Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jugul Kishore Tiwari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 April, 2017
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : AT JABALPUR
Criminal Revision No.3275/2015
Jugul Kishore Tiwari
versus
State of Madhya Pradesh
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Present:- Hon'ble Shri Justice C.V. Sirpurkar
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Shri S.C. Datt, Senior counsel with Shri Rahul Sharma,
counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Akhilendra Singh, Government Advocate for the
respondent/State.
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ORDER
(07-04-2017)
1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 05.12.2015 passed by the Court of I Additional Sessions Judge, Sidhi, in Sessions Trial No.134/2015; whereby a charge under sections 420, 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of Madhya Pradesh Vinirdishta Bhrashta Acharan Nivarn Ahiniyam, 1982 (hereinafter referred to in this order as 'the Act'), was framed.
2. As per the prosecution case before the trial Court accused/petitioner Jugul Kishore Tiwari worked as A.D.O. L.S.R. in Gulab Mahan Sagar Pariyojana District Sidhi. The gist of the charge against him is that he committed forgery of vouchers for the purchase of poor quality building material and purchased the same without the work order. He also prepared forged documents and misappropriated an amount of Rs.37,00,000/- without getting the work done. He used aforesaid forged vouchers as genuine for the purpose of withdrawal of aforesaid Rs.37,00,000/-. Being entrusted with the supervision of the execution of work contract and being the officer-in-charge of supervision of the work done by the contractor, he failed to prevent the purchase and use of poor quality building material and execution of poor quality work by the contractor. He deliberately ignored the prescribed standards and orders and directions in respect of construction so as to adversely affect the strength and durability thereof. The aforesaid offences were committed by the petitioner in furtherance of his common intention with co- accused and Sub- Engineer Rajendra Singh.
3. The impugned order framing charge under sections 420, 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been challenged on behalf of petitioner/accused Jugul Kishore Tiwari mainly on the ground that the alleged offences are said to have been committed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duties; therefore, previous sanction of the State Government was mandatorily required in accordance with the provisions of section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge framed under section 5 of the Act has been assailed principally on the ground that in view of section 39 of the Act, no police officer can investigate an offence under this Act except on a direction of the prescribed authority not below the rank of Commissioner of the Division on a report submitted by him to such authority. Since, the Court has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under aforesaid provisions of Indian Penal Code without previous sanction of the State Government, the charges under the Indian Penal Code are liable to be quashed. It has also been contended that since, the investigation was conducted without obtaining a direction of the prescribed authority as envisaged under proviso to section 39 of the Act, the charge under section 5 of the Act is also liable to be quashed. As such, the trial Court grievously erred in framing charge as aforesaid against the petitioner and the petitioner is liable to be discharged.
4. Learned Government Advocate for the respondent/State on the other hand has opposed this revision petition contending that it is no part of the duty of a public servant to commit offences of cheating, forgery of documents or misappropriation of public funds; therefore, the acts alleged were not performed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duties; as such, no sanction under section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required to prosecute the petitioner.
5. On perusal of the record and due consideration of the rival contentions, the Court is of the view that this criminal revision can succeed only so far as the charge under section 5 of the Act is concerned. There are no grounds for interfering with the charges framed for various offences under the Indian Penal Code.
6. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has relied heavily upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Prof. N.K. Ganguly vs C.B.I. New Delhi, (2016) 2 SCC 143, wherein it has been held as hereunder:
20. Both the learned senior counsel placed reliance on another judgment of a three judge bench of this Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287. In that case, the allegation against the appellant therein and two other Government servants was that they had conspired to defraud the Government in respect of certain properties and arranged to sell the goods to the approver. The case against them was registered under Section 120-B read with Section 409 of IPC. While considering the contention advanced that the said acts could not be said to have been committed in discharge of official duty, Bose, J. placed reliance upon the observations made by the Federal Court in the case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh v.
Emperor4, wherein Vardachariar, J observed that in respect of a charge under Section 409 of IPC, the official capacity is relevant only for entrustment, and not necessarily in respect of misappropriation or conversion which may be the act complained of. It was held by this Court that the correct position of law was laid down in the case of Hori Ram Singh, which is as under:-
"I would observe at the outset that the question is substantially one of fact, to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances; it seems neither useful nor desirable to paraphrase the language of the section in attempting to lay down hard and fast tests."
Bose, J., further held in Shreekantiah case referred to supra that there are cases and cases and each must be decided on its own facts. It was held as under:
"Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course, it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) While considering the facts of the case, Bose J. observed that the offence in question, could not have been committed any other way, and held as under:
"...If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately; there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the order, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it."
(Emphasis laid by this Court)
21. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, the learned senior counsel on behalf of some of the appellants has further rightly placed reliance upon the judgement of a three judge bench of this Court in the case of Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 to buttress the contention that the issue of requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 of Cr.PC can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and not just at stage of framing of charges. The decision in the case of Hori Ram Singh (supra) was also quoted with approval, especially the categorisation of situations in three scenarios, as under:
"a) Decision which held that sanction was necessary when the act complained of attached to the official character of the person doing it;
b) Judgments which held that sanction was necessary in all cases in which the official character of the person gave him an opportunity for the commission of the crime; and
c) Those which held it was necessary when the offence was committed while the accused was actually engaged in the performance of official duties.'' It was further held in the Amrik Singh case that:
"The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: it is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution u/S. 197 of the Cr. P.C.; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be invested at the trial and could not arise at the stage of grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) The position of law, as laid down in the case of Hori Ram Singh was also approved by the Privy Council in the case of H.H.B. Gill v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 128, wherein it was observed as under:
"A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty."
22. Reliance was further rightly placed by the learned senior counsel on the decision of a constitution bench of this Court in the case of Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 which pertained to an income tax investigation. It was alleged by the appellant therein that while conducting a search, the officials of the income tax department had forcibly broke open the entrance door of the house and interfered with the boxes and drawers of the tables. It was also alleged by the appellant therein that the officials tied him and beat him up. Upon an enquiry of the said complaint, the magistrate came to the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out and issued process. During the course of trial, the issue pertaining to want of sanction was urged. This Court held as under:
"Article 14 does not render Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires as the discrimination is based upon a rational classification. Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) On the other hand, ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was further observed that :-
"....Whether sanction is to be accorded or not, is a matter for the Government to consider. The absolute power to accord or withhold sanction on the Government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on that Court which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the act."
The Court finally summed up the result of the discussion as follows:-
"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty....."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) In the case of Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266 a constitution bench of this Court while examining the scope of Section 197 of CrPC, observed as follows:
"It appears to us to be clear that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an offence punishable under s.161 of IPC, is one of them and the offence of cheating or abetment thereof is another... where a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, as such offences have no necessary connection between them and the performance of the duties of a public servant, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of the offences......
...the Act of cheating or abetment thereof has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
In the case of R.R. Chari referred to supra, while examining the scope of Section 197 of Cr. P. C., this Court held as follows:
"It is clear that the first part of Section 197(1) provides a special protection, inter alia, to public servants who are not removable from their offices save by or with the sanction of the State Government or the Central Government where they are charged with having committed offences while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties; and the form which this protection has taken is that before a criminal Court can take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by such public servants, a sanction should have been accorded to the said prosecution by the appropriate authorities. In other words, the appropriate authorities must be satisfied that there is a prima facie case for starting the prosecution and this prima facie satisfaction has been interposed as a safeguard before the actual prosecution commences. The object of Section 197(1) clearly is to save public servants from frivolous prosecution....."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) The learned senior counsel further placed reliance on a three judge bench decision of this Court in the case of Baijnath Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 wherein the question that arose before this Court was whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 409 and 477A of the IPC was illegal for want of sanction. This Court observed as follows:
"It is not that every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable."
(Emphasis laid by this Court) In the case of B. Saha v. M.S Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 : (AIR 1979 SC 1841) the constitution bench of this Court observed that the question of sanction under Section 197 of Cr. P. C. could be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings. On the issue of when the protection of Section 197 of Cr. P.C. is attracted, this Court held as under:
"In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this Section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him."
The learned senior counsel further placed reliance on the decision of a constitution bench of this Court in the case of R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 : (AIR 1984 SC
684) wherein certain observations were made with regard to Section 6 of P. C. Act, 1988, as under:
"Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants....The Legislative advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that that authority alone would be able, when facts and evidence are placed before him to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either frivolous or speculative. That authority alone would be competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the office which the public servant holds, how that power could be abused for corrupt motive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competent authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the office and whether the same has been abused or misused. It is the vertical hierarchy between the authority competent to remove the public servant from that office and the nature of the office held by the public servant against whom sanction is sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therefore, permit interference of knowledge about the fuctions and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse by the public servant. That is why the legislature clearly provided that that authority done would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office......
(Emphasis laid by this Court)
7. However, in the case of Satwant Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266, a constitution bench of Supreme Court has held as hereunder:
"It appears to us to be clear that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an offence punishable under s.161 of IPC, is one of them and the offence of cheating or abetment thereof is another... where a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, as such offences have no necessary connection between them and the performance of the duties of a public servant, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of the offences......
...the Act of cheating or abetment thereof has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
8. Likewise in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. M. P. Gupta, AIR 2004 SC 730, the Supreme Court observed that:
"To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar."
9. In the case of Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that:
"49. Great emphasis has been led on certain decisions of this Court to show that even in relation to offences punishable under Sections 467 and 468 sanction is necessary. The foundation of the position has reference to some offences in Rakesh Kumar Mishra's case. That decision has no relevance because ultimately this Court has held that the absence of search warrant was intricately with the making of search and the allegations about alleged offences had their matrix on the absence of search warrant and other circumstances had a determinative role in the issue. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. Reference to a particular sentence in the context of the factual scenario cannot be read out of context.
50. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence."
10. Subsequently, considering the entire law available on record in respect of offences punishable under sections 467, 468 etc. of the Indian Penal Code, the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh, AIR 2009 SC (suppl) 1615, held that:
5. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha and Ors.
v. M.S. Kochar (1979 (4) SCC 177) it was held : (SCC pp. 184-185 Para 17) "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision."
6.Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or emission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty.
7. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or mission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (AIR 1956 SC 44) thus"
"The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
8.If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then the Act must be held as official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed.
9.In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State (AIR 1958 SC 107) and in C.R. Bansi v. The State of Maharashtra (1970 (3) SCC 537) this Court has held that :
"There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a Court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the Court was asked to take congizance, although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed."
10. That apart, the contention of the respondent that for offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B of IPC sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution is equally fallacious. This Court has stated the legal position in S.R. Munnipalli v. State of Bombay (1955 (1) SCR 1177) and in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu (1955 RD-SC 9) that it is not every offence committed by a public servant, which requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Following the above legal position it was held in Harihar Prasad etc. v. State of Bihar (1972 (3) SCC 89) as follows :
"As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with Section 409, Indian Penal Code is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar."
11.Above views are reiterated in State of Kerala v. Padmanabhan Nair (1999 (5) SCC 690). Both Amrik Singh (supra) and S.R. Munnipalli (supra) were noted in that case. Sections 467, 468 and 471, IPC relate to forgery of valuable security, Will etc; forgery for purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged document respectively. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the aforesaid offences. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is, therefore, no bar.
12. This position was highlighted in State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta (2004 (2) SCC 349)."
(Emphasis supplied by this Court)
11. Placing reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Prof. N.K. Ganguly (supra), learned senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that though it is not and cannot be a part of the official duty of a public servant to commit offences of forgery, cheating etc. yet the necessity of sanction cannot be dispensed with simply because the sections of the I.P.C. providing punishment for aforesaid offences have been mentioned in the charge sheet.
12. When we examine the facts of the case, in the light of aforesaid legal position, we find that it has been alleged in the report of the Inquiry Officer that while working as Sub- Engineer Officer L.S.R. Sub Division, Sidhi, the petitioner issued 47 piece work order for the survey of the area of submergence in the Mahan Pariyojana and for other purposes and showing that aforesaid work has been done sanctioned payment of Rs.19,83,793.00 to the contractor; whereas, at the time of the spot inspection, it was found that though it cannot be said that no work was done on the spot, the quantum and the quality of the work done vis-a-vis the payment made to the contractor, was doubtful; therefore, in the departmental inquiry this charge was found to have been partly proved. Thus, there are grounds for presuming at the stage of charge that the petitioner forged/prepared false vouchers for payment to the contractor. It was also found that though a recommendation was made for conferring the financial powers of the Executive Engineer upon the petitioner, no such powers were in fact conferred by the State; therefore, he misused his financial powers. It was also found in the departmental inquiry that the petitioner exercised the powers which were not vested in him and in an unauthorized manner and displaying undue haste made payment to the contractor.
13. In aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that the charges under sections 420, 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code framed against him are groundless. So far as the principles enunciated in the case of Prof. N.K. Ganguly (supra) is concerned, the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because in the case of Prof. N.K. Ganguly (supra), the allegation was that of misuse of powers for private gain and charge framed was under section 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; whereas, in the present case, there are allegations of forgery of vouchers or preparation of false vouchers, cheating and exercise of powers not vested in the petitioner for the work not fully done. Consequently, there are no grounds for interfering with the charges framed under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code; therefore, this part of the challenge fails.
14. Now the question remains whether the offence under section 5 of the Act could have been investigated without the direction of the prescribed authority, as envisaged under proviso to section 39 of the Act. It is not in dispute that no such direction was made by the Commissioner of the Division.
15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a coordinate bench of this Court in the cases of State of M.P. vs. Rajendra Singh Rathour, 1997(1) MPLJ 561 and S.P. Kori vs. State of M.P., 2001(2) MPLJ 702, wherein inter alia it was held that for initiating investigation into an offence punishable under section 5 of the Act, direction of the authority not below the rank of the Commissioner of the Division on a report submitted by the police officer, is mandatory.
16. Since, admittedly, no such direction has been obtained in the present case, the investigation and consequent prosecution is incompetent and the charge under section 5 of the Vinirdishta Bhrashta Acharan Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1982, is liable to be quashed.
17. Consequently, this criminal revision succeeds in part. The head of the charge, as framed under section 5 of the Vinirdishta Bhrashta Acharan Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1982, is quashed. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial of charge framed under sections 420, 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as per law.
(C V SIRPURKAR) JUDGE b