Patna High Court
Sm. Sudha Devi vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 5 July, 1956
Equivalent citations: AIR1956PAT506, AIR 1956 PATNA 506
Author: Chief Justice
Bench: Chief Justice
JUDGMENT Ramaswami, C.J.
1. In this case the petitioner, Sm. Sudha Devi, has applied for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for calling up and quashing the two orders of the State Government, dated 6-1-1956, sanctioning grant of a mining lease in favour of respondents 3 and 4 for about 2893 and odd acres of land located in village Sabeyatand District Gaya, for the purpose of mining, mica. Cause has been shown by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State of Bihar and learned counsel on behalf of respondents 3 and 4.
2. Respondent 4 Chalhu Ram Horil Ram Ltd. is a private limited company with members of two joint Hindu families as shareholders. Respondent 3, Sant Saran Prasad Bhadani, is a Director of the Company. On 30-9-1940, respondent 4 took lease of the mica mining area in dispute by two documents executed by the proprietors of the tauzi for a period of 15 years. On 27-6-1953, the tauzi in question, namely tauzi No. 12561, was notified under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and the proprietary right, including the mica area in dispute, vested in the State of Bihar.
By Section 10, Bihar Land Reforms Act, it is provided that the lease made by the previous proprietor would be deemed to be a lease made by the State Government to the holder of the subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of the lease, and such holder shall be entitled to retain possession of the lease-hold property. The section further states that the terms and conditions of the lease by the State Government shall, mutatis mutandis be the same as the terms and conditions of the subsisting lease, subject to certain exception mentioned in the section. After the date of vesting the State of Bihar accepted rent from respondent 4 for the mining area.
The lease in favour of respondent 4 expired on 30-9-1955, but respondent 3 and respondent 4 both filed applications for grant of mining lease in respect of the same area. On 6-1-1956, the State Government sanctioned a grant of mining lease in favour of respondent 4 for 410 acres of mica mining area, and in favour of respondent 3, Sant Saran Prasad Bhadani, for an area of 2890 acres of mica mining area.
The petitioner alleges that she was granted a certificate of approval on 12-1-1956, from the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. The petitioner had intended to take a mining lease of the area in question. The case of the petitioner is that there was no notification of the State Government in the official gazette about the date front which the area should be treated as available for regrant, as provided by Rule 67 of the Mineral Concession Rules.
The contention of the petitioner is that there was violation of Rules 67 and 68 and, therefore, the orders of the State Government sanctioning lease in favour of respondents 3 and 4 were illegal and ultra vires and ought to be quashed by the High Court by the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari.
3. In the counter-affidavit respondents 1 and 2 state that there was no fresh grant of lease to respondents 3 and 4, but there is only a renewal of the previous grant. It was contended that Rules 67 and 68 have no application to the case. In para. 5 of the counter-affidavit respondents 1 and 2 further state that the State Government had granted a licence to respondent 3 for setting up a factory in Jhumri Tilaiya for the manufacture of micanite, and for the purchase of the necessary machinery the Bihar State Finance. Corporation had granted a loan of Rs. 2,80,000/- to respondent 3. It is stated that in view of these facts the State Government had decided to renew the lease in favour of respondent 3.
4. The contention on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 is also to the same effect. They only submit that there was no fresh grant of lease by the State Government but there was renewal of the previous lease and Rules 67 and 68 have no application. It was also contended on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 that the petitioner was not sufficiently interested in the grant of mining lease and had, therefore, no locus standi to make the present application to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. The first question which arises for decision is whether there has been a violation of Rules 67 and 68 of the Mineral Concession Rules and whether the two orders of the State Government, dated 6-1-1956, sanctioning the leases in favour of respondents 3 and 4 were illegal and ultra vires. Rule 67 is to the following effect;
"67. Availability of areas for regrant to be signified by entry in Standard Register.--No area which was previously held under a prospecting licence or a mining lease shall be treated as available for regrant, unless any entry to the effect has been made in Standard Register. The date from which the area shall be treated as available for regrant shall be notified in the Official Gazette of the State at least 30 days in advance.
Explanation:-- For the purpose of this rule, the registers required to be maintained under Rules 20 and 33 shall be deemed to be Standard Registers."
It is also necessary to quote Rule 68 in full:
"68. Premature applications.--Applications for grant of a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of areas which have been previously held under a prospecting license or a mining lease but in respect of which there is no entry in the Standard Register as provided in Rule 67 shall be deemed to be premature and shall be disposed of by the State Government accordingly. The fee paid shall be refunded."
6. It is admitted on behalf of the respondents that there was no entry made in the Standard Register of the area in question and there was no notification in the Official Gazette as required by Rule 67. It is also the admitted position that the State Government did not consider the applications of respondents 3 and 4 as premature within the meaning of Rule 68 and did not refund the fee paid along with the applications.
It is admitted, therefore, that the provisions of Rules 67 and 68 were not observed, but the case of the respondents is that these rules have no application because the State Government only renewed the leases in favour of respondents 3 and 4 and did not make a fresh grant. In my opinion, the two orders of the State Government show that there was grant of fresh lease to respondents 3 and 4 and it was not a case of a mere renewal of a previous lease.
7. The order of the State Government dated 6-1-1956, sanctioning a grant of mining lease in favour of respondent 4 is in the following terms;
Government of Bihar Revenue Department Memo No. A/MM-40107/55. 176R Patna, the 6th January, '56 To The Collector of Gaya, Reference: His Additional Collector's letter No. 6909/LR Mine dated the 18th October, 1955, Subject:--Grant of mining lease for mica in village Saphi (Sewaiyatand) thana No. 295, thana Kajauli, District Gaya, to Messrs. Chhatturam Ho-rilram Ltd., Jhumritelaiya.
Orders:--Sanctioned on the following terms and conditions.
(1) Area; 410 acres only as shown in the plan enclosed herewith.
(2) Mineral:--Mica.
(3) Period:--20 years with option of renewal for another 20 years.
(4) Dead Rent:--Rs. 8/- per acre.
(5) Royalty;--Mica.
(a) Crude Mica........Rs. 1/4/- per maund,
(b) Trimmed Mica all qualities other than heavy stained dense stained and spotted.........
Rs. 3/12/- per maund.
(c) Trimmed mica other than (b) Rs. 1/14A per md.
(d) Waste and scrap mica........Rs. 2/6/-
per md.
The above rates of royalty shall be subject to revision from the beginning of the year 1955 and thereafter once in every ten years in accordance with the rates prescribed by the Government of India from time to time.
(vi) Surface Rent;--At such not exceeding the land revenue and cesses assessable on the land.
(vii) Security:-- Rs. 500/- only.
(viii) The applicant will have to employ a qualified Mining Engineer or Geologist to super-vise his mining work as required by Rule 20 of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1955.
(ix) Other terms as per Mineral Concession Rules, 1949.
2. A copy of the draft lease to be executed should be submitted to Government for approval through proper channel.
3. A copy of this order has been sent direct to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Bihar, Commissioner of Patna Division for information.
By order of the Governor of Bihar Sd/- M. Choudhury, Additional Secretary to Government."
The second order of the State Government sanctioning a grant of mining lease in favour of respondent 3 is to the following effect:--
Government of Bihar Revenue Department Memo No. --A/ MM-40107/55. 177R. Dated Patna. the 6th January 1956.
To, The Collector of Gaya.
Reference:--His Additional Collector's letter No. 6708/LR/Mines, dated the 18th October, 1955.
Subject:--Grant of mining lease for mica in village Saphi (Sewaiyatand) thana No. 295 thana Rajouli District Gaya, to Sri Sant Saran Prasad Bhandani of Jhumritelaya, Orders:--Sanctioned on toe following terms and conditions.
(1) Area: 2890 acres only as shown in the plan enclosed herewith.
(2) Mineral:--Mica.
(3) Period:-- 20 years with option of renewal for another. 20 years. (4) Dead Rent:--- Rs. 8/- per acre.
(5) Royalty:-- Mica.
(a) Crude Mica . . . Rs. 1/4/- per md.
(b) Trimmed mica, all qualities other than heavy stained, dense stained, and 'spotted. ......
Rs. 3/12/- per md.
(c) Trimmed mica other than (b).....
Rs. 1/14/- per md.
(d) Waste and scrap mica.....Rs. -/2/6 per md.
The above rates of royalty shall be subject to revision from the beginning of the year 1955 and thereafter once in every ten years, in accordance with the rates prescribed by the Government of India from time to time.
(vi) Surface Rent: At such rates not exceeding the land revenue and cesses assessable on the land.
(vii) Security:-- Rs. 500/- only.
(viii) The applicant will have to employ a qualified Mining Engineer or Geologist to supervise his mining work as required by Rule 20 of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1955.
(ix) Other terms as per Mineral Concession Rules, 1949.
2. A copy of the draft lease to be executed should be submitted to Government for their approval through proper channel.
3. A copy of this order has been sent direct to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Bihar/, Commissioner, Patna Division, for information.
By order of the Governor of Bihar, Sd/- M. Choudhury, Additional Secretary to Government."
The application made on behalf of respondent 4 to the State Government does not throw much light on the point. In col. 5 of the application, which is dated 2-9-1955, respondent 4 states as follows:
"5. Whether the application is Renewal -- by way of grant fore fresh concession or for a of fresh lease over the area renewal of a concession under the Mineral Concession Rules."
previously granted.
In the first paragraph of the application respondent 4 states that he has applied "for the grant of mining lease under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949". The application of respondent 4 is, therefore, ambiguous but the point is clarified and, resolved if the language of the two Government orders dated 6-1-1956, is carefully analysed.
In the first place the subject-matter of the Government letter is "Grant of mining lease for mica in village Saphi (Sewaiyatand) thana No. 295, thana Rajmahal, district Gaya to Messrs. Chhattu-ram Horilram Ltd., Jhumritelaiya." This clearly indicates that there was no renewal of the mining lease in favour of respondent 4, Chhatturam Horilram Ltd., but there was a grant of fresh mining lease. In the second place, col. 3 states that the period of the lease would be "20 years with option of renewal for another 20 years."
If the Government had sanctioned a renewal of the previous lease such a clause would not have been inserted. In this connection Rule 40 of the Mineral Concession Rules is important. Rule 40 states that the lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee, for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease in the case of mica. If the State Government had intended to renew the previous lease, there would have been no renewal clause for 20 years in col. 3 of the Government letter.
This fact strongly supports the conclusion that the sanction of the Government) dated 6-1-1956 was for the grant of a fresh lease and not for renewal of the previous lease. Lastly, there is the important circumstance that the lease has been granted by the State Government in favour of respondent 3, Sant Saran Prasad Bhadani with regard to the major portion of the area which had been previously leased to respondent 4, Chhatturam Horilram Ltd.
The original lessee was respondent 4, Chhattu. ram Horilram Ltd. and as a matter of law there could be no renewal of the lease in favour of Sant Saran Pd. Bhadani respondent 3. It is true that respondent 3 is a Director of the private limited Co. but in the eye of law the company is a distinct legal entity and has a distinct legal existence, apart from the Directors or share-holders. There is hence no legal identity between respondent 3 and respondent 4, and there could be no renewal of the lease by the State Government in favour of respondent 3.
This important circumstance also establishes that the orders of the State Government granting leases in favour of respondents 3 and 4 are not by way of renewal of the previous lease but they are grant of fresh lease of the mica mining area. If this conclusion is correct, it follows that there has been a breach of Rules 67 and 68 by the State Government and the order dated 6-1-1956, sanctioning leases in favour of respondents 3 and 4 are illegal and ultra vires.
8. It was submitted by Mr. S.N. Dutt on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4 that the Mineral Concession Rules made by the Central Government under Section 5 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1948, are obligatory and not mandatory and any breach of these rules by the State Government would be in the nature of mere irregularity and would not make the order of sanction, dated 6-l-1956 illegal and void. In my opinion this argument is completely misconceived. The Mineral Concession Rules have been made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of Act 53 of 1948.
Section 5 states:
"5. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of mining leases or for prohibiting the grant of such leases in respect of any mineral or in any area.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(a) the manner in which, the minerals or areas in respect of which and the persons by whom, applications for mining leases may be made and the fees to be paid on any such applications:
(b) the authority by which, the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which, mining leases may be granted;
(c) the maximum or minimum area and the period for which any mining lease may be granted, and the terms on which leases in respect of contiguous areas may be amalgamated;
(d) the fixing of the maximum and minimum rent payable by a lessee, whether the mica is worked or not".
Section 4 (1) and (2) of the Act is important. Section 4 (1) states:
"No mining lease shall be granted after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under this Act. Section 4 (2) is in the following terms;
"Any mining lease granted contrary to the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be void and of no effect".
Reference may also be made to Section 13 of Act 53 of 1948. Section 13 states that the provisions of the Act "shall be binding on the Government, whether in the right of the Dominion or of a State", My concluded opinion is that the rules made by the Central Government under Section 5 have mandatory effect, and any lease granted by the State Government in contravention of the rules would be void and a nullity, as expressly stated by Section 4 (2) of the Act. It is also manifest that the provisions of the Act and the rules are binding upon the Central Government and upon the State Government and their officers, and the fetters imposed by the Act and the rules cannot be brushed aside with impunity by the Government or its officers.
9. In the course of the argument Mr. S.N. Dutt, appearing for respondents 3 and 4, relied upon two cases -- 'Peddarangaswami v. State of Madras', AIR 1953 Mad 583 (A); and -- 'Shamji Naranji v. State of Madhya Pradesh', AIR 1954 Nag 161 (B). But the ratio of these two cases has no application to the present case. In 'AIR 1953 Mad 583 (A)', the question at issue was whether the plaintiff had a right to sue the Government for grant of mining lease in respect of an area covered by his prospecting licence.
It was held by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that the rights of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, namely, the terms of the prospecting licence, and under para. 5 of the prospecting licence the only remedy of the plaintiff was to refer the question to the Governor of the State whose decision was final and binding upon the parties. The material portion of the paragraph was as follows:
"If and whenever any dispute or question shall arise regarding the construction, meaning or effect of these presents or the rights, powers, liabilities or duties of the licensee hereunder or as to amount of payment of any royalty or other money payable by virtue hereof or otherwise however in relation to these presents such dispute or question shall be referred to the Governor whose decision thereon shall be final and binding on the parties hereto."
It was therefore held by the High Court that the plaintiff had no right to sue the State Government for grant of a mining lease with respect to the disputed area. That is the true principle of this case. But Mr. S.N. Dutt referred to page 586 of the report in which the learned Judges say that the rules made by the Government of India are "in the nature of administrative instructions for the guidance of revenue authorities who are entrusted with the grant of the licences and the leases".
"With the greatest respect, it appears to me that this observation of the learned Judges is not correct in view of the express provisions of Section 4 (1) and Section 4 (2) of Act 53 of 1948, which state that any mining lease granted contrary to the provisions of the rules shall be void and of no effect. The second case upon which Mr. S.N. Dutt relied was AIR, 1954 Nag 161 (B). In this case the Government did not grant any lease of mineral rights at all, and it was pointed out by the High Court that when a prior licence or lease had been relinquished or cancelled, the land did not automatically become available for regrant and it was open to the Government to decide whether it should or, should not be granted again.
The material facts of the present case are different for, there has been a grant of lease by the State Government in favour of respondents 3 and 4 in express violation of Rules 67 and 68 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Nagpur case should also be distinguished on another ground. It appears that Rules 67 and 68 came into existence in July, 1953, and the orders of the State Government which were impugned in the Nagpur case were made in 1952, long before the amendment of the Mineral Concession Rules made in July, 1953. It is true that there were old Rules in existence before July, 1953, but whether these rules were departmental instructions or statutory rules is not apparent from the reported judgment of the High Court.
In any event, the material facts of that case are distinguishable from those of the present case and the ratio of the Nagpur decision is not, therefore, applicable.
10. I shall then proceed to consider the question of 'locus standi' of the petitioner, Sm. Sudha Devi, to make an application to the High Court for grant of a writ. The argument presented on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioner obtained a certificate of approval from the State Government on 12-1-1956, but long before that date the State Government had sanctioned the grant of leases to respondents 3 and 4 with regard to the mining area in dispute.
It was contended, therefore, that at the time of the grant of certificate of approval to the petitioner there was no area to be leased and that the question of lease was a 'fait accompli'. It was submitted that the petitioner had, therefore, no. 'locus standi' to present an application to the High Court for issue of a writ. I am unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that certificate of approval was granted by the State Government to the petitioner on 12-1-1956, but the petitioner has stated in her supplementary affidavit that she had made an application for certificate of approval on 22-8-1955, several months beforehand.
On behalf of the State of Bihar, the Government Pleader also produced the Secretariat file and documents showing that the Minister approved the grant of certificate of approval to the petitioner in November, 1955, and that the Central Government sanctioned the grant of such a certificate on 21-12-1955. It is manifest, therefore, that the State Government sanctioned the grant of leases to respondents 3 and 4 with regard to the mining area in dispute after the State and the Central Government ordered that the certificate of approval should be granted to the petitioner.
It was also alleged by the petitioner that the State Government had deliberately delayed the grant of a certificate of approval to the petitioner and had shown undue preference to respondents 3 and 4. I shall assume in favour of the State Government that the delay was not intentional. Even so, it is undisputed that there was delay in considering the application of the petitioner for grant of a certificate of approval and the State Government cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own default.
In Para. 1 of the affidavit the petitioner said that she was competent to apply for the grant of milling lease for mining mica and in para. 2 she said that she had and still has the intention of taking mining lease in respect of the disputed area. It is also necessary to state that the sanction of the State Government dated 6-1-1956, is not tant amount to an execution of a lease in favour of respondents 3 and 4.
The order of sanction of the State Government is only an agreement to lease, and under Rule 28A the formal lease should be executed within six months of the order sanctioning the lease. Rule 28A further provides that "if no such lease is executed within the aforesaid period, the order sanctioning the lease shall be deemed to have been revoked". In my opinion, the order of the State Government dated 6-1-1956, sanctioning the lease in favour of respondents 3 and 4 was not tantamount to an executed lease but was only an agreement to lease. I thing that there is no question of a 'fait accompli' as is contended for on behalf of the respondents.
In the present case the State Government is clothed with certain statutory powers under the Mineral Concession Rules. These rules also impose a duty upon the State Government as to the procedure in which the powers are to be exercised. The matter is not left unfettered to executive discretion but is covered by statutory rules which were enacted for regulating and controlling the exercise of discretion. In the circumstances of the present case I think that the petitioner is within the range of those persons to whom the State Government owes a statutory duty.
There is, I think, sufficient legal interest vested in the petitioner which entitles her to maintain the present application. This view is borne out by two decisions of this Court -- 'Rambharosa Singh v. Government of the State of Bihar, AIR 1953 Pat 370 (C); and -- 'Ramphal Singh v. Government of the State of Bihar', AIR 1954 Pat 235 (D).
The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in a recent case -- 'K.N. Guru-swamy v. State of Mysore', AIR 1954 SC 592 (E). It was held by a unanimous Bench of the Supreme Court that though the bidder at an auction for a liquor license had no legal and enforceable right, yet he had sufficient legal interest to prosecute an application for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. At page 595 Bose J., states:
"The next question is whether the appellant can complain of this by way of a writ, in our opinion, he could have done so in an ordinary case. The appellant is interested in these contracts and has a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Here "we have Thimmappa, who was present at the auction and who did not bid not that it would make any difference if he had, for the fact remains that he made no attempt to outbid the appellant. If he had done so it is evident that the appellant would have raised his own bid.
"The procedure of tender was not open here because there was no notification and the furtive method adopted of settling a matter of this moment behind the backs of those interested and anxious to complete is unjustified. Apart from all else, that in itself would in this case have resulted in a loss to the State because, as we have said, the mere fact that the appellant has pursued this writ with such vigour shows that he would have bid higher. But deeper considerations are also at stake, namely the elimination of favouritism and nepotism and corruption: not that we suggest that that occurred here, but to permit what has occurred in this case would leave the door wide open to the very evils which the Legislature in its wisdom has endeavoured to avoid. All that is parti and parcel of the policy of the Legislature. None of it can be ignored.
"We would therefore in the ordinary course have given the appellant the writ He seeks".
11. The same principle has been expounded in an English case -- 'The King v. Speyer', (1916) 1 KB 595 (F). One of the questions at issue in that case was whether a writ could only be sought at the instance of the Attorney General by an information ex officio and whether the rule should be discharged because it was made at the instance of a private person. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the rule should be discharged, but the argument was rejected by the King's Bench Division presided over by Lord Reading C. J., Avory and Lush JJ. At page 613 Lord Reading C. J. states:
"The distinction is pointed out in Kyd on Corporations, p. 416, to the effect that the power of the Master of the Crown Office is confined to cases concerning the public government, whereas the power of the Attorney-General extends also to cases concerning the private rights of the Crown. In -- 'Rex v. Kemp', (1789), 1 East 46, n. (G), Lord Kenyon C. J. said: 'I do not mean to say that a stranger may not in any case prefer this sort of application; but he ought to come to the Court with a very fair case in his hands,' just) as the Court thought it right to inquire into the motives of the applicant to see that the application was not made merely to disturb the local peace of corporations: -- 'Rex v. Brown', 3 TR 574, n. (H), per Ashhurst J.
It cannot be doubted that this application concerns public government, and there is no ground for impugning the motives of the relator. A stranger to the suit can obtain prohibition (see -- 'Broad v. Perkins', (1888) 21 QBD 533 (1) ), and I see no reason why he should not in a proper case obtain an information of quo warranto. Sir George Makgill appears to have brought this matter before the Court on purely public grounds without any private interest to serve, and it is to the public advantage that the law should be declared by judicial authority. I think the Court ought to Incline to the assistance, and not to the hindrance, of the applicant in such a case if the Court has the power, which I think it has".
At page 622 Avory J., states;
"Finally it was contended by the Attorney-General that the only remedy, if any, in the present case was by way of information ex officio to be filed by the Attorney-General himself, which means that there is no remedy so long as he holds the view set forth in his argument. In -- 'Darley' v. The Queen', (1846) 12 Cl & Fin 520 at p. 533 (J), the counsel for the defendant in error, who was a private relator, quoted from Kyd on Corporations the following passage: 'By an examination of the cases, the distinction between the power of the Attorney-General and the Master of the Crown Office seems to be this, -- that the power of the latter is confined to cases which concern the public government, whereas the power of the former extends also to cases which only concern the private rights of the Crown.' I think the present case is one which concerns and might vitally concern the public government, and in -- 'Rex v. Brown', (H), reported in a note to -- 'Rex v. Smith', (1790) 3 TR 573, 574, no (K), Ashhurst J., said: 'The ground on which this application is made is to enforce a general Act of Parliament, which interests all the corporation in the kingdom; and therefore it is no objection that, the party applying is not a member of the corporation'; and although the Court in the exercise of its discretion may have refused in some instances the application of a mere stranger, 1 think the principle on which Brett J., as he then was, in -- 'Worthington v. Jeffries', (1875) LB 10 OP 379, 382 (1), said the Court ought to act in prohibition should be applied to such a case as that now before the Court that is, there should not be "any distinction in the action of the superior Court dependent upon the means by which, or the persons by whom, it is informed of the breach of order, which is a breach of the prerogative'. 'If information is given by a stranger 'order is no less broken, the prerogative is no less invaded'. For these reasons I think the preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court should be overruled."
12. I think that the principle of this case is important on the question of locus standi. As I have already said, the petitioner has sufficient interest in the circumstances of the present case to prosecute this application for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the argument of counsel for respondents on this point must be overruled.
13. For the reasons I have attempted to state, I hold that the two orders of the State Government dated 6-1-1956 sanctioning a grant of mining lease for mica in favour of respondent 3 for an area of 2,890 acres and in favour of respondent 4 for an area of 410 acres are ultra vires and void and that a writ of certiorari should be issued quashing these two orders of the State Government dated 6-1-1956.
In my opinion an order of injunction should also be issued restraining respondents 1 and 2 from granting mining leases to respondents 3 and 4 on the basis of the two orders of sanction dated 6- 1-1956. I would accordingly allow the application of the petitioner with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250/- to be paid in equal shares by the two sets of respondents, namely, respondents 1 and 2 and respondents 3 and 4.
Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
12. I agree.