Gujarat High Court
Pradeepbhai Vikrambhai Jadav vs State Of Gujarat on 16 April, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 15959 of 2019
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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PRADEEPBHAI VIKRAMBHAI JADAV & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR TEJAS M BAROT, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS RHEA CHOKSHI for the
Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
MR KEVALSINH B RATHOD(10250) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR.AMIT R JOSHI(6682) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR SOHAM JOSHI, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 16/04/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. By way of this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicants have prayed to quash and set aside the FIR being II-C.R.No.48 of 2019 registered with Dhrangandhra Taluka Police Station, Surendranagar for the offences under Sections 323, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code, sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(za)(c) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "Atrocities Act") and section 135 of Gujarat Police Act and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
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2. Brief facts of the case is as under :-
2.1. On 12.08.2019, the offence u/s 323, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC, u/s 3(1)(R)(S), 3(2)(5-A), 3(1)(ZA)(C) of the Atrocity Amendment Act and u/s 135 of the G.P. Act has been committed in such a way that the complainant went to the fair of Khambhadiya Dada. As the complainant had religious vow to offer a dry coconut to Khambhadiya Dada, he was going to offer prayer with the dry coconut. At that time, accused no. 1 insulted him by caste saying that, "You are dhedha. You don't have to offer prayer here. Offer prayer at your temple." and stopped him.
As the accused no. 1 was about to inflict knife blow to the complainant, the complainant sustained injury beside the right eye. The accused nos. 2 and 3 inflicted fist and kick blows to the brother of the complainant. Therefore, when complainant and his brother were going to their uncle's house, accused no. 4 to 7 approached complainant and witness and insulted them by caste and inflicted fist and kick blows to them and threatened to kill. They aided and abetted each other in commission of the offence and thereby, they have violated the notification issued by Ld. District Magistrate, Surendranagar.
3. Learned Senior advocate Mr.Tejas Barot for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have not pressed the petition qua offence registered under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, which is recorded in the order dated 21.08.2019.
3.1 Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Barot submitted that the petition is pressed to quash allegations levelled under the Page 2 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined provisions of Atrocities Act. After taking this Court to FIR, it is submitted that essential ingredient of sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(za)(c) of Atrocities Act are not established. It is submitted that even as per FIR, alleged incident, whereby it is claimed that the petitioner used derogatory words against the complainant to lower him on the caste and castier slur were not spoken in presence of any independent party. It is submitted that even offence under IPC alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is not with intention that first informant belongs to SC / ST category and therefore, he has to suffer for incident, where allegations of offence under section 323 and 506(2) of IPC are levelled. While referring to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Georige Pentaiah v/s. State of Andra Pradesh [2008 (12) SCC 531], it is submitted that complainant ought to alleged that accused are not member of SC /ST caste and he was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in place within public view. It is submitted that basic ingredients are missing in the FIR, then permitting such complaint to continue and to compel the accused to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law.
3.2. Referring to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria v/s. State of Kerala [2024 SCC Online 2249], learned Senior Advocate Mr.Tejas Barot submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court has examined the meaning of expression 'intent to humiliate' appearing in section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act and held that offence under said provision must have been committed on person or for the reason that such person is SC / ST caste. It is submitted that in the present case, prosecution Page 3 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined has failed to establish such ingredients. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v/s. State of Uttarkhand [(2020) 10 SCC 710] and in the case of Prabhat Kumar Mishra v/ s. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2024) 3 SCC 665] was relied upon to submit that to attract offence under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, the victim should be person belonging to SC or ST and that offence under the IPC is committed against him on the basis that such person belongs to SC or ST, however, in absence of such ingredients, it cannot be said that offence under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act is committed.
3.3. Mainly on above submissions, it is submitted to quash the FIR so far as allegations of offence under Atrocities Act are levelled against the petitioners.
4. Per contra, learned advocate for respondent no.2 referring to Article 14, 17 and 25 of the Constitution of India in background of judgment in the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. (Sabarimala Temple) v/s. State of Kerala [(2019) 11 SCC 1] (popularly known as Sabarimala Temple judgment), would submit that citizens of India have fundamental right under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India to profess religion he believes. Citizens of India cannot be prevented from professing particular religion and further preventing from entering into Temple of religion he believes. Referring to FIR, it is submitted that it is classic case of untouchability. It is submitted that petitioners have restrained complainant and other members from entering into Khambhadiya Dada Temple and threaten them not to come to pay darshan of Khambhadiya Dada Temple. Learned advocate for respondent no.2 would Page 4 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined submit that specific words are spoken to the complainant which is forming part of FIR and it demonstrate that complainant and other members were intentionally humiliated by the petitioners uttering castier slur and therefore, looking to facts coming out from FIR, at threshold it should not be quashed.
4.1. Referring to three affidavits filed at Annexure I, learned advocate for respondent no.2 submits that three independent persons have stated on oath that they have also seen petitioners humiliating complainant and other members by speaking castier slur, which indicates that the petitioners have spoken specific words within public place. Therefore, it is submitted not to exercise inherent power to quash the FIR and direct the petitioners to face trial.
4.2. So far as offence under section 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(za)(c) of Atrocities Act is concerned, it is submitted by learned advocate for respondent no.2 that averments made in the FIR indicates that complainant and other members have been obstructed by the petitioners from entering into worship temple of Khambhadiya Dada Temple which is open to public for professing religion or taking part in religious activity and therefore, he submits that contents of the FIR prima facie establish the offence.
4.3. Learned advocate for the respondent no.2 further argued that the petitioners have not pressed petition seeking quashing of offence under sections 323 and 506(2) of IPC, however, these offences falls within category of schedule offence and if schedule offence alleged to have been committed by accused, offence Page 5 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined under sections 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act would ipso facto is attracted.
4.4. Making above submissions, it is submitted not to exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR.
5. Learned APP after adopting arguments of learned advocate for respondent no.2 submitted that FIR cannot be accepted to be encyclopedia to mention each and every incident taken place. The facts stated in the FIR attract offence alleged therein and therefore, he submits to dismiss the petition.
6. I have heard learned advocates for both the sides and perused record. At the outset, I may refer order passed by Co- ordinate Bench on 21.08.2019, it reads as under :-
"Learned advocate for the applicants does not press present application so far as offences registered under the provisions of IPC is concerned.
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 obliges the complainant in opening recital, to plead the case that the accused is not the member of the SC/ST caste. No such plea is taken in the FIR itself and, therefore, amended provisions of section 18 of the said Act would not come into play in the present proceedings in view of decision in case Georige Pentaiah V. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2008(12) SCC 531. Therefore, present application deserves consideration. Issue notice returnable on 14.11.2019. Learned A.P.P. waives service of notice for respondent - State. Meanwhile, no coercive steps shall be taken against the applicants. Direct service is permitted."
7. Co-ordinate Bench while passing aforesaid order in Page 6 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined unequivocal terms held that complainant is obliged in opening recital to plead that the accused is not the member of SC /ST Caste. Co-ordinate Bench found missing of such statement in the FIR and therefore, held that amended provision of section 18 of Atrocities Act would not come into play. Co-ordinate Bench while passing order of no coercive steps to be taken against the petitioners has taken assistance from judgment in the case of Georige Pentaiah (supra).
8. Since the petition is limited to quash FIR so far as offence under the Atrocities Act is concerned, let refer concerned provisions of the Atrocities Act :-
Section 3(1)(r)(s)
3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.--
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(v-a) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)17 for such offences and shall also be liable to fine.] Page 7 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined
9. Let me first go through judgment in the case of Gorgige Pentaiah (supra). In para 5 and 6, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :-
"5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that even if all the allegations incorporated in the complaint are taken as true, even then, no offence is made out under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and under Sections 447, 427, 506 of the Indian Penal Code. As far as Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as under:
"3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe:-
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view."
6. In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused- appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."
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10. It is settled principle of law that in order to prove offence under section 3(1)(r)(s), the prosecution is required to prove that intentionally insulted or intimidated has been made with intent to humiliate persons / members of SC / ST in a place within public view or abuses on the ground that he is member of SC / ST, castier slur is uttered at place within public view.
11. In the case of Hitesh Verma (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has held in para 10 to 14 as under :-
"10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community.
11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)
(r) which reads as under:
"3(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;"
12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)
(r) of the Act can be classified as "1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view".
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13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under:
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However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."
12. As per FIR, except relatives of complainant, no third party were present in vicinity, where certain words alleged to have been spoken to derogate or humiliate complainant as he being member of SC /ST caste. Hopeless argument is made by learned advocate for respondent no.2 that as incident took place near temple, it can be said to be place within public view. In order to attract expression 'place within public view', presence of third party is must. Learned advocate for respondent no.2 to satisfy expression 'place within public view' referred to affidavit at Annexure I of persons and submitted that on oath they have Page 11 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined stated that they were present when incident took place. Filing of affidavit has no factored to believe that they were present. FIR is blank about name of petitioners who have filed affidavit. Moreover, the affidavit filed at the instance of complainant in the present proceedings demonstrate that those persons are interested persons and since they found to be interested persons, their affidavits is of no consequence. Complainant who has filed FIR having claimed that he is victim of Atrocities Act, has not named persons who have filed affidavits at Annexure I, the complaint is silent that why he has not named persons in FIR itself makes affidavits at Annexure I suspicious and further found to be filed with oblique and specific purpose and therefore, it cannot be acted upon.
13. Another argument was canvassed by learned advocate for respondent no.2 that still untouchability practice prevail upon member of SC / ST and they are not permitted to visit temple. It is also argued that complainant and other members are constantly humiliated for being SC / ST member. Hon'ble Apex Court while examining the concept of humiliation of untouchability in contest of offence under section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, in the case of Shajan Skaria (supra), in para 61 to 74 held as under :-
"a. Meaning of the expression "intent to humiliate"
appearing in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
61. The words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional Page 12 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the "upper castes"
over the "lower castes/untouchables", the notions of 'purity' and 'pollution', etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.
62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea of "humiliation" as it has been used under the Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate category as they arise from the practice of 'untouchability' and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special laws treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation.
63. V. Geetha in her paper titled Bereft of Being: The Humiliations of Untouchability1 describes humiliation as an experience that is "felt, held and savoured in the very gut of our existence." Humiliation, in her understanding, can either be suffered as a one-time occurrence which bruises the self-esteem or pride of an individual, or it can be "suffered as a condition that is degrading and wounding." In the words of Gopal Guru, humiliation is not Page 13 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart.
64. Explaining the social structures that perpetuate humiliation, Gopal Guru, in an introduction to his book2 writes that "humiliation is almost endemic to social life that is active basically through asymmetries of intersecting sects of attitudes - arrogance and obeisance, self-respect and servility and reverence and repulsion. Discussing on how the basis of humiliation varies in different societies, depending upon the social context, he observes that the idea and practice of humiliation "continues to survive in different forms depending upon the specific nature of the social context. For example, in the West it is the attitude of race that is at the base of humiliation. In the East, it is the notion of untouchability that foregrounds the form and content of humiliation."
65. While Gopal Guru makes the aforesaid observation in the context of different societies in relation to one another, such as the East and the West, in our opinion the observations are equally applicable to specific individual societies as well wherein multiple varying grounds of humiliation like gender, caste, race, etc. can co-exist and apply to the same or different individuals and groups.
66. Bhikhu Parekh in his paper titled Logic of Humiliation3 attempts to differentiate humiliation from other concepts that it is generally confused with. He gives the example of the ticket inspector who threw Gandhi off the train in South Africa to argue that humiliation might, but need not, involve physical cruelty. On the contrary, he contends that a man who starves another to death and tortures him, shows cruelty but does not necessarily humiliate him. He argues the same regarding the difference between insult and humiliation and observes that although humiliation generally involves insult, yet insult alone is not sufficient to constitute humiliation.
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67. On the social context of humiliation, Parekh writes that "organised or institutionalized humiliation exists when social institutions and practices embody disrespect for, and systematically violate the self-respect of, groups of individuals." Drawing a distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation on the one hand as distinguished from isolated incidents of humiliation on the other, he observes that while the latter is present in modern liberal societies, the former is found in societies structured on the basis of slavery, racial segregation, untouchability, caste system, hierarchical status, etc. According to him, the reason for the same is that the modern liberal societies, though marked by deep economic, political and other inequalities, allow for vertical mobility owing to the fluid nature of the inequalities. Whereas, societies based on race, caste system, etc. are grounded in inequalities like colour, birth, ethnicity, etc. which are unalterable and deeply entrenched in the very foundational fabric of such a society. The inflexible nature of the basis of inequalities leads to the existence of a more structural and systemic form of humiliation, as the perpetrator is assured of its place in the structure of the society owing to its immobility. Since no one can be assured of the same in a modern liberal society which is marked by vertical mobility in the social structure, there is no incentive for anyone to have a regimented system of humiliation.
68. Resistance is internal to humiliation, and some scholars have argued that humiliation is only defined on the basis of the claims made against it. Thus, those who are humiliated also inherently possess the capacity to protest against it. However, those who protest also run the risk of inciting opposition from those who want to push the traditionally humiliated groups to the margins. This apprehension of opposition and push back from the dominant against the marginalised is also evident from the Statements of Objects of the Act, 1989, as discussed by this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra).
69. What appears from the aforesaid discussion is that the expression "intent to humiliate" as it appears in Section Page 15 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must necessarily be construed in the larger context in which the concept of humiliation of the marginalised groups has been understood by various scholars. It is not ordinary insult or intimidation which would amount to 'humiliation' that is sought to be made punishable under the Act, 1989. The Parliament, by way of different legislations, has over the years sought to target humiliation based on different grounds and identities which exist in the society. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeks to punish humiliation based on gender inequalities by specifically including the term 'humiliation' in the definition of "domestic violence". Similarly, The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 includes treatment causing humiliation to a female employee and which may likely affect her health and safety within the definition of sexual harassment.
70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term 'humiliation' as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
71. We would also like to refer to Section 7(1)(d) of The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 ("Civil Rights Act") at this juncture to give a more meaningful construction to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. The provision reads as follows:
"7. Punishment for other offences arising out of "untouchability".--
(1) Whoever-- xxx xxx xxx
(d) insults or attempts to insult, on the ground of "untouchability", a member of a Scheduled Caste;
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months, and also with fine which shall be not less than one hundred rupees and not more than five hundred rupees."
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72. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provision that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act. With the passage of time, it was realised by the legislature that the Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to the enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the context of Section 7(1)(d) of the Civil Rights Act. Seen thus, the words "with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe" become inseparable from the underlying idea of "untouchability" which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989.
73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1)
(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations is extracted hereinbelow:
"18. [...]The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)
(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. [...]"
74. Having regard to the reprehensible conduct and the nature of the derogatory statements made, the appellant, Page 17 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined at best could be said to have prima facie committed the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. If that be so, it is always open for the complainant to prosecute the appellant accordingly. However, the complainant could not have invoked the provisions of the Act, 1989 only on the premise that he is member of Scheduled Caste, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of the transcript of the video and the complaint fails to disclose that the actions of the appellant were impelled by the caste identity of the complainant."
14. In background of above, examining statement made in the FIR, it is clear that prima facie it does not attract offence under section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act.
15. It was also argued by learned advocate for respondent no.2 that the petitioners and other members have restrained complainant and other members to enter into Temple and as such it breaches fundamental right of the complainant and other members and it attracts offence under section 3(1)(za)(c) of the Atrocities Act. In order to attract this provision, there should be clear recital in the FIR that accused are not being member of SC / ST and they have obstructed member of SC / ST in entering any place of worship which is open to public. Plain reading of FIR, it lacks necessary ingredients which requires to establish offence. Even Co-ordinate Bench while passing order on 21.08.2019 also noted that the complainant has not pleaded in opening recital in the FIR that accused is not member of SC / ST.
16. In Prabhat Kumar Mishra (supra) , Hon'ble Apex Court held that in absence of requisite ingredients, no offence under section Page 18 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined 3(2)(v) arises. Moreover, reading FIR does not give impression that accused have prevented complainant and other members from professing their religion or restrain from entering into place of worship. Except general allegations that they are not allowed to enter into temple, no other averments are made nor supporting evidence are produced on record. Moreover, alleged incident took place without there being presence of any independent person, which itself establish incident more suspicious. Therefore, it cannot be believed that accused have committed offence under Atrocities Act.
17. Lastly, it was argued that since offence under sections 323 and section 506(2) of IPC falls under category of schedule offence, trial of the said offence against the petitioners ipso facto attracts offence under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. To deal with said contention, let refer section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act.
3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-- 13[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-- (za) obstructs or prevents a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any manner with regard to--
(C) entering any place of worship which is open to the public or other persons professing the same religion or taking part in, or taking out, any religious, social or cultural processions including jatras;
18. Again plain reading of aforesaid provision, offence is not attracted. Order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench on 21.08.2019 clearly states that complainant is obliged to plead in opening Page 19 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined recital that accused are not member of SC/ ST. Moreover, section 3(2)(va) provides that victim should be a person who belongs to SC or ST and that the offence under IPC is committed against him on the basis that such person belongs to SC / ST and in absence of such ingredients, no offence under section 3(2) (va) of the Atrocities Act arise. At this stage, let me refer para 15 to 17 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Kumar Mishra(supra). Para 15 to 17 reads as under :-
"15. At the outset, we may take note of the fact that the prosecution of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is ex facie illegal and unwarranted because it is nowhere the case of the prosecution in the entire charge-sheet that the offence under IPC was committed by the appellant upon the deceased on the basis of his caste.
16. This Court in the case of Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra1 considered this issue and held as under:-
"9. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Penal Code, 1860 is committed against him on the basis Page 20 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside."
17. Thus, from the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)
(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out so as to justify prosecution of the accused appellant for the said offence."
19. Applying ratio to the present case, impugned FIR lacks essential ingredient that offence under IPC has been committed by complainant and others knowing fully well that they are member of SC / ST. Therefore, in absence of requisite ingredient of offence, accused cannot be put to trial.
20. So far as scope and ambit of power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint, the issue is addressed in the case of Gorige Pentaiah (supra). It is held by Hon'ble Apex Court that every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exits or to prevent abuse of process of Court. Para 12, 13,14,15,16,17,18 and 25 of said judgment of Gorige Pentaiah (supra) reads as under :-
"Scope and ambit of courts' powers under section 482 Cr.P.C.
12. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex Page 21 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.
Discussion of decided cases
13. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great Page 22 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved.
14. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
15. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.
16. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the Page 23 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.
17. In Chandrapal Singh & Others v. Maharaj Singh & Another (1982) 1 SCC 466, in a landlord and tenant matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated, this Court observed in para 1 at page 467 as under:-
"A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of civil courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous."
The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.
18. This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under:
"7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice Page 24 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
24. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Others , this court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The court further observed that "13...any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."
21. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansari v/s. State of Jharkhand rendered in SLP No.6763 of 2023, held as under :-
"7. Admittedly all the prosecution witnesses are related and the specific case of the accused was that due to the enmity, on account of the land dispute, the accused were framed under the SC & ST Act alleging house trespass. Section 3 of the Act charged against the accused is not attracted for reason of the allegations of derogatory terms being used against the complainants, if at all true, was not in a public place nor in the presence of any member of the public. However, we see from the order of the Trial Court that the specific allegation levelled was of wrongful occupation or cultivation in any land owned by or in the possession, allotted to or notified by any competent Page 25 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/15959/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/04/2025 undefined authority to be allotted to a member of a Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe as coming out in sub-clause (f) of Section 3(1) of the SC & ST Act. We cannot but notice that there is also an allegation of derogatory terms having been used in the presence of villagers, in the complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate, which brings in clause
(s) of Section 3(1) dealing with abusing any member of a Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe by caste name in a place within public view and clause (r) relating to intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of SC & ST in any place within public view.
11. We cannot but find that there are gross inconsistencies insofar as the complaint and the oral evidence led by way of deposition before the Court. The place of occurrence was stated to be the house, in the complaint, while all the witnesses spoke of the alleged incident having occurred in the field, which was the disputed land. In any event, there is no scope for finding either clause (r) or (s) of Section 3(1) of the SC & ST Act since PW-1 has categorically stated that there was no member of the public present at the time the incident occurred. Insofar as the allegation under clause (f) of Section 3(1) there is nothing to indicate that the complainant and her family were forcefully evicted from the disputed land or that the accused occupied it illegally after delivery was effected on 25.04.2005. As far as the house trespass is concerned, the oral evidence does not support it. On the above reasoning we find absolutely no reason to sustain the conviction as entered into by the Magistrate's Court confirmed by the High Court. We set aside the order of the Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court and acquit the appellants herein."
22. In view of above discussion, and applying ratio recorded herein above, allegations made in the FIR clearly found to be vexatious and total abuse of process of law. Even if FIR is taken at its face value and accepted in entirety, it does not constitute the offence against accused under the provisions of Atrocities Act.
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23. Applying ratio laid down in the case of State of Haryana v/ s. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], more particularly, finding at sr. no.1,3 and 5 of para 102, impugned FIR qua offence under Atrocities Act deserves to be quashed.
24. Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the caes of Inder Mohan Goswami v/s. State of Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1] has examined scope and ambit of section 482 of Cr.P.C. and observed that inherent powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C. should be exercised for advancement of justice. If any abuse of process leading to injustice is brought tothe notice of the Court, then the Court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the Court.
25. In view of above, present petition is partly allowed. FIR being II-C.R.No.48 of 2019 registered with Dhrangandhra Taluka Police Station, Surendranagar for the offence under sections 3(1)
(r)(s), 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(za)(c) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is quashed and set aside qua the petitioners. Offence against the petitioners under Indian Penal Code would be put to trial. Needless to state that learned Trial Court shall not be influenced by observation made herein above while conducting trial under IPC offence against the petitioners.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) SATISH Page 27 of 27 Uploaded by SATISH C. VEMULLA(HC00206) on Wed Apr 23 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Apr 23 21:19:48 IST 2025