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[Cites 3, Cited by 1]

Patna High Court

Ramdeep Singh And Ors. vs Shyama Singh And Ors. on 2 May, 1960

Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT71, 1961CRILJ303, AIR 1961 PATNA 71, 1960 BLJR 476

JUDGMENT
 

 Sahai, J. 
 

1. This is an appeal under Section 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the filing of a complaint against the appellant; by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge of Gaya.

2. A dacoity case started on a petition of complaint filed by appellant Ramdeep Singh. On the case being committed to session, two sessions cases, bearing Sessions Trial Nos. 43 and 68 of 1957, came to be registered. They were transferred for disposal to the 1st Additional Sessions Judge who, by his judgment dated the 21st September, 1957, held the prosecution case to be false and acquitted all the accused persons. The accused persons filed an application on the 20th November, 1957, before the same learned Judge, and made a prayer that he should file a complaint against Ramdeep Singh and the alleged eye-witnesses for the prosecution in the sessions trial. Under an order of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge dated the 4th March, 1958, a complaint has been filed against all the appellants. The offence alleged against all of them is one under Section 193, and in addition, the offence alleged against appellant Ramdeep and his wife, Khubsurat Kuer, is one under Section 211 of the Penal Code.

2a. It is manifest that the learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to notice Section 479-A, which was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure by Act XXVI of 1955 which came into force on the 1st January, 1956. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that, if the court is of opinion that:

"a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the Judicial proceeding", and if he is further of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such witness should be prosecuted, he shall record the necessary finding with reasons at the time of delivery of his judgment and, after giving an opportunity to the witness to be heard, shall file a complaint. Sub-section (6) of the same section provides that no proceeding under Sections 476 to 479 inclusive can be taken for giving or fabricating false evidence against a person if proceeding could be started against him under Section 479-A.

3. The words which I have quoted above have been extracted almost verbatim from Section 193 of the Penal Code, and have been inserted in Section 479-A. It is admitted by Mr. Sharma that there is nothing in the order of acquittal dated the 21st September, 1957, which can, be construed! to be a finding as required by Section 479-A, and that, therefore, the learned Judge was completely debarred from filing a complaint against the appellants for an offence under Section 193 by a subsequent order. So far as appellant Khubsurat Kuer is concerned, she was not the complainant, and she cannot be said prima facie to have committed an offence under Section 211. She cannot, therefore, be prosecuted under that section,

4. Appellant Ramdeep was the complainant, and the learned Judge was entitled to file a complaint against him for an offence under Section 211. Nothing in Section 479-A is a bar to Ramdeep's prosecution under that section. On the merits of the case, I do not see any good reason to interfere with the prosecution of Ramdeep under Section 211 at this stage.

5. In the circumstances mentioned above, I hold that the prosecution of all the appellants under Section 193 and that of appellant Khubsurat Kuer under Section 211 is illegal. The complaint filed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is withdrawn completely in so far as all the appellants are concerned with the exception of Ramdeep Singh. The complaint against him for the alleged offence under Section 211 of the Penal Code will alone stand. The appeal is dismissed only to this extent and it is allowed to the extent that I have already indicated.