Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Puran Mal And Ors vs Judge Labour Court/Industrial on 4 September, 2025
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:35067]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7685/2006
1. Puran Mal son of Shri Ramdev Meena, aged about 40 years,
Resident of Village Nayi Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District Ajmer.
2. Shri Rathi Ram son of Shri Ram Pal Raigor, aged about 36
years, resident of Nayi Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District Ajmer.
3. Sri Banwar Lal son of Shri Laxman Raigor, aged about 41
years, resident of Nayi Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District Ajmer.
3/1. (Smt.) Prem wife of Late Shri Banwar Lal, aged 54 years,
3/2 Labh Chand son of Late Shri Banwar Lal, aged about 30
years,
3/3 Lekhraj son of Late Shri BhanwarLal, aged about 25 years,
3/4 Suresh son of Late Shri Bhanwar Lal, aged about 21 years,
3/5 Lalita wife of Shri Chetan (daughter of Late Shri Banwar Lal)
aged about 27 years,
All are residents of Village, Nayi Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District
Ajmer.
4. Shri Jagdish S/o. Shri Mishri Lal, aged about 41 years,
resident of Nayi Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District Ajmer.
5. Bheru son of Shri Mangi Lal, aged about 36 years, resident of
Nai Naya Kheda, Tehsil Kekdi, District Ajmer (Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer.
2. The Assistant Engineer, Public Halth Engineering Department,
Sub-Division Kekdi, District Ajmer.
----Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Prem Krishan Sharma Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Neeraj Batra Government Counsel with Ms. Priyamvada Singh Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
RESERVED ON :: 20.08.2025
PRONOUNCED ON :: 04.09.2025
1. The petitioners, erstwhile daily-rated workmen of the Public Health Engineering Department (for short 'PHED'), by way (Downloaded on 06/09/2025 at 12:40:18 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:35067] (2 of 8) [CW-7685/2006] of this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, have challenged the award dated 27.07.2006 passed by the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Labour Court'), whereby reference has been answered against the workmen, rejecting their demand for reinstatement with continuity of service and consequential benefits.
2. It is stated that petitioners' services were terminated on different dates, such as services of Petitioner No. 1, Puran Mal were terminated on 01.04.1983; services of Petitioner No. 2, Ratiram were terminated on 16.07.1993, and services of the Petitioner No. 3 to 5, namely, Late Bhanwar Lal; Jagdish and Bheru were terminated on 01.01.1994, in violation of provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act of 1947'). The industrial dispute, however, was raised belatedly on 09.07.1998, after delays spanning from 4 to 15 years.
3. On receiving failure of conciliation report, appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court and on the basis of reference, statement of claim of the petitioners and reply thereto by the respondents, points for consideration which arose before the Labour Court were as to whether the petitioners had worked for 240 days or more in the preceding year from the date of termination, which may attract provisions of Section 25F of the Act of 1947 and whether provisions under Section 25G ("last come, first go") and Section 25H of the Act of 1947 were violated, coupled with the fact of raising dispute by the petitioners with long and unexplainable delay.
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4. After considering the pleadings of the parties, material on record and law prevailing at the relevant time, the Labour Court passed award dated 27.07.2006 against the petitioners.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while challenging the award, submitted that the award passed by learned Labour Court is contrary to the facts of the case, evidence on record and law applicable at the relevant time. It has been submitted that despite order passed by the Labour Court, entire record directed to be produced, was not brought and placed on record by the Employer, yet adverse inference was not drawn by the Labour Court. Apart from the issue of rendering continuous service for more than 240 days, the grounds regarding violation of provisions of Section 25G and 25H of the Act of 1947 were not properly appreciated by the learned Labour Court.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 supported the award and stated that award has been passed by the Labour Court after meticulous examination of the facts, due analysis of the documents on record and after applying the justified principles of law. The workmen raised the dispute with hopeless delay and therefore, on account of long gap between the date of termination and raising industrial dispute, some of the record relating to the daily wagers, finding no claim at their behest, was weeded out, yet sufficient material was placed by the Employer on record to show the days of working intermittently by the petitioners, which do not attract protection under the Act of 1947. Hence, there is no infirmity and illegality in the impugned award and the writ petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be rejected.
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7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record.
8. The law is settled that the burden lies on the workman to establish 240 days' continuous service. In the case of Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"3. ..................In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year. preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot. Filling be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in an year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman................"
9. In the instant case, the workmen utterly failed to discharge their burden, whereas, the Labour Court examined the documents (Ex. M-1, M-2) produced by the Employer, which disclosed intermittent engagement. Minor discrepancies between the record before the Conciliation Officer and Labour Court were noticed, but rightly ignored in the light of there being no evidence to the contrary by the workmen. As reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 8 SCC 450:-
".............On the face of the aforesaid authorities, the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in placing the burden on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days with the employer. The burden of proof having been on the workman, he has to adduce an evidence in support of his contention that he has complied with the requirement of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, apart from examining himself in support of his contention the workman did not produce any material to prove the fact that he worked for 240 days......."
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10. Thus, on account of lack of evidence by the workmen, Section 25F of the Act of 1947 was never attracted, and the plea of non-compliance by not issuing notice or pay in lieu of notice, as well as non-service of retrenchment compensation falls flat as the foundation of the claim failed. Petitioners never proved 240 days' service. In absence of this basic jurisdictional fact, Section 25F of the Act of 1947 does not come into play at all.
11. As regards applicability of Section 25G of the Act of 1947 presupposes that irrespective of the fact that the employee has not established continuity of service, it is settled preposition of law that the principle of 'last come first go' is not an inflexible rule, but a principle of fair play, applicable where the workman establishes that juniors were retained. Here, the petitioners neither proved continuous service, nor retention of juniors. On the contrary, respondents showed that only those daily-wagers, who had completed 240 days were regularised. The petitioners did not controvert this by cross-examination. Hence, Section 25G of the Act of 1947 has no application in the instant case. Without showing that juniors were kept in preference, petitioners cannot rely on Section 25G of the Act of 1947. The very trigger for invoking "last come, first go" is missing in the evidence led by the petitioners.
12. As regards provisions under section 25H of the Act of 1947, it is evident that the plain language of Section 25H of the Act of 1947 speaks only of re-employment of 'retrenched workmen'. Section 25H of the Act of 1947, which is couched in wide language and is capable of application to all retrenched (Downloaded on 06/09/2025 at 12:40:18 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:35067] (6 of 8) [CW-7685/2006] workmen, not merely those covered by Section 25F of the Act of 1947. It does not require curtailment of the ordinary meaning of the word 'retrenchment' used therein. The provisions for re- employment of retrenched workmen merely gives preference to a retrenched workman in the matter of re-employment over other persons. It is enacted for the benefit of the retrenched workmen and there is no reason to restrict its ordinary meaning which promotes the object of the enactment without causing any prejudice to a better placed retrenched workman. However, it is clear that the right under Section 25H is confined to retrenched workmen and not to others. Since petitioners were not "retrenchment victims" in law, they cannot invoke Section 25H of the Act of 1947. Moreover, no cogent evidence of fresh recruitment in the same category was adduced. It is settled law that Section 25H of the Act of 1947 is not a blanket re- employment right; it applies only where retrenchment has been established. On account of there being lack of evidence to attract the said provisions, petitioners do not qualify to invoke the aforesaid provisions.
13. Apart from above, admittedly the petitioners raised the dispute after long, unexplained delays of 15 years in the case of Puranmal, 5 years in the matter of Ratiram, and 4½ years in others' cases and no explanation to justify such delay has been given by the petitioners.
14. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455, the Court held that a dispute, which is stale, could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of (Downloaded on 06/09/2025 at 12:40:18 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:35067] (7 of 8) [CW-7685/2006] the Act. Hence in the instant case, where the workmen have kept quiet for years together, their dispute cannot be the subject-
matter of industrial adjudication. Applying these principles, the Labour Court rightly found the petitioners' claim barred by laches.
15. Otherwise also, it is settled that writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution of India is supervisory in nature and not appellate judrisdiction. Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Radhey Shyam & Another v. Chhabi Nath & Others, (2015) 5 SCC 423, has observed that the supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct all errors of fact or law, but only to ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within their bounds. In the instant case, this court finds that the Labour Court's award is well- reasoned, based on evidence, and does not suffer from perversity. No case is made out for interference.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corp., (2010) 3 SCC 192, where relief of reinstatement was granted by applying the principle that where termination is proved to be illegal and unjustified, reinstatement is the normal rule. Here, in the present case, illegality itself is unproven as the foundation of 240 days' service is missing. Hence, the aforesaid decision is of no avail to the petitioner.
17. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 584, which is also based on established continuous service. The ratio does not (Downloaded on 06/09/2025 at 12:40:18 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:35067] (8 of 8) [CW-7685/2006] apply where service itself is not proved. Similarly, reliance by learned counsel for the petitioner on Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya(D.Ed.) & Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324, concerning back wages, is misplaced. That case involved an illegally dismissed teacher. The principle cannot be stretched to intermittent daily-rated workers.
18. Having thoughtful consideration of the facts of the case, material on record and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above judgments, this court is of the view that no case for interference is made out.
19. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed.
20. Pending applications also stand dismissed.
(ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI / (Downloaded on 06/09/2025 at 12:40:18 AM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)