Delhi High Court
Saheed Capt. D.K. Khola College Of ... vs National Council For Teacher Education ... on 20 April, 2011
Author: Dipak Misra
Bench: Chief Justice, Sanjiv Khanna
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Delivered on: April 20, 2011
+1. LPA No. 242 Of 2011
Saheed Capt. D.K. Khola College of Education ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
2. LPA No. 243 Of 2011
Kalpana Chawla College of Education for
Women & Ors. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
3. LPA No. 313 Of 2011
I.B. Women College of Education & Management ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 1 of 50
4. LPA No. 314 Of 2011
IPS School of Management and Education ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
5. LPA No. 315 Of 2011
IP College of Education ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
6. LPA No. 316 Of 2011
IPS College of Education Research & Technology ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
7. LPA No. 318 Of 2011
Shanti Niketan College of Education & Ors. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 2 of 50
8. LPA No. 320 Of 2011
Rao Kehar Singh Elementary Institute
of Education & Anr. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
9. LPA No. 358 Of 2011
Rao Udmi Ram Memorial College of Education ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Raj K. Ruhil and Mr.Vivek Malik,
Advocates.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
10. LPA No. 359 Of 2011
B.M.P. College of Education ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Raj K. Ruhil and Mr.Vivek Malik,
Advocates.
Versus
National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh
Kumar, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
1. Whether reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
3 Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? YES
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 3 of 50
DIPAK MISRA, CJ
Not for nothing it has been said, training is the first foundation of
life and better than an abstract concept. Training is fundamentally
governed by reason which is tested on the touchstone of logic and rational
acceptability. It distances itself from desire, habitual disobedience and
unfettered feelings. In a cultured society which is governed by Rule of
Law, the command of law is an imperative prescription. The collective at
large is assured of what is just and right. It ostracises any reason based on
ignorance as well as pretence. It does not countenance any allowance to
any deviation or artificially contrived path. In a State where the Rule of
Law is supreme, it is not expected to have any kind of conflict and hazard
which is hostile to it. Warren E. Burgern, in one of his addresses, had
spoken thus:-
"Rule of law places restraints on individuals and on
governments alike. This is a delicate, a fragile balance
to maintain. It is fragile because it is sustained only by
an ideal that requires each person in society, by an
exercise of free will, to accept and abide the restraints of
a structure of laws."
2. It is apt to note here that sometimes, some individuals and at other
times, some institutions managed by individuals, scandalise the role
attributed to them for imparting education and training. Sometimes, as
the factual exposé would uncurtain, the private institutions, which impart
training to the students who, in turn, become teachers and teach the
students, endeavour to create a state of instability in the name of Rule of
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 4 of 50
Law. One may not be very much wrong if it is called inadequacy and
starvation of intellect. One is reminded of the saying that if one is totally
truthful, he shall always be courageous and not labour hard to take
recourse to the over-stretched concepts and unnecessary labyrinths of
interpretation.
3. The question, a pivotal and a spinal one, that arises for
determination in this batch of appeals is whether the stand and stance
assiduously pyramided by the appellants to the extent that the Northern
Regional Committee (NCR) constituted by the Central Council under the
National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (for brevity „the Act‟) is
devoid of power and authority to carry any inspection after the recognition
is granted under Section 14 of the Act, or whether the submission of the
NCTE that the Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the
establishment of a National Council for Teachers Education with a view to
achieving planned and coordinated development of the teachers education
system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of
norms and standards in teachers education system and for matters
connected therewith, and, therefore, the power of inspection has to be an
integral part of the scheme of Section 17 of the Act.
4. The proposition that has been canvassed by the institutions
fundamentally is that once the Regional Committee grants recognition, it
has no power to do anything relating to inspection as the power
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 5 of 50
exclusively vests with the National Council for the same and, therefore,
any action for inspection by the Regional Committee is totally sans the
authority of law and deserves to be lanceted in exercise of inherent
jurisdiction of this Court. The proponement of NCTE is that the
interpretation that is placed by the institutions exposes a disturbing
phenomenon that corrodes the marrows of the educational institutions
which are concerned with imparting education to the students who, in
turn, become teachers and eventually the system of education is
slaughtered or thrown to the abysmal depth so that the term "teaching", as
is understood in the proper paradigm, would lose importance, for a
vicious atmosphere is deliberately created.
5. The aforesaid controversy, as we proceed with our deliberations,
shall gradually get unfurled and uncurtained. We may note with profit
that regard being had to the commonality of issue involved in these
appeals, they are disposed by a singular order. For the sake of clarity and
convenience, the facts in LPA No.242/2011 arising out of order dated
28.2.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.9703/2009 are
exposited herein.
6. The appellant, Saheed Capt. D.K. Khola College of Education, was
granted recognition by the National Council for Teacher Education (for
short „NCTE‟) and its functionaries for conducting four courses, namely,
B.Ed; B.Ed [Add]; D.Ed and M.Ed, in the year 2007-2008. The recognition
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 6 of 50
for each course was granted by the respondents after conducting
inspection each time and after duly verifying the availability of the
requisite infrastructural and instructional facilities. The affiliation was
granted by the University after due inspection and the appellant
institution was subject to numerous inspections before affiliation was
granted. On 4.6.2009, the NCTE conducted inspection of the appellant
institution under Section 13 of the Act. Thereafter, the respondent No.2,
namely, Northern Regional Committee (for short „NRC‟), desired to
conduct inspection of the appellant and constituted an inspection team.
When the appellant institution got the information about the inspection, a
request was made to defer the date. That apart, it was also stated that
NCTE had already conducted the inspection under Section 13 of the Act.
On 4.6.2009, a show cause notice was issued under Section 17 of the Act
purporting to withdraw the recognition of the appellant in respect of all
courses on the ground that the inspecting team was not allowed to conduct
the inspection. Thereafter, the appellant submitted its reply and requested
the NRC that it was open to inspection any time. Despite the said request,
the NRC withdrew the recognition of the appellant in respect of all
courses.
7. Being dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant preferred the
writ petition challenging the power of the Regional Committee to conduct
inspection of any recognized institution after recognition is granted under
the Act. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that the
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 7 of 50
Regional Committee does not have the power under Section 17 of the Act
or under any other provision of the Act, Rules and Regulations to conduct
an inspection once the recognition is granted by it. It was urged that the
Regional Committee is a subordinate body which exercises limited powers
under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act being a nodal regulatory body of
NCTE and, hence, could not have thought of inspecting the institution.
The further stand was when there is an express conferment of power on
the Council, the regional committee cannot assume the said power and
inspect the institution for the reason that if a statute requires a particular
thing to be done in a particular manner, the same shall be done in that
manner or not done at all. It was also put forth that the doctrine of implied
power does not get attracted while interpreting Section 17 of the Act.
8. A counter affidavit was filed by the respondents contending, inter
alia, that the Regional Committees have been empowered to grant
recognition and permissions to the institutions desirous of conducting
teachers training courses and the power also rests with the Regional
Committees to derecognize a particular institution under Section 17 of the
Act which provides for contravention of the provisions of the Act and
consequences thereof. The stand that there is no provision in Section 17 for
causing inspection is totally devoid of substance inasmuch as the Regional
Committee, on its own motion, or on any representation received from any
person, on being satisfied that any institution has contravened any of the
provisions of the Acts or the Rules, Regulations, Orders made or issued
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 8 of 50
thereunder, or any conditions subject to which recognition under sub-
section (3) of Section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15
was granted, may withdraw recognition of such recognized institution for
reasons to be recorded in writing. The satisfaction can be arrived at by
causing inspection of the institution by a team consisting of professionals /
experts in the field who, after inspection, submit their report which is
ultimately considered by the Regional Committee before proceeding
further in terms of the procedures laid down under Section 17 of the Act.
If the Regional Committee without inspection would arrive at a conclusion
that the recognition granted is to be withdrawn, the said procedure can be
termed as arbitrary. The inspection is caused in the interest of the
institution and the purpose of inspection is for fair assessment and
objective satisfaction.
9. It was contended that the writ petition had been preferred to
preempt and prevent the NCTE and NRC from going ahead with the
process of inspection in accordance with the provisions of the Act and
Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. A recognized institution can
neither deny nor obstruct the NRC from causing inspection for
ascertaining as to whether the institution concerned is complying with the
provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. The
assertion that causing of an inspection tantamounts to coercive action is
devoid of any substance and, in fact, it is an Act of preemption from
conducting an inspection. There is no right inhered as claimed in the writ
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 9 of 50
petition and, therefore, the question of infringement of the same does not
arise. It is urged that when the Regional Committee intended to cause
inspection, the institutions held a large demonstration outside the office of
the NCTE Headquarters at New Delhi and about hundred persons barged
into the room of the Chair Person of NCTE and started thumping the table
and made wild gestures against him. They wanted an assurance that
NCTE / NRC would not go ahead. The situation became very tense and
the authorities were constrained to report the matter to the police
authorities for lodging an FIR against the persons concerned. A copy of
the complaint dated 16.6.2009 written by the Under Secretary to the SHO,
I.P. Estate Police Station was brought on record as Annexure R-2. It was
put forth that the institution had already been inspected by the expert
committee constituted by the NRC on 2.7.2009 and submitted its report to
the NRC and the NRC, after considering the reports, issued show cause
notice on 4.8.2009 under Section 17 of the Act and the reply to the same
was awaited.
10. It was the stand in the return that the power of withdrawal as
engrafted under Section 17 of the Act empowers the NRC to initiate the
process for ascertaining whether a particular institution is complying with
the provisions of the Act and the provisions framed thereunder and the
Regional Committee may initiate such a process either on its own motion
or on a representation made by any person. It was also put forth that the
same is done so that there is no infraction of the statutory provisions and
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 10 of 50
further to ensure that the provisions of the Act, the Rules, Regulations and
the norms are appropriately followed.
11. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the writ petition,
the NRC, in its 155th meeting held from 23rd to 25th January, 2010, decided
to withdraw the recognition of the appellants in respect of all the three
courses and pursuant to the said decision, the NRC passed a formal order
of withdrawal of recognition of all the three courses vide Annexure A-13.
A corrigendum was issued by the NRC on 26.2.2010 deciding to keep the
order of withdrawal of recognition of the appellants in abeyance till the
outcome of the writ petition which has been pending before the learned
Single Judge.
12. At this juncture, we may reproduce the question posed by the
learned Single Judge:
"Whether under the National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993, the Regional Committee has any
power to inspect an Institution granted recognition
under the said Act or whether the power of such
inspection is only with the Council constitution under
the said Act."
After posing the said question, the learned Single Judge referred to
various provisions of the Act and certain decisions in the field and came to
hold that the contentions of the writ petitioner did not deserve acceptance
and the inspection by the Regional Committee could not be faulted
because of lack of authority as the said Committee has the power to
inspect the institution to which recognition has been granted.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 11 of 50
13. We have heard Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, learned counsel for the
appellant, and Mr. Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh Kumar, learned
counsel for the respondents.
14. Mr. Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellant has raised the
following contentions:
(a) When the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, it
was unwarranted on the part of the learned Single Judge to
incorporate something which is not there in Section 17 and thereby
entered into the field of legislation.
(b) Under the scheme of the NCTE Act, there are two statutory bodies,
namely, the Central Council and the Regional Committee. The
Council is the nodal regulatory body entrusted with vast functions
and powers under Sections 12, 13, 18 and 32 of the Act which is the
heart and soul of the statute and responsible for laying down the
norms and standards and ensuring for their compliance and further
the power to conduct inspection is conferred expressly upon the
Council under Section 13 and this power is available to the Council
alone and can be exercised after recognition has been granted to the
institutions. There is no other provision in the Act which speaks of
inspection and, hence, the post-recognition inspection would lie
with the Central Council. The said legislative intent is clear,
manifest and unambiguous and, hence, the learned Single Judge has
clearly erred in his interpretation of Section 17 of the Act.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 12 of 50
(c) Section 31 of the Act confers power on the Central Government to
make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and there is a
specific provision in sub-section (e) under which the rules are
required to be framed for the purpose of regulating the power of
inspection under Section 13. Under Section 32 of the Act, NCTE is
vested with the powers to frame regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of the Act and none of the provisions
confer any power on the Central Government or the NCTE to frame
rules or regulations for conferment of power on the Regional
Committee relating to post recognition inspection.
(d) When the power is absent in Section 17, the doctrine of implied
power cannot be implanted into it inasmuch as the said doctrine can
only be invoked in cases where when an Act confers jurisdiction to
do a particular thing, it also confers, by implication, the power of
doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially
necessary for its execution. The said doctrine can legitimately be
invoked when it is found that the duty has been imposed or the
power conferred on an authority by a statute and it is further found
that the duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised
unless some auxiliary or incidental power is presumed to exist.
When the learned Single Judge has not opined that it is absolutely
essential that the Regional Committee must possess power to
conduct inspection of recognized institutions in order to effectively
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 13 of 50
discharge its statutory obligation, to implant such power in the
language of Section 17 of the Act causes violence to the basic tenets
of statutory interpretation.
(e) The learned Single Judge has erred in holding that a statutory body,
i.e., regulatory in character, has to be given full play and, hence, to
be held to be empowered to do all things necessary to enable it to
effectively regulate what it has been constituted to regulate though
the concept of invocation of inherent power by a statutory body is
unknown to law.
(f) The NCTE Act is a self-contained code and expressly deals with all
aspects for regulating teacher education system in the country and
after grant of recognition, the Regional Committee does not have
any power to conduct inspection in order to ascertain whether the
said institution is complying with the provisions of the Act or not.
The recognition of an institution can be withdrawn strictly in
accordance with the express provisions of the Act which has been
spelt out in Section 17 of the Act and the words used under Section
17 are capable of only singular interpretation and, hence, the
interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge is absolutely
unacceptable.
(g) The learned Single Judge by the order impugned made an effort to
supply the statutory omission which is not permissible. The order of
the learned Single Judge suffers from incurable infirmity as he has
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 14 of 50
endeavoured to perceive a conflict between two provisions in a
statute and harmonise them to bring in consistency though there is
no inconsistency in the provisions. That apart, when the provisions
are absolutely plain, clear and unambiguous, the interpretation
should have been placed regard being had to be language employed.
(h) The learned Single Judge misinterpretated Section 20(6) of the Act to
come to the conclusion that the Central Council can assign certain
powers to the Regional Committee in addition to the functions
which are given under Sections 14, 15 and 17 but the statutory
authorities are required to function within the statutory framework
and there cannot be conferral of additional power which travels
beyond the statutory parameters. That apart, when the legislature
has vested the power with a superior body, the said power cannot
be carried out by a subordinate body, that is, the Regional
Committee.
The learned counsel for the appellant, to bolster the aforesaid
contentions, has placed reliance on number of citations to a few of which
we shall refer to while dwelling upon the fundamental issues.
15. Mr. Mayank Manish, learned counsel for the respondents, per-
contra, has propounded the following contentions:
(i) The term „Council‟ which has been defined in the dictionary clause
Section 1(c) to mean National Council for Teacher Education as per
Section 3(1) of the Act has to be read in a comprehensive manner to
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 15 of 50
cover Regional Committee as the Regional Committees are
constituted and established by the Council. Section 2(i) defines
recognized institution to mean an institution recognized by the
Council under Section 14 and, therefore, the term „Council‟ cannot
be restricted to the Central Council as is contended by the learned
counsel for the appellant.
(ii) Section 17 of the Act empowers the Regional Committee to
withdraw the recognition if there is contravention of the provisions
of the Act and, hence, it would be totally incompatible and absurd if
it is interpreted that the inspection has to be done only by the
National Council after the recognition is granted.
(iii) Sections 13, 14, 15 and 17 are to be read in a purposive manner to
give effect to and to carry on the purposes of the Act and not to
create impediments.
(iv) Section 20(6) empowers the Regional Committee to perform such
other functions as may be determined by the Regulations and,
therefore, to deny the said authority the power of inspection once it
had granted recognition is wholly inconceivable and, therefore, the
interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the appellant is
unacceptable.
(v) Section 21 of the Act empowers the Council to terminate the
Regional Committee and to reconstitute the Regional Committee
and till the Committee is in existence, it is inappropriate to hold that
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 16 of 50
the said Committee, despite being its original character, cannot carry
out an inspection and become a silent spectator.
(vi) The reliance on Section 31(e) is a procedural one and does not
compete or cannot be allowed to compete with the substantive
power conferred on the Regional Committee under Section 17 of the
Act.
(vii) It is difficult to think of a situation wherein only the National
Council can inspect and not the Regional Committee. On the
contrary, it would be apposite to construe that despite inspection by
the Regional Committee, the National Council can also proceed for
inspection for the purpose of achieving planned and coordinated
development of the teacher education system and may recommend
for implementation of certain aspects or to take appropriate action as
required. There may be a situation when the Regional Committees
are disbanded or terminated, and then the Council can carry on the
inspection.
16. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the bar, it is necessary to
scan the anatomy of the Act. Section 2(c) defines „Council‟ as follows:
"(c) "Council" means the National Council for Teacher
Education established under sub-section (1) of section 3;"
17. Section 2(i) defines „recognised institution‟ as follows:
"(i) "recognised institution" means an institution
recognised by the Council under section 14;"
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 17 of 50
18. Section 2(j) defines "Regional Committee" as follows:
"(j) "Regional Committee" means a committee
established under section 20;"
19. Section 3 which occurs in Chapter II deals with the establishment of
the Council. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 reads as follows:
"3 (1) With effect from such date as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
appoint there shall be established a Council to be called
the National Council for Teacher Education."
20. Section 12 deals with the functions of the Council. The said
provision, being relevant, is reproduced below:
"12. FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL
It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as
it may think fit for ensuring planned and co-ordinated
development of teacher education and for the
determination and maintenance of standards for teacher
education and for the purposes of performing its
functions under this Act, the Council may -
(a) undertake surveys and studies relating to various
aspects of teacher education and publish the result
thereof;
(b) make recommendations to the Central and State
Government, Universities, University Grants
Commission and recognised institutions in the matter of
preparation of suitable plans and programmes in the field
of teacher education;
(c) co-ordinate and monitor teacher education and its
development in the country;
(d) lay down guidelines in respect of minimum
qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in
schools or in recognised institutions;
(e) lay down norms for any specified category of courses
or trainings in teacher education, including the minimum
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 18 of 50
eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method
of selection of candidates, duration of the course, course
contents and mode of curriculum;
(f) lay down guidelines for compliance by recognised
institutions, for starting new courses or training, and for
providing physical and instructional facilities, staffing
pattern and staff qualification;
(g) lay down standards in respect of examinations leading
to teacher education qualifications, criteria for admission
to such examinations and schemes of courses or training;
(h) lay down guidelines regarding tuition fees and other
fees chargeable by recognised institutions;
(i) promote and conduct innovation and research in
various areas of teacher education and disseminate the
results thereof;
(j) examine and review periodically the implementation
of the norms, guidelines and standards laid down by the
Council, and to suitably advise the recognised institution;
(k) evolve suitable performance appraisal system, norms
and mechanism for enforcing accountability on
recognised institutions;
(l) formulate schemes for various levels of teacher
education and identify recognised institutions and set up
new institutions for teacher development programmes;
(m) take all necessary steps to prevent commercialisation
of teacher education; and
(n) perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it
by the Central Government.
21. On a perusal of Section 12, it is clear as crystal that the statute casts a
duty on the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring
planned and coordinated development of teacher education and for
determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education. The
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 19 of 50
Council has been authorized by the Act to do certain things which are
basically in the realm of policy decisions. It is also required to prevent
commercialisation of teacher education and to carry out such functions as
entrusted to it by the Central Government.
22. Section 13, which deals with inspection, reads as follows:
"13. INSPECTION
(1) For the purpose of ascertaining whether the
recognised institutions are functioning in accordance
with the provision of this Act, the Council may cause
inspection of any such institution, to be made by such
person as it may direct, and in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(2) The Council shall communicate to the institution the
date on which inspection under sub-section (1) is to be
made and the institution shall be entitled to be associated
with the inspection in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) The Council shall communicate to the said institution,
its views in regard to the results of any such inspection
and may, after ascertaining the opinion of that institution,
recommend to that institution the action to be taken as a
result of such inspection.
(4) All communications to the institution under this
section shall be made to the executive authority thereof,
and the executive authority of the institution shall report
to the Council the action, if any, which is proposed to be
taken for the purposes of implementing any such
recommendation as is referred to in sub-section (3)."
23. The learned counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on the
aforesaid provision to highlight that the Council alone is empowered to
cause an inspection for the purposes of ascertaining whether the recognized
institutions are functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act and,
therefore, no other authority has the power to cause inspection after the
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 20 of 50
institution is recognized. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) to Section 13, submits
the learned counsel for the appellant, basically deal with the role ascribed to
the Council. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the
Council can direct such an inspection to be caused by such person as it may
direct and in such manner as it may prescribe. In this context, it is necessary
to refer to Section 14 which deals with recognition of institutions offering
course or training in teacher education. Sub-section (1) of Section 14
requires an institution offering or intending to offer to make an application
to the Regional Committee concerned. Sub-section (3) deals with the things
that shall be considered by the Regional Committee. The said provision
reads as follows:
"(3) On receipt of an application by the Regional
Committee from any institution under sub-section (1),
and after obtaining from the institution concerned such
other particulars as it may consider necessary, it shall-
(a) if it is satisfied that such institution has adequate
financial resources, accommodation, library,
qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such
other conditions required for proper functioning of
the institution for a course or training in teacher
education, as may be determined by regulations,
pass an order granting recognition to such
institution, subject to such conditions as may be
determined by regulations; or
(b) if it is of the opinion that such institution does
not fulfill the requirements laid down in sub-clause
(a), pass an order refusing recognition to such
institution for reasons to be recorded in writing;
Provided that before passing an order under sub-
clause (b), the Regional Committee shall provide a
reasonable opportunity to the concerned institution
for making a written representation."
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 21 of 50
24. Sub-section (4) to Section 14 requires publication in the Gazette. It
reads as follows:
"(4) Every order granting or refusing recognition to an
institution for a course or training in teacher education
under sub-section (3) shall be published in the Official
Gazette and communicated in writing for appropriate
action to such institution and to the concerned examining
body, the local authority or the State Government and the
Central Government."
25. On a scanning of the anatomy of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear as
day that an application has to be submitted in such a manner as may be
determined by the Regulations and the application shall be considered by the
Regional Committee which shall record its satisfaction that such an
institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library,
qualified staff, laboratory and it fulfills other such conditions required for
the proper functioning of the institution to offer a course or training in
teacher education as may be determined by the Regulations and thereafter
pass an order granting recognition to such institution subject to such
condition as may be determined by the Regulations. Sub-section (4)
postulates that grant or refusal of the order shall be published in the official
gazette and communicated in writing for appropriate action to such
institution and to the concerned examining body, the local authority or the
State Government and the Central Government. Sub-section (6) stipulates
that on receipt of the order under sub-Section (4) the examining body shall
grant affiliation to the institution where recognition has been granted.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 22 of 50
26. Section 15 deals with permission for a new course or training by a
recognized institution. Sub-section (1) stipulates that where any recognized
institution intends to start any new course or training in teacher education, it
may make an application to seek permission therefor to the Regional
Committee concerned. Sub-section (3) deals with the role of the Regional
Committee.
27. Section 16 requires the affiliating body to grant affiliation after
recognition or permission by the Council. Section 17 deals with the
contravention of the provisions of the Act and consequences thereof. For the
sake of completeness, sub-sections (1) to (3), being relevant, are reproduced
below:
"17. Contravention of provisions of the Act and
consequences thereof -
(1) Where the Regional Committee is, on its own motion
or on any representation received from any person,
satisfied that a recognised institution has contravened any
of the provisions of this Act, or the rules, regulations,
orders made or issued thereunder, or any condition
subject to which recognition under sub-section (3) of
section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of section
15 was granted, it may withdraw recognition of such
recognised institution, for reasons to be recorded in
writing;
Provided that no such order against the recognised
institution shall be passed unless a reasonable
opportunity of making representation against the
proposed order has been given to such recognised
institution:
Provided further that the order withdrawing or refusing
recognition passed by the Regional Committee shall
come into force only with effect from the end of the
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 23 of 50
academic session next following the date of
communication of such order.
(2) A copy of every order passed by the Regional
Committee under sub-section (1), -
(a) shall be communicated to the recognised
institution concerned and a copy thereof shall also
be forwarded simultaneously to the University or the
examining body to which such institution was
affiliated for cancelling affiliation; and
(b) shall be published in the Official Gazette for
general information.
(3) Once the recognition of a recognised institution is
withdrawn under sub-section (1), such institution shall
discontinue the course or training in teacher education,
and the concerned University or the examining body
shall cancel affiliation of the institution in accordance
with the order passed under sub-section (1), with effect
from the end of the academic session next following the
date of communication of the said order."
28. Section 32 deals with the power of the Council to make regulations.
Sub-section (1) of the said Section is as follows:
"32. Power to make regulations.
(1) The Council may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, make regulations not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder,
generally to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Sub-section (2)(n) of the said Section provides as follows:
"(n) additional functions to be performed by the
Regional Committee under sub-section (6) of section 20"
29. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to the Rules, namely, the
National Council for Teacher Education Rules, 1997 (for short „the Rules‟)
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 24 of 50
which have been framed under Section 31 of the Act. Rule 8, which deals
with inspection, reads as follows:
"8. Inspection - (1) The Council may inspect the
recognized institutions in the manner specified in sub-
rules (2) to (8).
(2) The Council shall approve a panel of names of
experts in teacher education or educational
administration who may be able to inspect the recognized
institutions. The Chairman shall nominate at least two
persons out of the panel of experts to a inspection team.
(3) The Council shall give a notice of its intention to
the institution alongwith a questionnaire in Form - „IV‟
seeking information within fifteen days on all relevant
matters relating to the institution.
(4) On receipt of the completed questionnaire, the
Council shall communicate the names of the members of
inspection team and the date of inspection to the
institution.
(5) The institution to be inspected shall nominate its
one officer or employee, to be associated with the
inspection team.
(6) The inspection team shall ascertain as to whether
the institution is functioning in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations made
thereunder.
(7) The members of the inspection team may, if deem
necessary, interact with the faculty members and other
employees of the institution.
(8) The inspection team shall submit its report to the
Council within a period of fifteen days from the last day
of the inspection.
30. At this stage, we may usefully state that a set of Regulations, namely,
the National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norms and
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 25 of 50
Procedures) Regulations, 2009 has come into force on 31.8.2009. The
relevant part of Regulation 7 is reproduced below:
"7. Processing of Applications.-
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(1-B) Furnishing any wrong information or concealment
of facts in the application, which may have bearing on
the decision making process or the decision pertaining to
grant of recognition, shall result in withdrawal of
recognition of the institution besides other legal action
against its management; order of withdrawal of
recognition shall be passed after affording reasonable
opportunity of hearing through a show cause notice to the
institution.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(4) ....After consideration of the recommendation of the
State Government or on its own merits, the Regional
Committee concerned shall decide that institution shall
be inspected by a team of experts called visiting team
with a view to assess the level of preparedness of the
institution to commence the course. Inspection shall not
be subject to the consent of the institution, rather the
decision of the Regional Committee to cause the
inspection shall be communicated to the institution with
the direction that the inspection shall be caused on any
day after 10 days from the date of communication by the
Regional Office. The Regional Committee shall ensure
that inspection is conducted ordinarily within 30 days
from the date of this communication to the institution.
The institution shall be required to provide details about
the infrastructure etc. on the duly filled up proforma
available on National Council for Teacher Education
web-site to the visiting team, at the time of inspection
along with building completion certificate issued by the
competent civil authority, if not submitted earlier.
The Regional Committee shall organise such inspections
strictly in chronological order of the receipt of
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 26 of 50
application for the cases approved by the Regional
Committee for Inspection.
The members of the visiting team for inspection shall be
decided by the Regional Committee, out of the panel of
experts approved by it, and in accordance with the
visiting team policy of National Council for Teacher
Education.
(5) At the time of the visit of the team of experts to an
institution, the institution concerned shall arrange for the
inspection to be videographed in a manner that all
important infrastructural and instructional facilities are
videographed along with interaction with the
management and the faculty, if available at the time of
such visit. The visiting teams, as far as possible, shall
finalise and courier their reports alongwith the video
tapes on the same day:-
Provided that the videography should clearly establish
the outer view of the building, its surroundings, access
road and important infrastructure including classrooms,
labs, resource rooms, multipurpose hall, library etc. The
visiting team shall ensure that the videography is done in
a continuous manner, the final unedited copy of the
videography is handed over to them immediately after its
recording and its conversion to a CD should be done in
the presence of visiting team members:-
Provided further that at the time of inspection for new
courses or enhancement of intake of the existing course,
the visiting team shall verify the facilities for existing
teacher education courses accorded recognition by
National Council for Teacher Education and would
ascertain the fulfillment and maintenance of Regulations
and Norms and Standards for the existing courses as
well.
(6) The application and the report alongwith the video
tapes or CDs etc of the visiting team shall be placed
before the Regional Committee concerned for
consideration and appropriate decision.
(7) The Regional Committee shall decide grant of
recognition or permission to an institution only after
satisfying itself that the institution fulfills all the
conditions prescribed by the National Council for
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 27 of 50
Teacher Education under the National Council for
Teacher Education Act, Rules or Regulations, including,
the norms and standards laid down for the relevant
teacher education programme or course.
[Emphasis supplied]
31. We have referred to the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the
Regulations to understand the role of the Regional Committee under the
scheme of things. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit
that whatever the compass of powers of the Regional Committee may
have, it only covers the period prior to recognition. Once the action of
withdrawal on the prism of Section 17 of the Act is contemplated, it does
not encompass the power of inspection by the Regional Committee after
grant of recognition under Section 14 of the Act.
32. Regard being had to the scheme of the Act and the role ascribed to
the Council and the Regional Committees which are constituted by the
Council and the role played by the Regional Committee under the Act, it is
necessary to understand and appreciate the purpose of the Act and to read
the provisions harmoniously.
33. Mr. Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted
with immense zeal and vehemence that Sections 13 and 17 operate in
different spheres as Section 13 uses the word „Council‟ whereas there is no
such reference or mention in Section 17 of the Act. It is urged by him that
if power of inspection is conferred on the Regional Committee after
recognition is granted, it will entrench upon the power of the Council as
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 28 of 50
engrafted under Section 13 of the Act. If we understand the submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, the provisions are
absolutely distinct and different and cannot be reconciled. The learned
counsel for the respondents would contend that there is basically no
conflict and even if there is a conflict and discord, the principle of
harmonious construction should be applied.
34. In this context, we may refer to certain authorities in the field. In D.
Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1967
SC 1211, their Lordships have expressed thus:
"(4) We are unable to accept the argument of the
appellant as correct. In our opinion, the provisions of
S.150 of the Act must be interpreted in the context of
Sections 84 and 98(c) and other relevant provisions of
Part III of the same Act. If the interpretation contended
for by the appellant is accepted as correct the vacancy
must be filled by a bye-election as soon as a member
resigns his seat notwithstanding the pendency of an
election petition challenging his election. If the
candidate who filed the election petition eventually gets
a declaration that the election of the member is void and
that he himself had been duly elected there will be two
candidates representing the same constituency at the
same time, one of them declared to be duly elected at
the General Election and the other declared to have
been elected at the bye-election and an impossible
situation would arise. It cannot be supposed that
Parliament contemplated such a situation while
enacting Section 150 of the Act. Parliament could not
have intended that the provisions of Part VI of the Act
pertaining to election petitions, should stand abrogated
as soon as a member resigns his seat in the Legislature.
It is a well-settled rule of construction that the
provisions of a statute should be so read as to
harmonise with one another and the provisions of one
section cannot be used to defeat those of another unless
it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 29 of 50
The principle stated in Crawford's Statutory
Construction at p. 260 is as follows :
"Hence, the Court should, when it seeks the
legislative intent, construe all of the constituent
parts of the statute together, and seek to ascertain
the legislative intention from the whole Act,
considering every provision thereof in the light of
the general purpose and object of the Act itself,
and endeavouring to make every part effective,
harmonious, and sensible. This means, of course,
that the Court should attempt to avoid absurd
consequences in any part of the statute and refuse
to regard any word, phrase, clause or sentence
superfluous, unless such a result is clearly
unavoidable."
[Emphasis supplied]
35. In State of Punjab and others v. Amar Singh and another, (1974) 2
SCC 70, emphasis was laid on the conspectus of the legislative scheme and
the duty of the court while interpreting a statute to promote the legislative
intent.
36. In this context, we may refer with profit to Krishan Kumar v. State
of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1992 SC 1789 wherein their Lordships
noticed an apparent conflict between Sections 100(4) and 217 (2)(e) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and expressed thus:
"11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where
there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the
same Act, the principle of harmonious construction
should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It
should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament
has given with one hand, it took away with the other.
The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used
to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to
reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v. State
of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at p.268, this Court
observed:
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 30 of 50
"The rule of construction is well settled that when
there are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they should
be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be
given to both. This is what is known as the rule of
harmonious construction."
The essence of harmonious construction is to give effect
to both the provisions. Bearing these principles in mind
it is legitimate to hold that S. 100(4) prescribed period of
limitation of one year in respect of the scheme proposed
under the provisions of the new Act, while in the case of
a scheme under S. 68-C of the old Act, pending on the
date of enforcement of the new Act, namely, 1.7.1989,
the period of one year as prescribed under S. 100(4)
should be computed from the date of commencement of
the new Act. This interpretation would give full effect to
both the Sections-S. 100(4) and S. 217(2)(e) of the new
Act."
[Emphasis added]
37. It is worth noting that Section 17 of the Act specifically confers
power on the Regional Committee to withdraw the recognition if a
recognized institution has contravened any of the provisions of the Act or
Rules, Regulations or orders made or issued thereunder. If Section 13 is
interpreted to mean that the Regional Committee cannot inspect the
recognized institution and the Council alone is empowered to cause an
inspection, such an interpretation would render the provisions of Section
17 nugatory. Sections 13 and 17 are to be read harmoniously in order to
give effect to the provisions contained in Section 13 as well as Section 17 of
the Act. In this context, we may refer with profit to a passage from
Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006 wherein the Apex
Court has opined thus:
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 31 of 50
"11. The statute has to be read as a whole to find out
the real intention of the legislature.
12. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. (1898) AC 735,
Lord Davy observed:-
"Every clause of a statute should be construed
with reference to the context and other clauses of
the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute or
series of statutes relating to the subject-matter."
This Court has adopted the same rule in M. Pentiah v.
Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107; Gamman
India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 960 : (1974) 1
SCC 596; Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mirza Khasim Ali Beg, AIR 1977 SC 747; Vaddeboyina
Tulsamme v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC
1944 : (1977) 3 SCC 99; Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v.
Suresh Chand, AIR 1978 SC 995; Commissioner of
Income-tax v. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 SC 485;
Calcutta Gas Co. (Properietary) Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 and J.K. Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170.
This rule of construction which is also spoken of as "ex
visceribus actus" helps in avoiding any inconsistency
either within a Section or between two different
Sections or provisions of the same statute.
On a conspectus of the case law indicated above, the
following principles are clearly discernible:
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head on clash
between two Sections of the Act and to construe the
provisions which appear to be in conflict with each
other in such a manner as to harmonise them.
(2) The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be
used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in
spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the
time that when there are two conflicting provisions in
an Act, which, cannot be reconciled with each other,
they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 32 of 50
should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule
of "harmonious construction".
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an
interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a
"dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious
construction.
(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory
provision or to render it otiose."
[Emphasis supplied]
38. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s. Hindustan Bulk Carriers,
AIR 2003 SC 3942, it has been ruled thus:
"24. A statute is designed to be workable and the
interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure
that object unless crucial omission or clear direction
makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1926) AC 37 p. 52
referred to in Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja
Singh (AIR 1959 SC 352), Gursahai Saigal v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, (AIR 1963 SC
1062).
27. The statute must be read as a whole and one
provision of the Act should be construed with reference
to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute.
30. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot
be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible
to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a
construction that reduces one of the provisions to a
"useless lumber" or 'dead letter' is not a harmonised
construction. To harmonise is not to destroy."
[Emphasis added]
39. In Kailash Chandra and another v. Mukundi Lal and others, AIR
2002 SC 829, the said principle was reiterated.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 33 of 50
40. In Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation of Kalyan & Dombivali and others, (2004) 11 SCC 417, it has
been stated as follows:
"16. A statute, as is well known, must be construed in
such a manner whereby the intent and object of the Act
can be given effect to. A literal meaning should also be
avoided if it results in absurdity."
41. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India and others, (2003) 7 SCC 628,
it has been held thus:
"25. A statute must be construed as a workable
instrument. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a well-
known principle of law. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply
Co. Ltd. v. (1989) 3 SCC 709 this Court stated the law
thus : (SCC p.754, paras 118-120)
"118. The courts strongly lean against any
construction which tends to reduce a statute to a
futility. The provision of a statute must be so
construed as to make it effective and operative, on
the principle „ut res magis valeat quam pereat‟. It
is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely
vague and its language wholly intractable and
absolutely meaningless, the statute could be
declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial
review by testing the law for arbitrariness or
unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a
court of construction, dealing with the language of
a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and
accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose
which the legislature intended for it. In
Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester
Racecourse Co. (1900) 2 Ch 352, Farwell J. said :
(pp. 360-61)
„Unless the words were so absolutely
senseless that I could do nothing at all with
them, I should be bound to find some
meaning and not to declare them void for
uncertainty.‟
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 34 of 50
119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham
County Council (1960) 3 All ER 503 Lord Denning
approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said : (All ER
p.516)
„But when a statute has some meaning,
even though it is obscure, or several
meanings, even though there is little to
choose between them, the courts have to
say what meaning the statute is to bear,
rather than reject it as a nullity.‟
120. It is, therefore, the court's duty to make
what it can of the statute, knowing that the
statutes are meant to be operative and not inept
and that nothing short of impossibility should
allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. In
Whitney v. IRC 1926 AC 37 Lord Dunedin said :
(AC p.52)
„A statute is designed to be workable, and
the interpretation thereof by a court should
be to secure that object, unless crucial
omission or clear direction makes that end
unattainable.‟
26. The courts will therefore reject that construction
which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature
even though there may be some inexactitude in the
language used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 AC
627 (AC at p.634)]. Reducing the legislation futility shall
be avoided and in a case where the intention of the
legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts would
accept the bolder construction for the purpose of
bringing about an effective result. The courts, when rule
of purposive construction is gaining momentum,
should be very reluctant to hold that Parliament has
achieved nothing by the language it used when it is
tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve. [See BBC
Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., (1990) 2 All ER
118 (All ER at pp.122-23)]."
[Emphasis supplied]
42. In Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2005) 3 SCC
551, S.B. Sinha. J, in his concurring opinion, has opined that a statute must
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 35 of 50
be construed having regard to the scheme and the ordinary state of affairs
and consequences flowing therefrom. His Lordship restated the principle
that the courts should lean strongly against any constructions which tend
to reduce a statute to a futility. When two meanings, one making the
statute absolutely vague, wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless
and the other leading to certainty and a meaningful interpretation, are
given, in such an event, the latter should be followed.
43. While interpreting the provision of a statute, it is obligatory on the
part of the court to sustain the validity and place such meaning on the
provision which advances the object sought to be achieved by the
enactment. The Act, as we perceive, is meant to achieve planned and
coordinated development of the teacher education system and to maintain
norms and standards thereof. That apart, the Act intends to regulate
imparting of such education. That being the object and purpose, the Court
has a sacrosanct role while interpreting the provisions. In this context, it is
apposite to reproduce a passage from M/s. British Airways Plc. v. Union
of India and others, AIR 2002 SC 391:
"7. ...The court cannot approach the enactment with
a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting
which make its working impossible. It is a cardinal
principle of construction of a statute that effort should
be made in construing the different provisions so that
each provision will have its play and in the event of any
conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The
well-known principle of harmonious construction is
that effect shall be given to all the provisions and for
that any provision of the statute should be construed
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 36 of 50
with reference to the other provisions so as to make it
workable. A particular provision cannot be picked up
and interpreted to defeat another provision made in
that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the court
to make such construction of a statute which shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. While
interpreting a statute the courts are required to keep in
mind the consequences which are likely to flow upon
the intended interpretation."
[Underlining is ours]
44. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law relating to
principles of interpretation, we have to scan and scrutinize the object,
intent and purpose of the Act and especially the scheme of Section 17 of
the Act. The Act has a basic and fundamental purpose. The Apex Court in
State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra
Mahavidyalaya and others, (2006) 9 SCC 1 has held thus:
"63. ...admittedly, Parliament has enacted the 1993
Act, which is in force. The preamble of the Act provides
for establishment of National Council for Teacher
Education (NCTE) with a view to achieving planned
and coordinated development of the teacher-education
system throughout the country, the regulation and
proper maintenance of norms and standards in the
teacher-education system and for matters connected
therewith..."
Again, in the said decision, at a later stage, it has been observed as
follows:
"74. ...NCTE, therefore, in our opinion, is
expected to deal with applications for
establishing new Bed colleges or allowing
increase in intake capacity, keeping in view the
1993 Act and planned and coordinated
development of teacher-education system in the
country. It is neither open to the State
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 37 of 50
Government nor to a university to consider the
local conditions or apply "State policy" to refuse
such permission..."
45. Recently, in National Council for Teacher Education & Ors. v. Shri
Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan & Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 238, their
Lordships, while dealing with the importance of NCTE Act, have
expressed thus:
"2. With a view to achieve the object of planned and
coordinated development for the teacher education
system throughout the country and for regulation and
proper maintenance of norms and standards in the
teacher education system and for matters connected
therewith, Parliament enacted the National Council for
Teacher Education Act, 1993 (for short, "the Act"),
which provides for the establishment of a Council to be
called the National Council for Teacher Education (for
short "the NCTE") with multifarious functions, powers
and duties. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the term
"council" to mean a council established under sub-
section (1) of Section 3. Section 2(i) defines the term
"recognised institution" to mean an institution
recognised under Section 14. Section 2(j) defines the
term "Regional Committee" to mean a committee
established under Section 20. Section 3 provides for
establishment of the Council which comprises of a
Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson, a Member-Secretary,
various functionaries of the Government, thirteen
persons possessing experience and knowledge in the
field of education or teaching, nine members
representing the States and Union Territories
administration, three members of Parliament, three
members to be appointed from amongst teachers of
primary and secondary education and teachers of
recognised institutions."
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 38 of 50
In the said case, their Lordships referred to the decision in Sant
Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya (supra) and eventually
held thus:
"41. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that
the cut- off dates specified in clauses (4) and (5) of
Regulation 5 of the 2007 Regulations as also the
amendment made in Regulation 5(5) vide Notification
dated 1-7-2008 are not violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution and the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court were not right in
recording a contrary finding qua the date specified in
Notification dated 1-7-2008. We further hold that the
provisions contained in Section 14 and the Regulations
framed for grant of recognition including the
requirement of recommendation of the State
Government/Union Territory Administration are
mandatory and an institution is not entitled to
recognition unless it fulfils the conditions specified in
various clauses of the Regulations. The Council is
directed to ensure that in future no institution is
granted recognition unless it fulfils the conditions laid
down in the Act and the Regulations and the time
schedule fixed for processing the application by the
Regional Committees and communication of the
decision on the issue of recognition is strictly adhered
to."
46. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities as in the said decisions,
emphasis has been laid on the purpose of the Act, the role of the
authorities under the Act and the need and the necessity of strict
adherence to the Regulations framed under the Act. As we perceive, the
fundamental object of the Act is to impart requisite education to the
students in the institutions which have proper infrastructure and which
follow the norms prescribed by the NCTE. Grant of recognition has its
sacrosanctity. The sustenance of the standard of the institution has its
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 39 of 50
signification. The statute does not tolerate any deviation. A hierarchy of
bodies has been created to look into the matter from many a spectrum.
Apart from statutory provisions, detailed Regulations have been framed to
require the institutions to do certain things so that there is no failure of
standard. Norms have been set out relating to the appointment of faculty
members, number of teaching days and various aspects. The purpose
basically pertains to salubrious growth of training for those who are
trained to teach. Any institution engaged in such imparting of training
cannot afford to behave in a fanciful manner. The institutions cannot
harbour the notion that they are engaged in any kind of trade. They must
bear in mind that they are involved in the field of education. True it is, no
authority can act beyond the statutory provisions but interpreting the
compass and the prism of the statutory provisions, we are disposed to
think, a narrow or a restricted view is not to be taken. In this backdrop, we
have to understand the import of Section 17 of the Act as a colossal
grievance has been made that for the purpose of withdrawal, an inspection
is impermissible and further, the Regional Committee is denuded of the
power of inspection once recognition is granted. It is worth noting that
Section 17 confers specific power on the Regional Committee to take action
in case there is any contravention of provisions of the Act on its own
motion or on any representation received from any person. If the Regional
Committee is satisfied that the recognized institution has contravened any
of the provisions of the Act or the Rules, Regulations made or issued
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 40 of 50
therein or any condition subject to which recognition under sub-section (3)
of Section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15 was
granted, it has the power to withdraw the recognition. The proviso
stipulates that the recognized institution has to be afforded reasonable
opportunity of making representation. The provision mandates to record
a reasoned order. Thus, the principle of natural justice has to be adhered
to. The term „representation‟ is of wider connotation. One can take a
hypothetical example. The NCTE has framed various norms and
standards for B.Ed, M.Ed, B.PED courses, etc. At the time of inspection,
they are found to be in order. Assuming an information is received by the
Regional Committee that the faculty members and other staff are really not
further engaged by the institution, it would require verification. There is a
difference between a paper verification and a spot verification or
inspection. If it is construed that there is no power of inspection with the
Regional Committee while taking action under Section 17, it will lead to
absurdity and a limb of the statute would be comatosed to a dead letter.
That is not the intention of the legislature. An institution can also raise a
complaint that had the institution been inspected, all aspects could have
been revealed and truth would have come out. The submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that if the power of inspection is
allowed to the Regional Committee after recognition, it is likely to be
abused. The aforesaid submission is only noted to be rejected. If an
institution maintains its standard and follows the Act, Rules, Regulations
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 41 of 50
and the norms prescribed by the NCTE, there should be no such
apprehension as regards the action of statutory committee. In fact, such
apprehension is misconceived in law. That apart, a decision taken under
Section 17 is appealable before the Council under Section 18 of the Act.
While hearing the appeal, the Council can take recourse to inspection
under Section 13. There is no prohibition. That apart, if the Council comes
to know from any source that a recognized institution is not functioning in
accordance with the provisions of the Act, it can cause an inspection and as
provided in the Section, the result of inspection shall be intimated to the
said institution and it would also recommend to the institution that action
is to be taken as a result of such inspection. The inspection provided
under Section 13 empowers the Council to ascertain whether the
institution is properly guided by the Act, Rules, Regulations and the
norms. It is meant for control and regulation. Thus understood, Sections
13 and 17 have to be read in a harmonious and purposive manner to give
effect to both the Sections. If an interpretation is placed on Section 13 that
once an institution is recognized there can be no inspection by the
Regional Committee, it will make Section 17 of the Act absolutely nugatory
and that is definitely not the legislative intendment.
47. At this juncture, we shall refer to certain authorities which have
been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. Saharawat,
learned counsel, has commended to the decisions, namely, Deewan Singh
and others v. Rajendra Pd. Ardevi and others, AIR 2007 SC 767, M.P.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 42 of 50
Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah, (2006) 10 SCC 696 and Kurmanchal Institute
of Degree & Diploma and others v. Chancellor, M.J.P. Rohilkhand
University and others, (2007) 6 SCC 35 to buttress the stand that the
Council and the Regional Committees have been created by the legislature
under the Act and two bodies which enjoy statutory powers must do so in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act.
48. In the case of M.P. Wakf Board (supra), the Apex Court was dealing
with the powers of the tribunal constituted under the Wakf Act, 1995 and
their Lordships dealt with the purpose of constitution of the tribunal under
Section 83 of the 1995 Act and opined that it is an adjudicatory body but
cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Board as there is no provision which
empowers the tribunal to frame a scheme. In the absence of any such
power vested in the tribunal, it ought to have left the said function to the
Board which is statutorily empowered therefor. In that context, the Apex
Court opined that where a statute creates different authorities to exercise
their respective functions thereunder, each of such authority must exercise
the functions within the four corners of the statute. In the case at hand, the
nature and purpose of the enactment is absolutely different and there is no
strait jacket compartment and also cannot be so thought of. Thus, the said
decision is distinguishable.
49. The decision in Kurmanchal Institute of Degree & Diploma (supra)
dealt with a situation where study centers were recognized by the
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 43 of 50
University beyond the territorial limit. Their Lordships opined that a
fortiori statutory authority is required to operate within the boundary of
the territories within which it is to operate under the statute. The factual
matrix and the context in which the decision was being delivered being
different, in our considered opinion, the ratio laid down therein is
inapplicable to the case at hand. That apart, it has been laid down that a
statutory authority cannot act inconsistent with the provisions of the
statute as the said action could make it void. Be it noted, the same was
expressed in the context of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 which
stipulated various acts under various provisions and we are disposed to
think that the said decision is totally distinguishable to the lis at hand.
50. The learned counsel for the appellants, to bolster the contention that
as the Act provides inspection to be done by the Council, and hence, it
cannot be done in any manner other than the Council itself, has invited our
attention to the decision in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill
(P) Ltd. and others, (2003) 2 SCC 111. It is also his submission that the
Regional Committee being subordinate to the Council and the legislature
having vested the power in the superior body, the Committee cannot so
exercise. To buttress the said contention, he has placed reliance on Taylor
v. Taylor, (1875-76) L.R. 1 Ch.D 426, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR
1936 PC 253, Patna Improvement Trust v. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi, AIR
1963 SC 1077, State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358,
Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559,
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 44 of 50
Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266, Surender Pal
Singh Chauhan v. Bar Council of India, 158 (2009) DLT 697 and Order
dated 20th September, 2010 of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High
Court at Gwalior in W.P. No.4501/2010 titled Shri Vaishnav Institute of
Technology & Management v. National Council for Teacher Education.
51. As both the submissions are interconnected, we shall deal with the
applicability of the said authorities. In Bhavnagar University (supra), the
Apex Court was considering with regard to the statutory interdiction
under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. In
that context, a three-Judge Bench stated thus:
"40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of
the property must be strictly construed. It is well
settled that when a statutory authority is required to do
a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done
in that manner or not at all. The State and other
authorities while acting under the said Act are only
creature of statute. They must act within the four
corners thereof."
52. It is worth noting that in the said case, the appellant University
under Section 20 of the said Act was under obligation to take steps for
acquisition of land on receipt of the requisite notice in terms of sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the Act but as it failed to take steps for the reservation/
de-designation in respect of the land, the notice lapsed. In that context,
their Lordships opined that the power of the State enumerated under sub-
section (1) of Section 20 does not become ipso facto applicable in the event
of issuance of a revised plan as the said provision has been specifically
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 45 of 50
mentioned therein so that the State may use the same power in a changed
situation. On a reading of the said decision and the lis involved therein,
we are of the considered opinion that the reliance placed is absolutely
misplaced.
53. The next line of decisions basically relate to the proposition that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be
done in that manner and in no other manner. The learned counsel for the
appellants would submit that when the National Council has been
conferred the power of inspection under Section 13 of the Act, it has to be
done by the said Council and not by the Regional Committee. It is also
urged by him that the Council is a superior body and an act of a superior
body cannot be performed by an inferior or subordinate body. As we
understand the anatomy, the scheme and the purpose of the Act, we have
no trace of doubt in our mind that the said principle is not applicable. The
Regional Committee is created by the Central Council and a Regional
Committee can be suspended by the Central Council but to import a strait
jacket compartmentalized power under all circumstances would defeat the
purposes of the Act. Quite apart from above, as we have stated earlier,
there is no prohibition under Section 17 to inspect. On the contrary, it is a
necessity. Hence, we distinguish the said line of decisions which have
been commended to us by the learned counsel for the appellants.
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 46 of 50
54. The learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn inspiration
from the decision in Mohd. Sahabuddin v. State of Bihar and others, (2010)
4 SCC 653 to highlight that the court cannot read anything into a statutory
provision which is plain and unambiguous because the language
employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. The
said principle is not applicable to the case at hand as nothing is provided
to Section 17 by applying the doctrine of causus omissus.
55. Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellants has drawn
immense inspiration from a Division Bench decision of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh on 20.9.2010 in W.P. No.4501/2010. In the said case, it
has been held that the legislature has deliberately enacted Section 13 and
the procedure has also been prescribed so that on being advised by the
Council, the institution may remove the deficiency and, therefore, it was
imperative on the part of the respondents to issue notice under Section 13
of the Act and thereafter to take action under Section 17 of the Act. We
have perused the decision that has been brought on record. In the said
case, notice for inspection was issued under Section 17 of the Act without
conducting an inspection under Section 13 of the Act. The Bench was of
the view that there has to be an inspection under Section 13 of the Act.
With great respect, we are not persuaded to agree with the said view as we
are not inclined to form an opinion that inspection by the Central Council
under Section 13 is a condition precedent before steps for withdrawal are
taken under Section 17 of the Act as the same would lead to an anomalous
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 47 of 50
and absurd situation. The basic concept of statutory interpretation, we are
disposed to think, does not so permit.
56. The controversy can also be viewed from the spectrum whether the
Regional Committee should be denuded of the power because the term
inspection is not specifically mentioned in Section 17 of the Act. The
learned counsel for the appellants would submit that in the absence of any
power conferred, the said action cannot be taken recourse to. Per-contra,
the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that to give effect to
Section 17, the same is an imperative necessity. The learned counsel for
the respondent would further submit that there is no prohibition for
inspection and it is essential to inspect under certain circumstances to
exercise the power of withdrawal as the said power is fundamentally an
essential power for the proper discharge of the power conferred under the
Act. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Sub-
Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad v. Shambhoo Narain Singh, AIR 1970
SC 140 wherein it has been held thus:
"8. It is well recognised that where an Act confers a
jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing
all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially
necessary to its execution. But before implying the
existence of such a power the court must be satisfied
that the existence of that power is absolutely essential
for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely
that it is convenient to have such a power."
57. Be it noted, the learned counsel for the appellants has also
commended us to the said decision to highlight that a statutory body has
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 48 of 50
to work within its framework and in the absence of a power, the same
cannot be taken recourse to. It is worth noting that their Lordships, in the
said case, were dealing with the power of the State Government to
suspend a „Pradhan‟ of a Gaon Sabha under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (26
of 1947). Their Lordships in para 6 have stated thus:
"6. The Gaon Sabha is the creature of a statute. Its
powers and duties as well as the powers and duties of
its officers are all regulated by the Act. Hence no
question of any inherent power arises for consideration
- see Sm. Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjanpur,
(1952) SCR 1122 = (AIR 1952 SC 362)."
58. In that context, their Lordships have stated that the power to place
under suspension an officer is not absolutely essential for the proper
exercise of the power conferred under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act. Their
Lordships for the said purpose scanned the various provisions of the said
Act, as aforesaid. If the ratio is properly understood, it conveys that where
an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing of such
acts for its execution but the court is required to be satisfied that the
existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the
power conferred. Their Lordships did not accept the theory of
convenience. In the case at hand, as we perceive the language of Section
17, we have no scintilla of doubt in our mind that the power of inspection
has to be ingrained for the exercise of the power of withdrawal.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we concur with the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge and consequently, the appeals are
LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 49 of 50
dismissed. However, we direct that the letter / communication / order of
withdrawal issued by the Regional Committee under Section 17 of the Act
can be assailed under Section 18 before the appellate authority. If appeals
are preferred within a period of four weeks, the appellate authority shall
entertain and dispose them of in accordance with law within a period of 8
weeks therefrom. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the costs in
each appeal is assessed at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only).
The same shall be paid to the respondent within four weeks hence.
CHIEF JUSTICE
APRIL 20, 2011 SANJIV KHANNA, J.
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