Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
T.V. Chowdary vs Riata Industrial Corporation on 27 February, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(3)ALD11, 1998(2)ALT449
Author: P. Venkatarama Reddi
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi
ORDER P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. This contempt appeal arises out of the order passed by the learned single Judge in C.C.No.769 of 1997. The contempt case was filed before the learned single Judge alleging violation of the order of this Court passed in W.P.No. 12386 of 1991, dated 18-10-96. The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the District Collector, Prakasam District to enter into a lease deed with the petitioners in respect of an extent of Ac. 15-00 of land in S.No. 15/5 of Rajupalem-Lakshmipuram Village, Chimakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District. It was also directed that the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, before whom the petitioners filed application for grant of quarry lease, shall transmit the application to the Director of Mines and Geology, who shall dispose of the same in accordance with law. It appears that Writ Appeal was filed against this order, though at a somewhat leisurely pace, and it was dismissed by an order dated 27-6-97. Thereafter, there was some correspondence between the District Collector, the Director of Mines and Geology and the State Government, and ultimately an order was passed by the Director of Mines and Geology (appellant herein) rejecting the mining lease application for various reasons set out in his order dated 29-9-97. As no order was passed in terms of the directions given by this Court in W.p.nO. 12386 of 1991, the contempt case was filed on 30-4-97. The Writ Appeal was disposed of subsequently. However, during the interregnum, when the Contempt case was filed, the learned single Judge issued interim direction to dispose of the application within six weeks. It appears that an application was filed for extension of time. Thereafter, the order dated 29-9-97 came to be passed. Alleging that rejection of the writ petitioner's application was not the result of bona fide exercise of power and that the order of the learned single Judge directing consideration of the application in accordance with law, was flouted, the contempt case was filed. The learned single Judge examined each and every ground on which the mining lease application was rejected and found that almost all of them were "nonexistent grounds", and the decision taken by the Director of Mines and Geology virtually amounted to defiance of the order of this Court passed in W.P.No. 12386 of 1991. So holding, the contempt case was disposed of with the following direction:
"Therefore, the respondents are liable for contempt. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that the Civil Contempt is remedial, the primary object being to enforce the order for the benefit of the party in whose favour the order has been made, I direct the respondent to implement the decision of this Court in W.P.No. 12386 of 1991 dated 18-10-96 on or before 14th of November, 1997, failing which the respondent is liable for punishment for contempt of Court.''
2. It is against this order, the present contempt appeal is filed. We agree with the learned Advocate-General that the learned single Judge outstepped the jurisdiction vested in the Court while deciding the contempt application by dealing with the merits of the order passed by the appellant. It is trite to say that the scope and purport of the contempt jurisdiction is to see whether the order of the Court has been complied with, in substance or deliberately flouted. There is no positive direction to dispose of the application in a particular manner. Whether or not the concerned authority disposed of the mining lease application in accordance with law, is a matter on which some debate or controversy is possible. Whereas it is the contention of the writ petitioners that the order passed is not in accordance with law, it is the contention of the appellant that the order passed by him is in confirmity with law. The legality or propriety of the order passed by the appellant is liable to be tested in an independent proceeding either by way of revision or by filing writ petition. We arc not for a moment saying that the order passed by the appellant is valid. On that aspect, we express no opinion. At best, we are only concerned with the limited question whether the order of rejection was passed in a predetermined manner, and whether the whole exercise is farcical and colourable. We are unable to reach that conclusion. As observed already, we cannot subject the order to judicial review and go into the controversial questions as to whether the order passed is in accordance with law. As far as the Court dealing with Contempt is concerned, it can only embark upon a limited enquiry as indicated above. Viewed from this perspective, we are not in a position to say that the direction of the Court in W.P.No. 12386 of 1991 has been violated. We arc fortified in our view by the recent decision of Supreme Court in . We do agree with the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that there are substantial grounds to challenge the order in question. But, as already observed, that has to be done in an appropriate proceeding, but not in a contempt application. There is one other aspect, which we would like to advert to. The direction given by the learned single Judge virtually amounts to a direction to pass an order granting the mining lease, because in the course of discussion, the learned single Judge expressed that there could possibly be no legal objection for the grant of lease. This, in our view, goes beyond the scope of the direction granted in the writ petition. The learned Judge while dealing with the contempt application ought not to have granted such direction.
3. For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned order of the learned single Judge and allow the contempt appeal.
4. Before parting with the case, we must say that there is certain amount of unexplained delay in disposing of the application. The learned Advocate-General has tried to explain that the delay is not intentional and that the delay has occurred on account of pendency of various legal proceedings and the absence of clearance from the District Collector and the State Government in regard to execution of lease. The least that was expected of the appellant was to explain in chronological sequence the reasons that have contributed to the delay. The appellant, who is present in the Court has tendered apology, and we are therefore, not inclined to pursue the matter further, though as we observed earlier, there is some unexplained delay in passing the order.
5. We may also record that the learned Advocate-General has fairly stated, in reply to our query that the State Government will not raise any objection on the ground of limitation if revision is filed by the writ petition within 15 days from today. If any revision is filed by the writ petitioners within 15 days from today, the State Government shall dispose it of on merits expeditiously.