Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Haryana vs Jit Ram on 19 November, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)121PLR385
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This regular first appeal when filed before this Court was barred by time. Consequently the State of Haryana filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 354 days in filing the appeal.
2. Notice on this application was issued. Reply was filed on behalf of the respondent objecting the condonation of delay. Land acquisition reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon on 11.4.1996, while the memorandum of appeal in the present case was filed in the Registry of this Court on 30.6.1997. The only reason given in this application was that considerable time was taken by the department including the office of the Legal Rememberancer and Secretary to Government of Haryana, which decided to file an appeal and thereafter the appeal was filed. As afore-noticed, the appeal could be filed till 3.12.1996. Even this is not sated in this application as to when the certified copy of the judgment was applied to and when the same was received. The averments made in the paragraphs No. 2 to 4 of the application are not only vague but they even do not indicate the basic necessary facts which could be considered by this Court in considering the present application.
3. Another factor which shows the callous attitude adopted on behalf of the State that the affidavit in support of this application is of 15.5.1998, while the application itself was drafted on 20.5.1998. As such there is no proper affidavit even in support of this application.
4. At the request of the learned counsel appearing for the State, the matter was even adjourned but no steps were taken to file any detailed proper affidavit. The order dated 9.2.1998 passed by the Court reads as under :-
"Counsel appearing for non-applicant prays for time to file reply. Reply be filed within two weeks from today.
Learned Counsel for the State is at liberty to file an additional affidavit, if so advised by the concerned officer who are responsible for causing the delay of 354 days in filing the present appeal. List on 27.4.1998."
5. The non-applicant has contested this application and has vehemently opposed the condonation of delay, as no sufficient cause has been disclosed. A definite right has accrued to the non-applicant and that right certainly cannot be taken away so lightly because it has the affect of ignoring the statutory provisions of the Limitation Act. In this regard, a reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India the case titled as P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., Judgments Today 1997(8) S.C. 189, wherein it has been held that:
"Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time."
6. Following the aforestated principle, this Court in the case titled as Punjab State etc. v. Onkar Nath and Anr., (1998-3)119 Punjab Law Reporter 492, also held as under:-
"7. It is true that the State department cannot function like an individual. Certain office working is required to be completed before the cases are taken up in appeal or recourse to other legal remedy is taken by the State. But that certainly does not mean that the State can act at its leisure. The State and its officers are expected to work in accordance with the settled cannon of administration of justice and expected to act and work like any reasonable and prudent person working in the given facts and circumstances of the case.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
11. Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran (Supra), this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, Malot v. Prem Singh, CM. No. 4751 and 4852-C of 1997 and R.S.A. No. 2873 of 1997, (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 325, declined to condone the delay in filing the appeal and dismissed the application preferred by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in that case. Furthermore, the Court in the case of Mauria Udyog and Ors. v. Shubh Karan and Anr., R.S.A. No. 2340 of 1996, decided on 10.10.1996 held as under:-
"The term sufficient cause must receive liberal meaning and has to be incorporated so as to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general condonation. Certainly Limitation Act is a substantive law and its provisions have to be adhered to in a manner that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party, as a result of unexplained sufficient or reasonable cause and directly as a result of negligence, default or inaction of the other party, such a right cannot be taken away lightly and in a routine manner."
7. Applying the above well settled principle of law to the present case, it is clear that the applicant has failed to show any cause for condonation of delay, much less as reasonable or a sufficient cause for that purpose. As already noticed, inspite of specific order of the Court, no proper affidavit was filed in the Court. Even the appeal itself was refiled 32 days late than the prescribed period, after the objections were raised by the Registry. The whole conduct of the applicant is such that it would deprive the applicant of any reasonable benefit, which could be granted to him in the discretion of the Court and in accordance with law. The mere fact that another R.F.A. has been admitted by itself cannot constitute a sufficient cause or ground for condonation of delay. A right of finality of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge has vested in the non-applicant (respondent herein). The right, therefore, cannot be taken away in a routine manner. There has to be definite and complete averments so as to constitute a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In the present case, nothing has been stated that by whom the file was dealt with, for how long and for what purpose. Mere one line allegation without describing the duties, period and the purpose of the concerned official in dealing with the file would not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of such serious delay. The mere procedure of office and delay resulting there-from per se cannot constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. May be the State is not required to explain each day's delay like a private litigant but it must by and large explain the cause of delay with particulars and some definite averments.
8. For the reasons aforestated, I am of the considered view that the applicant-appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of 354 days' delay in filing the present appeal.
9. Consequently, this application is dismissed. However, without any order as to costs.
10. As the application for condonation of delay stands dismissed, the appeal does not survive for consideration.
11. Application as well as appeal stand disposed of.