Punjab-Haryana High Court
(O&M) Romesh Chander vs Bachittar Singh on 4 February, 2026
Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal
RSA-111-1990(O&M)
1990(O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
101 RSA No.111 of 1990 (O&M)
Reserved on:27.01.2026
Pronounced on:04.02.2026
Uploaded on:
on:04.02.2026
Romesh Chander (since deceased) through LRs ... Appellant
Versus
Bachittar Singh ... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL
Present: Mr. Sahil Soi, Advocate
for the LRs of the appellant.
Mr. K.S. Dadwal, Advocate
Mr.
r. Manish Dadwal, Advocate and
Mr. Naresh Kumar, Advocate
for the respondent.
***
****
AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-defendant defendant challenging the judgment and decree dated 26.10.1989 passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court, Hoshiarpur, whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent-plaintiff plaintiff was allowed and the suit for possession by way of specific performance of the agreement agreement to sell dated 11.03.1985, in respect of land measuring 28 kanals 13 marlas situated in village Sasoli, Tehsil and District Hoshiarpur, was decreed, while setting aside the judgment and decree dated 28.04.1987 passed by the learned trial Court which had dismissed the suit for specific performance or, in the alternative, for recovery of ₹60,000/-
₹60,000/ as damages and refund of earnest money.
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2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in terms of their status before the trial court.
3. Succinctly, uccinctly, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted the suit for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 11.03.1985 on payment of the balance sale consideration of ₹48,840/- or in the alternative for recovery of ₹60,000/- as damages. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant agreed to sell land measuring 28 kanals 13 marlas situated in village Sasoli for a total sale consideration of ₹57,500/ ₹57,500/-.. At the time of execution of the agreement, a sum of ₹10,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as earnest money. It was agreed between the parties that if the area of the land was found to be more or less at the time of execution of the sale deed, the sale consideration would be proportionately increased oorr decreased. The date fixed for execution and registration of the sale deed was 15.06.1985. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was residing abroad and, therefore, the agreement to sell was executed by his father, Rattan Singh, on his behalf. Accordi According ng to the plaintiff, he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and had sufficient funds to pay the balance sale consideration. It was averred that notices dated 09.05.1985 and 21.05.1985 were served upon the defendant calling upon him to execute the sale deed, but the defendant avoided the same on one pretext or the other.
other It was further pleaded that 15.06.1985 being a holiday, the attorney of the plaintiff appeared before the Sub Sub-Registrar Registrar on 14.06.1985 and again on 17.06.1985, but the defendant did not turn up to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant backed out of the agreement on account of rise in the price of the land and thereby thereby committed breach of contract, causing loss to the plaintiff, plaintiff which led him to institute the present suit.
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4. Upon notice of the suit, the defendant appeared and contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendant denied the execution of the agreement to sell and pleaded that the alleged agreement was vague, indefinite and not enforceable, as no specific khasra numbers or boundaries of the land were mentioned therein. It was further pleaded that the defendant was an old man and the plaintiff, in collusion with the marginal witnesses, obtained his signatures on blank papers under the pretext of selling only 13 marlas of land and paid a sum of ₹1,000/- only. The defendant denied having received ₹10,000/- as earnest money. It was also pleaded that the land in dispute was joint Hindu family coparcenary property and that there was no legal necessity for its sale. The defendant further pleaded that upon raising an objection regarding the alleged fraud, the father of the plaintiff assured the defendant to not to execute the sale deed in pursuance of agreement to sell. Even otherwise, he had no authority to execute the said agreement as he had no authority to enter into agreement on behalf of the plaintiff and without authority the agreement to sell itself was void ab initio. Thus, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial rial Court framed as many as nine issues, including relief. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced adduced by the parties, the learned trial rial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, which came to be allowed by the learned 1st Appellate Court. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-defendant defendant has filed the present Regular Second Appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant appellant-defendant defendant contended that the judgment and decree passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court is perverse and 3 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -4- unsustainable, having been rendered in disregard disregard of the pleadings and evidence on record. It was argued that reversal of the well well-reasoned reasoned judgment of the learned trial rial Court was erroneous, as the agreement to sell dated 11.03.1985 (Ex.P-2)
2) was allegedly executed by Rattan Singh on behalf of the resp respondent ondent-
plaintiff at a time when he admittedly held no power of attorney, rendering the agreement invalid and void.. It was further submitted that the subsequent power of attorney dated 04.06.1985 (Ex.P-1) (Ex.P 1) could not validate or ratify the earlier agreement in n view of Section 200 of the Indian Contract Act, as such ratification would cause prejudice to the appellant-defendant defendant. It was also urged that the power of attorney dated 04.06.1985 (Ex.P-1) ( was neither authenticated nor duly stamped in accordance with Section Section 3 read with Article 48 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and therefore, was inadmissible in evidence. M Mere ere exhibition of the document does not dispense with its proof. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Hon ble Supr Supreme Court in Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Yelamarti Satyam Alias Satteyya AIR 1971 SC 1865. 6.1. It was further contended that the learned 1st Appellate Court committed a serious illegality in allowing the application filed for placing on record additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC by the respondent-
respondent plaintiff and by taking on record the subsequent power of attorney dated 17.06.1987 (Ex.C-1) (Ex.C at such uch a belated stage, as it tant tantamount amount to fill up the lacunae. It was also argued that only photocopy of the power of attorney, Ex.C1 was brought on record but the original of the same had never seen light of the day. It was also argued that father of the plaintiff was not even competent to file beforee learned 1st the suit on behalf of the plaintiff as well as the appeal befor Appellate Court in the absence of any power of attorney. Lastly, it was 4 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -5- contended that the agreement to sell Ex.P-2 2 was vague and unenforceable for want of specific khasra numbers, particularly when the appellant owned four separate plots in village Sasoli and thus, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court is liable to be set aside.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent respondent-plaintiff plaintiff supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court and submitted that the same is based on correct appreciation of evidence and law and does not call for any interference by this Court. It was argued that though the appellant-defendant defendant contested the application for placing on record the power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1) under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC by filing reply to the same, however, no objection was taken therein with respect to placing on record mere photocopy of the aforesaid power of attorney. Thus, in the absence jection, Ex.C1 was rightly taken on record by the learned 1st Appellate of any objection, Court, much less, the appellant-defendant appellant defendant is debarred from raising such an objection now at the second appellate stage. Further, it was argued that no power of attorney is required to enter into an agreement to sell and at the most, the respondent--plaintiff plaintiff had executed a power of attorney dated 04.06.1985 (Ex.P1) before the target date i.e. 15.06.1985 in favour of his father, Rattan Singh, thus, father of the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff was duly competent to execute sale deed on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff but it was the appellant-defendant defendant, who despite being served upon notices on 09.05.1985 and 21.05.1985 21.05.1985,, did not turn up to execute the sale deed. The power of attorney dated 04.06.1 04.06.1985 985 was duly ratified by the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff vide power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1) and thus, the suit was rightly decreed by the learned 1st Appellate Court while setting aside the judgment and decree dated 28.04.1987 passed by the 5 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -6- learned trial rial Court. In support of his submissions submissions,, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff plaintiff relied upon the judgments passed in Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi, (2009) 2 SCC 582; Vijay Kumar v. Ashok Kumar Laroia, 2017 (1) PLR 615; Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655; Jujhar Singh v. Giani Tarlok Singh, AIR 1986 RRR 618; Matkul v. Manbhari and others, AIR 1958 SC 918; Punjab University v. V.N. Tripathi, 2001 (2) Cur LJ 309; Municipal Council, Kharar v. APJ Public School and another, 2015 5 (3) LAR 62; Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. v. M/s Krishna Trading Company, FAO No.1916 of 2009; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Madras v. Mukund Construction Company, Bangalore, RFA No.602 of 1999; Mohan Singh v. Gurdeep Singh Singh,, 2020 (2) RCR (Civil) 185; Smt. Shyamali Chandra v. Smt. Reba Adak, 2018 (4) ICC 500; Sham Singh v. Waryam Singh, 1994 (3) RRR 27; Ranbir Singh v. Satbir Singh, 2010 (2) RCR (Civil) 712; United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, 1997 (90) Comp Cas 329; and R.V.E. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, Civil Appeal No.105858 of 1996 1996.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book as well as the case laws cited with their able assistance.
9. As regards regards the argument of learned counsel for the appellant-
appellant defendant that father of the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff had no authority to enter into agreement to sell dated 11.03.1985 (Ex.P2) as well as to file the suit, it is pertinent to highlight that a power of attorney ey is mere an instrument, which creates an agency relationship, empowering the agent to act on behalf of the principal.. In the present case the principal and the agent are father and the son. Admittedly, the son was abroad at the time of execution of the agreement to sell, 6 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -7- which fact was duly in the knowledge of the appellant appellant-defendant. Furthermore, the target date for execution of sale deed in terms of agreement to sell (Ex.P2) was fixed for 15.06.1985 and the power of attorney (Ex.P1) was dated 04.06.1985, 985, meaning thereby, before execution of the sale deed on 15.06.1985, Rattan Singh, father of the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff was in possession of a duly notorized power of attorney in his favour to act on behalf of his son namely Bachhittar Singh (respondent-plaintiff).
(respondent aintiff). It is also crucial to note here that two notices dated 09.05.1985 and 21.05.1985 were served upon the appellant-
appellant defendant to come forward for execution of the sale deed on 15.06.1985 but he avoided performance of the same for the reasons best kn known own to him. Had there been a fraud played upon the appellant-defendant, appellant defendant, what prevented him to lodge a criminal complaint against the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff and his father, despite the fact that two notices were served upon him with respect to execution of tthe he sale deed in terms of agreement to sell (Ex.P2).
10. Further, this Court finds force in the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff respondent plaintiff that though the application for placing on record the subsequent power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1) under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC was contested by the appellant appellant-defendant defendant by filing reply to the same but no specific objection was raised qua taking on record photocopy of the same and thus, the learned 1st Appellate Court did not commit any illegality or infirmity in allowing the said application.
11. Itt is trite law that an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document is not rendered invalid or void ab initio because the failure to stamp an instrument is a curable defect. A Seven Judges Bench of the Hon'ble ble Supreme Court in RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 7 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -8- UNDER THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN STAMP ACT, 1899 (2024) 6 SCC 1 while exercising its inherent/civil original jurisdiction has held that the admissibility admissibility of an instrument in evidence is distinct from its validity or enforceability in law. The effect of not paying duty or paying an inadequate amount renders an instrument inadmissible and not void. Non-stamping stamping or improper stamping does not resu result lt in the instrument becoming invalid. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 does not render such an instrument void. The non-payment non payment of stamp duty is accurately characterised as a curable defect. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 itself provides for the manner in which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure for it. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments and once that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument.
instrument The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced as under:-
under:
"b) The difference between inadmissibility and voidness
49. The admissibility of an instrument in evidence is distinct from its validity or enforceability in law. Section 2( 2(g)) of the Contract Act provides that an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. The admissibility of a particular document or oral testimony, on the other hand, refers to whether or not it can be introduced into evidence.
50. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon defines "admissible"
thus:
Admissible Proper to be received, capable and worthy of being admitted. As applied to evidence, the term means that it is of such a ccharacter haracter that the Court or Judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
8 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -9- introduced in evidence. Many statutes have rules on the admissibility of documents, with the Evidence Act, 1872 ("the Evidence Act") being one of them.
51. An agreement can bee void without its nature as a void agreement having an impact on whether it may be introduced in evidence. Similarly, an agreement can be valid but inadmissible in evidence. For instance, A and B may enter into an agreement by which B is restrained from undertaking ndertaking a particular trade. This agreement would be void under Section 27 of the Contract Act.
Act
52. When an agreement is void, we are speaking of its enforceability in a court of law. When it is inadmissible, we are referring to whether the Court may con consider sider or rely upon it while adjudicating the case. This is the essence of the difference between voidness and admissibility.
(c)
c) Section 35 of the Stamp Act renders a document inadmissible and not void
53. The majority judgment in N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.,, (2023) 7 SCC 1 summed up its holding in the following terms : (SCC p. 81, para 109) "109
109.. ... An agreement which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped is not enforceable, as long as it remains in the said condition. Such an instrument would be void as being not enforceable [see Section 2(g) 2( ) of the Contract Act]."
The above observation conflates the distinction between enforceability and admissibility.
54. Section 35 of the Stamp Act is unambiguous. It stipulates, "No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence..."
..."
The term "admitted in evidence" refers to the admissibility of the instrument. Sub-section Sub section (2) of Section 42, too, states that an instrument in respect of which stamp duty is paid and which is endorsed as such will be "admissible "admissible in evidence". The effect of not paying duty or paying an inadequate amount renders an instrument 9 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -10- inadmissible and not void. Non-
Non-stamping stamping or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming invalid. The Stam Stamp p Act does not render such an instrument void. The non non-payment payment of stamp duty is accurately characterised as a curable defect. The Stamp Act itself provides for the manner in which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure for it. It bears m mentioning entioning that there is no procedure by which a void agreement can be "cured".
xxxx xxxx xxxx
iii) The purpose of the Stamp Act
(iii
65. The Stamp Act is a fiscal legislation which is intended to raise revenue for the Government. It is a mandatory sstatute. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Co. (1969) 1 SCC 597,, this Court dealt with the import of Sections 35, 36 and 42 of the Stamp Act. One of the parties relied on the difference in the phraseology between Sections 35 and 36 to argue that an instrument which was insufficiently stamped or not stamped could be admitted in evidence upon the payment of duty and a penalty (if any) but that it could not be acted upon, once admitted. It was argued that Section 35 ope operates as a bar in two o respects, namely, the admission of an instrument into evidence as well as acting upon that instrument. It was argued that Section 36, in contrast to Section 35, removed the bar in one respect alone -- the admissibility of the instrument into evidence. This This Court rejected this argument and held that the provisions of the Stamp Act clearly provide that an instrument could be admitted into evidence as well as acted upon once the appropriate duty has been paid and the instrument is endorsed endorsed:
"6. ... The argument nt ignores the true import of Section 36. By that section an instrument once admitted in evidence shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that it has not been duly stamped. Section 36 does not prohibit a ch challenge allenge against an instrument that it shall not be acted upon because it is not 10 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -11- duly stamped, but on that account there is no bar against an instrument not duly stamped being acted upon after payment of the stamp duty and penalty according to the procedure prescribed by the Act. The doubt, if any, is removed by the terms of Section 42(2) which enact, in terms unmistakable, that every instrument endorsed by the Collector under Section 42(1) shall be admissible in evidence and may be acted upon as if it has been een duly stamped."
(emphasis in original)
66. In so holding, this Court made a significant observation about the purpose of the Stamp Act and the manner in which it is to be interpreted terpreted by courts:
courts "7.. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments instruments: It is not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent opponent.. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue once that object iss secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument. Viewed in that light the scheme is clear."
(emphasis supplied) The Stamp Act is a legislation which is ena enacted cted in the interest of the revenue. The statute must be interpreted with due regard to its purpose.
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(b) The effect of the word "shall" in Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act
200. Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act use the word "shall". While this ordinarily indicates that the provision is 11 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -12- mandatory, it may be read as directory. In Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan 1961 SCC OnLine SC 15 , this th Court held :-
"12.. ... The word "shal "shall"
l" is ordinarily mandatory, but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands."
201. In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5, this Court held that the principles for the construction of statutes whi which ch used the mandatory word "shall" were as follows :
"29.. The relevant rules of interpreta interpretation tion may be briefly stated thus:: When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislatur legislaturee by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non non-compliance compliance with the provisions, the fact th that the non-compliance compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered."
202. This Court must therefore in interpret terpret Sections 33 and 35 to assess whether they are mandatory in relation to a court presiding over proceedings under Section 8 or Section 11 by examining:
12 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -13- 202.1. Whether the context indicates that the provision is directory;
202.2. The scope of the stat statute;
202.3. The nature and design of the statute; 202.4. The consequences which would follow from construing it one way or another; 202.5. The impact of other provisions; 202.6. The consequences of non non-compliance; and 202.7. Whether the object of the legis legislation lation will be furthered or destroyed.
203. The decisions adverted to in the preceding paragraphs were delivered in the context of a single provision in a single statute. Additional factors must be considered in cases such as the present one, where multipl multiplee statutes appear to operate in relation to a single issue (or a single agreement such as the arbitration agreement in the present case). To this list of considerations which must animate the Court's evaluation of whether a provision is mandatory or direct directory, ory, we would add that the scope, nature, and design of all the statutes which appear to operate simultaneously must be considered.
Their interplay and the intention of the legislature must be evaluated in the context of all such statutes. The question of whether the object(s) of the applicable legislation(s) will be furthered or destroyed must also be considered in view of all such statutes.
(c) The object of the Stamp Act is preserved
204. In N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.,, (2023) 7 SCC 1, the majority judgment observed as follows :
"92.. While the Stamp Act is a fiscal enactment intended to raise revenue, it is a law, which is meant to have teeth. The point of time, at which the stamp duty is to be paid is expressly provid provided ed for in Section 13 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -14- 17 of the Stamp Act. There cannot be any gainsaying, that call it a fiscal enactment, it is intended that it is to be implemented with full vigour. The duty of a Court must be to adopt an interpretation which results in the enforcement of the law, rather than allowing the law to be flouted with impunity. Once this principle is borne in mind, the task of the Court becomes less difficult."
205. The interpretation accorded to the Stamp Act by this Court in the present judgment does not allow the law to be flouted. The Arbitral Tribunal continues to be bound by the provisions of the Stamp Act, including those relating to its impounding and admissibility. The interpretation of the law in this judgment ensures that the provisions of the Arbitration on Act are given effect to while not detracting from the purpose of the Stamp Act.
Act."
12. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon Hon'ble ble Supreme Court has categorically held that provisions of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act uuse se the word "shall", which ordinarily ily indicates that the provision is mandatory but it may be read as directory, directory, subject to the exception that such an interpretation results in the enforcement of the law, rather than allowing the law to be flouted with impunity.. The Special Relief Act, 1963 is a special law and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is a general law. The The provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 clearly provide that an instrument could be admitted into evidence as well as acted upon once the appropriate duty has been paid and the in instrument strument is endorsed.. In the present case, the power of attorney dated 04.06.1985 (Ex.P1) was ratified vide subsequent power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1) (Ex.C1),, which was duly embossed by the office of the Commissioner, Jullunder vide its seal and stamp dated 17.06.1987, meaning thereby, the defect contained in the power 14 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -15- of attorney dated 04.06.1985 (Ex.P1) was duly cured by the power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1). In other words, the respondent respondent-plaintiff plaintiff had ratified the power of attorney dated 04.06.1985 04.06.1985 (Ex.P1) by power of attorney dated 08.06.1987 (Ex.C1) by virtue of which power of attorney (Ex.P1) became operative from 04.06.1985 as though there was no defect. The principle of ratification is fundamentally based on the doctrine of relation ba back, ck, established by the maxim omnis mnis ratihabitio retrorahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur, aequiparatur which signifies that when a principal ratifies an unauthorized act, the act is deemed valid from the date it was originally performed and not from the date of ratification.
13. The readiness and willingness has duly been proved by the respondent-plaintiff plaintiff especially in view of the statement of PW PW-4, 4, Ram Dev Sharma, Officer-in-Charge, Officer Charge, State Bank of India, Chabbewal Branch, Hoshiarpur who categorically stated therein that a draft bearing No.836783 dated 10.06.1985, amounting Rs.69,160/-
Rs.69,160/ payable to Ramesh Chander son of Mehar Chand was got prepared by Rattan Singh, however, vide application dated 19.06.1985, the said draft was deposited by him in his account.
14. The execution of the agreement to sell dated 11.03.1985 (Ex.P2) was duly proved by the scribe Karam Singh and attesting witnesses namely Sucha Singh and Amar Nath. The description of khasra numbers were not mentioned in the agreement to sell owing to the fact that fard jamabandi regarding the suit land was not available with the appellant appellant-defendant defendant himself and therefore, it was mentioned therein that the land is admeasured approximately 28 kanals in village Sasoli and in case that land is found more or lesss than 28 kanals, the price of the land would be increased or decreased 15 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 10-02-2026 05:24:38 ::: RSA-111-1990(O&M) 1990(O&M) -16- proportionately. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant-
appellant defendant that the agreement to sell was vague has also no force.
15. In n view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Chandrika and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others (2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan 875, questions of Singh (dead) through LRs and others (2023) SCC Online SC 875 law are not required to be framed in second appeal before the Punjab and Har Hary-
y-
ana High Court whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
1918
16. As an upshot of above, above, this Court finds no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned 1st Appellate Court.
Court Consequently, the instant regular second appeal is dismissed.
17. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL)
JUDGE
February 04,, 2026
Pankaj*
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : Yes
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