Patna High Court
Sri Ram Dalmia vs The State on 17 November, 1960
Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT361, AIR 1961 PATNA 361, 1961 BLJR 149
ORDER Kamla Sahai, J.
1. The Additional Sessions Judge of Saran at Chapra has made this reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order whereby petitioner Sri Ram Dalmia has been summoned to stand his trial for an offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with the Sugar Control Ordar.
2. There is a mill called Vishnu Saugar Mills Ltd. at Harakhua under Gopalganj Sub-division of Saran District. The Cane Inspector of Gopalganj filed a complaint on the 23rd September 1958 against S.C. Choudhary, alleging that the accused was the Manager of the Mill, and that the Mill had released sugar between the 19th January and the 31st July, 1957, in excess of release orders issued to it. On the 26th May, 1959, the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Magistrate praying for several other persons being summoned. The learned Magistrate passed an order on the same date summoning the persons mentioned in the Public Prosecutor's applications. The petitioner is one of those persons, and he is admittedly a Director of the Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd.
3. The point which Mr. Nageshwar Prasad has urged on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no allegation in the complaint petition, in the public Prosecutor's petition or in the evidence adduced before the Magistrate which can be taken as making out a case against the petitioner as a Director so that he may be put upon his trial, He has drawn my attention, in support of his argument to Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act. On a perusal of that section, I am of opinion that his contention is right.
4. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 provides that the following persons are to be guilty in case of the contravention of an order made under Section 3 of the Act:-
1. "Every person who, at the time the contravention is committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company",
2. "The company itself".
Mr. Verma, who appears on behalf of the State, has admitted that there is no allegation to show that the petitioner was in charge of, or responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the alleged contravention. He has argued that, as a Director of the company, the petitioner can be said to be a part of the company and, therefore, liable. There is no substance in this argument. The explanation added to the section defines the word "company", and says that it means "any body corporate, and includes a firm or- other association of individuals". This leaves no room for doubt that, by use of the word ''company" in Sub-section (1) of Section 10, the legislature meant the company itself which has a legal status different from that of its individual directors and shareholders. There is a separate provision in Sub-section (2) in respect of directors, and, if the word "company" in Sub-section (1) had been used as including directors, that provisions would not have been necessary. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is not liable under Sub-section (1) of Section 10.
5. Sub-section (2) provides that a director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company will be liable for an offence if it was committed with his consent or with his connivance or if the commission of the offence is attributable to any neglect on his part. Mr. Verma has admitted that there is no allegation on the record of this case that the alleged contravention was committed with the consent or connivance of the petitioner or that it is attributable to any neglect on his part. Hence, the petitioner does not come even within the mischief of Sub-section (2) of Section 10.
6. For the reasons given above, I accept the reference, and quash the proceedings against the petitioner.