Supreme Court of India
K.A. Barot vs State Of Gujarat on 11 April, 1990
Equivalent citations: (1992)ILLJ473SC, AIRONLINE 1990 SC 38, 1991 SCC (L&S) 419, (1992) 1 CUR LR 343, 1990 SCC (SUPP) 287, (1992) 1 LAB LN 376, (1992) 64 FAC LR 431, (1992) 1 LAB LJ 473, (1991) 15 ATC 887, (1991) 79 FJR 606
Author: Ranganath Misra
Bench: Ranganath Misra, M.M. Punchhi
JUDGMENT Mr. Ranganath Misra, J.
1. The appellant in this appeal by special leave was appointed as Civil Judge of the Junior Division in the Gujarat Judicial Service on March 7,1969, on probation for a period of two years. His probation was thrice extended - on October 1, 1971, for six months; again for six months on April 1, 1972, and for the third time for six months on October 1,1972. On April 13, 1973, there was an order terminating his services with effect from April.30, 1973. He challenged the order of termination by filing a writ petition, before the High Court and when the High Court, dismissed the same, this appeal has been filed by special leave.
2. It is, settled view, of this Court, that, in the absence of, a rule to the contrary, probation does not transform itself into confirmation, unless there is a specific order. It is not the case of the appellant that he be was confirmed by any order of the authority. The only contention which: is canvassed in support of the appeal before us is the term of the order of appointment which stipulated :
you will be on probation for a period of two years-from the date on which you take charge of your appointment and during this period your appointment is liable to be terminated without notice. After the period of probation your services are liable to be terminated on .one month's notice as long as your appointment is temporary.
It should be clearly understood that your appointment at present is purely temporary.
3. Appellant's learned Counsel contends that the appellant was entitled to a month's notice of termination, as, after, March 31, 1973, when the final extension of probation expired, the status of the appellant became temporary and he was entitled to a month's notice as stipulated-and in its absence the termination was bad in paw. He further indicated that the appellant was prepared to go back as a probationer. We have examined app aspects of the matter and particularly the fact that he has been out of employment from May 1, 1973, until now, a period of about 17 years.
4. It must be accepted, in the facts of this case, that though in the absence of a clear order of confirmation, a probationer does not get the confirmed status, it is open to the appointing authority to confer a status other than that of confirmed status on the termination of probation. In the instant case, the appellant's status was temporary as indicated in the order of appointment. The order of appointment stipulated termination with a month's notice. In the event of notice falling short of a month as stipulated, at the most the appellant would have become entitled to a month's salary in lieu of notice. The principle in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act or under Section 5 of the Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, where this Court has taken the view that unless the statutory dues accompanied the notice of termination, the same would be bad cannot be invoked in the facts of the present case. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to succeed in his contention raised in the appeal.
5. We have, however, taken a broad view of the matter and looked into the different aspects appearing on the record. On an earlier occasion when the matter was heard by a different Bench, a suggestion had been made to the State of Gujarat to compensate the appellant by payment of a fixed sum. No final decision could be taken then. On looking into the record, we are of the view that the appellant should be compensated by payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000 net and this amount should be paid within two months hence. If it is so paid, it shall not carry interest and in the event of failure to pay or necessity to execute for its recovery, interest of 12 per cent shall be payable on the amount from today till payment.
6. This amount represents compensation to the appellant and, therefore, must be deemed to be spread over the period intervening between the date of termination and the date of this judgment for purpose of tax. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.