when the facts bearing on these matters are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the defendant."
"The plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. If the result, in the circumstances in which he proves it, makes it more probable than not that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability."
55. Once a special obligation on the owner to take care of the safety of the structure has been shown to exist then as held in MCD v. Subhag Wanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750 (at p. 1753): "It is no defence for the owner to prove that he neither knew, nor ought to have known of the danger. In other words the owner is legally responsible irrespective @contd/...
40of whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect."
58. So far as the defence of contributory negligence is concerned, it needs a short and summary disposal. Contributory negligence is the conduct of a plaintiff consisting of some act or omission which has materially contributed to the damage caused and is of such a nature that it may properly be described as negligence, only in the sense of careless conduct and not given its usual meaning. Thus, it is an express meaning "negligence materially, contributing to the injury." Contributory negligence is not in itself a bar to the plaintiff's claim but is merely a ground for refusing damages
59. On the plea of contributory negligence being successfully pleaded by the defendants the Court may order reduction of damages by an amount which is just and equitable. If the blame of the plaintiff be only slight it would not be just and equitable to reduce the damages. The respective blameworthiness of the parties shall have to be weighed and rated. However, where the premises of the defendant suffers from a latent hazard and an invitee for consideration suffers injuries by making a permitted use of the premises, in my opinion the defence of contributory negligence is totally misconceived.
9. In Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme Court discussed the applicability of the maxim Res Ipsa Loquitur in civil as also criminal cases in the light of the provisions of the Evidence Act. In the case the Supreme Court observed as follows :
"The rule of Res Ipsa Loquitur, in reality, belongs to the law of torts where negligence is in issue. But the peculiar circumstances constituting the event or accident, in a particular case, may themselves proclaim in concordant, clear and unambiguous voices the negligence of somebody as the cause of the event or accident. It is to such case that the maximum Res Ipsa Loquitur may apply, if the cause of the accident is unknown and no reasonable explanation as to the cause is coming forth from the defendant. To emphasise the point, it may be reiterated that in such cases, the event or accident must be of a kind which does not happen in the ordinary course of things if those who have the management and control use due care. Further the event which caused the accident must be within the defendant's control. The reason for this second requirement is that where the defendant has control of the thing which caused the injury, he is in a better position than the plaintiff to examine how the accident occurred."
12. Though the learned Counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in M.C. Melita v. Union of India (supra) and Charanlal Sahu v. Union of India (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that the rule of strict liability laid down in the decision of Rylands @contd/...
41v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330) was not applicable in India and the Supreme Court evolved a new principle of liability which is more in tune with the modern society, it may not be necessary to go into that question for the purpose of the present case. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 34, on negligence in paras 35 and 36 at page 31 and 32, it is pointed out that the performance of dangerous work and the possession, use or supply of dangerous things impose a duty to take special precautions. It is further observed in para 36 that operations connected with the handling of petroleum and the distribution of gas and electricity also call for special precautions and are in addition subject to statutory provisions for safety. Persons who leave dangerous things where they are likely to be used or affected by others, and particularly by young persons, are responsible if the interference should reasonably have been foreseen and results in injury. It is also stated in para 57 of the same volume that under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence where (1) it is not possible for him to prove precisely what was the relevant act or omission which set in train the events leading to the accident, and (2) on the evidence as it stands at the relevant time it is more likely than not that the effective cause of the accident was some act or omission of the defendant or of someone for whom the defendant is responsible, which act or omission constitutes a failure to take proper care for the plaintiff's safety. There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. However, where the thing which causes the accident is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his employees, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
8. Incidentally, this Court in C.K. Subramania Iyer and others v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and Six others, 1969(3) SCC 64, while dealing with the matter of fatal accidents laid down certain relevant guidelines for the purpose of assessment of compensation. Paragraph 13 of the report would be relevant on this score and the same is set out hereinbelow :
"13. The law on the point arising for decision may be summed up thus :
Compulsory damages under Section 1A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily @contd/...42
personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the Appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by the courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration." (Emphasis supplied)
9. The observations as above, undoubtedly lays down the basic guidance for assessment of damages but on redeeming feature ought to be noted that compensation or damages cannot be awarded as a solatium but to assess the same with reference to loss of pecuniary benefits. In the decision last noted (1969)3 SCC 64, this Court placed strong reliance on two old decisions of the English Courts to wit : Franklin v. The South East Railway Company, 1957 English Reports 3 H & N, p. 448, wherein Pollock, C.B. stated :
"We do not say that it was necessary that actual benefit should have been derived, a reasonable expectation is enough and such reasonable expectation might well exist, though from the father, not being in need, the son had never done anything for him. On the other hand a jury certainly ought not to make a guess in the matter, but ought to be satisfied that there has been a loss of sensible and appreciable pecuniary benefit, which might have been reasonably expected from the continuance of life."
M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (SC) 2002(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 214 : 2001 A.I.R. (SC) 3660 : 2001(8) S.C.C. 151 : 2001(5) Scale 610 : 2001(7) J.T. 159 : 2001 SCC(Cri) 1426 :
2001(Sup2 ) SCR 156
31. As noticed hereinbefore six several judgments have been cited wherein the quantum of compensation varies between Rs. 1,00,000/ to Rs. 1,50,000/ but in every decision there was a factual basis for such as assessment and there is no denial of the same. But the adaptability of @contd/...43
the multiply method and its acceptability without any exception cannot just be given a go by. This Court in a long catena of cases and without mixing word did apply the multiply method to decide the question of compensation in the cases arising out of Motor Vehicles Act. It is in this context the view of British Law Commission may be noticed and which indicates " the multiplier has been, remains and should continue to remain, the ordinary, the best and the only method of assessing the value of a number of future annual sums". The actuarial method of calculation strictly speaking may not have lost its relevance but its applicability cannot but be said to be extremely restricted said the British Commission. Lord Denning's observations in Hodges v. Harland & Wolff Limited, 1965(1) All ER 1086, also seem to be rather apposite. Lord Denning observed that multiplier method cannot but be termed to be of universal application and as such it would meet the concept of justice in the event the same method is applied for determining the quantum of compensation. Incidentally in a very recent decision of this Court (Civil Writ Petition No. 232 of 1991 in the matter of Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar & Others [of which one of us (U.C. Banerjee, J.) was a party] wherein a threeJudge Bench of this Court has had the occasion to consider an award of a former Chief Justice pertaining to the assessment of compensation by reason of a huge accidental fire. Significantly a writ petition was filed in this Court and this Court thought it expedient to have the claims examined by a former Chief Justice of the country and the latter duly and upon adaptation of multiplier method finalised the quantum of compensation which more or less barring some exceptions stands accepted by this Court in the decision noticed above. In Lata Wadhwa's decision factual score records that while 150th Birth Anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata, was being celebrated on 3rd March, 1989 within the factory premises at Jamshedpur and a large number of employees, their families including small children had been invited, a devastating fire suddenly engulfed the Pandal and the area surrounding and by the time the fire was extinguished, a number of persons lay dead and many were suffering with burn injuries. The death toll reached 60 and the total number of persons injured were 113. The factual score in Lata Wadhwa's case further depicts that amongst the persons dead, there were 26 children, 25 women and 98 men and Srimati Lal Wadhwa the petitioner in the matter lost her two children, a boy and a girl as also her parents. It is on this score that the learned arbitrator fixed in the absence of any material a uniform amount of Rs. 50,000/ to which again a conventional figure of Rs. 25,000/ has been added for determining the total amount of compensation payable. While dealing with the matter this Court (Pattanaik, J. speaking for the Bench) observed :
"So far as the determination of compensation in death cases are concerned, apart from the three decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court, which had been mentioned in the order of this Court dated 15th December, 1993, this Court in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors, 1994(2) SCC 176, exhaustively dealt with the question. It has been held in the aforesaid case that for assessment of damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account many @contd/...44
imponderable, as to the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether. The Court further observed that the manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants, and thereafter it should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of year's purchase. It was also stated that much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master, since there are so often many imponderable. In every case, "it is the overall picture that matters", and the Court must try to assess as best as it can, the loss suffered. On the acceptability of the multiplier method, the Court observed :
"The multiplier method is logically sound and legally well established method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. A departure from this method can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases."
33. Needless to say that the multiplier method stands accepted by this Court in the decision last noticed and on the acceptability of multiplier method this Court in para 16 had the following to state :
"It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally wellestablished. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and award the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss dependency for 45 years virtually adopting a multiplier of 45 and even if onethird of one fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future @contd/...45
life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are, aware that some decisions of the High Courts and this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 insofar as it envisages the compensation to be 'just', the statutory determination of a 'just' compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases."
As to the multiplier, Halsbury states :
"However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependants can invest their damages, the lump sum award in respect of future loss must be discounted to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being that the dependants will each year draw interest and some capital (the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the passage of years), so that they are compensated each year for their annual loss, and the fund will be exhausted at the age which the court assesses to be the correct age, having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such as illness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible, but the courts do not encourage such evidence. The calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest. In practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities is so much higher than 4 to 5 per cent that rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure."
@contd/...
46Shanta Devi v. Charchal Singh Chadha, (Delhi) 1992 AIR (Delhi) 373
13. The last question which remains to be considered is about the grant of interest. No interest was claimed or has been awarded by the Tribunal. Award of interest under S. 110CC of the Act is discretionary. In the present case the deceased died in 1970. The compensation was assessed by the Tribunal after about ten years. There is good ground for grant of interest as an adhesive to the amount of compensation determined. The absence of a claim for interest in the petition is no ground to disallow it. The Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandera v. Randhir Singh, 1990 ALJ 777, has held that the claim for interest needs no pleadings and can be allowed on an oral submission.
14. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and rate of interest from the Government securities like National Saving Certificates, long term fixed deposits in banks, in my opinion an interest at the rate of 12% per annum will be reasonable in the instant case. 1.
@contd/...
47MONEY DECREE SECTION 34 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF SHRI SURINDER S. RATHI, ADJ-07/CENTRAL/ DELHI.
CS NO: 398/08 ID NO: 02401C0920842008 IN THE MATTER OF :
SHRI BUDHU PAL S/o SHRI DHANI RAM, VILLAGE TIKARIA JAIT PUR, P.S. AJNAR, TEHSIL KULPAR, DISTT. MAHOBA, U.P. ................ (PLAINTIFF) VERSUS
1. M/s. CONVEST BUILDCON (P) LTD.
AT 1384-88, NICHOLSON ROAD, KASHMERE GATE, DELHI-110006, THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR S. GURCHARAN SINGH
2. SHRI NARESH YADAV S/o SHRI TEK CHAND, R/o 5537, GALI NO. 5, NEW CHANDRAWAL, NEAR KAMLA NAGAR, DELHI-110007
3. SHRI BHIM SEN S/o SHRI RAJPAL R/o N-16A/108, SANJAY BASTI TIMAR PUR, DELHI ................... (DEFENDANTs) SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF Rs. 4,00,000/- AS COMPENSATION DATE OF INSTITUTION : 09.07.2008 DATE OF ARGUMENTS : 22.07.2010 DATE OF JUDGMENT : 07.08.2010 The Suit coming for final disposal before me in the presence of Sh. Ashok Mahey LD. Counsel for plaintiff, Ld. Counsel for defendant no.1 Sh. V.P. Malik & LD. Counsel for defendant no. 2 & 3 Sh. Santosh Pandey. . It is ordered suit of the plaintiff suit of the plaintiff stands decreed for a sum of Rs.4 lacs with cost jointly and severely apart from interest @12% per annum pendentilite and till the date of realisation jointly and severally.
@contd/...
48
Costs of the suits
Plaintiff Defendant
Stamp for plaint NIL Stamp for power NIL
Stamp for power NIL Stamp for exhibits NIL
Stamp for exhibits NIL Stamp for petition NIL
Pleader's fee NIL Pleader's fee NIL
Subsistence for witness NIL Subsistence for witness NIL
Commissioner's fee NIL Commissioner's fee NIL
Service of process NIL Miscellaneous NIL
Miscellaneous NIL
Total Total NIL
Given under my hand and the seal of this court, Dated 07.08.2010.
SEAL ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE
CENTRAL-07,DELHI
@contd/...