Delhi District Court
Rakesh Press vs Duggals Print House And Anr on 16 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF
Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) Digital Court-01,
Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi)
(Presided Over by Ms. Nishi Jindal, DJS)
(Earlier presided as Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) -05, RACC
At New Delhi, NEW DELHI)
C.C. No. 4157/2016
PS : Sansad Marg
CNR No.DLND020208392016
M/s Rakesh Press
A-22, Sector-68,
Noida- 201301
Uttar Pradesh
.........Complainant
Versus
1)M/s Duggals Print House,
A-68-69,
DSIDC Packaging Complex,
Kriti Nagar,
New Delhi
2)Mr. Siddharth Duggal
Proprietor,
S/o Late Sri Pradeep Duggal
F-254, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi ........Accused
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 1/17
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:42:14 +0530
Date of Institution 20.10.2016
Offence complained of 138 NI Act
Date of decision 16.07.2025
Plea of guilt Not guilty
Decision Acquittal
JUDGMENT
Vide this judgment, this Court shall dispose of the present complaint case instituted by the Complainant invoking the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(as in after referred to as 'NI Act').
2. The accused hereinabove mentioned has been summoned to face trial under Section 138 NI Act on the complaint filed by M/s Rakesh Press (hereinafter referred as 'complainant') against the accused M/s Duggals Print House through its proprietor Siddharth Duggal (hereinafter referred as 'accused'). It is alleged in the complaint that the complainant had been printing materials for accused no. 1 sole proprietorship concerned as per its requirement on consideration and as on July, 2014, there had been balance outstanding against the accused to the tune of Rs. 11,08,802/-. Thereafter, the sole proprietor Mr Siddharth Duggal being the signatory of the cheque in question and sole proprietor acknowledged his liability on 31st March 2016 for the same. A letter dated 2nd August, 2016 was sent to accused by the complainant firm which was duly acknowledged by them by writing the date 31st of March 2015. The same was objected to by the complainant wherein it was stated that the date of 31st March 2015 was inadvertently put instead of the date 2nd August 2016. Consequently, the accused handed over to the complainant cheque bearing no. 166360 for Rs. 2,00,000/- drawn on Union Bank of India. However, the same were dishonoured for the ground 'Account Closed/ Transferred C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 2/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:42:20 +0530 To' vide dishonour memo dated 19.08.2016. That the complainant through its counsel sent legal demand notice to the accused dt. 05.09.2016 through speed post. That the accused neither made the said payment within the stipulated period of 15 days as contemplated under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 from the receipt of the legal demand notice and hence, the present complaint has been filed.
Pre Trial Procedure:-
3. The complainant tendered his evidence by way of affidavit which is Ex. CW-1/A and relied upon following evidences: -
a) Letter of Authorization of AR is Ex. CW1/1,
b) Impugned Cheque is Ex. CW1/2,
c) Bank return memo dated 19.08.2016 is Ex. CW1/3,
d) Legal demand notice dated 05.09.2016 is Ex.CW1/4,
e) Speed Postal receipts are Ex. CW1/5,
f) Reply dt. 22.09.2016 to legal notice is Ex. CW1/6,
g) Letter dated 02.08.2016 is Mark A,
4. Upon appreciation of pre-summoning evidence, accused was summoned for an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act and notice under Section 251 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.') was served upon them on 06.03.2018 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
The accused took the defence that at the time of issuance of the dishonoured cheque in question, Duggals Print House was a proprietorship concern and late Mrs Madhu Duggal i.e. his mother was its sole proprietor. At present, he has no knowledge about the status of Duggals Print House as on September 2014, as there was a partition in his family and he was removed from C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 3/17 Digitally signed NISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date:
2025.07.16 14:42:30 +0530 the working of the Duggals Print House. Prior to the Partition, he was the only authorised representative/ attorney of Mrs. Madhu Duggal in Duggals Print House. He admitted to have been in business transaction with the complainant from the year 2016 to July 2014. His father was in business transaction with the complainant since 1996. He admitted that Ex. CW1/2 is a leaf of a cheque book issued to Duggals Print House. He admitted that the cheque bears his signatures and the name of the payee as well as the amount in words and figures is filled in his handwriting. However, the date was not in his handwriting. He admitted that both the signatures on cheque were his. He signed it twice because there was some issue with the signature in the bank. He stated that he gave specific instructions to his bank that the cheque for Duggals Print House should be passed only after it is signed by him and his mother Madhu Duggal together or when the cheque is signed twice by him. Therefore, he had signed twice on the cheque so the cheque could be passed. He signed the same in the capacity of authorised signatory and became aware about its dishonour only after receiving the legal demand notice. He admitted to have received the legal demand notice and even replied to the same and admitted there was some liability towards the complainant to the tune of approx. Rs. 4 Lacs. He further stated that he was never a proprietor of Duggals Print House. His mother who expired on 01.05.2017 was its proprietor and he was only the authorised representative and attorney acting on her behalf in Duggals Print House. The cheque in question was issued as a security cheque to the complainant in July, 2014 along with one more cheque bearing no. 166359 for Rs. 1.5 lakhs dated 10.07.2014 in order to discharge liability which was duly encashed. In September, 2014, there was a partition in his family wherein he was separated from the business of Duggals Print House and he was no more an authorised representative, signatory or attorney for Duggals Print House. He had no role to play with respect to business and working of Duggals Print House even C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 4/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:42:37 +0530 with respect to banking relations. He stated that it was in the knowledge of the complainant and the proprietor of Duggals Print House is his late mother and not him. There is no existing legally enforceable debt or any other liability on the date of issuance of the dishonoured cheque and even as on date. A security cheque has been misused by the complainant.
5. The AR of the complainant was examined as CW-1. In the post-summoning evidence, the AR of the complainant (CW1) adopted his pre-summoning evidence. The complainant was cross examined at length by the Ld. Counsel for accused. Thereafter, the complainant evidence was closed by the AR of the complainant on 02.07.2018.
Statement of accused :-
6. Accused was, thereafter, examined U/s 281 r/w Sec 313 Cr.P.C. on 05.07.2018, wherein entire incriminating evidence was put to him.
The accused took the defence that he had issued the cheque in question as an AR of accused no. 1 company for security purpose. All the particulars on the cheque except the date has been filled by him. One more cheque was issued bearing no. 166359 to the complainant for Rs. 1,50,000/- which was cleared on 10th of July 2014 and upon clearance of this cheque, all liabilities of accused stood cleared. He further stated that he was never the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 company. The name of accused no. 1 is not Duggal Print House but it is Duggal's Print House. He personally has no liability and cannot say whether accused no. 1 was having liability or not. He is not the proprietor of accused no. 1. The cheque was not issued in discharge of liability but as a security cheque. He admitted his signature on the cheque in question to be his. He admitted to have signed the letter dated 02.08.2016 in the office of the complainant as they informed him that they have to institute some case against Madhu Duggal, C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 5/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:42:44 +0530 proprietor of accused no. 1 company. When the same was signed, he was neither the AR of accused nor was holding any position. He admitted to have received the legal demand notice and even replied to the same.
Defence Evidence:-
7. The accused chose to lead Defence Evidence and examined witness from VAT department as DW-1 and Bank witness as DW-2. Accordingly, the same was closed vide order dated 08.04.2025. The matter was, thereafter, fixed for final arguments.
8. I have heard counsel for the parties and have ruminated over the case file thoroughly.
9. The following points required determination in the present case.
(i) Whether the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is made out against the accused.
(ii) Whether the complainant proved the guilt of the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt.
10. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the complainant is duty bound to prove the following ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Aparna A. Shah v M/s Sheth Developers P. Ltd &Anr. (2013)8 SCC 7.
"9. It is manifest that to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the following ingredients are required to be fulfilled:
a) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account;C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 6/17
NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL 14:42:53 +0530 Date: 2025.07.16
b) the cheque should have been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability;
c) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier;
d) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;
e) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
f) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice"
11. The Act also raises certain presumptions i.e. one contained in Section 118
(a) of the Act and other in Section 139 thereof. Section 118 (a) raises presumption as to Negotiable Instrument, until the contrary is proved the following presumption shall be made: -
Section 118 of the N.I Act provides:
"Presumptions as to negotiable instruments: Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:
of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;"
Section 139 of the N.I Act further provides as follows:
"Presumption in favour of holder - it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability".
Section 146 of NI Act provides that:
"Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. -- The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank's slip C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 7/17 Digitally signed NISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:43:01 +0530 or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved."
12. However, in N.S. Narayana Menon Vs. State of Kerala 2006 (6) SCC 39, while dealing with the aspect of presumption in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the presumption under Section 118 (a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable and the standard of proof required for such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It was further observed that in terms of Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act that, whenever it is provided by the Act that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard the said fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.
Applying the said definition of proved and disproved to the principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstance of the particular case, to act upon supposition that the consideration does not exist. For rebutting such presumption what is needed is to raise a probable defence.
The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probability. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
Therefore, rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before Court in support of defence, the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable. The standard of reasonableness being that of the "Prudent Man".
13. In this way from the combined reading of both these sections, two kinds of presumptions are raised i.e. one regarding the fact that the cheque was drawn for C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 8/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:43:09 +0530 some consideration and that the same was held by the holder in whole or in part of any debt or any other liability. It is a mandatory presumption, though the accused is entitled to rebut the said presumption.
14. During the course of final arguments, Ld. Counsel for complainant argued that there exists a legally enforceable liability on behalf of the accused towards the complainant. He further argued that the cheque in question Ex. CW1/2 was issued to the complainant in discharge of the liability. He further argued that upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured and the same has been proved by the cheque return memo Ex. CW1/3. Further, Ld. Counsel for complainant argued that legal demand notice Ex. CW1/4 was sent to the accused and the same was duly served upon the accused. Ld. Counsel for complainant submitted that all the ingredients of Section 138 NI Act are fulfilled and accordingly, the accused should be convicted.
15. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for accused argued that the accused was never a proprietor of accused company and hence, was not liable for its dues. Moreover, the cheque was issued as security which has been misused by the complainant. Further, the requisite amount has already paid to the complainant by way of cheque and hence, they have no legal liability towards the complainant. He further argued that the essential ingredients of Section 138 NI Act have not been satisfied in the present complaint in order to constitute a valid complaint. He prayed that the accused be acquitted of the offence.
FINDINGS-
16. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is an undisputed fact that the cheque in question bears the signature of the accused and the same has C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 9/17 Digitally signed NISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:43:16 +0530 been drawn on an account maintained by him. Hence, a mandatory presumption is raised against the accused in this case that the cheque in question was issued in discharge of a legally recoverable debt and drawn for good consideration by virtue of Section 118(a) r/w Section 139 of NI Act. The onus to rebut this presumption lies upon the accused. The same has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled as Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 that: -
"The accused under Section 138 NI Act has two options. He can either show that the consideration and debt did not exit or that under the particular circumstances of the case, the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumption, an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as it is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non- existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which his probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or there non-existence was so probably that a prudent man under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question, was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon the circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are so compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arises under Section 118 and 139 of NI Act".
FIRST DEFENCE: - NO LEGALLY RECOVERABLE DEBT/ LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED TO PAY C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 10/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:43:23 +0530
17. The accused has contended that he does not have any liability towards the complainant as he is not the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 firm rather it was his mother Mrs. Madhu Duggal who was the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 firm.
It is a settled position of law that a sole proprietorship firm is not covered within the ambit of section 141 NI Act and vicarious liability cannot be fastened on any other employee of the firm. Reliance in this regard is placed on case titled as M M Lal vs State NCT Of Delhi & Anr., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4851 wherein it was held that-
"5. It is well settled that a sole proprietorship firm has no separate legal identity and in fact is a business name of the sole proprietor. Thus any reference to sole proprietorship firm means and includes sole proprietor thereof and vice versa. Sole proprietorship firm would not fall within the ambit and scope of Section 141 of the Act, which envisages that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time of offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Company includes a partnership firm and any other association of individuals. The sole proprietorship firm would not fall within the meaning of partnership firm or association of individual. Vicarious liability cannot be fastened on the employees of a sole partnership firm, by taking aid of Section 141 of the Act, inasmuch as, no evidence has been led to show that the business was run by the respondent no.2."
The same has been held in the case titled as Raghu Lakshminarayanan vs. M/s. Fine Tubes (2007) 5 SCC 103, wherein the Hon'ble The Supreme Court of India has held that in case of proprietorship concern, it is only the proprietor who can be held liable under Section 138 of NI Act, on account of the fact that proprietorship concern has no separate legal identity. A sole proprietorship firm would therefore not fall within the scope and ambit of Section 141 of NI Act. It was held that-
"It is settled position in law that the concept of vicarious liability introduced in Negotiable Instruments Act is attracted only against the Directors, partners or other persons in charge and control of the business of the C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 11/17 Digitally signed NISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL 14:43:31 Date: 2025.07.16 +0530 company, or otherwise responsible for its affairs. Section 141 of NI Act not covers within its ambit, the proprietary concern. The proprietary concern is not a juristic person so as to attract the concept of vicarious liability. The concept of vicarious liability is attracted only in the case of juristic person, such as the company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or the partnership firm registered under the provisions of Partnership Act, 1932 or association of persons which ordinarily would mean a body of persons which is not incorporated under any statute. The proprietary concern stands absolutely on different footing. A person may carry on a business in the name of the business concern being proprietor of such proprietary concern. In such case the proprietor of proprietary concern alone can be held responsible for the conduct of business carried in the name of such proprietary concern. Therefore, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have no applicability in a case involving the offence committed by a proprietary concern."
18. To prove that accused no. 2 was not the sole proprietor of accused firm, he has examined the concerned official from VAT department as DW-1 who has placed on record the DVAT 11 Form as Ex. DW1/1 (Colly) as per which the sole proprietor of accused firm is stated to be Mrs. Madhu Duggal and not Siddharth Duggal. Further, concerned bank official was examined as DW-2 who brought the account opening form of the account from which the cheque in question was issued wherein the account holder is stated to be Mrs. Madhu Duggal and not Siddharth Duggal.
19. Even the AR of the complainant was examined as CW-1 who deposed on similar lines that he was not aware whether Siddharth Duggal was the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 firm. The relevant portion of cross examination of AR of the complainant/ CW-1 dated 02.07.2018 is reproduced as hereunder: -
"I had not seen any document which could suggest that Mr. Siddharth Duggal is the sole proprietor of M/s Duggal's Print House/ accused no. 1. I have no idea that Mrs. Madhu Duggal has been shown and her name is registered as sole proprietor of M/s Duggal's Print House/ accused no. 1 in all public documents after the death of Mr. Pradeep Duggal."C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 12/17
NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL 14:43:39 +0530 Date: 2025.07.16 Hence, it is manifest that only the sole proprietor can be held liable for the transactions of the proprietorship concern and liability cannot be fastened on any third person including the authorized signatory. The same being the case in the present matter, Siddharth Duggal cannot be said to be acting on behalf of the proprietorship firm and thus, cannot be held liable for the same.
20. Moreover, as far as the liability of accused firm is concerned, the accused has contended that he had issued cheque bearing no. 166359 of Rs. 1,50,000/- in discharge of his liability and therefore, no liability qua the amount mentioned in the cheque in question can be fixed on him. Pertinently, the same has been admitted by AR of the complainant in his cross examination. The relevant portion of cross examination of AR of the complainant/ CW-1 dated 02.07.2018 is reproduced as hereunder: -
"It is correct that a cheque bearing no. 166359 of Rs. 1,50,000/- was given to me by the accused no. 1 and the same was duly encashed in my account."
Furthermore, the complainant has not placed on record any ledger account or bank statement by which the liability of the accused qua the amount mentioned in the cheque in question could be determined. Mere placing on record the cheque in question is not sufficient to compute the legal liability of the accused. This is moreso, as the transaction in hand is of a business/ commercial in nature and not personal. Not placing on record relevant documents to show the outstanding legal liability of the accused creates an even further dent in the case of the complainant.
21. It is a settled law that to hold a conviction in cheque bounce case, there must be legally enforceable debt or liability as on the date of presentation/maturity of cheque or in other words, if there is no debt or liability to C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 13/17 NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL 14:43:47 +0530 Date: 2025.07.16 the tune of cheque amount in question on date of presentation of cheque, Section 138 of NI Act is not made out.
22. The above discrepancies in the case of the complainant as projected in the complaint and in deposition in the cross examination as noted above casted a serious cloud on the entire case of the complainant against the accused. It is well settled law that in a criminal case, prosecution has to stand upon its own legs and it cannot take the advantage of the fact that accused has not led cogent defence evidence or accused is having a weak defence. The suspicious circumstances arising in the present case will certainly give advantage to the accused.
23. In Anss Rajashekar v. Augustus Jeba Ananth (2020) 15 SCC 348, a two Judge Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court, reiterated the decision of the three-judge bench of Apex Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SUPREME COURT 1898, on the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. The court held-
"12. Section 139 of the Act mandates that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received it, in discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt, or liability. The expression "unless the contrary is proved" indicates that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is rebuttable. Terming this as an example of a "reverse onus clause" the three- Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa held that in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the test of proportionality must guide the determination. The standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption under section 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities. This Court held thus:
"28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of preponderance of probabilities". Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 14/17 Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL 14:43:53 Date: 2025.07.16 +0530
24. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the burden on the accused to prove his defence is not very high. The defence needs to be proved by only a preponderance of probability. This can be done either by proving his defence by adducing cogent evidence or by destroying the case of the complainant by pointing out loopholes in the complaint or by means of cross examination.
25. It is also pertinent to mention here that the accused has taken a consistent stand and stood firm on his defence throughout the trial. Needless to state that the case of the complainant has to stand on his own legs and not dependent upon the lacunae or contradictions in the defence of the accused, once he has been able to raise a probable defence.
26. Therefore, in present matter the accused has been able to raise a reasonable probable defence by punching holes in the case of the complainant itself on the basis of the materials already brought on record by way of cross examination of the complainant, which has created doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and has been able to rebut the presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and the reverse onus cast upon him has been discharged.
27. Since the accused has rebutted the statutory presumptions, the onus again shifts back upon the complainant. Now the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act will not again come for the rescue of the complainant. In the instant case, complainant has failed to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt by proving all the ingredients under Section 138 NI Act.
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 15/17 Digitally signedNISHI by NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:44:00 +0530
28. Accordingly, accused namely Siddharth Duggal authorized signatory of M/s Duggals Print House is acquitted of the offence under section 138 of the NI Act. Bail bonds stand cancelled and surety, if any, stands discharged. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Pronounced in Open Court. Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
Dated: 16.07.2025 JINDAL Date:
2025.07.16
14:44:06 +0530
(Nishi Jindal)
Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT), Digital Court-01, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi Certified that this judgment contains 17 pages and each page bears my signature.
The undersigned had reserved the said judgment prior to her transfer vide notification no. 16/DHC/Gaz-IIB/G-7/VI.E.2(a)/2025 dated 30.05.2025 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and in compliance of the direction at footnote no.2 of the same, the judgment has been notified and is being pronounced.
NISHI Digitally signed by NISHI JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 JINDAL 14:44:09 +0530 (Nishi Jindal) Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) Digital Court-01, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 16/17 In compliance of practise direction no. 124/Rules/DHC dated 10.12.2024 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the parties are hereby informed about the availability of free legal aid facilities for pursuing higher remedies. The contact address and phone number of DSLSA, PHC, NDD is provided here in below.
DSLSA, Patiala House Court, Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110001.
Phone number : 01123232273.
e-mail address : [email protected] Digitally signed by NISHI NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:44:16 +0530 C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 17/17