Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Y. Chandraiah @ Y. Chandra Reddy vs Commissioner Of Police And Ors. on 28 December, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007(1)ALD730, 2007(1)ALT533
Author: Goda Raghuram
Bench: Goda Raghuram
ORDER Goda Raghuram, J.
1. The petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents 1 to 3 to provide him protection for his agricultural operations in an extent of Ac.4.29 gts, in Sy.No.281; Ac. 1.16 gts in Sy. No. 282 and Ac. 1.26 gts, in Sy. No. 285 of Kuntloor Village, RR District ('the schedule land').
2. The petitioner is about 61 years old and he is pursuing relentless efforts and to obtain the fruits of his lawful entitlements to unhindered possession and enjoyment of agricultural land and a peaceful environment for his lawful occupation of agriculture in his land for nearly 40 years.
The chronology of facts:
A - The litigation:
(i) The petitioner's father Yelamati Ramana @ Ramaiah was a protected tenant in respect of the schedule land, who was in possession of the land till his death on 10.1.1960. On 2.8.1967 the petitioner filed a petition before the Tahsildar, Hayatnagar Taluk, Rangareddy District (the Tahsildar) for a succession certificate.
(ii) The Tahsildar, by the order bearing reference No. B1/4317/67, dated 21.5.1969 declared the petitioner to be the successor to the deceased protected tenant, his father, Ydamali Ramaua. Aggrieved (by the order of the Tahsildar dated 21.5.1969), the respondent No. 5 herein, preferred an appeal to the Joint Collector, Hyderabad. The appellate authority set aside the order of the Tahsildar dated 21.5.1969 and remanded the matter for fresh enquiry by the Tahsildar to consider the issue whether the deceased protected tenant (Y. Ramaua) was in lawful possession of the schedule land at the time of his death. On remand, the Tahsildar considered the application of the petitioner de novo, heard the petitioner as well as the 5th respondent, recorded their testimony, considered the oral and documentary evidence on record and by the order dated 8.12.1980 certified succession of the protected tenancy to the petitioner as valid and declared the petitioner to be the lawful successor to the protected tenancy, in respect of the schedule land. The Tahsildar declared the possession of the 5th respondent to have been unlawfully obtained.
(iii) The petitioner thereafter filed an application No. B1/9785/1 dated 26.12.1980 before the Tahsildar for restoration of his possession to schedule land, under Section 32(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 ('the Act'). Notices were issued to the respondents 5 to 8 who also filed a counter dated 10.9.1981. The petitioner claimed in his application that he was forcibly dispossessed after the death of his father in 1960 and could not agitate for restoration of his possession as he was a minor. On attainment of majority, he sought a succession certificate which was granted to him by the Tahsildar on 8.12.1980. The respondents claimed to have continued in possession of the schedule land since 1957 and to have purchased the same in 1961 from the pattadar Dcvender Raju Naidu. By the order dated 31.3.1982, the Tahsildar held, on the basis of the perusal of the relevant records that the protected tenant Y. Ramaua expired and soon thereafter the petitioner, his son, was forcibly dispossessed as he was a minor and in view of the petitioners status as the successor to the protected tenancy having been established by the order of the Tahsildar dated 8.12.1980, the petitioner was entitled for possession under Section 32. The Tahsildar directed the petitioner to be put in possession of the schedule lands.
(iv) Aggrieved, the respondents 5 to 8 preferred an appeal under Section 90 of the Act to the Joint Collector, Rangareddy District. By the order bearing reference No. B4/813682, dated 15.11.1982, the appeal was dismissed. The appellate authority held that the order (of the Tahsildar) dated 8.12.1980 granting succession to the petitioner (of the right to protected tenancy) had become final, as no appeal was preferred therefrom; the appellants failed to establish that the protected tenant had surrendered his rights voluntarily; that any sale or lease granted in favour of the respondents 5 to 8 without the consent of the protected tenant Y. Ramana or the petitioner, as the case may be, is a nullity; and consequently the possession by the respondents 5 to 8 herein of the schedule land is contrary to law. Consequent on this finding the appellate authority confirmed the petitioner's right to possession of the schedule land, upheld the order of the Tahsildar dated 31.3.1982 and dismissed the appeal.
(v) Aggrieved, the respondents 5 to 8 preferred a revision to this Court under Section 91 of the Act. CRP No. 1452 of 1983 was dismissed by the order dated 24.4.1985. Dismissing the revision this Court held:
(a) There is no evidence whatsoever that the original protected tenant (Y. Ramana) had surrendered the land to the original pattadar. Therefore the possession of the purchasers (R-5 to R-8) is unlawful; they should be dispossessed and the current protected tenant who succeeded to the right of protected tenancy of his father (the petitioner herein) is entitled to restoration of possession;
(b) In view of the law declared in G. Narasaiah v. Tahsildar, Mahaboobabad 1978 (2) APLJ 36 and G. Chennaiah v. State of A.P. 1982 (2) APLJ 376, once a certificate under Section 38-E(2) of the Act is issued after holding an inquiry in accordance with the Rules, it is conclusive between the certificate holder and the land holder or other persons who were in possession, or are otherwise interested in the land in respect of which ownership is transferred to the protected tenant or an ownership certificate is issued under Section 38E. The certificate cannot be challenged either in collateral proceedings or even by way of a civil suit, as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded under Section 99 of the Act;
(c) The plea of the purchasers (R5 to R8 herein) that they perfected their title by adverse possession is unsustainable. Y. Ramana was the protected tenant and continued to be so till his death (on 10.1.1960). Y. Ramana did not surrender his tenancy rights to the land holder during his lifetime. After his death, the land holder and the purchasers took advantage of the minority of Y. Chandraiah (the petitioner) and forcibly and unlawfully occupied the land. Soon after attaining majority Chandraiah (the petitioner) filed the petition on 2.8.1967 for succession. The Tahsildar enquired into the matter and after issuing notices, affording opportunity and considering the objections of the purchasers, by the order dated 8.12.1980 declared Chandraiah as the successor to the protected tenancy after declaring Y. Ramana to be the protected tenant till his death in 1960. The Tahsildar also declared the occupation of the land by the purchasers as unlawful. The purchasers did not claim that they had perfected their title by adverse possession or that the claim of Chandraiah was barred by limitation. Even if they had raised such an objection that would be unsustainable as the facts do not establish the title of the purchasers by adverse possession; and
(d) In view of the several conclusions recorded on facts and analysis of the relevant legal principles, the revision fails and the concurrent findings of the Tahsildar and the Joint Collector are confirmed.
(vi) Respondents 5 to 8 aggrieved by the judgment in CRP No. 452/83 preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10352/85. The Supreme Court by the order dated 23.8.1985 dismissed the SLP.
(vii) Under a Panchanama held on 21.1.1986 and recorded in file No. C/3504/82 in Cc/408/85, the MRO, Hayatnagar (R4 herein) took possession of the schedule land of Ac.4.29 gts, from the respondents 5 to 8 and handed it over to the petitioner. The Panchanama recorded that the respondents 5 to 8 were present but declined to sign it and that possession was restored to the petitioner in the presence of the said respondents.
(viii) Respondents 5 to 8 thereafter filed OS No. 35 of 1986 (on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy at Saroornagar), for a declaration that they acquired title to the suit lands by possession adverse to Y. Ranuma now represented by Chandraiah (the petitioner herein). By the judgment and decree dated 31.1.1994, the suit was dismissed with costs. In dismissing the suit the Civil Court recorded the following findings on facts:
(a) That the Panchanama dated 21.1.1986 (Ex.B6 in the suit) is a public document, genuine and bona fide and establishes the delivery of possession of the schedule land to the defendant (petitioner herein) from the plaintiffs (R5 to R8 herein).
(b) The plaintiffs failed to establish how the protected tenant lost possession and how they acquired possession of the suit land.
(c) The civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the order of the Tahsildar, Hayatnagar, a Tribunal under the Act, particularly as the order was confirmed in appeal by the Joint Collector, in revision by the High Court and by the Supreme Court too by way of dismissal of the SLP.
(d) The plaintiffs' claim that only paper possession was delivered to Chandraiah is unsustainable. The oral testimony of PWs.4 to 6 that the plaintiffs are in possession of the land is not worthy of credence. In view of the Panchanama (Ex.B6) the plaintiffs are not and the defendant is, in possession of the scheduled land.
(e) The plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit in view of the successive upholding of the defendant's case from the stage of the preliminary Tribunal (Tahsildar) upto the Supreme Court;
(f) Since the suit is filed for declaration of title, the civil Court has jurisdiction;
B. The petitioner's futile efforts to seek State aid for enforcement of his established right:
(ix) Ever since the delivery/restoration of possession (on 21.1.1986) under the Panchanama, the petitioner has been petitioning to the official respondents, in particular the 4th respondent (MRO) complaining that despite induction into possession his name was not entered in the Pahani of 1986-87 as a protected tenant and was seeking recording of appropriate entries in the Revenue records. There was no response. The petitioner preferred an application to the Joint Collector, RR District for an injunction against the respondents 5 to 8 from interfering with his possession of the property; for a direction to the police to provide protection to enable him to cultivate the land; a direction to the 4th respondent to incorporate the relevant entries in the Revenue records in the possessory column and for grant of a patta pass book and title deeds. The application was made in 1997 by way of appeal No. B4/8836 of 1997. He submitted another representation on 9.6.2004 to the 4th respondent for affecting necessary entries in the Revenue records and for issuance of pass books in respect of the schedule lands. By a representation dated 16.2.2005 the petitioner petitioned the District Collector, Rangareddy pleading that he was a poor and enfeebled fanner facing constant threats from trespassers, was having no means "for pleasing the bureaucrats in various levels for effecting fast movements to my file though there is a verdict of Hon'ble Apex Court of India in my favour"; seeking police aid to protect his possession; and for issuance of pass books with incorporation of the necessary entries in the Revenue records. He submitted another representation on 22.11.2005 to the 4th respondent by way of a reminder seeking issuance of pass books and entries in the revenue registers.
(x) On 30.11.2005 the 4th respondent addressed the District Collector, RR District, informing that he had written to the 3rd respondent (Hayatnagar PS) by a letter dated 21.2.2005, to provide police aid to the petitioner to carry out agricultural operations; and that meanwhile the (present) writ petition was filed
(xi) On 21.1.2006 the 4th respondent addressed the 3rd respondent to inform that on local inquiry and as per the statement of the neighbouring pattadars, the possession of the schedule lands was now with the respondents 5 to 8.
(xii) The petitioner had addressed several complaints (earlier) to the respondents 1 to 4 herein dated 14.8.1990 (to R3), 27.2.2003 (to R1), 8.4.2003 (to the DSP, RR District), 16.11.2001 (to R4), 16.3.2003 (to the Joint Collector, RR District), 6.5.2003 (to R4), 27.5.2003 (to R1) and 24.6.2005 (to R1). There are also on record letters addressed by the 4th respondent to the 3rd respondent dated 21.2.2005 to provide police aid to the petitioner for his agricultural operations and another dated 13.5.2003.
(xiii) On 27.5.2003 the 3rd respondent informed the 4th respondent that the persons who are harassing and threatening the petitioner are in physical possession of the land and that the land should be vacated and handed over to the petitioner. The 3rd respondent also stated that the police are ready to provide protection if the 4th respondent intimates the date and time for ensuring vacant possession and is willing to be present to ensure handing over of the possession to the petitioner (protected tenant) for his agricultural operations.
(xiv) The 4th respondent thereupon issued a memo on 4.6.2003 to the Assistant MRJ, Hayatnagar, to accompany the police to ensure police aid to enable the petitioner to cultivate his lands.
On 7.5.2003 the 3rd respondent had addressed the 4th respondent stating that the police aid would be provided (to the petitioner) if the 4th respondent is present. On 31.5.2005 the 4th respondent addressed the 3rd respondent stating that the 4th respondent would be present at 5 p.m. on 4.6.2005 and that police aid should therefore be provided at that time for enabling the petitioner to pursue his agricultural operations.
(xv) There was however no police protection provided to the petitioner. On 12.12.2005 the petitioner petitioned the respondents 3 and 4 to take necessary steps for protecting his rights in respect of the land in question. He specifically alleged in this petition that respondents 5 to 8 and their henchmen and family members along with antisocial elements are threatening and preventing him from pursuing his agricultural operations. He also stated that the 3rd respondent had promised to provide police protection but no such protection was provided and that he is submitting this petition in the light of the interim order of this Court dated 8.12.2005 in this writ petition.
(xvi) On 15.1.2006 Cr. No. 30 of 2006 was registered on the file of the 3rd respondent-PS against respondents 5 to 8 and eight other under Sections 447, 188, 504, 506 read with Section 34 IPC. On 22.1.2000 Cr. No. 46 of 2006 was registered under Sections 147, 447, 437 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC against the respondents 5 to 8 and some others. Another FIR 131 of 2006 was registered on 15.3.2006 by the 3rd respondent under Sections 447, 324 and 34 IPC against some family members of the respondents 5 to 8.
3. The 4th respondent has filed a counter-affidavit admitting to the fact relating to the status of the petitioner as the protected tenant, pursuant to the orders of the several authorities under the Act; that the orders were confirmed through the revision in this Court and the dismissal of the SLP preferred by the respondents 5 to 8 in the Supreme Court; that possession was delivered to the petitioner on 21.1.1996; that the suit OS No. 35/86 filed by the respondents 5 to 8 for declaration of title and permanent injunction was dismissed; the said judgment has become final; and that if the petitioner is unable to protect his possession and raise crop because of the illegal and unlawful conduct of the respondents 5 to 8, the petitioner should seek protection either from the police or from the competent Civil Court by instituting a civil suit against those persons. The 4th respondent further stated in his counter that on his part he had forwarded the petitioner's request for police protection to the concerned police officials. (The 4th respondent was unmindful of his statutory obligations under Section 32 of the Act).
4. On behalf of the respondents 5 to 8, the 8th respondent has filed an affidavit dated 22.1.2006. This affidavit admits that the respondents 5 to 8 had lost the litigation under the Act all through to the Supreme Court; that the suit filed by them was also dismissed. They nevertheless claim to have been in continuous possession of the land all through and claim that the Pahanis verify such possession. They plead that possession of the schedule land was never delivered to the petitioner on 21.1.1986. They contend that though they lost the litigation comprehensively under the provisions of the Act, their possession and enjoyment is intact and has not so far been disturbed. These respondents urge that since they are in possession they cannot be dispossessed without following the procedure of law. They reiterate that have they perfected their title by adverse possession. They claim continuous possession on the strength of Pahanis which allegedly certify their continuous possession. These respondents also contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction to execute the orders passed under Section 32 of the Act; that the petitioner has no right over the schedule land; and that no relief could be granted to him.
5. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit on 9.9.2006. The petitioner seriously disputes the reports of the respondents 3 and 4 and alleges that the 4th respondent had sent up a false report to the 3rd respondent in collusion with the respondents 5 to 8 with a dishonest intention of helping the party respondents and to subvert the orders of the authorities under the Act, of this Court in the CRP and of the Supreme Court (dismissing the SLP filed on behalf of the respondents 5 to 8). The petitioner pleads that the respondents 5 to 6 trespassed into the schedule land by breaking the stone pillar fencing and on the basis of the complaint by the petitioner and after due investigation, the 3rd respondent had registered Cr. Nos. 157/06 and 429/06 and another on 15.5.2006. The petitioner categorically asserts that the inaction of the respondents 1 to 3 in extending protection and aid to safeguard his possession of the schedule land constitutes a failure of the State in implementing the law declared between the parties i.e., the petitioner and the respondents 5 to 8.
6. Mr. Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned Counsel (for the respondents 5 to 8) submits that the relief (as claimed) cannot be granted; the writ petition seeks grant of police protection to the petitioner for conducting his agricultural operations; no such relief could be granted is the defence. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharamananda Theertha Padar . Particular reliance is placed by Mr. Venkataramana on the observations in Para 17 of this judgment, which reads as follows:
(17.) A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a Court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil Court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.
7. In Murlidharan's case (supra), the relevant facts were that the respondent (before the Supreme Court) filed a writ petition seeking police protection claiming to be the Mathadhipathi of "Vadayampadi Ashramam". Earlier he filed OS No. 71 of 2000 (Court of Civil Judge Junior Division), for a declaration that he was the Mathadhipathi; entitled to continue in the said capacity and alleging that he is not being permitted to discharge the duties of his office. The suit was dismissed. It was the case of the appellant (before the Supreme Court) that the General Body of the Seva Sangham had resolved on 7.1.2001 to amend the Deed of Trust and had provided for abolition of the post of Mathadhipathi and to vest the powers and duties of Mathadhipathi in the President of the Seva Sangham. There was thus a dispute as to whether the respondent was a Mathadhipathi. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (in the writ petition filed by the respondent) went into the question of the entitlement of the respondent; declared his entitlement to being the Mathadhipathi; and allowed the writ petition directing the police to grant adequate and effective protection. The appellants (respondents in the writ petition) preferred the appeal to the Supreme Court. The observations in Para-17 (extracted above), were made by the Supreme Court in the above factual context. It must be noticed that the apex Court clearly implied (in Para-17) that a writ is maintainable on a complaint that a party had not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner or when a party was deliberately flouting the decree or order and the police authorities were not providing him the required protection in terms of the decree or order, passed by a Court having jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's ruling is that no writ (of mandamus) could be granted directing protection in respect of property, status or right which has not been adjudicated upon. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court's observations are also to the effect that the determination as to the existence of a right or status in respect of property must be after a process of adjudication and in an appropriately instituted civil suit. What the Supreme Court ratio clearly prohibits (under the rubric of mandamus) is a direction to the police to protect a mere claim for possession of property without the right to property having been established in an appropriate substantive adjudicatory process. The observations in Para-18 in Muralidharan's case (supra), fortify this analysis. The Supreme Court pointed out that in the case before it, several disputed questions based on the Deed of Trust and arising out of the facts pleaded by the writ petitioner and controverted by the other side, require to be resolved and therefore no relief should have been granted in the writ petition.
8. In the case on hand, by the order dated 8.12.1980 (of the Tahsildar) the petitioner was declared the successor to his father - the deceased protected tenant Y. Ramana. The Tahsildar had also declared the possession of the respondents 5 to 8 to be unlawful. This decision had become final. The application of the petitioner under Section 32(1) of the Act (seeking restoration of possession) was allowed by the Tahsildar on 26.12.1980. The appeal of the respondents 5 to 8 was rejected by the order of the Joint Collector dated 15.11.1982. The revision CRP No. 1452/83 preferred by the respondents 5 to 8 (against the order of the Joint Collector) was dismissed by this Court on 24.4.1985. The SLP filed by the respondents 5 to 8 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 23.8.1985. OS No. 35/86 (instituted by the respondents 5 to 8 seeking declaration of title by adverse possession) was dismissed on 31.1.1994 by the Additional Subordinate Judge, RR District. That decision has also become final. In the judgment in OS No. 35/80 the civil Court rejected the claim of respondents 5 to 8 that possession was factually restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986 under a panchanama. The civil Court clearly recorded a finding that physical possession was delivered to the petitioner from the respondents 5 to 8.
9. In substance it is the effectuation of such successively adjudicated and comprehensively declared right (by the statutory Tribunals and the Courts) and the deployment of the coercive process of the State to effectuate the declaration and restoration of possession by Courts and Tribunals of competent jurisdiction, that is sought in this writ petition. The observations in Para-17 of Muralidharan's case (supra), far from supporting the defense of respondents 5 to 8 comprehensively supports the petitioner's case and the observations and underlying principles compel this Court to direct the police and the State to grant police aid to effectuate and enforce the order of the Tahsildar as confirmed in the appeal by the Joint Collector, as further confirmed in the revision by this Court and as ultimately confirmed by the dismissal of SLP preferred by the respondents 1 to 8 and further judicially verified by the dismissal of OS No. 35/86 (preferred by the respondents 5 to 8).
10. The conduct of the respondents 5 to 8 in interfering with the right, title, possession and enjoyment of the schedule land so comprehensively, conclusively and successively declared by the Tribunals and Courts of competent jurisdiction, is a conduct that is inconsistent with the membership of a civilized society and subvert the rule of law. Once a Tribunal or a Court of competent jurisdiction declares a right in a party, it is the duty of the State in every relevant facet of its functioning to effectuate such declaration and ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the declared right.
11. Such is the fundamental purpose of an organized State and of a constitutional Government. This is also the normative justification for the State to collect taxes from citizens to support the behemoth of the Governmental structure. It is the fundamental incident of law and order and good governance function of the Executive to deploy State force to enforce the decrees, directions and orders of Courts or Tribunals of competent jurisdiction; to restrain persons like respondents 5 to 8 from defying judicial or quasi judicial declarations. Despite the Tahsildar having restored possession to the petitioner on 21.1.1986 (a restoration of possession verified under a panchanama drawn up on the said date and declared to have been duly executed - by the civil Court in OS No. 35/86), the respondents 5 to 8, in utter defiance of the command of the Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction (the Tahsildar under Section 32 of the Act), are seen to exercise brute physical force, threatening the petitioner and interfering with his lawful possession and enjoyment of the property. The dispossession of the petitioner (as is claimed by the respondents 5 to 8) even if true is thus only subsequent to 31.1.1994. Such defiance of the lawful authority of the State by the respondents 5 to 8 cannot be countenanced and if not effectively restrained by exercise of lawful State power, would debilitate the exercise of the Sovereign power of the Republic of which the State is a constituent. The conduct of the respondents 5 to 8 is subversive of all fundamental assumptions of the Rule of Law.
12. No rights of the petitioner either to title, possession, enjoyment or otherwise remain to be adjudicated. They have already been adjudicated in successive of orders of Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and by Courts including the Apex Court. The further litigative adventures of the respondents 5 to 8 have also met their Waterloo in the dismissal of OS No. 35/86.
13. Exercising statutory power, authority and jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Act the Tahsildar by the order dated 31.3.1982 directed restoration of possession to the petitioner from the respondents 5 to 8. This is an order of a duly constituted statutory Tribunal. It is the duty of the State to employ the fullness and plenitude of State power to aid and enforce the order of the Tahsildar, particularly as the order was confirmed right up to the Supreme Court.
14. The repeated and relentless representations by the petitioner to the several authorities were not responded to with the seriousness of purpose and expedition as is obligated and expected by law. The negligence of the State and of its various officers had emboldened the respondents 5 to 8 to run amuck and persistently defy the lawful authority and the solemn declaration and injunctions of a statutory Tribunal. Not only has the petitioner suffered and continuously as a consequence, the authority of the State has also been dented. But for such continuous abdication of executive responsibility by the State and its officers, neither would the petitioner have suffered incessant deprivation nor the respondents 5 to 8 become so brazen.
15. This Court as the sentinel on the qui vive cannot remain impassive to the cooperative subversion of lawful authority - a product of co-operation between the lawless conduct of the respondents 5 to 8 and the chronic apathetic conduct of the hierarchy of State officials. This Court is obligated to administer the corrective and direct the executive to effectuate the rights of the petitioner as by law declared and to restrain the respondents 5 to 8 from defying and subverting such declared rights. This is the justification and purpose for which judicial authority vests in this Court under Article 226 of our Constitution. The will of the Republic must prevail over the lawlessness of the respondents 1 to 8. There is no other way. The writ must therefore issue.
16. It requires to be noticed that in P. Anil Kumar and Ors. v. The Joint Collector, Rangareddy District at Hyderabad and Ors. 1988 (2) ALT 583, a Division Bench of this Court considering the scope of Sections 32 and 40 of the Act held that the power of the Tahsildar under Section 32 is vast and inclusive, not merely preventive or prohibitive and extends to restoring his lost possession including by granting interim injunction in favour of the protected tenant. The Division Bench further held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction in this matter.
17. On behalf of the respondents 5 to 8 reliance is also placed on the decision in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs v. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs and Anr. . The ratio of this decision is that under Indian law a person in peaceful possession which amounts to "settled possession" is entitled to retain his possession. The Apex Court held that settled or effective possession of a person even without title would entitle him to protect his possession even against the true owner unless he is evicted in the due course of law. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. In Para-9 the Supreme Court reiterated the test to be adopted as a working rule of determining the attributes of 'settled possession'. The Court affirmed these tests enunciated earlier in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab .
18. The principle laid down in Rame Gowda denies entitlement to the petitioner to recover his possession of the schedule land from the respondents 5 to 8, by employing force. Does the Rame Gowda ratio prohibit a direction as sought in this writ petition is an altogether different question.
19. In the case on hand the petitioner's entitlement to possession and enjoyment of land was declared by the certificate and order of the Tahsildar dated 8.12.1980. By a subsequent order dated 31.3.1982 the Tahsildar exercising his consecrated statutory power and jurisdiction (under Section 32 of the Act) directed restoration of possession to the petitioner. This order of the statutory Tribunal was confirmed by all relevant quasi judicial and judicial authorities. As a result the petitioner is entitled and the respondents 5 to 8 disentitled, to possession of the schedule lands. These respondents may not interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the schedule land by the petitioner. Yet they have done so, relentlessly and with manifest impunity. The Executive authority of the State is required to ensure the continued protection of the petitioner from transgression of the declared right, by the respondents 5 to 8. The State failed to do so despite repeated representations of the petitioner (which have been chronicled in this judgment). The physical force of the respondents 5 to 8 cannot prevail over the lawful authority of the State to the extent the petitioner's right to possession and enjoyment of the schedule land has been declared. To countenance such a proposition would be to obfuscate the seminal principles of constitutional Government. The law of the jungle would overtake the Rule of Law. That ought not to be.
20. The respondents 5 to 8 reiterate that they have acquired title to the property by adverse possession. In view of the findings recorded in OS No. 35/86 (judgment and decree dated 31.1.1994 of the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, RR District) [a judgment inter paries] the petitioner's possession was restored on 21.1.1986. The petitioner never acquiesced in the unlawful use of force by the respondents 5 to 8 in depriving him of his possession. The petitioner was consistently representing to the Revenue and Police authorities and complaining as to the unlawful conduct of the respondents 5 to 8. The Executive authority of the State defaulted in its constitutional and legal duty, to give full faith and credit to the orders of the statutory and judicial authorities; failed to enforce the quasi judicial and judicial declarations by employing the coercive power of the State to effectively and expeditiously protect the lawfully restored possession of the petitioners. Abdication of a constitutional function by the State, despite persistent requisition by a citizen cannot feed a new head of substantive right that constitutes title in favour of the respondents 5 to 8. The claim of the respondents 5 to 8 to have acquired prescriptive title to the schedule land has been rejected clearly and comprehensively in the judgment of this Court dated 21.4.1985 in CRP No. 1452/83 and in the judgment dated 31.1.1994 in OS No. 35/86 (by the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, RR District). In sub-paras (ix) to (xvi) above (The Chronology of Facts) the several representations and petitions of the petitioner to the State - the Police and Revenue authorities, has been set out. The petitioner has not at all been indolent or remiss in pursuing his remedies. The respondents 5 to 8 cannot legitimately and gainfully claim title by adverse possession and at any rate for a period which confers a title in these respondents. The respondents have no lawful defence to this writ petition.
21. Respondents 5 to 8 have pleaded and Sri Venkataramana their learned Counsel has urged at the hearing, that the petitioner cannot seek relief under Article 226. According to these respondents, the only course available to the petitioner is to again apply to the Tahsildar for possession under Section 32 or to seek injunctive relief before the civil Court of competent jurisdiction. This contention on behalf of the respondents 5 to 8 does not commend acceptance by this Court. Section 99 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court - to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar and no order of the Tahsildar made under the Act could be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. Section 98 of the Act consecrates power and authority in the Collector to summarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land, to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled, under the provisions of the Act. Section 32 confers power and authority in the Tahsildar to restore lost possession (of the protected tenant) including by way of grant of interim injunction. The jurisdiction of the civil Court is therefore comprehensively excluded (insofar as the petitioner's substantive grievance is concerned), by specific legislative ouster of jurisdiction. Insofar as the Tahsildar is concerned, he had already passed an order on 31.3.1982 directing restoration of possession to the petitioner from the party respondents herein. Possession was restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986. Despite these proceedings and executive action by duly constituted statutory authority, the respondents 5 to 8 have interfered with the petitioner's possession and peaceful enjoyment of the property and now claim to have been in continuous possession. These respondents again claim that no factual possession was restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986, despite the clear finding recorded by the civil Court in OS No. 35/86.
22. The respondents 5 to 8 are thus seen to adopt a strategy of employing brazen and unlawful use of force to deprive the petitioner of his legal desserts, complacent in the belief that the functionally slow and tardy process of the statutory remedy available under the provisions of the Act and administered by an apathetic executive branch, would entrench and perpetuate their illegal and unlawful occupation of the petitioner's property. On and since the death of the petitioner's father (in 1960), the respondents (5 to 8) had illegally and forcibly dispossessed the petitioner and occupied the property. This was put an end to, formally by the order of the Tahsildar dated 3.11.1982 and possession was factually restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986. Even thereafter and despite their suit OS No. 35/86 being dismissed on 31.1.1994, the respondents 5 to 8 continue their lawless pursuits. Now they claim that the petitioner can only go back to the Tahsildar to reclaim his possession. The respondents 5 to 8 are seen to mock at the Rule of Law; at social order as by law established and administered; and at the integrity of the legal process. The majesty of law qua the beneficent provisions of the Act (legislatively crafted to ensure a level playing field between the wealthy and powerful landlords and the poor and enfeebled tenants) has been relentlessly under attack by the respondents 5 to 8 and their motley crowd of lawless companions.
23. It is the constitutional obligation of this Court to issue a mandamus to enforce the established legal right of the citizen. The petitioner has an adjudicated and duly declared legal right to continue in possession and to peacefully enjoy the schedule land. The respondents 5 to 8 have conclusively suffered a declared disentitlement to be in possession and enjoyment of these lands. These declared rights and the corollary obligations (of the petitioner and of the respondents 5 to 8) could and must be enforced by issuing a mandamus to the State to deploy State power to enforce the declarations and orders of statutory and legal authorities. The above contention of the respondents 5 to 8 is accordingly rejected. No other contention or defence is urged by or on behalf of the respondents 5 to 8 except what have been recorded and dealt with in this judgment.
The Mandamus:
For the aforesaid reasons and on the aforesaid analysis the respondents 1 to 3, in particular the 1st respondent is directed to forthwith and in any event within three days from today, restore the possession of the petitioner to an extent of Ac.4.29 gts, in Sy. No. 281; Ac. 1.16 gts in Sy.No.282 and Ac. 1.26 gts, in Sy.No.285, Kuntloor Village, RR District, by evicting, if warranted, respondents 5 to 8 from the lands. The 4th respondent shall whenever directed by the 1st respondent be available to assist and co-ordinate with the 1st respondent or to his direction for effectuating this order. The 1st respondent shall further deploy and keep deployed adequate police force in requisite strength to protect, defend and effectuate the possession of the petitioner in respect of the schedule land, to enable peaceful pursuit of agricultural operations by the petitioner in relation to the lands in question and to prevent unlawful interference by or on behalf of the respondents 5 to 8 herein. Such deployment shall continue at least for a period of 12 months from the date of restoration of possession to the petitioner under this order.
As the respondents 5 to 8 have brazenly, incessantly, without any justification in law and in flagrant defiance of the Rule of Law and binding declaration and direction of duly constituted statutory Tribunals (the Tahsildar and the Joint Collector); of the Courts (this Court and the Supreme Court) and the competent Civil Court (in OS No. 35/86), interfered with the possession and enjoyment by the petitioner in relation to the schedule land and have defied lawful authority, the writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) payable by the respondents 5 to 8 jointly and severally. Of these costs Rs. 50,000/- shall be paid to the petitioner and Rs. 50,000/- to the Secretary, AP State Legal Services Authority, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad. The costs shall be paid by the respondents 5 to 8 within a period of four week from today. A copy of this order be furnished to the Secretary, A.P. State Legal Services Authority, for information.
24. The writ petition is allowed as above with costs.