Delhi High Court
Imran Ahmed Ansari & Anr vs Intex Technologies (India) Ltd & Anr on 8 May, 2026
$~15
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 08.05.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 199/2025, I.A. 13085/2025 (Stay) & I.A.
13087/2025 (Seeking permission to file lengthy synopsis and
list of dates)
IMRAN AHMED ANSARI & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rohan Jaitley, Mr. Arun
Srivastava, Mr. Yogya Bhatia,
Mr. Akhil Srivastava and Mr.
Prashant Srivastava, Advocates.
versus
INTEX TECHNOLOGIES (INDIA) LTD & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rudreshwar Singh and Mr.
Amit Chadha, Senior
Advocates along with Mr. Atit
Jain, Mr. Shanky Jain, Mr.
Harjas Singh, Ms. Tanishka,
Mr. Atin Chadha, Ms. Manisha
Chadha and Mr. Ayush Bhagat,
Advocates along with Mr.
Karmveer.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition being has been instituted under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 read with Section 10
of Commercial Courts Act, 2015, challenging and seeking, inter alia,
1
A&C Act
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setting aside of the Arbitral Award dated 27.01.20252, passed by the
Ld. Sole Arbitrator.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. Disputes between the parties arise out of an Agreement to Sell
dated 28.09.2016, executed in respect of Industrial Plot bearing No.
D-205, Sector-63, Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh
admeasuring 4000 sq. metres.
3. As per the Petitioners, the Agreement to Sell recorded a sale
consideration of Rs. 8 crores and various payments were made by the
Petitioners towards the transaction. Subsequently, the Agreement was
sought to be substituted in favour of Petitioner No. 1 and Transfer
Memorandum proceedings were initiated before the NOIDA
Authority.
4. Disputes thereafter arose between the parties regarding alleged
encumbrances over the subject property, payment of the balance sale
consideration, readiness and willingness of the parties and execution
of transfer documents. The Respondents thereafter issued a
Termination Notice dated 12.09.20173 purporting to terminate the
Agreement to Sell.
5. Pursuant to proceedings before the Noida Authority, an order
dated 15.10.2019 came to be passed directing Respondent No.1 to
furnish relevant documents and directing Petitioner No.1 to make
payment of the balance consideration amount simultaneously.
6. The Petitioners claim that they remained ready and willing to
perform their obligations, whereas the Respondents dispute the same.
2
Arbitral Award
3
Termination Notice
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7. In view of the disputes between the parties, arbitration was
invoked and this Court vide Order dated 03.03.2022 appointed the
learned Sole Arbitrator.
8. Before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, the Petitioners sought,
inter alia, specific performance of the Agreement to Sell, whereas the
Respondents contested the claims and also preferred counterclaims.
9. Vide the Impugned Arbitral Award, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal declined the relief of specific performance and instead
awarded a refund of Rs. 3.50 crores along with interest in favour of
the Petitioners. In the same line, certain counterclaims, namely,
counterclaims 2 and 3, of the Respondents were also allowed.
10. Aggrieved by the findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal
insofar as denial of specific performance and allowance of
counterclaims 2 and 3 are concerned, the Petitioners have filed the
present Petition seeking setting aside of the Impugned Arbitral Award
on grounds including patent illegality, perversity and non-
consideration of evidence.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES:
11. Mr. Rohan Jaitley, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners, contends that the Impugned Award is patently illegal and
contrary to the settled principles governing the grant of specific
performance in contracts relating to immovable property.
12. He submits that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has erroneously
refused the relief of specific performance solely on the premise that
the non-performance of the Agreement could be compensated in terms
of money, while completely overlooking the statutory presumption
contained in Explanation (i) to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act,
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19634, which mandates that breach of a contract pertaining to transfer
of immovable property is presumed not to be adequately compensable
in monetary terms unless the contrary is proved.
13. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has completely reversed the settled burden of proof
by requiring the Petitioners to establish that damages would not
constitute an adequate remedy, whereas the burden in law lay upon the
Respondents to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 10 of
the SRA.
14. He contends that the Impugned Award neither records any
finding rebutting the said presumption nor discloses any reasoning as
to why the refund of money would constitute adequate compensation
in the facts of the present case.
15. Mr. Jaitley further submits that the learned Arbitrator has failed
to consider the material evidence demonstrating the continuous
readiness and willingness of the Petitioners to perform their
obligations under the Agreement. In this regard, he draws attention to
the payments made by the Petitioners, the purchase of stamp papers
worth Rs. 40 lakhs, deposit/payment of Transfer Memorandum
charges, and the preparation of a demand draft amounting to Rs. 4.42
crores pursuant to the order dated 15.10.2019 passed by the NOIDA
Authority.
16. He submits that the Petitioners had throughout expressed their
willingness to complete the transaction and even before the NOIDA
Authority had offered to deposit the balance sale consideration.
17. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that
4
SRA
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paragraph 14 of the Impugned Award, which constitutes the principal
reasoning while deciding Issue No. (a), is wholly conclusory and
bereft of reasons. He submits that, though reliance has been placed by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Ltd. v. Katta
Sujatha Reddy5, the ratio and factual matrix thereof have been
incorrectly applied. According to him, the said judgment in fact
reiterates the statutory presumption in favour of specific performance
in contracts concerning immovable property and recognizes that
where substantial payments have already been made and the purchaser
remains ready and willing, specific performance ought ordinarily to
follow. Para 14 of the Impugned Arbitral Award reads as follows:
"14. The said provision has recently been examined by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Ltd. Vs Katta
Sujatha Reddy & Ors, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3214 decided on
08/11/2024 and held that a correct interpretation of the Specific
Relief Act would mean that if the non-performance of the contract
cannot be compensated in terms of money, then only the relief of
specific performance can be granted. In the instant case, the
counsel for the respondent Mr. Atit Jain has clearly and
categorically stated that non-performance of the contract in this
case can be compensated in terms of money. I find substance in the
said submission. On the other hand, the claimants have not
demonstrated as to how the non-performance of the contract cannot
be compensated in terms of money/damages in the instant case.
After all, the agreement under consideration is an agreement to buy
a property by the claimants for which he has paid a consideration
amount of Rs. 3.50 Cr in cheque and the claimants claim that they
have paid an amount of Rs. 1.20 Cr in cash to the respondents. If
such a transaction is not performed then undoubtedly the said
transaction can be reversed by giving, reasonable compensation to
the claimants. In view of the same, I decide issue (a) against the
claimants and in favour of the respondents."
18. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioners contends that the
5
(2024) 20 SCC 140
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learned Arbitral Tribunal has failed to consider that there existed no
impediment to the grant of specific performance as the alleged
encumbrances over the subject property already stood cleared.
Learned counsel also submits that the Respondents never pleaded or
proved any hardship which would disentitle the Petitioners from
seeking equitable relief.
19. Learned counsel for the Petitioners also submits that the Order
dated 15.10.2019 passed by the CEO, NOIDA, having been passed
with the consent of the parties, clearly demonstrated the subsistence
and enforceability of the Agreement to Sell even subsequent to the
alleged Termination Notice. He submits that despite the Petitioners
acting in terms thereof and expressing willingness to pay the balance
consideration, the Respondents failed to furnish the requisite original
documents and consequently cannot now be permitted to resile from
the transaction.
20. Per contra, Mr. Rudreshwar Singh, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the Respondents, submits that the present
Petition is nothing but an impermissible attempt to seek re-
appreciation of evidence under Section 34 of the A&C Act. He
submits that the scope of interference under Section 34 is extremely
limited and the Impugned Award neither suffers from patent illegality
nor contravenes the public policy of India.
21. Learned senior counsel for the Respondents submits that the
Impugned Award is a reasoned Award rendered upon appreciation of
pleadings, oral evidence and documentary material placed before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal. He submits that the learned Arbitrator has
specifically considered the conduct of the parties, the failure of the
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Petitioners to make payment of the balance consideration amount
within the stipulated period, as also the fact that the Petitioners failed
to establish continuous readiness and willingness as contemplated
under Section 16(c) of the SRA.
22. Mr. Singh further submits that readiness and willingness alone
cannot ipso facto entitle a party to a decree of specific performance
and the same continues to remain an equitable relief dependent upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
23. He further submits that the learned Arbitral Tribunal rightly
exercised its discretion in declining specific performance and instead
awarded a refund of the amount paid along with interest @15% per
annum, which, according to him, sufficiently compensates the
Petitioners.
24. Learned senior counsel for the Respondents further controverts
the factual assertions regarding the quantum of payments allegedly
made by the Petitioners. He submits that the Agreement to Sell
recorded the total consideration as Rs. 8 crores and that only an
amount of Rs. 3.50 crores was admittedly retained by the Respondents
after refund of Rs. 2.50 crores. He further submits that the alleged
cash payment of Rs. 1.20 crores stood specifically denied and was
rightly rejected by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
25. Learned counsel on behalf of the Respondents submits that all
encumbrances over the subject property stood cleared during the
subsistence of the Agreement and requisite NOCs had already been
obtained from the concerned financial institutions. Learned senior
counsel further submits that despite the same, the Petitioners adopted
inconsistent stands, initiated criminal proceedings and defamatory
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publications against the Respondents and failed to perform their
reciprocal obligations under the Agreement.
26. Learned senior counsel for the Respondents lastly submits that
the Agreement to Sell already stood terminated vide Notice dated
12.09.2017 and the Petitioners had also failed to comply with the
timelines prescribed under the NOIDA Transfer Policy. He thus
submits that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has rightly declined the
discretionary relief of specific performance and no ground for
interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act is made out.
ANALYSIS:
27. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully perused
the Impugned Arbitral Award and the other material placed on record.
28. At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court remains
conscious of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an
objection petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. There is a
consistent and evolving line of precedents whereby the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has authoritatively delineated and settled the contours
of judicial intervention in such proceedings.
29. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
judgments, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.6, while dealing with the grounds of
conflict with the public policy of India and patent illegality, grounds
which have also been urged in the present Petitions, made certain
6
(2025) 2 SCC 417
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pertinent observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
"Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 34
has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses which
are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as clause (b)
is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii). Sub-
clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in hand.
Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds that the
arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India, it may
set aside the award.
Public policy
31. "Public policy" is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression "in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law" was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or
Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
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46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does
away with the use of words : (a) "without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)" in the opening part of the pre-
amended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) "without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section" in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
specified categories by using the words "only if".
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) "in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law";
(b) "in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice";
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and
(c) "patent illegality" have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
"in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law" was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase "contrary to the public policy", this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after "the 2015 Amendments" in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase "in conflict with the
public policy of India" must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression "in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law" by use of the word
"fundamental" before the phrase "policy of Indian law" makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase "in
contravention with the policy of Indian law", which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,
are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
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by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase "public policy of India" as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
68. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that "patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award" refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within "the
fundamental policy of Indian law", namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to "public policy" or "public interest", cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality [See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it
was observed, reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under
this category of challenge to an arbitral award [See Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral decision
must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an award is
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perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a possible
view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the
arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.
71. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to
a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores
vital evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was
also observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on
evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be
characterised as perverse [ See Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and
later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in DMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
"39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
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construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of "patent illegality".
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice."
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself is
not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's autonomy
to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided
under the law."
30. Before proceeding to examine the challenge laid to the
Impugned Arbitral Award and the rival contentions advanced on
behalf of the parties, this Court considers it apposite to extract the
reasoning and conclusions recorded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal
on the issues arising for consideration. The relevant portion of the
Impugned Arbitral Award is reproduced herein below:
"The issues:
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10. On the basis of the pleadings and after hearing both the sides
primarily the following broad issues arise for consideration and
resolution in the present arbitration proceedings:
a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the claimants are entitled to the specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 28/09/2016?
b) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the cancellation and forfeiture notice dated 12/09/2017 of
the respondents is justified?
c) In case, the issue (a) is decided against the claimants,
whether, the claimants are entitled to the refund of
consideration amount paid with or without interest?
Furthermore, in such eventuality, whether the claimants are
entitled to any damage? If so, what amount of damage?
d) Whether the claim of cash payment of Rs. 1.20 crore falls
within the ambit of the present arbitration proceedings, if
so to what relief the claimants are entitled to?
On issue (a) above:
11. This issue pertains to specific performance of the agreement to
sell dated 28/09/2016. This means directions to the respondents to
execute the sell at the consideration for which it was agreed to. The
Id. Counsel for the claimants Mr. Ashok Kumar has argued that
since they were at every point of time ready to perform their part of
the contract and it was because of lack of non-encumbrance
certificate on the part of the respondents, the claimants could not
proceed to be perform. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to a
decree to specific performance.
12. On the other hand, the counsel of the respondents Mr. Atit Jain
laid emphasis on the fact that inspite of being called upon and put
to notice, the claimants did not come forward to make the balance
sale consideration of Rs. 4.5 crore, therefore they are not entitled to
the relief of specific performance. On the issue of a property being
non encumbered, Mr. Atit Jain by referring to various documents
as well as cross examination of witness and has pointed out that the
factor of the property being encumbered was known to the
claimants and inspite of that claimants have proceed to make the
TM before the Noida Authority and took further steps for
completion of agreement to sell. In any case, the respondents
produced certificates of non-encumbrance of the aforesaid property
on 12/04/2017 and served it upon the claimants. This fact is proved
beyond any reasonable doubt from the documents with pleadings
filed by the respondents on 26.02.2024 wherein the Claimants
themselves had filed the non-encumbrance certificate of the
respondents before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C.
No. 1967/2017. However, inspite of the service of the said non-
encumbrance certificate, the claimants did not make payment of
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balance consideration and therefore failed in discharging their
obligation under the agreement. In view of the said conduct of the
claimants, the factor that the property was encumbered and
subsequently got non-encumbered cannot be held against the
respondents. Furthermore, Mr. Atit Jain has relied upon the Section
10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Relying upon the same, he has
argued that specific performance can be enforced only when
remedy regarding damage cannot be determined. If the remedy of
damage is adequate relief, in that case specific performance is not
to be insisted upon. He submits that in the instant case, damage, if
any is quantifiable. Therefore, the claim regarding specific
performance be declined.
13. I have considered the arguments and counter arguments on
issue no.(a) regarding the claim of the claimants for specific
performance of the agreement. It appears that the law is fairly well
settled on this issue. The relief of specific performance can only be
granted only if non-performance cannot be quantified in terms of
money as damages. In this regard Section 10 of the Specific Relief
Act is quoted hereunder:
"10. Cases in which specific performance of contract
enforceable - Except as otherwise provided in this
Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in
the discretion of the court, be enforced-
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining actual
damage caused by the non-performance of the act
agreed to be done; or
(b) when the act agreed to be done is such that
compensation in money for its non-performance
would not afford adequate relief
Explanation - Unless and until the contrary is proved, the
court shall presume
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable
property cannot be adequately relieved by
compensation in money; and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable
property can be so relieved except in the following
cases:
(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of
commerce, or is of special value of interest to the
plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily
obtainable in the market;
(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the
agent or trustee of the plaintiff."
14. The said provision has recently been examined by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Ltd. Vs Katta
Sujatha Reddy: 2024 SCC On Line SC 3214 & Ors decided on
08/11/2024 and held that a correct interpretation of the Specific
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Relief Act would mean that if the non-performance of the contract
cannot be compensated in terms of money, then only the relief of
specific performance can be granted. In the instant case, the
counsel for the respondent Mr. Atit Jain has clearly and
categorically stated that non-performance of the contract in this
case can be compensated in terms of money. I find substance in the
said submission. On the other hand, the claimants have not
demonstrated as to how the non-performance of the contract cannot
be compensated in terms of money/damages in the instant case.
After all, the agreement under consideration is an agreement to buy
a property by the claimants for which he has paid a consideration
amount of Rs. 3.50 Cr in cheque and the claimants claim that they
have paid an amount of Rs. 1.20 Cr in cash to the respondents. If
such a transaction is not performed then undoubtedly the said
transaction can be reversed by giving reasonable compensation to
the claimants. In view of the same, I decide issue (a) against the
claimants and in favour of the respondents.
On issue (b) above:
15. This issue is regarding cancellation of the agreement and
forfeiture of consideration amount of Rs. 3.50 crore paid by the
claimants. The claimants have argued that at each relevant point of
time claimants were ready to make the payments and it is only
because the respondents had wrongly declared in the Agreement to
Sell that the property was non-encumbered, because of which
proceedings etc were initiated by the claimants as well as the
respondents as indicated above that the Agreement could not be
performed.
16. On the other hand, the Id. Counsel for the respondents ha-
argued that the factum of the property being encumbered at the
time of execution of the agreement was known to the claimants. In
any case, a non-encumbrance certificate of the property dated
12/04/2017 was provided to the claimants. Inspite of that the
claimants did not pay the balance consideration amount inspite of
being specifically called upon by legal notices as indicated in the
sequential chronology of events as above. In the circumstances, the
respondents had no other legal option but to cancel the agreement
and forfeit the consideration amount already paid by invoking the
provisions under clause 4(b) of the agreement. On the other hand,
Mr. Atit Jain on behalf of respondents have pleaded that the letter
of cancellation and forfeiture of the amount already paid was done
only as a last resort after failing to get the balance amount of
consideration inspite of his writing letters/legal notices dated
21/02/2017, 26/07/2017. The said action has been done by the
respondents by invoking clause no. 11 of the agreement to sell.
Thus, no fault can be found with the action of the respondents in
this regard.
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17. 1 have considered the rival submissions on this issue. It is an
established law that a wrong doer cannot take advantage of his own
wrong. A bare reading of the Agreement to Sell specifically clause
4 (b) would clearly prove that the respondents had given a wrong
declaration about non-encumbrance status of the property. The
same is also proved from the averments of the respondents that
they produced a certificate of non-encumbrance to the claimants
only on 12/04/2017. Thus, on the date of execution of the
agreement, the property was not encumbrance free. One cannot
give a wrong declaration in the Agreement to Sell and yet cancel
the agreement unilaterally and forfeit the part consideration amount
of Rs. 3.50 crore. Clause 4(b) of the agreement specifically
stipulates for payment of the balance consideration amount
simultaneous to execution and registration of lease cum transfer
deed of the property in favour of the claimants. However, as can be
seen from the sequence of events given above, the stage for
execution and registration of lease cum transfer deed in favour of
claimants never happened. As has been spelt out in the said
provision, the balance consideration amount was to be paid
simultaneous to the execution of lease cum transfer deed in favour
of the claimants. Admittedly, that stage never happened. The
claimants have also emphasized that not only the consideration
amount of Rs. 3.50 crore but a cash amount of Rs. 1.20 crore was
also paid to the respondents. The issue regarding cash payment will
be analyzed and considered separately. However, in the facts of the
present case, and tor the reasons noticed above, it is clearly
unjustified that the respondents have invoked and cancelled the
agreement and forfeited an amount of Rs. 3.50 crore. Therefore,
the said action of the respondents by legal notice dated 12/09/2017
is hereby quashed and set aside with all its consequences.
18. I further take note of the specific and repeated submission of
Mr. Atit Jain on behalf of the respondents during the course of
present arbitration proceedings that in various proceedings as noted
in sequential chronology of events above the respondents had
offered to refund the consideration amount paid by the claimants to
the respondents with interest as determined by the Authority/Court.
Since, the said offers had been given by the respondents post
12/09/2017 before various legal fora including during hearing
before the Allahabad High Court as well as during arguments
during the present arbitration proceedings, in my opinion, the said
letter of cancellation dated 12/09/2017 by the respondents has lost
its meaning and significance. In view of this, I hold that the said
letter dated 12/09/2017 has no effect whatsoever and the
respondents are liable to refund the consideration amount as
determined later. Thus, I decide the issue (b) in favour of the
claimants and against the respondents.
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On issue (c) above:
19. As far as the issue (c) is concerned, Mr. Jain has reiterated his
submissions in relation to issue (a) and (b) to point out that once
the letter of cancellation and forfeiture of amount paid is justified
then there is no question of refund of any amount to the claimants.
However, as has already been noted above, Mr. Jain has admitted
as well as offered to return the receipt amount of Rs. 3.50 crore
with whatever reasonable rate of interest this Tribunal thinks fit
and proper to return the said amount. Mr. Jain has clearly and
categorically denied to have received any amount in cash as a part
of the consideration of the aforesaid agreement.
20. In view of my decision of issue (b) above, I am of the opinion
that the admitted receipt of consideration amount of Rs. 3.50 Cr by
the respondents be refunded to the claimants with interest. As far
as the rate of interest is concerned, 1 have borne in mind that this
was a commercial transaction between the parties. I have further
borne in mind that in clause 4(b) both the parties have agreed at the
rate of interest of 15% simple interest for breach of payment. I
have also borne in mind that the respondents in their counter claim
have claimed interest at the rate of 18 % as the subject matter of
the dispute is of commercial nature. I have also borne in mind that
the claimants both in the body of the claim as well as in the prayer
have claimed interest @ 15% p.a. on the consideration amount
already paid, which rate of interest is in sync with the agreed rate
of interest stipulated by the parties in clause 4(b) of the agreement.
Therefore, in my opinion, 15% simple interest would be the most
appropriate rate of interest to be awarded to the claimants under
this issue.
21. Therefore, the respondents are directed to refund the
consideration amount of Rs. 3.50 Cr already received by them with
simple interest @ 15% p.a from the date of receipt of each
installment of payment made by the claimants till the date of actual
refund. Thus, this issue is decided in favour of claimants and
against the respondents.
22. Now coming to the issue of damages, it may be noted that the
argument of the respondent on the issue of specific performance of
the agreement was that a relief of specific performance has to be
denied when the damage on account of non-performance of the
agreement is quantifiable. This argument I have accepted for
denying relief is specific performance to the claimants. Implicit in
this is the task of quantifying the damages incurred by the
claimants. One simple way of looking at the damage suffered by
the claimants is the various expenditures incurred by him in
applying for Transfer Memorandum before the Noida Authority
and e-stamp paper purchased by the claimants for registration of
sale deed. In the present proceedings, there is no dispute of the fact
that the claimants had paid an amount of Rs.23,20,000/- at the time
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of applying the Transfer Memorandum before the Noida Authority
on 09/02/2017. The claimants have also claimed that they had
purchased e-stamp paper of Rs. 40,00,000/- the photocopy of
which they had annexed along with their reply dated 08/03/2017
and also with the reply dated 01/12/2017 to the Noida Authority, a
fact which has already been noted in the chronology sequence of
facts given above. As far as the expenditure incurred on purchase
of e stamp paper is concerned, I take note of lawful provision of
refund of the unused e-stamp paper and getting the consideration
back. In view of this, I do not award any damage to the claimant on
the count of purchase of e-stamp paper. However, on the count of
payment of fees of Rs. 23,20,000/- to the Noida Authority, I'm of
the opinion that the claimants have suffered this loss, therefore I
direct that the respondents shall pay an amount of Rs. 23,20,000/-
to the claimants forthwith without any interest thereon. It is further
stipulated that once the amount directed under this issue are paid to
the claimants, the claimants will have no right or claim over the
property being Plot No. D-205, Sector-63, Noida, Gautam Budh
Nagar situated in Noida, UP whatsoever. The respondents will be
restored to their power and authority over the said property which
they had before 28/09/2016 when the present agreement was
executed.
Issue (d) above:
23. This issue pertains to a claim of cash payment of Rs. 1.20 Cr on
20/09/2016 i.e. before even the agreement was entered into by the
parties on 28/09/2016. The claimants have also made clear and
categoric averments in the claim statement that the cash payment
was made on 20/09/2016 only to the respondent no. 2 who was the
MD of respondent no. 1. Thus, irrespective of the fact whether the
amount was paid in cash or not, it remains undisputed that the said
alleged transaction took place before even the agreement to sell
dated 28/09/2016 saw the light of the day. It is a well settled law
that an arbitrator/arbitration is a creation of the agreement itself.
The arbitrator is required to decide dispute, if any, based upon the
various clauses in the agreement. It is well settled that the arbitrator
cannot go beyond the four corners of the agreement between the
parties. On this point reference may be made to Bharat Cooking
Coal Ltd. Vs Annapurna Construction: (2003) 8 SCC 154
(Relevant Paras 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25), UOI VS Bharat
Enterprise: (2023) SCC Online SC 369 (Relevant Para 8).
Obviously, the arbitrator cannot go into transactions which took
place before the agreement between the parties came into
existence. Secondly, in the instant agreement dated 28/09/2016,
there is no provision for any cash payment as consideration
amount. On the other hand, clause 4 of the agreement, clearly
states the total consideration amount to be Rs.8 Cr and also
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specifies the time schedule and manner in which the said
consideration amount is to be paid. The element of cash payment is
neither stipulated nor implied in any of the clause of the agreement
under consideration. Thirdly, it is furthermore well established that
if a party enters into a transaction not stipulated in the agreement,
then he does so at this own risk and cost. Fourthly, the agreement is
between the claimants and a company. The averments of the
claimants are that they had made cash payment to the respondent
no. 2 who is not the company. The claimants have not placed any
evidence on record to show that the respondent no. 2 had the
authority to receive cash on behalf of the company. For the
aforesaid reasons, collectively and separately, I decline the claim of
the claimants of cash payment of Rs. 1.20 Cr to the respondents.
Thus, this issue is decided against the claimants and in favour of
the respondents.
Conclusion:
Issue (a)
Decided against the claimants and in favour of the respondents.
Issue (b)
Decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents.
Issue (c)
Decided in favour of claimants and against the respondents.
Issue (d)
Decided against the claimants and in favour of the respondents.
In the facts of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs."
31. A perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned
Arbitrator specifically framed Issue No. (a) concerning entitlement to
specific performance and thereafter undertook a detailed consideration
of the rival submissions advanced by the parties.
32. The learned Arbitrator examined the contentions pertaining to
readiness and willingness, the effect of the alleged encumbrances over
the subject property, the conduct of the parties during the subsistence
of the Agreement to Sell, the subsequent events before the NOIDA
Authority and, most importantly, the applicability of Section 10, as
stood at the relevant time, of the SRA.
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33. The Impugned Award clearly records that the learned Arbitrator
noticed the Petitioners' contention that they were continuously ready
and willing to perform the agreement and that the transaction could
not fructify on account of the Respondents' inability to furnish a non-
encumbrance certificate at the relevant stage.
34. Equally, the learned Arbitrator also noticed the Respondents'
contention that despite repeated opportunities and notices, the balance
sale consideration was never tendered by the Petitioners and that the
encumbrance issue stood resolved upon issuance of the non-
encumbrance certificate dated 12.04.2017.
35. Significantly, the learned Arbitrator did not reject the
Petitioners' claim for specific performance in a mechanical or cursory
manner. Rather, the Impugned Award, if read as a whole, reflects a
conscious examination of the statutory requirements governing the
grant of such equitable relief.
36. The learned Arbitrator specifically extracted Section 10 of the
SRA, as stood at the relevant time, and thereafter adverted to the
principle that specific performance is ordinarily granted only where
compensation in terms of money would not constitute an adequate
remedy. The learned Arbitrator thus consciously addressed the very
aspect which now forms the core challenge before this Court, namely,
whether the breach complained of was capable of being adequately
compensated monetarily or whether the facts of the case necessitated
enforcement of the contract in specie.
37. It is pertinent to note that the learned Arbitrator, while
considering the aforesaid aspect, also took into account the
commercial nature of the transaction between the parties. The subject
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agreement pertained to a commercial transfer of an industrial plot for
consideration. The Impugned Award reflects that the learned
Arbitrator considered the fact that the dispute fundamentally revolved
around financial and commercial obligations capable of ascertainment
in monetary terms.
38. It is in that context that the learned Arbitrator ultimately arrived
at the conclusion that refund of the admitted consideration amount
together with interest and ancillary expenditures would constitute an
adequate recompense in the facts of the present case. Whether such a
conclusion was the only possible conclusion or whether another
adjudicatory forum may have exercised discretion differently is
wholly irrelevant within the limited contours of Section 34 of the
A&C Act.
39. So long as the view adopted by the learned Arbitrator is a
plausible and legally sustainable view arising from the material on
record, this Court cannot supplant the same with its own subjective
assessment.
40. The grievance of the Petitioners substantially proceeds on the
premise that the learned Arbitrator ought to have accorded greater
weight to the evidence allegedly demonstrating their readiness and
willingness to complete the transaction, including the payments
claimed to have been made, the transfer memorandum proceedings
before the NOIDA Authority, the purchase of e-stamp papers and the
preparation of the demand draft towards the balance consideration.
41. However, the appreciation of such evidence squarely falls
within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. Merely because the
Petitioners contend that a different inference ought to have been
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drawn from the same material would not justify interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. The Impugned Award cannot be tested as
if this Court were exercising appellate jurisdiction over the factual
conclusions arrived at by the learned Arbitrator.
42. In fact, the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned
Arbitrator did not completely reject the Petitioners' case on the facts.
On the contrary, while deciding Issue No. (b), the learned Arbitrator
expressly observed that the Respondents had made an incorrect
declaration regarding the encumbrance-free status of the property and
consequently held that the unilateral cancellation and forfeiture notice
dated 12.09.2017 could not be sustained. The learned Arbitrator thus
partially accepted the Petitioners' grievance against the Respondents
and proceeded to grant the relief accordingly.
43. This aspect assumes significance since it clearly establishes that
the learned Arbitrator undertook a balanced appreciation of the
conduct of both parties and did not proceed on any one-sided or
arbitrary approach as is now sought to be contended.
44. This Court also does not find merit in the submission that the
learned Arbitrator ignored the principles laid down in Siddamsetty
Infra (supra). The Impugned Award itself reflects that the learned
Arbitrator expressly noticed the statutory framework under Section 10
of the SRA as well as the aforesaid judgment while considering the
relief of specific performance. Merely because the learned Arbitrator
ultimately declined the relief would not imply non-consideration of
the judgment relied upon by the Petitioners.
45. The ratio of a precedent cannot be applied divorced from the
factual matrix of each case. In the present case, the learned Arbitrator,
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after appreciating the entirety of the material on record, exercised
discretion against the grant of specific performance and instead
awarded a refund with substantial commercial interest. Such exercise
of discretion, founded upon appreciation of facts and equities, cannot
be substituted by this Court merely because the Petitioners contend
that greater weight ought to have been assigned to certain
circumstances relied upon by them.
46. This Court is of the considered opinion that an arbitral award is
not expected to resemble an elaborate civil court judgment discussing
each and every submission advanced by the parties in minute detail.
The legislative intent underlying the A&C Act is to ensure expeditious
and efficient adjudication of disputes with minimal judicial
interference. Consequently, the requirement embodied under Section
31(3) of the A&C Act stands satisfied so long as the award discloses,
either expressly or by necessary implication, the thought process and
reasoning which weighed with the learned Arbitral Tribunal while
arriving at its conclusions. Mere absence of elaborate discussion or
detailed reasoning on every contention raised by the parties cannot, by
itself, render the award vulnerable to challenge under Section 34 of
the A&C Act.
47. At this stage, this Court deems it apposite to take note of the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dyna Technologies (P)
Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.7. The relevant observations contained
therein read as under:
"34. The mandate under Section 31(3) of the Arbitration Act is to
have reasoning which is intelligible and adequate and, which can in
appropriate cases be even implied by the courts from a fair reading
7
(2019) 20 SCC 1
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of the award and documents referred to thereunder, if the need be.
The aforesaid provision does not require an elaborate judgment to
be passed by the arbitrators having regard to the speedy resolution
of dispute.
35. When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order, three
characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are:
proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the order are
improper, they reveal a flaw in the decision-making process. If the
challenge to an award is based on impropriety or perversity in the
reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on the grounds
provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. If the challenge
to an award is based on the ground that the same is unintelligible,
the same would be equivalent of providing no reasons at all.
Coming to the last aspect concerning the challenge on adequacy of
reasons, the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34
has to adjudicate the validity of such an award based on the degree
of particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature of
issues falling for consideration. The degree of particularity cannot
be stated in a precise manner as the same would depend on the
complexity of the issue. Even if the Court comes to a conclusion
that there were gaps in the reasoning for the conclusions reached
by the Tribunal, the Court needs to have regard to the documents
submitted by the parties and the contentions raised before the
Tribunal so that awards with inadequate reasons are not set aside in
casual and cavalier manner. On the other hand, ordinarily
unintelligible awards are to be set aside, subject to party autonomy
to do away with the reasoned award. Therefore, the courts are
required to be careful while distinguishing between inadequacy of
reasons in an award and unintelligible awards."
(emphasis supplied)
48. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, and upon a cumulative and holistic reading of the Impugned
Award, this Court finds that the learned Arbitrator has sufficiently
indicated the basis upon which the relief of specific performance came
to be declined and, simultaneously, why refund of the consideration
amount together with interest was considered to be the appropriate
relief in the facts and circumstances of the case. The reasoning
furnished in the Impugned Award may not be as elaborate or
expansive as desired by the Petitioners; however, the same certainly
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cannot be characterised as either absent, unintelligible, or suffering
from such perversity so as to warrant interference within the limited
scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
49. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the learned
Arbitrator did not deny relief to the Petitioners altogether. While
declining the claim for specific performance, the learned Arbitrator
simultaneously directed refund of the admitted consideration amount
of Rs. 3.50 crores, together with simple interest @ 15% per annum
from the respective dates of payment, being the very contractual rate
stipulated between the parties. It is noteworthy that such relief formed
part of the Petitioners' alternative claims before the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. Further, while granting the said relief, the learned Arbitrator
also directed reimbursement of the transfer memorandum charges
incurred by the Petitioners. The Impugned Award, therefore,
unmistakably reflects a conscious exercise undertaken by the learned
Arbitrator and to ensure that the Petitioners are monetarily restituted
in respect of the amounts admittedly paid by them.
50. Viewed thus, this Court is unable to hold that the Impugned
Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity or violation of the
fundamental policy of Indian law so as to warrant interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. The conclusions arrived at by the learned
Arbitrator constitute a plausible view based upon appreciation of the
contractual terms, the conduct of the parties and the evidence placed
on record. The challenge raised by the Petitioners essentially seeks a
re-assessment of factual findings and substitution of the discretion
exercised by the learned Arbitrator with that of this Court, which is
wholly impermissible in proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. (COMM) 199/2025 Page 27 of 28
BHATIA
Signing Date:13.05.2026
19:00:02
Act.
CONCLUSION:
51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Impugned Arbitral Award dated
27.01.2025 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator does not suffer from
any infirmity warranting interference under Section 34 of the A&C
Act. The findings returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal are
founded upon due appreciation of the pleadings, contractual terms,
documentary material and conduct of the parties, and constitute a
plausible and reasoned view of the facts of the present case. No patent
illegality, perversity or conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian
law has been demonstrated by the Petitioners before this Court.
52. Accordingly, O.M.P. (COMM.) 199/2025 preferred by the
Petitioners challenging the Impugned Arbitral Award stands
dismissed.
53. Pending Application(s), if any, stand disposed of in the
aforesaid terms.
54. There shall be no order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MAY 08, 2026/tk/kr/ma Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. (COMM) 199/2025 Page 28 of 28 BHATIA Signing Date:13.05.2026 19:00:02