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[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Telangana High Court

C. Kalyan vs The State Of Telangana on 15 December, 2020

Author: M.S.Ramachandra Rao

Bench: M.S. Ramachandra Rao

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

                                     AND

      THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD


Interlocutory Application No.1 of 2018 in WPMP.No.23686 of 2016 in
                   Writ Petition No.19303 of 2016
                                      and
                      Writ Petition No.19303 of 2016;
                                      and

     Interlocutory Application No.2 of 2020 in Writ Petition No.4311 of 2020
                                      and
                       Writ Petition No.4311 of 2020


COMMON ORDER :

(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao) Both these Writ Petitions are filed by the same petitioner in relation to mutation by the Revenue Authorities of property admeasuring Ac.7.27 gts in Survey No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District purchased by the petitioner under registered Sale Deeds and refusal of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation to grant construction permission to the petitioner. Therefore, they are being disposed of by this Common Order.

2. According to petitioner, he had purchased an extent of Acs.7.27 gts. in Survey No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District under registered Sale Deeds bearing Doc. No.3095/06 dt.13.02.2006 from Burugupally Sivaramakrishna, Doc.No.1992/04 from Vishnuvardhan Reddy and G.B. Rajendra Prasad and Doc.No.7209/15 from Singanamala Ramesh Babu.

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3. Thereafter, according to petitioner, (i) for Acs.2.00 in Survey No.80/A, orders were passed vide proceeding No.B/186/2009 dt.29.06.2009 directing mutation of petitioner's name, (ii) for Ac.0.27 gts. in Survey No.80/A vide proceedings No.B/184/2009 dt.29.06.2009 in favour of petitioner's vendor G.B. Rajendra Prasad, and (iii) for Acs.5.00 in Survey No.80/A vide proceedings No.B/187/2009 dt.29.06.2009, in favour of petitioner's vendor Singanamala Ramesh Babu's name.

4. In spite of the same, petitioner contends that they were not carried out and implemented in the Pahani patrikas and in other Revenue Records.

5. Petitioner submitted representation on 04.04.2016 to the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the Dy. Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District along with an application in Form - VI to grant mutation of his name basing on the sale deeds and to change the entries in the Revenue Records including the Pahani patrikas by deleting the name of the Government therefrom stating that the State Government had lost title to this land in O.S.A.No.18 of 2010 on 01.02.2011 rendered by this Court and in S.L.P. (Civil) No.22420 of 2011 on 26.11.2013 by the Supreme Court arising out of C.S.No.14 of 1958.

6. The said Officers did not take any action.

7. Petitioner gave another representation on 27.04.2016 to the same effect enclosing an order dt.17.03.2016 passed by this Court in ::3:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 W.P.No.15056 of 2014 for the adjacent Survey No.77 of Hafeezpet Village wherein it had directed the respondents to delete the name of the State Government and incorporate the name of petitioner in all Revenue Records including pahani patrikas.

8. Nothing was done by the respondents on the said representation also.

9. Petitioner also submitted application for construction permission to the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation which rejected it on 21.05.2016 stating that the land is shown as Government land in Maabhoomi website.

W.P.No.19303 of 2016

10. Petitioner therefore filed W.P.No.19303 of 2016 challenging the non-consideration of the petitioner's representations dt.04.04.2016 and 27.04.2016 by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the Dy. Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and also the order dt.21.05.2016 passed by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation refusing to grant municipal permission for construction.

Order dt.22.2.2017 in WPMP.No.23686 of 2016 in W.P.No.19303 of 2016

11. Petitioner had filed WPMP.No.23686 of 2016 in W.P.No.19303 of 2016 to direct the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the Dy. Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to grant mutation in his favour as per representations ::4:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 dt.04.04.2016 and 27.04.2016 and incorporate his name as owner and possessor in all the Revenue Records including the pahanies and Maabhoomi website basing on the registered Sale Deeds in his favour, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.

12. On 22.02.2017, this Court passed an interim direction as prayed by relying on the interim order passed on 17.08.2016 in W.A.No.579 of 2016 filed by the State challenging the order dt.17.03.2016 in W.P.No.15056 of 2014 observing that incorporation of the names of petitioners in the Revenue Records and alienation by them of the subject lands, shall be subject to the result of the Writ Petition, and in any document alienating the subject property, petitioner shall specify that such alienation is subject to the result of the Writ Petition. I.A.No.1 of 2018 (vacate stay application) filed by the State and others

13. I.A.No.1 of 2018 is filed by the State of Telangana (1st respondent), the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District (2nd respondent) and the Dy. Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (3rd respondent) to vacate the order dt.22.02.2017 in WPMP.No.23686 of 2017 in WP.No.19303 of 2016. Memo No.B/1565/2017 dt.09.06.2017 issued by the 3rd respondent refusing to implement the mutation orders/affect mutation in petitioner's favor

14. The Dy. Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, (3rd respondent) issued Memo No.B/1565/2017 dt.09.06.2017 refusing to implement the above mutation orders in the Revenue Records on the ::5:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 ground that the subject land is covered by C.S.No.14 of 1958 and had vested with the Government; that the said land is part of land belonging to Kurshid Jah Paigah which was Jagir land; and that on abolition of Jagirs as per Section 4 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Jagirs Regulation, 1358 Fasli, it vested with the State Government. It is also stated that no final decree had been passed in C.S.No.14 of 1958 till date and an interim order was passed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.17362 - 17363 / 2014 directing M/s.Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd. and others who filed it not to create any further third-party interest and prohibiting the petitioners therein from approaching any other Court and further directing that any other suit or proceedings pending in any Court in India, shall await the verdict of the said Special Leave Petition.

W.P.No.4311 of 2020.

15. Assailing this order, petitioner filed W.P.No.4311 of 2020. Contentions of counsel for petitioner in W.P.No.4311 of 2020.

16. Sri V. Srinivas, counsel for petitioner in W.P.No.4311 of 2020 referred to Rule 30 of the Rules framed under the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Rules, 1989 framed under A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Book Act, 1971 which mandated as under :

"30. As and when the Record or Rights are prepared or brought upto date or rectified or maintained, such entry shall be brought into the village records."
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17. He contended that once mutation orders have been passed in favour of petitioner and his vendors as mentioned above, there is no choice left with the 3rd respondent to refuse to implement the same in the Pahani patrikas and other village Revenue Records. According to him, the 3rd respondent has no discretion not to comply with Rule 30 and he is bound to comply with it.
18. He further contended that petitioner had filed CC.No.2056 of 2017 in this Court stating that issuing the Memo on 09.06.2017 by the 3rd respondent is in violation of the interim orders passed by this Court on 22.02.2017 in WPMP.No.23686 of 2016 in WP.No.19303 of 2016 and a counter was filed therein and also in the Writ Petition No.19303 of 2016 that petitioner had not challenged the order dt.09.06.2017 passed by the 3rd respondent, and so, the petitioner has filed WP.No.4311 of 2020.
19. He also pointed out that SLP (C) No.17362 - 17363 of 2014 had been disposed of on 02.09.2015 itself and the order quoted by the 3rd respondent in his Memo dt.09.06.2017 no longer survives; that the Supreme Court in the final order passed in the SLPs had directed the Bombay High Court where Suit No.643 of 2014 was pending between the parties to the SLPs to dispose of an interlocutory application filed therein by the 1st respondent in the SLP; and the suit was ultimately compromised on 28.04.2017.
20. He also contended that the plea regarding the subject land being part of Jagir land belonging to Kurshid Jah Paigah was raised by the ::7:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 Jagir Administrator as defendant no.43 and the State of Andhra Pradesh as defendant no.53 in the Suit C.S.No.14 of 1958; the lands in Hafeezpet Village were mentioned as item No.37 of Schedule IV annexed to the Suit; the State as well as the Jagir Administrator claimed the suit lands by filing Written Statement, but preliminary decree was passed on 28.06.1963 rejecting their claim by holding that the lands are Matruka properties of Kurshid Jah Paigah and available for partition; Government later filed Application No.44 of 1982 to delete Hafeezpet Village and some other lands from the preliminary decree, but the same was dismissed on 18.12.1982; the State of Andhra Pradesh then filed O.S.A.No.19 of 1985 before the Division Bench of A.P. High Court which was dismissed on 24.12.1999; S.L.P. (Civil) No.7052 of 2000 filed against the said order was withdrawn by the State Government with liberty to file appeal against the preliminary decree passed in C.S.No.14 of 1958 on 28.06.1963; the State Government filed OSA.(SR).No.3526 and 3527of 2000 before a Division Bench challenging the preliminary decree, but they were also dismissed on 07.02.2001; and the State Government filed SLP. (Civil) No.10622 and 10623 of 2001 in the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 16.07.2001.
21. He also contended that when the decree holders obtained orders for recognition of the sale, impleadment, for grant of mutation in Revenue Records and for delivery of possession of the land, the State of A.P. filed O.S.A.Nos.19 to 26 of 2001 which were dismissed on ::8:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 24.08.2001; the State Government filed S.L.P.Nos.4463 to 4470 of 2002 in the Supreme Court which were also dismissed on 08.04.2002.

22. He stated that thereafter the State Government formed a Special Committee with regard to lands in C.S.No.14 of 1958 and after obtaining legal opinion of the then Advocate-General and the Chief Commissioner for Land Administration issued Memo No.28908/JA1/2004-01 dt.05.11.2004 permitting the Collector, Ranga Reddy District to affect the mutation in the land records in respect of lands in Survey No.80 of Hafeezpet Village also along with other survey numbers in the said village and in Hydernagar Village.

23. He also placed reliance on the letter No.G1/2504/2009 dt.04.02.2010 issued by the Collector, Ranga Reddy District addressed to the Metropolitan Commissioner, Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority issuing 'No Objection Certificate' to the petitioner's vendor B. Sivaramakrishna.

24. He stated that the land in Survey No.80 and 78 of Hafeezpet Village were allotted to Defendant Nos.157 and 206 in equal halves vide report dt.13.07.1984 of the Advocate-Receiver appointed by this Court in C.S.No.14 of 1958; that Defendant No.206 had executed assignment deeds in favour of I. Sudarshan Rao and others and had also given consent for passing of final decree by way of settlement; in Application No.420 of 2010 on 23.06.2010, though a learned Single Judge declined to pass final decree in respect of Ac.115.00 in Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, the said order was reversed by a ::9:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 Division Bench in O.S.A.No.18 of 2010 on 01.02.2011 and the Division Bench passed final decree in Application No.42 of 2010 in favour of vendors of the petitioner.

25. He also quoted the following passage in the order dt.01.02.2011 of the Division Bench in O.S.A.No.18 of 2010 wherein the Division Bench observed as under :

"In a final decree appeal, the correctness of the preliminary decree cannot be gone into when the appealing party has not filed an independent appeal against the preliminary decree. However, we are afraid that we are bound by the orders that were passed in the suit by co-ordinate Division Benches and the Apex Court and hence we refrain from making any comment about the correctness of the orders. We hold that the State had raised all contentions which include the tenure of the land being Jagir / Inam in the earlier round of litigation and failed. It has also failed in Review Petitions filed by it. The argument of the State that the release orders were not passed as contemplated by the preliminary decree, was also rejected by the co- ordinate Benches. Hence, we hold that the contentions that are canvassed by the State before the learned single Judge and reiterated before us, are devoid of any merit and they stood rejected earlier in the various orders referred by us in the foregoing paragraphs. Finality of a proceeding is the foundational bedrock in a civil litigation and parties cannot be allowed to take defences in piecemeal or by installments from time to time. Thus, viewed from any angle, we are unable to accept the findings of the learned single Judge. We further hold that the learned single Judge has outstepped the jurisdiction in formulating the points for consideration / issues at a final decree stage. Suffice it to say that the order under appeal is unsustainable in law."

26. He also stated that SLP (Civil) No.22420 of 2011 filed by the Jagir Administrator, Government of Andhra Pradesh and another ::10:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 against Burugupally Sivaramakrishna and 2 others was dismissed on 26.11.2013.

27. He thus stated that the stand of the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in the impugned Memo dt.09.07.2017, that there is no final decree as regards Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, that the said land is Jagir land which vested in the Government, is contrary to record and the State cannot be permitted to repeatedly re-agitate the said issue to the detriment of the petitioner and decline to mutate/implement the mutation orders already passed in favour of the petitioner in the pahani patrikas and other Village Revenue Records. The contentions of the Additional Advocate General and on consideration of the same.

28. The Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents did not dispute any of the judgments referred to above or the findings therein about lack of right, title or interest of the State in the land in Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village.

29. He stated that the subject matter of this case is land in Hafeezpet village which is subject matter of C.S.No.14 of 1958 ( an original proceeding still pending on the file of this Court) and there are certain findings recorded by a Division Bench in Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. State of Telangana1 about the validity of the preliminary decree passed by the A.P High court in CS.No.14 of 1 2018 (6) ALD 160 (DB) ::11:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 1958, and that this Bench must follow the same and deny relief to the petitioner.

30. We pointed out to him that there were appeals filed in the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Division Bench in Trinity Infraventures Ltd ( 1 supra) vide. Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.(s) 24590-24592 of 2018 and that the following brief order dt.5-10-2018 was passed by the Supreme Court in the said Special Leave Petitions:

" Heard the learned senior counsel for the parties.
We are not inclined to interfere at this stage, as final decree is required to be passed.
As agreed to, we make it clear that the observations made in the impugned order by the High court shall not be used in any proceedings and shall not influence the High Court to pass final decree in accordance with law.
The observations made are hereby diluted.
The Special Leave petitions are accordingly, disposed of. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."

31. The words in the above order passed by the Supreme Court that "We make it clear that the observations made in the impugned order by the High court shall not be used in any proceeding ... The observations are diluted", clearly indicate that the said order passed in Trinity Infraventures Ltd ( 1 supra), cannot be 'used' i.e., relied on as a precedent in any other proceeding by anybody.

32. So, in our view, the said decision has no precedent value and the findings rendered therein cannot be 'used' in any proceedings including the instant Writ Petition.

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33. The Additional Advocate General grudgingly admitted that the Supreme Court on 05.10.2018 did pass the above order in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.24590 - 24592 of 2018 (which had been filed against the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Trinity Infraventures Ltd (1 supra)) but contended that notwithstanding the above order of the Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Trinity Infraventures Ltd (1 supra).

34. By asking this Bench to follow the findings/observations/decision in Trinity Infraventures Ltd (1 supra), the learned Additional Advocate General is asking us to do what the Supreme Court in it's order dt.5-10-2018 in the said SLPs expressly prohibited us from doing i.e to 'use' the verdict in Trinity Infraventures Ltd ( 1 supra) in these Writ Proceedings as a precedent, follow it and deny relief to petitioners. Obviously he wants this Bench to commit contempt of the order dt. 5-10-2018 of the Supreme Court.

35. So we cannot accept the plea of the Additional Advocate General.

36. Moreover, the said case of Trinity Infraventures Ltd ( 1 supra) was decided in relation to land in Hashmathpet village in respect of which there is no final decree passed by this Court, but in relation to land in Hafeezpet village (with which we are concerned in these Writ Petitions), a final decree was already passed by the ::13:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 Division Bench of this court in OSA No. 18 of 2010 on 1.2.2011, and SLP (Civil) No.22420 of 2011 filed by the Jagir Administrator, Government of Andhra Pradesh and another against Burugupally Sivaramakrishna and 2 others against it was dismissed on 26.11.2013. So the said observations cannot come to the aid of the respondents.

37. The learned Additional Advocate General sought to rely on the counter affidavit of the 3rd respondent which reiterated the contents of the impugned order, i.e., that the land is Jagir land, that it vested in Government, that preliminary decree only was passed but not final decree and the order of the Supreme Court on 31.10.2014 in SLP Nos.17362 - 17363 of 2014 filed by M/s Cyrus Investment Private Limited.

38. But the learned Additional Advocate General did not dispute the order of the Division Bench dt.01.02.2011 in O.S.A.No.18 of 2010 under which a final decree passed in Application No.420 of 2010 in respect of land admeasuring Ac.115.00 in Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, that the plea of the State that this land is part of Jagir land which vested in the State was noted as having been rejected in the earlier rounds of litigation up to the Supreme Court and was also not accepted by the Division Bench in O.S.A.No.18 of 2010.

39. He however did not dispute that SLP (Civil) Nos.17362 - 17363 of 2014 relied upon by the 3rd respondent were disposed of on 02.09.2015 and the interim order therein which was quoted by the 3rd respondent no longer survived after that date.

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40. Therefore, none of the above factors justify the passing of the impugned order by the 3rd respondent and it practically amounts to committing contempt of the several orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court holding that the land in Sy.No.80/A in Hafeezpet Village is not Government land. In our opinion, this is vexatious conduct on the part of the State and it cannot be permitted to ignore the several adverse orders it had suffered right from 1982 till 26.11.2013 which have all attained finality up to the Supreme Court.

41. In fact in the 3rd respondent's counter at paras 8, 9 and 10, the 3rd respondent admitted the failure of the State in asserting it's claim over the land in Hafeezpet village in several proceedings before this Court and in the Supreme Court which are placed on record by the petitioner.

42. In para 11, a plea is raised that after lapse of 16 years petitioner filed Application for incorporation of his name in the revenue record, that it is not possible to verify whether any third party interest is involved on the land and to incorporate his name in the revenue record.

This plea is absurd because for Acs.2.00 in Survey No.80/A, orders were passed vide proceeding No.B/186/2009 dt.29.06.2009 directing mutation of petitioner's name, for Ac.0.27 gts. in Survey No.80/A vide proceedings No.B/184/2009 dt.29.06.2009 in favour of petitioner's vendor G.B. Rajendra Prasad, for Acs.5.00 in Survey No.80/A vide proceedings No.B/187/2009 dt.29.06.2009, in favour of ::15:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 petitioner's vendor Singanamala Ramesh Babu's name. Petitioner is only seeking implementation of these orders in the revenue record such as pahani patriks under Rule 30 of the Rules framed in 1989 under the A.P.Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 by taking note of his subsequent purchase under the above referred sale deeds. Having regard to the language in Rule 30, in our opinion, the 3rd respondent has no choice in the matter but to implement these mutation orders, take note of petitioner's subsequent purchase and mutate his name as owner and pattadar for these lands.

43. Under Sec.8 of the above Act, the decisions of competent Civil Courts ( like the High court and the Supreme Court) on the aspect of title are binding on the State, more so, when it is a party to the said decisions and an Officer of the State cannot again insist on satisfying himself about the title of the petitioner's vendors and their predecessors who are parties in the said litigation and still insist that the subject land is State property.

44. Recently in Edelweiss Asset Construction Company Limited vs. R. Perumalswamy and Ors2, the Supreme Court considered provisions of the Tamilnadu Patta Pass Book Act 1983 which are almost in pari materia with the provisions of the Telangana Act and held;

"19. Under the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act 1983 and the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules 1987, the Tahsildar is not empowered to adjudicate upon a 'title dispute'. A combined reading of Section 14 2 MANU/SC/0562/2020 ::16:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 and Rule 4(4) indicates that where there exists a dispute with respect to ownership of a land between parties with respect to a patta entry, the correct procedure to be adopted is to approach a civil court having competent jurisdiction. The entry records will be updated on the basis of the decree of the civil court upon adjudication."

45. A Division Bench of this Court presided over by Justice G.Raghuram held in Govt. of A.P. v. Malik Sultana3 as under:

"34. ... ... the learned Attorney General has categorically urged that none of the orders (dated 15-04-2002, 06-05-2004, 31-07-2004, or the impugned memo dated 21-05-2005) flow from any authority conferred to adjudicate upon competing claims of the State on the one hand and the legal heirs/successors-in-interest of Nusrat Jung I on the other, with respect to the schedule property of Acs. 1634.35 gts in Kokapet village. Neither the counsel for the writ petitioners in W.P. No. 29063 of 2009 nor the counsel for the non-official respondents in the appeals have brought to our notice provisions of any legislation conferring power, authority or jurisdiction on the Government, the Principal Secretary or the Special Chief Secretary to adjudicate disputes between the State and the competing claimants with respect to the schedule property.
35. Judicial power is an integer of sovereign power which inheres in the superior Courts under our Constitutional presents (Articles 32, 131 to 142; Articles 225 to 228; Articles 230 to 231). The jurisdiction to adjudicate civil, criminal or other disputes are conferred on courts inferior to superior courts by Acts of the appropriate legislatures, (exercising legislative power qua the enumerated legislative fields) i.e., Article 246 read inter alia with Entry 95 of the Union List; Entry 65 of the State List; or Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Examples of such legislative conferment of judicial powers and authority are the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There are other enactments which confer jurisdiction on courts or other tribunals. Illustrations of such conferment are the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, whereunder 3 2013(2) ALD 177 = Manu/AP/0927/2012 (DB) ::17:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 power to adjudicate is conferred on Administrative Tribunals qua Article 323A; jurisdiction to decide disputes is also conferred on other Tribunals under several enactments such as the Industrial Disputes Act, the Income Tax Act, the Stamp Act, Urban and Agricultural Lands Ceiling Legislation and Sales Tax enactments of several States, Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code confers wide jurisdiction on courts to adjudicate all disputes of a civil nature except those specifically excluded by legislation.
36. In the case on hand, despite the inconsistent and often incoherent positions (evident from the orders dated 15-04-2002, 06-05-2004, 31-07-2004 and 21-05-2005), the State has doggedly adopted the position that the schedule property belongs to the State and not to the heirs of Nusrat Jung I. In the circumstances and absent any specific power conferred on any executive authority or agency to adjudicate disputes between the State on the one hand and the private claimants to the schedule property on the other, we are unable to countenance any power, authority or jurisdiction in the Government or other State actors (public officials), to adjudicate the competing claims. On this analyses and in the absence of any legislatively explicated exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the conferment of concurrent or exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction on any authority, forum or tribunal, other than the Civil Court, neither the State nor any State actor has any power or authority to determine whether the schedule property belongs to the State or to the private claimants thereto. Other issues presented by the claimants/writ petitioners are equally contested and contestable and fall for adjudication.
37. We therefore conclude that the several instruments: dated 15-04- 2002, 06-05-2004, 31-07-2004 and 21-05-2005 (impugned) have no determinative trajectory whatsoever and are neither constitutive, declaratory or deprecatory of any rights in the schedule property; either in favour of the State or in favour of the claimants (writ petitioners).
.........
39. The judgment under appeal directs the Government to reconsider the issue after notice to the petitioners. What power, authority or ::18:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 jurisdiction the Executive branch of the Government is required to exercise, to adjudicate upon competing claims of itself and of the private claimants to the schedule property, is however not delineated in the judgment under appeal.
40. Our analyses herein before leads us to conclude that no power, authority or jurisdiction, either judicial or quasi-judicial is conferred on the State Government, or on any officer of the State, whether concurrent with or to the exclusion of the indisputably available power, authority and jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 9 CPC to determine whether the schedule property belongs to the State; to the competing claimants, including the writ petitioners; or its possession is required by law to be restored to the claimants, duly considering pleas regarding the bar of limitation period."

46. These decisions are all binding on this Court.

47. Therefore we hold that respondent no.3 could not have decided about the ownership of the subject lands and declared that petitioner/his vendors had no title to it and that they are Government lands. This is because no power, authority or jurisdiction, either judicial or quasi-judicial, is conferred on the State Government, or on any officer of the State, whether concurrent with or to the exclusion of the indisputably available power, authority and jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 9 CPC to determine whether the schedule property belongs to the State or to the petitioner /petitioners' vendors.

48. A more serious issue in the case is whether the respondent no.3, as an employee of the State, can unilaterally decide the issue of title to the subject property in favor of the State at all.

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49. There can be no dispute that if employees of the State decide such issues relating to title to property in favor of the State, there would be breach of principles of natural justice as well because the issue of bias arises in such cases.

50. According to the 3rd respondent, mere possession of a registered document does not confer title. If the petitioner's predecessors-in-title have succeeded against the State in CS No.14 of 1958, petitioner would certainly get good title under registered sale deeds executed by such successful parties and the State cannot refuse to recognize the same.

51. We are of the opinion that the conduct of the 3rd respondent is wholly vexatious and that his refusal to recognize the fact that the State has no title to the land in Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village, in spite of several orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court, practically amounts to contempt of Court and cannot be countenanced.

52. We therefore have no hesitation to set aside the Memo No.B/1565/2017 dt.09.06.2017 passed by the 3rd respondent and issue a Writ of Mandamus to the 3rd respondent to implement in the revenue records the various mutation orders passed in favour of the petitioner and his vendors and incorporate petitioner's name in the pahani patrika of Hafeezpet Village in respect of the extent of Ac.7.27 guntas purchased by him and also in the official website Dharani / Maa Bhoomi within four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.

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53.    Consequently,       we      also     set   aside   the     Letter

No.56942/21/12/2015/HO dt.21.05.2016 issued by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation because such refusal was made on the basis that the Maa Bhoomi website indicates that this land falls in Government land, which is not correct.

IA.No.2 of 2020 , the implead application

54. Coming to the claim of the implead petitioner Sahebzadi Hameedunnisa Begum who disputes the title of the petitioner, and opposes implementation of the name of the petitioner in the revenue record, it is not in dispute that she had filed O.S.No.843 of 2014 before the XX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against M/s. Cyrus Investments Private Limited and 2 others to cancel the registered sale deed dt.21.05.1966 executed by her in favour of Defendants 156 and 157 in CS No.14 of 1958.

55. Defendant No.156 was HEH the Nizam of Hyderabad and Defendant No.157 was Nawab Khasim Nawaz Jung. HEH the Nizam sold away his share to M/s. Cyrus Investments Private Limited.

56. Admittedly, O.S.No.843 of 2014 got dismissed on the ground of limitation on 21.04.2017. According to the proposed party, she has challenged the same in an Appeal which is pending in the High Court.

57. It is not in dispute that M/s. Cyrus Investments Private Limited is one of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioner. Therefore, the ::21:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 proposed party cannot claim any right, title or interest in the land in Sy.No.80/A of Hafeezpet Village.

58. Further, the proposed party is claiming as legal representative of defendant No.52 in CS No.14 of 1958 who also alienated his decretal rights in favour of Defendants 156 and 157 by a sale deed Document No.2460 of 1964 dt.03.08.1964.

59. The proposed party had filed Application No.92 of 2005 in CS No.14 of 1958 to come on record as legal representative of Defendant No.52 but the said Application was dismissed on 31.07.2006 on the ground that Defendant No.52 had already sold out his share and also holding that when there is no matruka left over, as per Mohammedan Law, legal representatives cannot come on record.

60. Admittedly, she filed O.S.A.No.47 of 2006 before a Division Bench against the above order, which was dismissed on 12.06.2007. She also filed SLP (Civil) No.19811 - 19812 of 2008 which was also dismissed on 03.02.2015.

61. When her very impleadment in CS No.14 of 1958 was not allowed, she cannot seek to get impleaded in the instant Writ Petition filed for implementation of mutation orders.

62. Therefore, I.A.No.2 of 2020 is rejected. CONCLUSION

63. In the result, ::22:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020

(a) W.P.No.4311 of 2020 is allowed;

(b) the Memo No.B/1565/2017 dt.09.06.2017 passed by the 3rd respondent in W.P.No.4311 of 2020 is set aside;

(c) a Writ of Mandamus is issued to the respondents in W.P.No.4311 of 2020 to implement in the revenue records the various mutation orders passed in favour of the petitioner and his vendors and incorporate petitioner's name in the pahani patrika of Hafeezpet Village in respect of the extent of Ac.7.27 guntas purchased by him and also in the official website Dharani / Maa Bhoomi within four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order;

(d) I.A.No.2 of 2020 in W.P.No.4311 of 2020 is dismissed;

(e) W.P.No.19303 of 2016 is allowed and the Letter No.56942/21/12/2015/HO dt.21.05.2016 issued by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (4th respondent) which is challenged therein by the petitioner is set aside;

(f) the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (4th respondent) shall consider any fresh application filed by the petitioner for grant of construction permission under the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 without reference to the claim of the State of Telangana that it is Government land since such claim has been rejected on ::23:: MSR,J & TA,J wp_19303_2016& wp_4311_2020 multiple occasions by this Court and the Supreme Court in CS No.14 of 1958;

(g) consequently, Interlocutory Application No.1 of 2018 in WPMP.No.23686 of 2016 in Writ Petition No.19303 of 2016 is dismissed;

(h) the respondents 1 to 3 in W.P.No.4311 of 2020 shall also pay costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) to the petitioner.

64. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any in these Writ Petitions, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.

______________________________ M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO, J _______________________ T.AMARNATH GOUD, J Date: 15.12.2020 Ndr