Allahabad High Court
Iffco Phulpur Karmchari Sangh vs Registrar Of Trade Unions And Ors. on 19 August, 1991
Equivalent citations: [1991(63)FLR823], (1992)IILLJ239ALL, (1991)2UPLBEC1345
JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J.
1. We are disposing of this petition finally at the admission stage after hearing learned counsel for the petitoner as well as Shri R.K. Jain who represents Sri A.K. Jaiswal, the third respondent.
2. IFFCO Phuipur Karmachari Sangh is a registered Trade Union. Like all trade unions it suffers from the malaise of factionalism. Two groups have emerged, one led by Rajendra Rai who has presented this petition in the name of the Trade Union, and the other by A.K. Jaiswal, the third respondent herein, who represents the other. For the past two years or more both these warring groups have been vying with one another for seeking recognition in the shape of entry of the names of the office-bearers elected every year at the meeting held separately by them for that purpose in the Register of Trade Unions. In regard to the last year's elections two petitions are already pending in this Court. We are, however, concerned with the elections held by the two groups for the current year, i.e. 1990-91 and the order dated July 3, 1991 passed by the Dy. Labour Commissioner/Dy Registrar, Trade Unions, U.P., Allahabad Region, upholding the claim of the group represented by A.K. Jaiswal and rejecting that put forward by the faction led by Rajendra Rai.
3. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Dy. Labour Commissioner dated July 3, 1991, Rajendra Rai has approached this Court by way of this petition. By the impugned order the Dy Labour Commissioner/ Dy Registrar, Trade Unions, U.P., had purported to exercise powers vested in him under a notification dated November 29, 1990 issued by the State Government under Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, authorising the Regional Dy. Labour Commissioners to exercise all powers and functions of the Registrar of Trade Unions in the areas of their respective jurisdictions save for the powers and functions relating to registration of trade unions and cancellation of registration, change of name and amalgamation of trade unions under Sections 8, 10, 23 and 24 respectively under the superintendence and directions of the Registrar. More specifically the Dy. Labour Commissioner has purported to exercise powers under Regulation 17-A of the U.P. Trade Unions Regulations framed under the aforesaid Act. It provides for intimation regarding any change of the officers of a registered trade union and the Registrar is required to record the change in the Register of Trade Unions, maintained under Section 8. This regulation is, as we shall presently demonstrate, referable to Section 28 which provides for sending a statement of all changes of office bearers made by the Trade Union. It was in the exercise of this power that the impugned order appears to have been passed by the Dy. Labour Commissioner of the concerned region.
4. The impugned order has been challenged by Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on three grounds. We will deal with them one by one.
5. We begin with the first ground of attack. It was urged that the notification dated November 29, 1990, the substance of which has been set out hereinabove, specifically excepts the power of the Registrar of registering trade unions under Section 8 of the Act from the powers delegated under the notification to the Dy. Labour Commissioners. And inasmuch as in the submission of Sri Dwivedi, entries of changes in the Register of Trade Unions is referable only to Section 8 which lays down the procedure for registration, the Dy.Labour Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in directing the changes of office-bearers as communicted by A.K. Jaiswal, In short, the argument was that making changes in the names of the office bearers in the Register of Trade Unions maintained by the Registrar under Section 8 with respect to any trade union is neither more nor less than an exercise amounting to registration of trade unions.
6. We are unable to agree. The petitioner Trade union was registered, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in 1977. The procedure for registration of a trade union is laid down in Sections 5 to 8 of the Act and Regulations 3 and 4 of the Central Trade Unions Regulations, 1984. The application for registration has to be submitted in Form A which lays down the particulars which are required to be furnished. These include the name of the trade union, the date on which it came into existence, the names, addresses and occupations of the office bearers of the trade union, the number and particualrs of the rules or bye-laws of the trade union and so on and so forth. Once the trade union is registered by the Registrar under Section 8, the Certificate of Registration continues to hold good until it is cancelled.
7. The office bearers of the trade unions, however, keep on changing from time to time with the elections which are held under the rules of the trade union periodically. These changes are required to be intimated to the Registrar for making consequential changes in the Register of Trade Unions maintained under Section 8. Regulation 17-A reads this:
"17-A. Intimation regarding any change in the officers of a registered Trade Union shall be sent in duplicate in Form J to the Registrar within a week of such change taking place. The Registrar shall, within thirty days and under intimation to the Secretary of the Trade Union concerned, record the change in the Register of Trade Unions maintained under Section 8 of the Act unless he has reason to believe that the change has not been made in the manner provided in the registered rules of Trade Union."
8. The next provision on the subject bearing on the point is Section 28 which provides for submission of Annual Return to the Registrar in the prescribed form, a general statement of all receipts and expenditures of every registered Trade union during the year ending on the 31st day of December. Sub-section (2) of Section 28 provides that together with the general statement there shall be sent to the Registrar a statement showing all changes of office-bearers made by the Trade Union during the relevant year. A form has been prescribed for that purpose and that is Form D appended to the Central Trade Unions Regulation. The heading of this Form is Annual Return prescribed under Section 28 of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 for the year ending 31st March 19....In this form, the Trade Union is required to furnish the changes of the officers relinquishing office as well as those appointed. It is on the basis of this return that the changes are entered in the Register of Trade Unions, This exercise of communication of changes of officers to the Registrar on the conclusion of the elections of office-bearers and the entries, made consequent thereto in the Register of Trade Unions pertaining to that Trade Union cannot legitimately be characterised as the act of registration of the Trade Union under Section 8. It is, in our opinion, clearly one covered by Section 28 which specifically provides for a submission of a statement to the Registrar showing all changes of office-bearers. As there is a specific provision dealing with the subject in the shape of Section 28, it is not possible to accept that the act of registering the changes of the names of office-bearers tantamounts to registration of Trade Union covered by Section 8 of the Act.
9. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Dy. Labour Commissioner was fully authorised to deal with the returns filed by the rival groups each praying for acceptance of the list of officebearers submited by it. The order passed by the Dy. Labour Commissioner was clearly within his jurisdiction. In this connection, it would not be out of place to mention that on the own showing of the petitioner, the papers were initially submitted to the Registrar of Trade Unions for registering the changes but vide his letter dated April 5, 1991 (Annexure 13) he returned the same to the Dy.Labour Commissioner for being dealt with at his own level in view of the delegation of powers under the aforesaid notification dated November 24, 1990. The petitioner not only did not choose to challenge the order of the Registrar, but submitted to the jurisdiction of the Dy Labour Commissioner admittedly without raising any objection as to his jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
10. That brings us to the second point canvassed in support of the petition. The contention was that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter by the Dy. Labour Commissioner before he passed the impugned order.
11. We regret we cannot agree. To appreciate the contention a few facts may be stated. By a notice dated June 10, 1991 the parties were intimated that the case will be heard on June 22, 1991 and that each party should bring its documents and records in support of its claim. The group represented by Rajendra Rai has already submitted a return showing that elections of office-bearers of the Union were held on February 26, 1991 at which Rajendra Rai was elected as General Secretary and C.S. Gupta as the President. In the returns submitted by the rival group represented by A.K. Jaiswal, the assertion was that the annual general election for electing the Executive of the Union was held in accordance with the rules of the Trade Union on March 18, 1991 at which Sri R.P. Singh was elected as the President and Sri A.K. Jaiswal as the Secretary.
12. At the instance of the group represented by Rajendra Rai, however, on the plea that he was out of station, the case was adjourned to June 27, 1991. On that date again nobody appeared on behalf of the group represented by Rajendra Rai on the self same plea. It was alleged that Rajendra Rai had not yet returned from Delhi where he had gone in connection with some case. An application for further adjournment is stated to have been moved. The Dy Labour Commissioner did not grant the adjournment and finally disposed of the matter by his order dated July 3, 1991 accepting the return of the group represented by A.K. Jaiswal. The petitioner complains that on July 2, 1991 an application was moved before the Dy Labour Commissioner praying therein that it be heard before any orders are passed. The Dy. Labour Commissioner, however, did not grant any futher indulgence in the matter and disposed of the case by his order dated July 3, 1991.
13 It is in this background that we have to examine the genuineness of the complaint that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity for being heard. The Dy Labour Commissioner had at the instance of the petitioner itself adjourned the case to June 27. All that the petitioner was required to do was to produce its papers and records in support of its claim that the elections held by Rajendra Rai were genuine and in consonance with the rules of the Trade union. Admittedly petitioners knew that June 27 was an adjourned date. Consequently if Rajendra Rai was not available, we see no reason why one or the other of the office-bearers representing the group of Rajendra Rai could not attend the officer of the Dy Labour Commissioner on June 27 and show the registers and other papers in proof of its claim that the elections were duly held by them.
14. The petitioner was given two opportunities to appear to substantiate its claim, once on June 22 and next on June 27. The requirement of law was to give opportunity of being heard. If the petitoners did not choose to avail themselves of repeated opportunities they cannot legitimately complain that they have been denied reasonable opportunity of being heard.
15. Coming to the petitioner's application dated July 2 for further adjournment, it must be rememebered that it was given after the hearing was closed on June 27. The Dy Labour Commissioner was not bound to grant further adjournment. We have examined the application but it does not disclose any valid ground. Further merely the petitioner had submitted an application on July 2, 1991 was no ground for believing that their application was bound to be allowed and they would be intimated the next date in due course.
16. It must be remembered that the discretion which vests in the Registrar under Regulation 17-A regarding effecting changes in the officebearers is not quasi-judicial in nature. It is purely administrative. No party is entitled to lead evidence or to cross- examine witnesses. Section 28(3) read with Regulation 17-A does not contemplate holding of any elaborate enquiry such as is required in the case of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. All that the magistrate is required to do is to hold a summary enquiry for satisfying himself before making any changes in the register regarding office bearers whether the elections have been held in accordance with the rules of the Trade union. The legal position on the subject stands firmly established between the two decisions of this Court- The North-Eastern Railway Employees' Union, Gorakhpur and Anr. v. The Registrar of Trade Unions, U.P. Kanpur and Ors., (1975 -I-LLJ-396) and 1969 LIC 209, North-Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions. In the latter of these two cases, the learned judges observed thus.
"The implied power of the Registrar to ascertain actual facts from the parties where there appears to be some conflict between the two versions placed before him by means of two forms filled up and filed by two rival groups could not convert the inquiry held by the Registrar in to a quasi-judicial proceeding in which each side has the right to lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses.... Even under Regulation 17-A, the Registrar could only look at the rules and prima facie evidence and arrive at a conclusion to believe, record or not to believe and record that the change is not in accordance with the rules. He can refuse to record any change, even if hewere to act under Section 17A and ask contesting parties to get an adjudication from a Civil Court first."
17. In case of North-Eastern Railway Employees Union (supra), Hon'ble K. N. Singh, J. (as his Lordship then was) examined in considerable depth the parameters and the nature of powers vested in the Registrar under Section 28(3) read with Regulation 17-A and in paragraph 10 of the judgment his Lordship ruled as follows: (pp 400- 401):
"The Registrar was not holding a quasi-judicial enquiry. He was discharging an administrative function. He was not required to examine witnesses or to allow opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. No doubt even an administrative enquiry must be held in a fair and impartial manner. In the instant case even if the Registrar was required to act in a quasi-judicial manner, the parties were given adequate opportunity but the petitioner No. 2 did not avail the same. The notice dated September 12, 1973 clearly stated that the parties should bring all evidence whether oral or documentary with them when they appear before the Registrar on September 17, 1973. Petitioner No. 2 did not comply with that requirement. The enquiry was adjourned for September 22, 1973 with the consent of the parties but even on that date petitioner No. 2 did not appear or produce any document or evidence in support of his case. The Registrar was not under any legal obligation to adjourn the enquiry further or to fix any other date. He had a discretion to proceed with the enquiry or to adjourn the same. Once he proceeded with the enquiry he did not violate any law. Petitioner No. 2 did not attend the enquiry on the ground of his illness. In the counter affidavit filed by Sri R.S. Awasthi, it has emphatically been asserted that Petitioner No.2 was not confined to bed, instead he had been moving about and he had performed journery from Gorakhpur to Lucknow between September 21 and 22, 1973. On these facts I am satisified that petitioner No. 2 was given full opportunity but he did not avail the, same."
18. With respect we entirely agree with both the decisions cited above and hold that the Registrar (or the Dy Labour Commissioner exercising the power of the Registrar) under Regulation 17 (3) is not required to hold any elaborate enquiry akin to the process of adjudication in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. He is only required to make a summary enquiry to satisfy himself that the return accompanying the changes of office-bearers is proper and in accordance with the rules. The satisfaction has also only to be a prima facie satisfaction as held in the above two decisions.
19. Keeping in view the nature of enquiry that the Dy. Labour Commissioner was called upon to make and keeping further in view the fact that the petitioner was afforded opportunity to substantiate its claim twice, we do not think that any rules of natural justice were violated. The enquiry was fair and proper and does not warrant interference by this Court.
20. In this connection a submission subsidiary to the second point mentioned above raised by the learned counsel was that the Dy Labour Commissioner was wrong in fixing different hours for the appearance of the two parties on the date fixed in the case. For one party the time fixed was 12 noon and for the other 2 p.m. on the same date. This submission is more or less academic in the context of the facts of the present case. In the first place, the petitioner had not appeared at all on the date fixed. Secondly, no complaint appears to have been made by anyone on behalf of the petitioner before the Dy Labour Commissioner on the date fixed claiming the right to be allowed to participate in the process of scrutiny of the papers submitted by the rival group. If the petitioner had specifically made a request to participate in those proceedings and the Dy Labour Commissioner would have refused that request, we would have gone deeper into this aspect to examine whether any injustice has resulted by the Dy. Labour Commissioner setting different time schedule for the two parties for scrutiny of their records.
21. Lastly, learned counsel made an attempt to question the correctness of the impugned order on facts. We, however, do not propose to comment on that submission in view of the fact that the decision of the Dy. Labour Commissioner is summary in nature and is open to challenge by way of a civil suit in which both the parties can lead evidence in support of their respective claims, and possibly also by way of approach to the Registrar as the notification dated November 29, 1990 delegating powers of the Registrar on the Dy Labour Commissioner itself provides that the Dy Labour Commissioner shall act under the superintendence and direction of the Registrar. Thus the petitioner has ample alternative remedies available to it so far as challenge to the impugned order on facts is concerned. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.