Chattisgarh High Court
Rajmoti Chauhan @ Baya vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 February, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
Digitally
signed by
2026:CGHC:8012-DB
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.02.16
NAFR
11:28:35
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2284 of 2024
Rajmoti Chauhan @ Baya W/o Hiralal Chauhan Aged About 48 Years
R/o Devpur Chowki - Baya, Police Station - Rajadevri, District -
Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh (Accused)
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station In-charge Rajadevri,
District - Baloabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
CRA No. 57 of 2025
Vasudeo Chouhan @ Choti S/o Mahesh Chouhan Aged About 28 Years R/o Village - Deopur, Chouki - Baya P.S. Rajadeori, District Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara (C.G.).
--- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Rajadeori District - Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara (C.G.).
--- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, Advocate (In CRA No.2284/2024) For Appellant : Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnskar, Advocate (In CRA No.57/2025) For State/Respondent : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Government Advocate 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13.02.2026
1. Heard Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, learned counsel for the appellant in CRA No.2284/2024 and Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, learned counsel for the appellant in CRA No.57/2025 as well as Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent.
2. Today, though the criminal appeals have been listed for hearing on I.A. No.01, applications for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellants, however, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeals are heard finally.
3. Accordingly, I.A. No.01, applications for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellants in both the cases, stand disposed of.
4. In these criminal appeals preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), the accused- appellants have assailed the legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.11.2024 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.29 of 2020 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Vasudev Chouhan and another).
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5. By the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "IPC") and has sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, with a further direction that in default of payment of fine, they shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
6. The prosecution case, as unfolded during trial, is that the deceased Anupama Chouhan was married to accused Vasudev Chouhan and was residing at her matrimonial home along with her husband and his family members, including co-accused Rajmoti (her jethani). The marriage was subsisting at the time of the incident, and the couple had children. On 09.05.2020 at about 10:00 AM, the incident in question is alleged to have taken place at the matrimonial house. According to the prosecution, while the deceased was preparing food in the kitchen, the accused persons, namely her husband Vasudev Chouhan and her jethani Rajmoti, poured kerosene upon her and set her saree ablaze with the intention to cause her death. As a result of the said act, she sustained extensive burn injuries. However, immediately after the incident, the deceased is stated to have informed certain persons that she had accidentally caught fire while lighting the stove. The prosecution case is that such statement was made by her under fear and anxiety concerning the future of her children and due to pressure or influence from the matrimonial side. 4
7. On 18.05.2020, complainant Neelambar Chouhan (PW-1), father of the deceased, lodged a written complaint (Ex.P/1) at Police Station Rajadeori alleging that his daughter had been intentionally set on fire by her husband Vasudev Chouhan and her jethani Rajmoti on 09.05.2020. On the basis of this complaint, preliminary inquiry was undertaken. On the same date i.e. 18.05.2020, the victim was undergoing treatment at Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital (popularly known as D.K.S. Hospital), Raipur. After obtaining certification from the attending doctor that the victim was in a fit mental and physical condition to make a statement, her dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded by Executive Magistrate Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11). In the said dying declaration, the deceased categorically stated that on 09.05.2020 at about 10:00 AM, while she was cooking food, the accused persons poured kerosene on her saree and set her on fire.
8. Subsequently, on 19.05.2020, after again obtaining a medical opinion with respect to her fitness to give statement, a second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded by Inspector Nitesh Janghel (PW-
14). In this statement, she reiterated the allegation that the accused persons had set her ablaze. She also explained that earlier she had falsely stated that the burn injuries were accidental and caused while lighting the stove, as she was apprehensive about the welfare and future of her children. On 20.05.2020, on the basis of the material collected, a formal First Information Report was registered against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 307 read 5 with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and investigation was taken up.
9. During investigation, statements of material witnesses including the complainant and family members were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The scene of occurrence was inspected and a spot map (Ex.P/4) was prepared. From the place of incident, a plastic jerrycan containing substance smelling of kerosene and certain portions of burnt and kerosene-soaked material from the cement floor were seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/3). The seized articles were sent for chemical examination. The accused persons were arrested in connection with the crime. As the health condition of the victim did not show satisfactory improvement, she was discharged from the hospital and taken by her relatives to her parental village Palsapali, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Basna. Unfortunately, she succumbed to her burn injuries on 28.05.2020. Upon her death, merg intimation (Ex.P/2) was registered at Police Station Basna. Inquest proceedings were conducted over the dead body and postmortem examination was carried out by the concerned medical officer. The postmortem report opined that death occurred due to complications arising from extensive burn injuries. Consequent upon the death of the victim and receipt of postmortem and merg inquiry reports, the offence was altered from Section 307/34 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.
10. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 21.08.2020 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kasdol. 6 The case was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions and ultimately tried by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar.
11. Charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were framed against both the accused persons. The charges were read over and explained to them, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
12. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 16 witnesses, including the complainant (PW-1), relatives and independent witnesses, the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration (PW-11), the medical officers who certified fitness and conducted the postmortem (PW-12 and PW-15), and the investigating officers (PW-13, PW-14 and PW-16). Relevant documentary exhibits, including the dying declarations, seizure memo, spot map, merg intimation, postmortem report and other documents, were brought on record.
13. After closure of the prosecution evidence, statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the incriminating circumstances. Accused Vasudev Chouhan claimed that he had been falsely implicated and that he was innocent. Accused Rajmoti took a specific defence that she was not present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. In defence, one witness, namely Ramkumar Singh (DW-1), was examined.
14. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, particularly placing reliance upon the dying declarations and medical 7 evidence, the learned trial Court held the accused persons guilty for committing murder of the deceased in furtherance of their common intention and convicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing them to imprisonment for life with fine, as stated hereinabove.
15. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the present criminal appeals have been preferred.
16. Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, learned counsel for the appellant in CRA No.2284/2024 and Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, learned counsel for the appellant in CRA No.57/2025 jointly submit that the learned trial Court has gravely erred in holding that the appellants are guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that the finding of guilt is wholly unsustainable and contrary to the evidence available on record. They would contend that there is no direct, cogent or trustworthy evidence to establish that the appellants had set the deceased on fire. The prosecution has failed to examine any reliable eye-witness to the actual occurrence. The persons who allegedly saw the incident have not supported the prosecution case in its entirety and have materially deviated from the version projected during investigation. Thus, the conviction is not based on any unimpeachable ocular testimony. It is further submitted that there is no incriminating seizure from the present appellants which connects them with the alleged commission of offence. The memorandum and seizure witnesses have not supported 8 the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. In absence of any corroborative forensic material firmly linking the appellants to the crime, the prosecution case rests only upon doubtful oral testimonies.
17. Learned counsel submit that the entire prosecution case hinges primarily upon the testimonies of PW-1 Nilamber (father of the deceased), PW-2 Anil Kumar (brother of the deceased), PW-3 Sanjay Kumar Chouhan, PW-4 Budhwara Bai (mother of the deceased), PW-5 Bilasari Bariha, PW-6 Laxmi Bai, PW-11 Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (Executive Magistrate), PW-14 Hitesh Janghel (Investigating Officer) and PW-15 Dr. Narayan Sahu. It is urged that these witnesses are either close relatives of the deceased or official witnesses, and their statements suffer from serious contradictions, omissions and improvements. Particular emphasis has been laid on the testimony of PW-14 Hitesh Janghel (Investigating Officer), who is stated to have narrated certain facts inconsistent with the version emerging from other prosecution witnesses. According to learned counsel, the Investigating Officer himself has admitted material discrepancies in the course of investigation, which create serious doubt about the authenticity and reliability of the prosecution case.
18. It is argued that the learned trial Judge has failed to properly appreciate the contradictions in the statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6 with regard to the place and manner of occurrence, the conduct of the accused and the circumstances under which the deceased initially stated that the burn injuries were 9 accidental. The fact that the deceased had first declared the incident as accidental, and only subsequently attributed overt acts to the accused, casts a substantial doubt on the voluntariness and reliability of the later statements. They further submit that the prosecution witnesses being close relatives of the deceased are interested witnesses, and in absence of independent corroboration, their testimonies ought not to have been relied upon implicitly. It is contended that the learned trial Court has designedly placed reliance upon these witnesses without scrutinizing their testimonies with the required degree of caution.
19. It is also contended that the essential ingredients of Section 302 IPC, particularly the existence of intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and the applicability of Section 34 IPC with regard to common intention, have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. There is no material on record to indicate prior meeting of minds or any concerted action attributable to both the appellants so as to attract Section 34 IPC. They would further submit that the findings recorded by the trial Court are based on conjectures and surmises rather than on legally admissible and reliable evidence. Material contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence have been brushed aside without proper reasoning. The appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court is stated to be perverse and contrary to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
20. It is submitted that in a case resting predominantly upon circumstantial evidence and alleged dying declarations, the chain of 10 circumstances must be complete and incapable of any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. However, in the present case, the chain is neither complete nor consistent. The material witnesses having turned hostile, the seizure witnesses not supporting the prosecution, and the inconsistencies in statements regarding the manner of occurrence, cumulatively create grave doubt about the prosecution version. They emphasize that the benefit of every reasonable doubt must go to the accused. It is contended that the learned trial Court has misread the evidence on record, ignored vital contradictions, and arrived at findings that are manifestly unreasonable and unsustainable.
21. In these circumstances, it is jointly prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC by extending the benefit of doubt.
22. On the other hand, Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned Government Advocate, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is strictly in accordance with law and based upon proper appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. He would submit that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly on the strength of the dying declarations of the deceased, which are consistent, voluntary and recorded in 11 accordance with law. It is contended that the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded by PW-11, the Executive Magistrate, after obtaining certification from the attending doctor regarding the mental and physical fitness of the deceased. Similarly, the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded by PW-14 after again obtaining medical opinion about the fitness of the victim to give her statement. Both the statements clearly implicate the appellants in pouring kerosene upon the deceased and setting her on fire.
23. It is further submitted that the mere fact that the deceased had initially stated that the incident was accidental does not demolish the prosecution case, as she has categorically explained in her subsequent statement that such earlier version was given out of fear and concern for the future of her children. The consistent version given subsequently, while in a fit condition and duly certified by the doctor, inspires confidence and has rightly been relied upon by the learned trial Court. He also submits that the evidence of PW-1 Nilamber, PW-2 Anil Kumar and PW-4 Budhwara Bai cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they are relatives of the deceased. Their testimonies are natural, consistent and corroborate the prosecution version. It is settled law that evidence of related witnesses cannot be rejected solely on the ground of relationship if it is otherwise trustworthy. The learned trial Court has appreciated their evidence with due caution and has assigned cogent reasons for finding them reliable. It is also contended that the medical evidence supports the prosecution case. The postmortem report establishes that the deceased sustained extensive 12 burn injuries which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The seizure of kerosene-smelling articles from the place of occurrence and preparation of spot map further corroborate the prosecution case.
24. Learned State counsel would further submit that minor contradictions and omissions pointed out by the defence are natural and do not go to the root of the matter. Such discrepancies are bound to occur in the testimony of witnesses and cannot be made a ground to discard the entire prosecution case, especially when the core of the prosecution story remains intact. It is argued that the common intention of the appellants is clearly established from their joint participation in the act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire. The offence squarely falls under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, and the learned trial Court has rightly recorded conviction under the said provisions.
25. Lastly, learned Government Advocate submits that the findings recorded by the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference in appeal. It is therefore prayed that the criminal appeals being devoid of merit deserve to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants be affirmed.
26. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
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27. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the deceased, Anupama Chouhan, died on account of burn injuries allegedly sustained in the incident dated 09.05.2020.
28. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the oral and medical evidence available on record.
29. PW-1 Nilamber Chouhan, father of the deceased, has stated that he received information that his daughter had sustained burn injuries at her matrimonial house. She was first taken to the Government Hospital at Pithora and thereafter shifted to Raipur for better treatment. He has further deposed that after remaining under treatment for several days, she was brought to her parental village Palsapali, where she ultimately succumbed to her injuries approximately twenty days after the incident. His testimony clearly establishes that the deceased had suffered burn injuries and that her death occurred subsequently while she was undergoing treatment for the same.
30. PW-2 Anil Kumar Chouhan, brother of the deceased, has also corroborated the aforesaid facts. He has stated that the deceased was admitted to hospital after sustaining burn injuries and despite treatment, she ultimately died. His evidence remains consistent with that of PW-1 regarding the cause of death.
31. PW-10 Sushila Sahu, who conducted the inquest proceedings on 29.05.2020 at village Palsapali, has proved the inquest report (Ex.P/7). She has stated that on receiving information from Police Station Basna, she conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased in the 14 presence of Panch witnesses. As per the opinion recorded in the inquest, the death appeared to have occurred due to burn injuries and therefore postmortem examination was recommended.
32. The most material evidence in this regard is that of PW-15 Dr. Narayan Sahu, who conducted the postmortem examination on 29.05.2020 and proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/22). He has described in detail the condition of the body. According to him, the deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries over the lower jaw, chest, abdomen, both arms, forearms and part of the lower limb. Certain portions of the body were wrapped in crepe bandages and there were signs of old burn wounds with secondary infection, including the presence of pus over the chest and abdomen emitting foul smell.
33. After conducting external and internal examination, PW-15 opined that the cause of death was burn injuries and their complications, which resulted in cardio-respiratory failure. His opinion has not been seriously challenged in cross-examination. The defence has not suggested any alternative cause of death nor disputed that the deceased had sustained burn injuries.
34. Thus, from the consistent testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, the inquest proceedings proved by PW-10, and most importantly, the medical opinion of PW-15 supported by the postmortem report (Ex.P/22), it stands firmly established that the deceased died on 28.05.2020 due to complications arising from burn injuries.
35. In view of the unimpeached medical evidence and the 15 corroborative oral testimony, this Court finds that the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the death of the deceased occurred on account of burn injuries sustained in the incident. Accordingly, this Court affirms the said finding.
36. Now the question for consideration before us would be whether appellants are the author of the crime in question or not ?
37. In the instant case, the prosecution case substantially rests upon the two dying declarations of the deceased, namely, the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11), and the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) recorded by Inspector Hitesh Janghel (PW-14) after obtaining due medical certification regarding the fitness of the deceased to make such statement. In view of the fact that the conviction primarily hinges upon these dying declarations, it would be appropriate to examine the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the principles governing their appreciation in law.
38. At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus:
"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.--Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be 16 procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:--
(1) when it relates to cause of death.--
When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.
Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.
xxx xxx xxx"
39. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions:
a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the 17 tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross-
examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that "a dying man seldom lies" or in other words "truth sits upon the lips of a dying man". The relevance of this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence.
40. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the "dying declaration" section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to "circumstances of the transaction":
"21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the 18 statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case.
For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context.
Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death.
For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more 19 than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant."
41. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that 20 when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324 reviewing the earlier authorities.
42. Thereafter, in the matter of Devinder alias Kala Ram and others v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 763, wherein the deceased, who sustained burn injuries while cooking meals on stove, had made a statement to the doctor, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and observed as under:
"14. In the facts of the present case, we find that PW 7, the Medical Officer of the Civil Hospital, examined the case of the deceased on 6-8-1992 at 6.30 a.m. and he has clearly stated in his evidence that on examination she was conscious and that there were superficial to deep burns all over the body except some areas on feet, face 21 and perineum and there was smell of kerosene on her body. He also stated in his evidence that the deceased was brought to the hospital by her husband Kala Ram (Appellant 1). He has proved the bed-head ticket pertaining to the deceased in the hospital (Ext. DD) as well as his endorsement at Point 'A' on Ext. DD, from which it is clear that he was told by the patient herself that she sustained burns while cooking meals on a stove. This statement of the deceased recorded by PW 7 is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question."
43. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2010) 11 SCC 489, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under:
"21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully 22 summed up as under:-
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court.
21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity 23 and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration."
44. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time must be preferred.
45. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2022 SCC Online SC 1019, while considering the issue of multiple dying declarations, their Lordships have held as under: 24
"9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting. The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon. However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.
xxx xxx xxx
20. We therefore find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt which 25 has been given to the other accused by the trial court, ought to have been equally given to the present appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused."
46. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under:
"5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545] wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier,we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 695] (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the 26 time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where after he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. Stateof Gujarat [(1999) 9 SCC 562]."
47. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration.
48. Further, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka (supra), the Supreme Court 27 has held that the dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind and observed in Para- 63 as under:
"63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant."
49. Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 941 has clearly held that once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration and observed in Para-25 as under:
"25. The law relating to dying declaration is now well settled. Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered 28 voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring. Once such a conclusion is reached, a great deal of sanctity is attached to a dying declaration and as said earlier, it can form the sole basis for conviction."
50. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned judgments, it is quite vivid that in the instant case the prosecution's case substantially rests upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/13), which was recorded by Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11). In the said dying declaration, the deceased Anupama Chouhan has clearly narrated the incident and implicated her husband as well as her brother-in-law to be the authors of the crime in question.
51. Before considering the submissions raised on behalf of the appellants, it would be appropriate to notice a few facts which are apparent on the face of the record.
52. The first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded on 18.05.2020 at about 4:00 PM in D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur by Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11). The said witness has categorically deposed before the trial Court that at the relevant time he was posted as Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate in the Nazul Branch of the Collectorate and on receiving the intimation, he proceeded to the hospital and, after obtaining certification from the attending doctor that the patient was in a fit condition to make the statement, recorded the dying declaration of Anupama Chouhan. He has further deposed that 29 the deceased disclosed her name as Anupama Chouhan and stated that on 08.05.2020 in the evening, there was a quarrel between her and her husband over watching television, and on 09.05.2020 at about 10:00 AM, her husband along with his brother poured fuel and set her on fire from behind. PW-11 has further stated that the dying declaration recorded by him is Ex.P/13, which bears the signature/thumb impression of the deceased at mark 'A' to 'A' and his own signature at mark 'B' to 'B'.
53. The dying declaration of Anupama Chouhan (Ex.P/13) reads as under: -
" मृत्यु पूर्व कथन मृतिका का नाम - अनुपमा चौहान पिता का नाम - वासुदेव चौहान उम्र - 21 वर्ष ग्राम - देवपुर, चौकी बया, जिला बलौदाबाजार प्रमाणित किया जाता है कि मरीज बयान देने की स्थिति में है।
(1) आपका नाम क्या है?
उत्तर - अनुपमा चौहान।
(2) यह घटना आपके साथ कैसे घटी?
उत्तर - 09 मई की सुबह 10:00 बजे मेरे पति और उसकी भाभी ने दारू के नशे में मुझे पीछे से आग लगा दिया।
(3) यह घटना क्यों घटी?
उत्तर - मेरा मेरे पति के साथ 08 मई की शाम को टीवी देखने को लेकर झगड़ा हुआ था।
(4) आपकी आग किसने बुझाई?
30उत्तर - हल्ला होने पर मेरे पति, उसकी भाभी और एक व्यक्ति आकर आग बुझाए।
(5) आपको यहाँ पर कौन लाया?
उत्तर - मेरे पति लोग लाए, पीछे से मेरे भाई लोग आए।
(6) आपको और कुछ कहना है?
उत्तर - मेरे दहेज के सारे सामान को बेचकर मद्य पी गए हैं, कुछ भी नहीं छोड़े।"
54. From a plain reading of the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13), it is manifest that the deceased has clearly named the accused persons and attributed to them the specific overt act of setting her ablaze. She has also disclosed the immediate cause for the incident. The statement is consistent, categorical and free from ambiguity.
55. In the cross-examination of PW-11, the defence suggested that the deceased was not in a condition to speak or sign; however, the witness has denied the said suggestion and has stated that though he offered to obtain her thumb impression, the deceased voluntarily chose to put her signature. He has further deposed that before recording the statement, he had obtained the opinion of the attending doctor regarding the fitness of the deceased. Nothing substantial has been elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony.
56. The record further reveals that Ex.P/13 bears the endorsement, signature and seal of Dr. Tusharkant certifying that the patient was in a fit state to give the statement. The testimony of Ishwar Lal Sakar (PW-
8) also establishes that prior to recording of the dying declaration, written communication (Ex.P/11) was sent to the hospital authorities 31 seeking medical opinion regarding the fitness of the victim, and upon such confirmation, intimation (Ex.P/12) was sent to the competent Magistrate. The endorsement on Ex.P/11 clearly indicates that on 18.05.2020 at 4:00 PM, the deceased was found fit to make her statement.
57. The Executive Magistrate (PW-11), being a responsible public servant and an independent witness, had no reason to falsely implicate the accused persons. The procedure adopted by him in recording the dying declaration appears to be fair and in accordance with law.
58. Furthermore, the fact that the deceased declined to affix her thumb impression and instead signed the dying declaration indicates that she was conscious, oriented and voluntarily making the statement. The defence has failed to bring on record any material to show that the said statement was the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
59. Thus, from perusal of the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13), this Court finds that the same has been recorded after due medical certification, by a competent Executive Magistrate, and contains a clear and specific attribution of the act to the accused persons. The said dying declaration inspires full confidence and can safely be relied upon.
60. Insofar as the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) is concerned, the same was recorded on 19.05.2020 by Sub-Inspector Hitesh Janghel (PW-14), who at the relevant time was posted as In-charge of Police Outpost Baya, Police Station Rajadeori. He has deposed that upon inquiry into the complaint submitted by Neelambar Chouhan, he 32 sent a written requisition (Ex.P/16) to the Medical Officer, Burn Ward, D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur, seeking opinion as to whether the victim Anupama Chouhan was in a fit condition to give her statement. Upon receiving medical endorsement certifying that the victim was mentally fit to make the statement, he proceeded to record her dying declaration, which is Ex.P/17, which reads as under :-
"कथन पीड़िता श्रीमती अनुपमा चौहान पति वासुदेव चौहान, उम्र 25 वर्ष, जाति गांड़ा, निवासी ग्राम देवपुर, चौकी बया, थाना राजादेवरी, जिला बलौदाबाजार (छ.ग.) "मैं उपरोक्त पते पर रहती हूँ। कक्षा 10 वीं तक पढ़ी हूँ। घर का काम करती हूँ। मेरी शादी दिनांक 11 अप्रैल 2014 को वासुदेव चौहान के साथ हिन्द ू रीति-रिवाज से हुई। दिनांक 08.05.2020 को रात 09 बजे कोटवार के घर टीवी देखने गई थी। मेरे पति बुलाने आए और घर बुलाकर टीवी देखने क्यों गई थी कहकर मारपीट कर झगड़ा किए। बच्चों को भी मारे, जिससे मेरे ससुर ने मना किए तो घर से भाग गया। दिनांक 09.05.2020 को सुबह लगभग 08 बजे मेरे पति शराब पीकर आए और मुझे गाली देकर झगड़ा कर अपनी भाभी राजमोती के घर चला गया और वहाँ से मेरे पति और जेठानी राजमोती शराब पीकर घर आए। लगभग सुबह 10 बजे मैं खाना बनाने के लिए चूल्हे में आग सुलगा रही थी। मेरे पति और जेठानी वहीं पास में बैठे कुछ बड़बड़ा रहे थे। चूल्हा जलाते समय मुझे मिट्टी तेल की गंध आई तो मैं पीछे पलटकर देखी, मेरा साड़ी का पल्लू जल रहा था। पल्लू के पास मेरे पति और जेठानी राजमोती खड़े थे। मैं पल्लू को बुझाने की कोशिश की, लेकिन आग मेरी साड़ी में 33 भी पकड़ लिया था। मैं आग को बुझाने की बहुत कोशिश कर चिल्लाने लगी। मेरे पति व जेठानी पास खड़े थे लेकिन आग नहीं बुझाए। मेरी आवाज सुनकर ससुर के बेटे संजय चौहान आकर पानी डालकर आग बुझाया। संजय को देखकर मेरे पति और जेठानी भी आग बुझाने लगे। बच्चों के भविष्य के डर के कारण मैंने घटना के बारे में गलत बताया कि चूल्हा जलाते समय खुद धोखे से जल गई। मुझे 108 गाड़ी से रायपुर लेकर आए। यहाँ भी मैं सभी को खुद धोखे से जली हूँ बताया। मेरे पति शराबी हैं, जो मेरे दहेज के सामान को बेचकर शराब पी गया। मेरे पति वासुदेव चौहान व जेठानी राजमोती मुझे जान से मारने के लिए मेरी साड़ी में आग लगाए हैं। यही मेरा कथन है। कथन को पढ़कर सुनी हूँ।"
61. A perusal of the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) would reveal that the deceased has elaborately narrated the sequence of events. She stated that on 08.05.2020 at about 9:00 PM she had gone to the house of the Kotwar to watch television, whereupon her husband brought her back home and quarrelled with and assaulted her for having gone there. On the following morning i.e. 09.05.2020 at about 8:00 AM, her husband came home under the influence of liquor, abused and quarrelled with her and thereafter went to the house of Rajmoti. Subsequently, at about 10:00 AM, while she was lighting the stove for preparing food, she smelt kerosene and on turning back saw that her saree was on fire and her husband and Rajmoti were standing near her. She tried to extinguish the fire, but it spread. Though her husband and Rajmoti were present, they did not immediately extinguish the fire. 34 On hearing her cries, her father-in-law's son Sanjay Chouhan came and poured water to douse the flames. She further stated that due to fear for the future of her children, she initially gave a false version that she had accidentally caught fire while lighting the stove. She categorically asserted that her husband Vasudev Chouhan and Rajmoti had set her saree on fire with an intention to kill her. She also reiterated that her husband was addicted to liquor and had sold her dowry articles for consuming alcohol. The statement concludes with her affirmation that it was read over to her and found correct.
62. From perusal of the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17), it is evident that the deceased has once again specifically implicated the accused persons and has attributed to them the act of setting her saree on fire after pouring kerosene. She has also furnished details explaining why she had initially given a different version of accidental burn, thereby lending assurance to the truthfulness of her subsequent statement.
63. As regards the mental fitness of the deceased at the time of recording Ex.P/17, the requisition letter (Ex.P/16) sent by PW-14 to the hospital clearly bears the endorsement of the attending doctor certifying that on 19.05.2020 at about 3:00 PM the victim was mentally fit to give her statement. Thus, the requirement of medical certification prior to recording the dying declaration stands duly satisfied. The defence has not been able to elicit anything in the cross-examination of PW-14 so as to render the recording of Ex.P/17 doubtful.
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64. The second dying declaration (Ex.P/17), therefore, not only finds support from the earlier dying declaration (Ex.P/13) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, but also reinforces and corroborates the material particulars stated therein, particularly with regard to the role attributed to the accused persons and the motive behind the occurrence.
65. Consequently, this Court finds that the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) also inspires confidence, having been recorded after due medical certification and containing a consistent and specific narration of the incident. It provides substantive corroboration to the first dying declaration and further strengthens the prosecution case.
66. Now, with regard to the oral dying declaration is concerned, the prosecution has relied upon the testimony of Anil Kumar (PW-2), who is the brother of the deceased Anupama Chouhan. Anil Kumar (PW-2) has deposed that after the incident, the deceased was admitted in D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur for treatment. He has further stated that he had visited the hospital on three occasions to see his sister. According to him, during his subsequent visit, upon making inquiry from Anupama about the incident, she disclosed that accused Vasudev Chouhan and Rajmoti had jointly set her on fire. His testimony further indicates that after learning about the true incident from the deceased, he informed his father, pursuant to which a written complaint (Ex.P/1) was lodged by Neelambar (PW-1), leading to registration of the offence under Section 307/34 of the IPC and commencement of investigation.
67. It is true that in paragraph 4 of his cross-examination, the witness 36 admitted that during his earlier visit to the hospital, Anupama had not disclosed anything to him and that at that time she was not in a position to speak. However, in paragraph 5, he has categorically denied the suggestion that his sister had never told him anything about the incident and that he was falsely implicating the accused. From the tenor of his cross-examination, it appears that the so-called admission in paragraph 4 was not in response to a clear and specific suggestion, and the same does not demolish the substance of his testimony.
68. The overall evidence of PW-2 indicates that although initially the deceased did not disclose the true facts, subsequently she narrated the actual incident to him. This circumstance finds support from the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17), wherein the deceased herself has explained that immediately after the incident she had falsely stated before others and even before the hospital authorities that she had accidentally caught fire while lighting the stove, out of fear for the future of her children.
69. The explanation furnished by the deceased in Ex.P/17 appears to be natural and plausible. The deceased was a rural woman having three minor children. The evidence on record shows that at the time of taking her for treatment, the accused and their family members were present with her. In such circumstances, the possibility of her suppressing the true facts initially, either due to fear or in consideration of the future of her children, cannot be ruled out.
70. The defence has examined Ramkumar Singh (DW-1), who has 37 stated that at the Primary Health Centre, Pithora, the deceased had told him and the doctor that she had caught fire accidentally while cooking. However, his presence in the hospital is admitted from Ex.P/20, which only establishes that he was present during treatment. In view of the categorical explanation given by the deceased in her subsequent dying declaration (Ex.P/17), the initial version of accidental burn loses its significance.
71. It is also noteworthy that the postmortem report (Ex.P/22) indicates burn injuries over both hands, back, chest and abdomen of the deceased. The extent and distribution of burn injuries, as reflected in the sketch annexed to the postmortem report, prima facie suggest that the burns were not confined to a localized accidental flare-up from a stove, but were consistent with the pouring of kerosene and setting the saree on fire. This medical evidence lends assurance to the prosecution case.
72. The plea of alibi taken by accused Rajmoti, to the effect that she was not present at the place of occurrence, has not been substantiated by leading any cogent evidence. The burden to prove such plea was upon her, which she has failed to discharge.
73. On cumulative consideration of the two written dying declarations (Ex.P/13 and Ex.P/17), the oral dying declaration made to Anil Kumar (PW-2), the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances, this Court finds that the prosecution has been able to establish that both the accused persons, in furtherance of their common intention, poured 38 kerosene upon the deceased and set her saree on fire. The act was done with the knowledge that such act was so imminently dangerous that it would, in all probability, cause death.
74. Accordingly, the question framed for consideration, namely, whether the accused persons are the authors of the crime in question, is answered in the affirmative.
75. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the entire evidence available on record and having examined the impugned judgment in the light of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt.
76. The case of the prosecution rests primarily upon the two written dying declarations (Ex.P/13 and Ex.P/17), which have been recorded after due medical certification regarding the fitness of the deceased. The first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded by an independent Executive Magistrate (PW-11) and the second (Ex.P/17) by Sub- Inspector Hitesh Janghel (PW-14), both after obtaining medical opinion that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. In both the dying declarations, the deceased has consistently and categorically implicated the accused persons and attributed to them the specific act of pouring kerosene upon her and setting her saree on fire. There is no material contradiction between the two declarations on the core aspect of the prosecution case.
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77. The dying declarations inspire full confidence. They were recorded in accordance with law, bear medical endorsement as to mental fitness, and have been duly proved by the witnesses concerned. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any circumstance suggesting tutoring, prompting, coercion or fabrication. On the contrary, the explanation offered by the deceased in her second dying declaration as to why she initially gave a version of accidental burn appears to be natural and consistent with the social circumstances in which she was placed.
78. The oral dying declaration made to Anil Kumar (PW-2), the brother of the deceased, further corroborates the prosecution case. Though the defence attempted to impeach his testimony, nothing substantial has been elicited to discredit his version. His evidence finds assurance from the contents of the written dying declarations and the surrounding circumstances.
79. The medical evidence, including the postmortem report (Ex.P/22), also lends support to the prosecution version. The nature and extent of burn injuries, as reflected in the postmortem report, probabilise the case that kerosene was poured and the deceased was set ablaze. The theory of accidental burn while cooking on a stove does not fit in with the distribution and severity of burn injuries noticed on the body of the deceased.
80. The plea taken by accused Rajmoti that she was not present at the place of occurrence has remained unsubstantiated. No cogent 40 evidence has been adduced to prove the plea of alibi. The burden to establish such plea was upon the accused, which she has failed to discharge.
81. On cumulative evaluation of the entire evidence -- the two consistent and reliable dying declarations, the oral dying declaration, the medical evidence, and the attendant circumstances -- this Court finds no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the appreciation of evidence made by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded by the trial Court are based on proper analysis of evidence and are neither contrary to law nor against the weight of evidence on record.
82. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life with fine imposed upon them are fully justified and commensurate with the gravity of the offence.
83. Consequently, both the criminal appeals (CRA No.2284/2024 and CRA No.57/2025) being devoid of merit deserve to be and are hereby dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.11.2024 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar in Sessions Case No.29 of 2020 are hereby affirmed. The appellants shall continue to undergo the sentence awarded to them, in accordance with law.
84. The Registry of this Court is directed to sent a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are languishing, informing them that they are at liberty to assail this 41 judgment before the Supreme Court by preferring an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the aid and assistance of the Chhattisgarh High Court Legal Services Committee or that of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
85. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu