Himachal Pradesh High Court
Kewal Krishan Sehgal And Others vs Rajeshwar Kumar And Another on 3 January, 2019
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA .
C.R. No. 127 of 2016 Reserved on: 28.12.2018 Date of decision: 03.01.2019 Kewal Krishan Sehgal and others ...Petitioners/Tenants.
Versus Rajeshwar Kumar and another ...Respondents/Landlords.
Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting ?1 Yes For the Petitioners : Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Devyani Sharma and Mr. Basant Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Mr. Ashok Kumar Sood and Mr. Dhiraj Thakur, Advocates.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge The petitioners are the tenants, who after having an order of eviction at the hands of the learned Rent Controller as affirmed by learned Appellate Authority, have filed the instant revision petition.
The parties shall be referred to as the 'Landlords' and the 'Tenants'.
1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ? Yes ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 2
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the landlords .
filed a petition under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, (for short 'Act'), seeking eviction of the tenants from the tenanted premises comprising a shop No.61, measuring 9.60 x 4.20 meters, constructed on khasra No. 125 and 126 at Up-mohal Sanjauli Bazar. It was averred by the landlords that their predecessor-in-interest had rented out the shop in the year 1945 and the premises in occupation of the tenants are bonafidely required by the landlords for setting up of office-cum-business premises of respondent No.1 and his daughter Mrs. Itee. It was averred that respondent No.1 is 65 years of age and is graduate in Engineering and he retired as Chief Engineer from H.P. State Electricity Board and has got experience of 35 years in the field of Engineering and he wants to augment his income by utilizing his experience which he gained in service with Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. It was further averred that there is no suitable accommodation for running proposed professional work except the premises occupied by the tenants. It was averred that he was already doing consultancy but no suitable accommodation is available with him in the market for this purpose. It was averred that he has no son to look after him and his wife who is an old aged lady, and therefore, he has decided to shift his daughter to Shimla so that she can reside at Shimla with him and take care of him and his wife in their old age. It was ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 3 averred that his daughter is doing private job and her husband is also .
doing private work and they have experience in Information Technology and advertising and for that purpose also they require suitable accommodation for settling at Shimla and they have proposed to start internet cafe in a place where customers are offered with high speed internet access of national and international level along with other computer services and variety of PC games and other allied computer services. It was further averred that the demised premises is bonafidely required by respondent No.1 and he does not have any vacant shop/ commercial premises in the main market in Urban area of Shimla for carrying work and also for establishing his daughter and son in law.
3. The said petition was contested and resisted by the tenants on various grounds inter alia maintainability and the landlords are estopped from filing and maintaining the present eviction petition and the same is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties. It was further averred that the present petition is barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this ground of eviction is not available under the Act and the petition has been filed with malafide intention and with a view to get the rent increased. It was also averred that the landlords have failed to plead and prove the necessary ingredients which are essential to evict the tenants from the premises. It was further averred that the premises in question is non-
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 4residential and the ground of bonafide requirement for eviction is not .
available for such premises. The petition was sought to be dismissed being barred under the principle of res judicata. Similarly, it was averred that neither the premises are required by the landlords nor for his daughter who is settled at Panchkula. It was averred that another petition filed by the landlords seeking eviction of the present petitioners on the ground of bonafide requirement by pleading that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and use which is still pending in the court of leaned Rent Controller, Court No.6, Shimla. It was further stand of the tenants that respondent No.1 has got independent house at Lower Jakhoo, Shimla where he has sufficient accommodation in case he wants to start consultancy business and so far as the averment that the same is required for his daughter Mrs. Itee is concerned, that also denied on the ground that she is happily living with her in-laws and she is also having an independent family and she has no interest to do any business at Shimla and the plea of bonafide requirement has been raised by respondent No.1 with the sole motive to harass the present petitioners.
4. The learned Rent Controller after framing the issues, put the parties on trial and vide judgment dated 8.7.2015 allowed the petition on the ground of bonafide requirement for the purpose of running consultancy as well as for settling his daughter at Shimla.
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 55. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenants filed an .
appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, however, the same also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 2.5.2016, constraining the tenants to file the instant revision petition.
6. It has been vehemently argued by Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Devyani Sharma, Advocate, that:
(i) the eviction petition itself was not maintainablee on the ground that eviction qua non-residential premises was not available to the landlords on the date of filing of the petition and, therefore, eviction orders being contrary to law, deserve to be set-aside on this ground alone;
(ii) the eviction petition was barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC as another eviction petition on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction had already been filed by the landlords and thereafter withdrawn unconditionally;
(iii) the eviction petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as the other co-owners of the building had not been arrayed as parties to the petition;
and
(iv) the findings recorded by the leaned authorities below are perverse inasmuch as they have not properly ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 6 appreciated the statement of son-in-law of the landlord .
PW-3 in its proper perspective and thereby reached on wrong conclusion.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents / landlords would argue that the judgments passed by learned authorities below cannot be held to be perverse, therefore, these findings warrant no interference.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record carefully.
8. At the outset, the scope of revisional jurisdiction which Court can exercise must borne in mind, as the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 laid down certain broad principles for exercise of revisional jurisdiction which can be summarized as under:
(i) The term 'propriety' would imply something which is legal and proper.
(ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority.
(iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.
(iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority.
(v) The expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 7 "appeal". The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of .
the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246.
(vi). The meaning of the expression "legality and propriety" so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be "according to law".
(vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below.
(viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon.
(ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law.
(x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with.
Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal.
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 8(xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of .
arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order.
(xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence."
9. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, T. N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The incongruity in the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499 and Ram Dass (supra) was the backdrop in which the Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the expression "legality and propriety" provided in the relevant statues. The essential question being as to whether in exercise of such powers, the revisional authority could reappreciate the evidence or not.
Finally the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the reference by making the following observations:-
"43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 9 from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under .
these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers."
10. Bearing in mind the law propounded in the aforesaid decision, this Court will now proceed to answer point-wise contentions raised by the tenants.
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 10POINT No.(i):
.
11. It is not in dispute that the premises in question are 'non-
residential'. It is further not in dispute that it was vide amendment carried out in the Rent Act which came into force w.e.f. 16.3.2012 that eviction could be sought from 'non-residential premises' on the ground of bonafide requirement. However, before the amendment was in fact carried out, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab 1995 (2) RCR 672 : (1996) 1 SCC 1, struck down a same or similar provision that existed in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act wherein also there was no provision in the Rent Act seeking eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement of 'non-
residential premises'. It was held that the provisions in the Rent Act which deprives the landlord of their right to seek ejectment from the non-
residential premises are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and classification created in this Act between residential and non-
residential for bonafide of landlord has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the Rent Act. It was in this background that the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act came to be amended and brought in conformity with the law as laid down in Harbilas Rai Bansal's case (supra).
12. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satya Wati vs. Union of India 2008 (2) SLJ 721 and Ashok Kumar vs. Ved ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 11 Parkash (2010) 2 SCC 264. In Satya Wati's case (supra) the Hon'ble .
Supreme Court was dealing with the Delhi Rent Act, whereas in Ashok Kumar's case (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Haryana Rent Control Act that was the subject matter of the lis. In Ashok Kumar's case it was specifically held that it will not make difference that Harbilas's case was under the Rent Act enacted by the legislature of State of Punjab, whereas the Haryana Rent Act was enacted by the different legislature of the State of Haryana and, therefore, negated the contention that because of the legislature having been enacted by two different States, the ratio in Harbilas case would not apply as was contended by the tenants therein. Rather the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the judgment in Harbilas was applicable to the Haryana Rent Act as it has persuasive value for the Court while considering the constitutionality of a very similar provision albeit in different Legislation. It shall be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions as contained in paras 21 to 24 of the judgment, which reads thus:
"21. Thus, in view of the overall discussions made hereinabove, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that an eviction petition filed by a landlord for eviction of a tenant cannot be filed under Section 13 of the Act when such eviction proceeding relates to a non-residential building.::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 12
22. Before parting with this Judgment, a short submission of the learned counsel for the appellant needs to be dealt with.
.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the case of Harbilas (supra) and Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, (2005) 8 SCC 504, were rendered on the amendments made to East Punjab Rent Act, whereas the case of Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain, (2006) 2 SCC 724 and the issue before us concerned removing a classification which existed from the inception of the legislation. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, a decision and reasoning concerning East Punjab Rent Act cannot apply to a question with respect to the present Act because both the legislations are products of different legislatures and the rationale behind one cannot be compared at par with that of the other.
23. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this contention, relied on a decision of this Court in the case of State of Madhyapradesh v. G.C.Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC 493 and strong reliance on para 9 of this decision was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, which may be quoted :-
"9....It is conceivable that when the same Legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where, as here, the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different legislatures."
24. There is no quarrel in the aforesaid principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision. However, we do not see why the decision concerning one legislation cannot hold persuasive value for the Court while considering the constitutionality of a very similar provision, albeit in a different legislation."
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 1313. As observed above, the provisions of Rent Act have now .
been amended and brought in conformity with the judgment laid down in Harbilas case (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari Dass Sharma vs. Vikas Sood and others (2013) 5 SCC 243 has itself applied the provisions of the amending Act to the pending proceeding before it as would be evident from para-19 of the report which reads thus:
"19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the directions contained in para 27 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, but grant time to the respondents to vacate the building within three months from today. We make it clear that it will be open for the respondents to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2009. Considering, however, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs."
14. In view of the law expounded in Hari Dass case (supra), it can conveniently be held that the provisions of the amending Act have retrospective operation and this was so noticed by learned Division Bench of this Court in Chaman Lal Bali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another AIR 2016 (HP)168.
15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can conveniently be held that the eviction petition filed by the landlord even prior to the amendment so carried out in the Rent Act, was maintainable.
::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 14POINT NO. (ii):
.
16. Under Section 14 of the Rent Act, a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of his tenant on various grounds. All these grounds are separate and distinct and, therefore, the mere fact that the landlord had instituted another petition seeking eviction on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction would not in any manner have bearing upon the instant petition as the withdrawal of the other petition has no effect upon the maintainability of this petition which has been filed on separate and distinct grounds, which otherwise were available to the landlord.
POINT No. (iii):
17. It has way back in 1976 that a bench of three Hon'ble Judges in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and others AIR 1976 SC 2335 held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as sole owner of the property is, therefore, can maintain an eviction petition. The aforesaid judgment was thereafter followed by a bench of three Hon'ble Judges in Kanta Goel vs. B.P.Pathak and others (1977) 2 SCC 814. Similar reiteration of law can be found in Pal Singh vs. Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs and others (1989) 1 SCC 444, Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and others (2002) 6 SCC 16 and India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and others vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and others (2004) 3 SCC
178. ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 15
18. In view of the law propounded in all the aforesaid .
judgments, it can be taken to be well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement.
19. Adverting to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that there is nothing on record to even remotely indicate that other co-
owners were not agreeable to eject the tenants and yet the eviction petition had been filed despite such disagreement.
POINT No. (iv):
20. As regards the perversity in the judgment, it is necessary to understand the meaning of perversity.
21. What is 'perverse' was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:-
"26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 16 violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse .
verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 17
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 .
"8...We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para
7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 18 to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-
.
appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law."
22. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel that the eviction of the tenants has been ordered solely on the ground that daughter and son-in-law of the landlord intend to settle at Shimla, whereas the statement of the son-in-law, who appeared as PW-3 was to the contrary and as regards the daughter, she did not even appear in the witness box and, therefore, an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the landlord. Even this contention of the tenants is without any basis.
23. PW-3 Vinay Sharma, son-in-law of landlord No.1 and husband of Ms. Itee, daughter of this landlord, while appearing as PW-3 not only corroborated but supported the testimony of the landlord, who appeared as PW-1 and stated that he was power of attorney of his wife, who could not appear due to her ill health. He further states that he was post graduate and diploma holder and had earlier worked with B.R. advertising company from the year 1999 uptil the year 2010. His wife ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 19 was working in Lozing Company and he is doing the work of advertising .
from his house. She had done digital marketing and content writing in Graphy Company Panchkula. He specifically deposed that he and his wife wanted to come to Shimla to look after his in-laws, who were in advance stage and not keeping good health. He and his wife intended to start advertising and cyber cafe business in the demised premises. His uncles had also settled in Shimla and, therefore, he and his wife will have no inconvenience and difficulty for settling in Shimla. Even though, PW-3 was cross-examined in length, but nothing material could be elicited so as to dent his testimony. In such circumstances, merely because the statement of PW-3 is not to the liking of the tenants, it cannot be held that the findings recorded by the authorities below are in any manner perverse.
24. It cannot be said that the evidence has not been read and appreciated or that there has been misreading of evidence by the leaned authorities below so as to warrant interference by this Court.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no interference warranted on the findings rendered by the authorities below. There is neither any illegality nor any perversity in the same. The testimonies of the witnesses stand correctly and completely appreciated. The oral and documentary evidence also stand considered in its right perspective and even the provisions of law have been correctly applied to the given facts ::: Downloaded on - 04/01/2019 23:02:41 :::HCHP 20 and circumstances of the case. This petition is devoid of any merit and .
is dismissed as such alongwith all pending application(s), leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
3rd January, 2019. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
(GR) Judge
r to
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