The State Of Madhya Pradesh Home ... vs Akhilesh Jha on 5 September, 2019

[Cites 20, Cited by 6]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

The State Of Madhya Pradesh Home ... vs Akhilesh Jha on 5 September, 2019

This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution takes exception to the order of Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) passed in OA. No.200/587/17 dated 05-01-2018 whereby the Tribunal has set aside the charge sheet dated 08-06-2016 and allowed the said OA.

2. The relevant facts are within narrow compass. The respondent No.1 was initially appointed as a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) in the year 1989. He was awarded Indian Police Services (IPS) 2 MP. No.3854/18 in the year 2011. In the year 2014, the respondent No.1 was awarded President's Award. The respondent No.1 worked as Superintendent of Police (SP) Alirajpur between June, 2012 to June, 2015. On 04-06- 2014, a person namely Jhingle allegedly died in police custody. The FIR etc. were lodged against the concerned officials.

3. The respondent No.1 received a charge sheet dated 15-06-2016, which was issued under Rule 7 (a)(b) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. The respondent No.1 filed his reply dated 07-07-2016 and denied the allegations in toto. In addition, the respondent No.1 submitted his defence in extenso through the said reply. Since the respondents did not take any decision on the reply to the charge sheet and respondent No.1 was coming within the zone of consideration in the ladder of promotion, he filed OA. No.200/747/16 before the Tribunal. The said OA was decided in limine on 28-07- 2016. The Tribunal declined interference on the ground that the respondents have not yet taken any decision on his reply and, therefore, OA is premature.

4. The department issued communication dated 20-02-2017 (Annexure P/10-A) whereby no objection was declined in relation to respondent No.1 for inter state deputation on the ground that he is facing a disciplinary proceeding. Aggrieved, the respondent No.1 filed OA. No.200/587/17 assailing the said charge sheet dated 08-06- 2016 and the communication dated 20-02-2017 (Annexure P/10-A). After completion of pleadings, the Tribunal passed the order dated 05- 01-2018 and set aside the impugned charge sheet. While deciding the matter, the Tribunal has taken note of various judgments of Supreme Court and the order of Indore Bench of this Court passed in MCRC. No.9351/14 and MCRC. No.3632/16.

5. Shri Saleem Rehman, learned Government Advocate urged that 3 MP. No.3854/18 the Tribunal has erred in allowing the said OA because-(i) in the teeth of dismissal of first OA (No.200/747/16) on 28-07-2016, the second OA (No.200/587/17) against the same charge sheet was not maintainable. It was hit by principle of res judicata. Reliance is placed on (1977) 2 SCC 806 (State of U.P. vs. Nawab Hussain), (1996) 10 SCC 561 (Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. T.P. Kumaran) & (1994) 3 SCC 357 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Upendra Singh); (ii) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the charge sheet at this stage. Even on the ground of delay, interference could not have been made by the Tribunal. Regarding the scope of judicial review at the stage of charge sheet, Shri Saleem Rehman placed reliance on (1987) 2 SCC 179 (State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma & Another), (1995) 3 SCC 134 (Deputy Registrar, Co- operative Societies, Faizabad vs. Sachindra Nath Pandey & Ors.), (2006) 12 SCC 28 (Union of India vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana), (2012) 11 SCC 565 (Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha) and (2013) 6 SCC 515 (Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society); (iii) by taking this Court to the reply of the respondent No.1 to the charge sheet (Annexure P/8), Shri Rehman urged that Para 3 of the reply clearly shows that the respondent No.1 indeed admitted that there was a telephonic call received by him whereby in a casual manner he was directed to disband the Gunda Squad. Thus, it cannot be said that there existed no such direction by superior. For these cumulative reasons, learned Government Advocate urged that the Tribunal has erred in interfering with the charge sheet dated 08-06-2016.

6. Sounding a contra note, Shri A.M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel supported the impugned order of Tribunal and urged that in view of judgment of Supreme Court reported in Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), the Tribunal has not committed any error of law, which 4 MP. No.3854/18 warrants interference by this Court.

7. No other point is pressed by the parties.

8. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record.

9. Before dealing with rival contentions advanced at the Bar, it is apposite to quote relevant portion from the charge sheet dated 08.10.2016, which reads as under:

^^&%vkjksi i=%& vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsok,a ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;e&1969 ds fu;e&7 ds mi fu;e&¼1½¼ch½ ds vUrxZr vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkjh ;Fkk jkT; 'kklu mDr fu;e ds fu;e&10 ds varxZr ,rn~ }kjk Jh vf[kys'k >k] Hkkiqls rRdk- iqfyl v/kh{kd] vyhjktiqj orZeku esa iqfyl v/kh{kd] ftyk bUnkSj ¼eq[;ky;½ ds fo:) fuEufyf[kr vkjksi vf/kjksfir fd;k tkrk gS %& vkjksi dz- 01& ftyk vyhjktiqj esa voS/kkfud :i ls xq.M+k LdkWM+ lapkfyr dj ofj"B vf/kdkfj;ksa ds funsZ'kksa dh vogsyuk ,oa vuq'kklghurk dk izn'kZu dj vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsok,a ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e&1968 ds fu;e&3 dk mYy?kau fd;k gSA vkidk mDr d`R; vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsok,a ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e&1968 ds fu;e&3 ds izko/kkuksa ds forjhr ,oa vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsok,a ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;e&1969 ds vurxZr n.Muh; gSaA mDr vkjksiksa dk foLr`r fooj.k layXu gSA e/; izns'k ds jkT;iky ds uke ls rFkk vkns'kkuqlkj ¼deyk mik/;k;½ voj lfpo e/; izn'sk 'kklu] x`g foHkkx^^ [Emphasis Supplied] 5 MP. No.3854/18 In Annexure to the charge sheet following assertion is made:

^^iqfyl egkfujh{kd] bUnkSj tksu bUnkSj }kjk tksu ds lHkh iqfyl v/kh{kdksa dks ;g Li"V funsZ'k fn;s x;s Fks fd ftys esa fdlh Hkh vf/kdkjh }kjk dksbZ xq.M+k LdkWM ugha cuk;k tk;sxk vkSj ;fn ,sls LdkWM+ dk;Zjr gks rks bUgsa rRdky Hkax djus gsrq funsZf'kr fd;k x;k FkkA^^ [Emphasis Supplied]

10. The respondent No.1 submitted his reply dated 7.7.2016 Annexure P-8 and in no uncertain terms urged that " I had not formed "Gunda squad" and had only kept Reserve Force in the control room.

It is further stated that "Gunda squad" and the "flying squad" are not the same. 'Flying squad' was constituted because of assembly elections and under the directions and guidance of Election Commission and as per the decision taken in meeting dated 05.10.2013 conducted by the Collector and District Returning Officer to maintain the law and order situation properly during the election period.

As to point 1 regarding applicability of res-judicata

11. The first order dated 28th July, 2016 passed in O.A. No. 200/747/16 clearly shows that the Tribunal has not decided anything on merits. The legality, validity and propriety of charge sheet was not decided. Indeed, the Tribunal was of the opinion that O.A. was premature because the respondent No.1 has approached the Tribunal immediately after filing the reply to the charge sheet. The principal of res judicata is applicable if something has been decided on merits in previous case which is binding between the parties interse, in the second litigation between the same parties, the decision so taken in the first round will operate as res-judicata. In the second round i.e. O.A. 200/587/2017 the respondent No.1 had a grievance because the alleged incident has taken place in June, 2014 and charge sheet was 6 MP. No.3854/18 issued after two years on 08.06.2016. Even after receiving the reply to the charge sheet, the sword of disciplinary proceedings was kept hanging on the head of the respondent No.1 which resulted into deprivation to seek inter-state deputation for respondent no.1. The officer was admittedly deprived from the benefit of inter-state deputation because of pendency of of Departmental Enquiry pursuant to charge sheet dated 08.06.2016. In the second O.A., the respondent No.1 challenged the charge sheet dated 08.06.16 as well as the order dated 20.02.2017 whereby permission was declined to go on inter- state deputation. In this backdrop, we are unable to hold that principal of res-judicata can be pressed into service. The judgments cited by Shri Rahman in this regard have no application in the fact situation of the present case. In the said cases, in the first round there was an adjudication on merits and such decision operated as res-judicata on the subsequent litigation.

Interference on the charge sheet at this stage

12. Shri Rahman rightly placed reliance on the judgments of Brahm Datt Sharma (supra), Sachindra Nath Pandey (supra), Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra) and Anant R. Kulkarni (supra) wherein it was held that "ordinarily" no interference be made by the Tribunal/Court at the stage of issuance of charge sheet. This is equally trite in view of principle of law laid down in Upendra Singh (Supra) that correctness of allegations cannot be gone into at the stage of issuance of charge sheet. Ordinarily, the employee should be directed to put forth his defence by filing reply and it is for the disciplinary authority to take a decision whether a departmental enquiry is to be conducted or not.

13. So far these legal principles are concerned, there cannot be any dispute on those points. However, a careful reading of the impugned 7 MP. No.3854/18 order of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal has mainly interfered on three counts- (i) there exists a delay of more than two years in issuing the charge sheet and concluding the inquiry. The said unreasonable and unexplained delay became reason of interference. (ii) The charges are vague/ambiguous. (iii) The Indore Bench of this Court in aforesaid M.Cr.Cs. decided to expunge the adverse remarks made by the Inquiry Officer on 10.10.2014.

14. The core issue before this Court is whether the impugned decision taken by the Tribunal on the basis of the aforesaid three reasons is legal and justifiable. The Apex Court in Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar High Court of Delhi 2015 (16) SCC 415 directed that the employer is under an obligation to conclude the departmental enquiry within shortest possible time by taking priority measures. In Para-28 of this judgment, it was held that the proceedings should be concluded within six months as an outer limit. However, if it is not possible for the employer to conclude the enquiry due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time frame, then efforts should be made to conclude within reasonable extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year.

15. The learned Tribunal has taken note of this judgment and opined that the department has not assigned any cogent or justifiable reason for issuing the charge sheet after two years.

16. The General Administrative Department (GAD) issued a circular in order to ensure that departmental enquiry is initiated and concluded within the time frame. The relevant portion reads as under:

"fo"k;%& foHkkxh; tkWap dk ,d o"kZ dh fu/kkZfjr le;kof/k es fuiVkjkA d`i;k ekftZu esa vafdr lkekU; izkklu foHkkx ds funsZ'kksa dk voyksdu djsaA buesa dgk x;k gS fd foHkkxh; tkWap ds ekeyksa dks fu/kkZfjr ,d o"kZ dh 8 MP. No.3854/18 le;kof/k esa gh fuiVkdj vfUre vkns'k ikfjr fd;k tkos ,oa vko';d@vuqfpr foyEc ij jksd yxk;h tk; rFkk foyEc ds fy;s ftEesnkj dkfeZd ds fo:) vuqkklfud dk;Zokgh dj y?k'qkkfLr ikfjr dh tk;A 2- le;≤ ij izlkfjr funsZ'kksa ds ckotwn foHkkxh; tkWapksa ds fuiVkus esa gks jgs foyEc ij vadq'k yxkus ds rRijrk ls iz;Ru ugha fd;s tk jgs gSaA 'kklu bl fLFkfr dks xEHkhj ekurk gSA 3- vr% layXu lkj.kh esa crkbZ xbZ foHkkxh; tkWap dh fofHkUu izkoLFkkvksa dh vksj leLr l{ke@vu'qkklfud] izkf/kdkfj;ksa dk /;ku vkdf"kZr dj vis{kk dh tkrh gS fd vk;ksx }kjk eU=.kk ¼tgkWa vko';d gks½ nsus esa yxus okyh le;kof/k dks NksM+dj] foHkkxh; tkWap dh lEiw.kZ dk;Zokgh ,d o"kZ dh vf/kdre le;kof/k esa vfuok;Zr% iwjh djus ;k djokus ds 'kklu ds funsZ'kksa dk rRijrk ,oa n`<+rk ls ikyu djuk lqfuf'pr fd;k tk; ,oa foyEc dh fLFkfr esa ftEesnkj dkfeZd ds fo:) Hkh vko';d dk;Zokgh djus dh dk;Zokgh dh tk;A ¼lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx dzekad lh-&@5&2@87@3@1] fnukad 16&4&1987½ layXu mijksDrkuqlkj& Kkiu dzekad ,oa fnukad 1&2198@2355@1 ¼3½] fnukad 30 flrEcj] 1963A 2&439@1164@1 ¼3½@75] fnukad 5 tqykbZ] 1975A 3&lh@6&5@76@3@1] fnukad 8 tqykbZ] 1976A 4&71@1376@dkizlq@1@81] fnukad 27 Qjojh] 1982A 5&,Q& 4&8@86@dkizlq@1] fnukad 25 flrEcj 86A foHkkxh; tkWap djus ds izdj.kksa dh izkoLFkk,Wa ,oa muesa yxus okyh le;kof/k dh lkj.kh 1- l{ke izkf/kdkjh }kjk uLrh ij foHkkxh;

         tkWap djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k tkuk&                 izdj.k izLrqfr ls ,d
                                                  lIrkg
 2- vkjksi&i=kfn tkjh fd;s tkuk&                         vf/kdre ,d ekg
 3- vipkjh ls vkjksi i= dk mRrj fofgr
         le;kof/k esa izkIr djuk&                        lkr fnu ls ,d ekg
         ¼;g vof/k vkjksi&i=kfn izkIr gkus dh
         frfFk ls de ls de lkr fnu i'pkr~
         dh gksxh½
 4- vipkjh ls vkjksi i= dk mRrj izkIr
         gksus ij mldk ijh{k.k dj
         tkWapdrkZ@izLrqrdrkZ inkf/kdkjh dh
         fu;qfDr&                                        lkr fnu ls ,d ekg
 5- tkWap izkf/kdkjh }kjk tkWap djuk ,oa
         izfrosnu Hkstuk&
         ¼1½ eq[; 'kkfLr;kWa vf/kjksfir djus ds
         fy;s fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k gsrq&                    vf/kdre N% ekg

       ¼2½ y?kq 'kkfLr;kWa vf/kjksfir djus ds             vf/kdre rhu ekg
                                            9                 MP. No.3854/18

             fy;s fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k gsrq&
      6-     tkWap izfrosnu izkIr gksu ij mldk
             ijh{k.k ,oa vufUre ¼izLrkfor½ ;k
             vfUre 'kkfLr ¼y?kq 'kkfLr ikfjr djus
             dh fLFkfr esa½ ikfjr djus dk fu.kZ;
             ysuk&

¼1½ eq[; 'kkfLr;kWa vf/kjksfir djus ds vf/kdre rhu lIrkg fy;s fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k gsrq& ¼2½ y?kq 'kkfLr;kWa vf/kjksfir djus ds vf/kdre nks lIrkg fy;s fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k gsrq& 7- vk;ksx dh ea=.kk ¼ea=.kk esa yxus okys le; dks NksM+dj½ tgka vko';d gks] izkIr gksus ds ckn eq[; 'kkfLr;ka vf/kjksfir djus ds fy, vfUre vkns'k vf/kdre nks lIrkg ikfjr djuk& The issuance of impugned charge-sheet before the tribunal was clearly in violation of said circular of GAD. No doubt, the circular is directory in nature but at the same time, the department is obliged to assign justifiable reasons for belatedly issuing the charge-sheet.

17. Pertinently, during the course of hearing, we have perused the pleadings of the parties before the Tribunal. We have noticed that the respondent No.1 has raised ground of delay in issuing the charge sheet and completing the enquiry. The department has given an evasive reply and did not apprise the Court by assigning any justifiable reasons which had caused delay of two years in issuing the charge sheet. Apart from this, it is condign to refer to certain judgments of Supreme Court wherein interference was made on the ground of delay in issuing the charge sheet. [see: State of M.P. Vs. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738, M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88]. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments leaves no room for any doubt that charge sheet can be interfered with if there exist an unexplained and unjustifiable delay in issuing the charge sheet.

18. Apart from the aforesaid, the Tribunal has interfered with the 10 MP. No.3854/18 charge-sheet because department failed to apprise the Tribunal about any specific direction/instruction/order which is allegedly violated by the respondent no. 1. The Tribunal opined that the vagueness of charge itself can be a ground to interfere and the Tribunal in this regard considered various judgments of the Supreme Court in para 28 of the order.

19. We will be failing in our duty if we won't consider the argument of Shri Rehman based on the reply to the charge-sheet dated 7/07/2016 Annexure P-8. By placing heavy reliance on para 3 of the reply, Shri Rehman urged that this para makes it clear that petitioner received some oral direction from superior authority for disbanding "Gunda Squad". Thus, it cannot be said that there was no material on the strength of which petitioner was charge-sheeted. The argument on the first blush appears to be attractive but lost its force when tested on the anvil of legal principles. The Apex Court in the case of A.L. Kalra Vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 2703 of 1981 opined as under :-

"25. ......... Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflages as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding officer, Labour Court, Meerut & Others where this Court held that 'everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing or is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty."

11 MP. No.3854/18

20. The question of vagueness of charge became subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in catena of judgments. It is apposite to refer to certain paragraphs of judgments which read as under :-

In Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, (2013) 6 SCC 515, the Supreme Court held as under:

"15. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. [(1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752] this Court held, that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him, and what kind of defence he should put up for rebuttal thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 553, para 5) "5. ... The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him."

(Emphasis supplied) In Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, the Supreme Court held as under:

"33. In a case where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge-sheet but may be crystal clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. (Vide State of A.P. v. S.Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] .) Thus, where a 12 MP. No.3854/18 delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice.

34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC 454 :

1986 SCC (L&S) 662 : AIR 1986 SC 995] this Court held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.

35. In view of the above, law can be summarised that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion.

Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct."

(Emphasis Supplied) In Govt. of A.P. Vs. A.Venkata Raidu (2007) 1 SCC 338, the Supreme Court held as under:

"9. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the High Court. It is a settled principle of natural justice that if any material is sought to be used in an enquiry, then copies of that material should be supplied to the party against whom such enquiry is held. In Charge 1, what is mentioned is that the respondent violated the orders issued by the Government. However, no details of these orders have been mentioned in Charge 1. It is well settled that a charge-sheet should not be vague but should be specific. The authority should have mentioned the date of the GO which is said to have been violated by the respondent, the number of that GO, etc. but that was not done. Copies of the said GOs or directions of the Government were not even placed before the enquiry officer. Hence, Charge 1 was not specific and hence no finding of guilt can be fixed on the basis of that charge.

(Emphasis Supplied) 13 MP. No.3854/18

21. The purpose of issuance of show-cause notice/charge-sheet is to give a clear impression with accuracy and precision to the delinquent employee as to what is the charge against him so that he can file an effective reply and meet the allegations with clarity. Thus, minimum expectation from the employer and minimum requirement of law was that charge should be clear and not ambiguous. In the instant case, even the name of superior officers whose directions are allegedly violated by the petitioners were not disclosed. What is the charge cannot be gathered from the reply of the respondent no. 1. Moreso, when respondent no. 1 nowhere admitted that he had established/constituted a "Gunda squad" indeed his stand was that there was a 'flying squad' which was established in order to conduct Assembly elections in a free and fair manner. In this view of the matter, we are unable to telescope para 3 of the reply into the charge- sheet to give a stamp of approval or validity.

22. The Constitution Bench Judgment in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 was pertained to a criminal prosecution. The principles enunciated therein were made applicable to a plea of delay in taking disciplinary proceedings as well by Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Chaman Lal (1995) 2 SCC

570. In Chamanlal and in Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), the Supreme Court held that right to speedy trial is flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. Where court comes to the conclusion that where right to speedy trial of the delinquent employee has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. However, it was made clear in both the judgments that Court needs to carefully examine the aspect of delay coupled with the aspect of the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved.

23. The Indore Bench of this Court has already directed that adverse remarks made against the respondent no.1 by the enquiry officer be 14 MP. No.3854/18 expunged. The charge against the respondent no.1 is not so grave which may become a reason for permitting the employer to continue with the enquiry when employer has miserably failed to explain the delay in issuing the charge-sheet and conclude the enquiry.

24. In the light of aforesaid analysis, in our view, the Tribunal has undertaken judicial review of the charge-sheet on permissible grounds. Since petitioner/Department failed to show the reason of belatedly issuing the charge-sheet, the Tribunal has rightly interfered with the vague charge-sheet. The petitioners have also failed to show that charges are so grave that despite delay, department can be permitted to proceed with the enquiry.

25. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error, manifest procedural impropriety or palpable perversity, interference can be made. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference (See: Shalini Shyam Shetty & anr. vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329). Since no such ingredient is available in this petition which warrants interference, interference is declined.

26. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed. No cost.

                 (Sujoy Paul)                                       (B.K. Shrivastava)
                   JUDGE                                                JUDGE

dixit & vy & mohsin

Digitally signed by MOHAMMED MOHSIN QURESHI
Date: 2019.09.07 12:44:06 +05'30'

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