Kerala High Court
The District Collector vs Athickal Muhammed Kunhi on 29 September, 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MRS.MANJULA CHELLUR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.CHITAMBARESH
FRIDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2012/23RD BHADRA 1934
WA.No. 557 of 2010
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AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN WPC.24875/2009 DATED 29/9/2009
APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENTS IN THE WPC:
-----------------------------------
1. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KANNUR.
2. THE SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA),
EZHIMALA NAVAL ACADEMY, PAYYANNUR.
BY SRI.P.I.DEVIS, GOVERNMENT PLEADER
RESPONDENT(S)/PETITIONER IN THE WPC:
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ATHICKAL MUHAMMED KUNHI,
ETTIKULAM P.O., RAMANTHALI, KANNUR.
R1 BY ADV.SRI.SERGI JOSEPH THOMAS
R1 BY ADV. SRI.K.M.AUGUSTINE
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14-09-2012,
ALONG WITH WA.NO.761/2010 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME
DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
AS
MANJULA CHELLUR, Ag.C.J
&
V.CHITAMBARESH, J.
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W.A.No. 557 of 2010,
W.A.No. 761 of 2010,
W.A.No. 1676 of 2010,
W.A.No. 1736 of 2010,
W.A.No. 1738 of 2010,
W.A.No. 1739 of 2010
&
W.A.No. 1747 of 2010
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Dated this the 14th day of September, 2012
JUDGMENT
Manjula Chellur, Ag.C.J. Appellants were respondents in the Writ Petitions before learned Single Judge. The Writ Petitions came to be filed by the party respondents seeking reference of applications filed by the writ petitioners to the concerned court having jurisdiction under Section 28A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions holding, an application filed under Section 28A of the Act can be submitted within three months from the date of award passed by a reference court on an application filed under Section 28A(3) of the Act and also on the basis of an award passed by the court after remittance under Section 54 of the Act. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeals are filed by the State. WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 2
2. So far as W.A.No.761 of 2010, the land involved is 0.0810 hector in Resurvey No.266/6 of Ramanthali Village. W.A.No.557 of 2010 pertains to 1 acre of land in Resurvey No.74/2 of Ramanthali Amsom acquired under the same notification as the other appeal. W.A.No.1676 of 2010 refers to 1 acre 17 cents in Resurvey No.334 of Ramanthali Village acquired for Naval Base purpose. W.A.No. 1736 of 2010 pertains to 5 acres 40 cents in Resurvey No.344 and 1 acre 34 cents in Resurvey No.331/2 of Ramanthali Village. W.A.No.1738 of 2010 refers to 3.50 acres of land in Resurvey No.332 of Ramanthali Village acquired for Ezhimala Naval Academy. W.A.No.1739 of 2010 pertains to 1.26.5000 acres of land in Resurvey No.344 of Ramanthali Village for Ezhimala Naval Academy. W.A.No.1747 of 2010 is in respect of 1.20 acres of land in Resurvey No.344 of Ramanthali Village.
3. W.A.Nos.557 and 761 of 2010 arise out of a common judgment dated 29.9.2009. In these two appeals, though compensation was received under protest, no application came to be filed for reference under Section 18 of the Act. Under Section 28A of the Act, an application came to be filed on 1.6.1998 before the District Collector, Kannur placing reliance on judgment in WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 3 LAR.No.120 of 1987 of Sub Court, Payyannur. This came to be rejected as time barred for proceedings dated 21.4.2009, as the original judgment in L.A.No.120 of 1987 came to be passed on 20.3.1990. Second application came to be filed on 1.6.1990 after disposal of LAA.No.229 of 1992. An application came to be filed on 16.6.1990 placing reliance on the judgment in LAR.No.120 of 1987. According to the appellants, in the absence of any challenge against the rejection of the application dated 1.6.1998, the learned Single Judge ought not to have considered the case of the writ petitioners but ought to have dismissed the Writ Petition.
4. So far as W.A.No.557 of 2010, on the basis of award in LAR.No.15 of 1987 at Exhibit P1, an application came to be filed and the same was rejected on 18.9.2006 as barred by limitation. This judgment at Exhibit P3 has reached finality. Another application came to be filed on 22.5.1998 under Section 28A of the Act for redetermination, placing reliance on LAR.120 of 1987. The Writ Petition came to be filed for a direction to consider application filed under Section 28A of the Act. During pendency of the Writ Petition, the application was dismissed as not WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 4 maintainable. Third application came to be filed on 26.2.2008. However, this Court, as per judgment dated 1.4.2008 in WP(C). No.26153 of 2007, directed the second respondent to dispose of the application filed under Section 28A of the Act. Having regard to the dismissal of application on 18.9.2006, an intimation was sent as per Exhibit P11 that third application cannot be considered.
5. The rest of the appeals are based on common judgment dated 26.5.2010. The first judgment of the learned Single Judge is dated 29.9.2009 and other judgments in the Writ Petitions are dated 26.5.2010. The crucial question that has to be decided in these appeals is, when an award of the authority is set aside by the High Court and the matter is remitted, if the reference court again decides the said matter, from what date commencement of period of limitation would occur.
6. In so far as W.A.Nos. 761 and 557 of 2010, the facts are that there was a decision on 20.3.1990 by the reference court and later LAA.No.229/1992 disposed of on 9.11.1996 and the matter was remitted back. Again, it was decided on 3.9.1997 after remand. The question is whether limitation starts running from WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 5 20.3.1990 or 3.9.1997. Several questions came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge. In so far as other five Writ Appeals, the learned Single Judge, after referring to Joseph v. District Collector (2004(2) KLT 1029), Annamma Thomas v. State of Kerala (2010(1) KLT 623) and Haji A.Abdul Rashid v. Spl. Tahsildar (2008(1) KLT 974), opined, the appeals deserve to be allowed with a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to reconsider the matter in accordance with law and pass fresh orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.
7. Aggrieved by the same, the above appeals are filed, contending that the definition of the word 'award' under Section 28A(1) of the Act is wrongly interpreted, which is quite contra to various decisions and judgments of the Apex Court; the learned Single Judge totally ignored the decisions of the Apex Court holding that an application under Section 28A of the Act can be made only on the basis of an award passed by the Principal Court of Original Jurisdiction and not on the basis of the judgment passed by the Appellate Court; when the Act envisages the application should be within three months from the date of WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 6 judgment of the reference court and in the light of beneficial provision made under Section 28A of the Act, if the person, who failed to file application under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation, fails to make application under Section 28A(1) of the Act within the time limit prescribed, second application is not maintainable; similarly, when three months period of limitation expires by efflux of time, none of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time under Section 28A(1), nor provide fresh cause of action. Challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge on various grounds, the appellants have sought for allowing the appeals by setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
8. On behalf of the appellants, learned Government Pleader relies upon the following judgments: Babu Ram v. State of U.P [(1995)2 SCC 689], Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari [(1995) 2 SCC 736] and State of A.P v. Marri Venkaiah [(2003)7 SCC 280].
9. In the case of Babu Ram's case (supra), several issues came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In this case it was said, Section 28A of the Act is prospective in operation and WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 7 the benefit is not applicable to awards made prior to commencement of amendment in 1984, even if three months period prescribed for making an application had not expired by that time. It was further held that a person interested becomes aggrieved, when for other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the court awards higher compensation. The condition is, such aggrieved person ought not to have made an application for reference earlier becomes entitled to invoke Section 28A of the Act. The aggrieved person in Section 28A(1) of the Act covers any interested person as long as he has not made an option for reference under Section 18 of the Act. The right available under Section 28A(1) of the Act is an extra remedy for redetermination of compensation payable to the owner of the land, if he has forgone his right and remedy under Section 18(1) of the Act. The starting point for computation of period of limitation of three months must be computed from the date of earliest award of reference court made under Section 26 of the Act and not from the date of judgment and decree of a court of appeal. Therefore, the remedy is not available to a party, who sought and failed in an appeal under Section 54 of the Act. WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 8 Section 28 of the Act operates in perpetuation and not a transitional provision.
10. In the case of Paradeep Kumari's case (Supra), Their Lordships held, the benefit of redetermination of quantum of compensation under Section 28A of the Act can be availed on the basis of any one of the awards that has been made by the Court subsequent to coming into force of Section 28A of the Act, provided the applicant seeking such benefit makes an application under Section 28A of the Act within the prescribed period of three months from the date of making award, on the basis of which redetermination is sought. In other words, the right of redetermination is held not confined to the earliest award made by the court. In this case, Their Lordships held, the following six conditions are essential and to be satisfied for redetermination of compensation. They are as follows:
"A person would be able to seek redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 9 excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the redetermination of amount of compensation is sought; and
(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for redetermination of compensation by an applicant.".
11. It was further held, the amended provision is a beneficial one and court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than one which curtails the benefit. Therefore, one cannot read words into the provision, which are not there resulting in restricting the scope of the provision. Learned Government Pleader also relies upon Marri Venkaiah's case (Supra). In this case, it was held, limitation of three months for filing application for redetermination of compensation, computation of limitation WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 10 begins to run from the date of award and not from the date of knowledge of the award. When applications were filed after five years, the applicants either had opportunity of knowing the award or expected to make efforts of knowing the award, and hence a presumption of knowledge of the award arises. Their Lordships specifically held that exclusion of time required for obtaining copy of award is permissible while computing the period of limitation, but it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant.
12. Sri.O.Ramachandran Nambiar, learned counsel for the respondents places reliance on The Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar to contend that order rejecting a claim petition on the ground, the same is barred by limitation would be an award and appealable. He refers to Krishen Lal v. J.G.Insurance (AIR 1977 J&K 90) to contend that the phrase "sufficient cause" should not be given a narrow construction and should not be treated on par with the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act so far as Motor Vehicles Act. He places reliance on Union of India v. Smt.Pradeep Kumari (1991 LACC 178). He also places reliance on Union of India v. Hansoli Devi [(2002)7 SCC 273]. In this WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 11 case, Their Lordships held that the expression, "did not make an application" as observed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari [(1995)2 SCC 736] would mean, did not make an effective application, therefore, when an application under Section 18 of the Act is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28A of the Act cannot be denied. Ultimately, it was held that dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28A of the Act. It is further held that in such circumstances, on dismissal of an application under Section 18 of the Act on the ground of delay, land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28A of the Act, if other conditions are fulfilled. Sri.O.Ramachandran Nambiar also places reliance on Somasundaran v. Special Tahsildar (2002(2) KLT 569). In this case, it is held as under: WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 12
"6. In this case, the appellants have preferred applications under S.28A claiming the benefit of the award in L.A.R. 5 of 1986. Therefore, unless an application is filed within three months from the date of award in L.A.R. 5 of 1986, it will not be within the period of three months mentioned in S.28A. However, the proviso to S.28A also gives the benefit of excluding the time taken for obtaining the certified copy while reckoning the period of three months. As per sub-s.2, the Collector shall conduct an enquiry and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicant. If a person is aggrieved by the award of the District Collector under S.28A(2) then he can seek a reference to the court for determination of the quantum and the provisions of S.28-A shall be applied to such reference as though applied to such reference under S.18.
7. It is true that in this case the District Collector has dismissed the application holding that the land acquired from the appellants herein and the land covered by the award in L.A.R. 5 of 1986 are not similarly situated. It was on this ground that the District Collector had rejected the application. In other words, though the District Collector is entitled to dismiss the application either on the ground that the application is beyond time, if the application is filed beyond three months as prescribed under the Act, or it could be dismissed if on enquiry it is found that the land in question is not similar to the land covered by the decree and judgment in L.A.R. 5 of 1986, the benefit of which he has claimed in re-determination. The fact that the WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 13 District Collector has dismissed the application on the latter ground by itself will not take away the jurisdiction of the court when the matter is ultimately referred to it since the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the District Collector is at large before the reference court. Suppose in a case the District Collector dismissed the application on the ground that it is beyond time that is also a matter which could be referred to the reference court in case the party seeks for such a reference under sub-s.3 of S.28A. Therefore, the court has necessarily to consider as to whether the application is barred by limitation as provided for under S.28Ain such cases. Therefore, the provision under S.28A enables a reference court to re-examine the question and also to examine the correctness or otherwise of the decision rendered by the District Collector. If that be so, to say that the District Collector having entertained the application and rejected the same on the other ground namely, the properties are not similar to the one involved in L.A.R. 5 of 1986, the court had no jurisdiction to consider the other question already decided in favour of the appellants does not appear to be correct. When there are more than one grounds available for rejection the mere fact that the District Collector has mentioned one of the grounds for rejecting the application by itself will not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to consider the very question as to whether the application is filed within time. Since the reference court has to consider ultimately as to whether the appellants are entitled for any enhancement of compensation necessarily it has to consider both these questions. In WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 14 this case, it is seen that such a contention was raised by the other side and hence the court was perfectly right in considering that issue."
13. In State of Tripura v. Roopchand Das [(2003)1 SCC 421] it is held that when more than one award passed by the reference court under Section 18 of the Act so far as three months period of limitation for determination of compensation would be the date of the latest award on the basis whereof redetermination was sought instead of the date of the earliest award. They further held that as held in Pradeep Kumari's case (Supra), there is nothing to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the court after coming into force of Section 28A of the Act. In Saradha P v. State of Kerala (2008 (1) KHC 738), this Court held that when an application filed under Section 28A of the Act for redetermination of compensation is rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer, application for reference under Section 28A(3) of the Act can be in a case where no award is passed and the Land Acquisition Officer is bound to refer the application and cannot reject the same on the ground that he did not redetermine the compensation. Whether such person is entitled for redetermination or not has to be decided by the Civil WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 15 Court, which undertakes the adjudication of a reference.
14. Sri.Augustine, learned counsel appearing for other respondents refers to Madhavi v. Special Tahsildar (2003(1) KLT 813). In this case, it is held that the object of Section 28A of the Act was certainly to confer a right of making reference by persons who might not have made a reference under Section 18 of the Act to get the benefit of enhanced compensation, which other similarly situated persons could get. Unless there is a valid application, the Rule of Res judicata does not apply to a second application under Section 28A of the Act, because it is not filed before a court or other authority, to which the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable. He also places reliance on Ramakrishna Rao v. Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (2010(4) KLT 255 (SC)), wherein the scope of sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 28A of the Act were considered. A person, who gets benefit of higher compensation under Section 28A(1) of the Act can also make an application under Section 28A(3) and it is not restricted to cases where amount paid to land owner under Section 28A(1) of the Act, if it is less than the amount awarded by reference court under Section 18. Paragraphs 9 and 11 of the said WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 16 judgment are relevant, which read as under:
"9. The above reproduced provison represents the Legislature's determination to ensure that the goal of equality enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution and Arts. 38, 39 and 46 thereof is translated into reality, at least in the matter of payment of compensation to those who are deprived of their land fr the benefit of the State, its instrumentalities/agencies and even private persons. S.28A also represents statutory embodiment of the doctrine of equality in matters relating to the acquisition of land. The Act which was enacted in 1894 and was amended after 90 years has the potential of depriving a large segment of the society i.e the 'agriculturist' of their only source of livelihood. The scheme of S.28A provide some solace to this segment of the society by ensuring that such of the land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification by who could not, on account of poverty, ignorance and other disabilities join others in seeking reference under S.18 get an opportunity to claim compensation at par with others. This section is aimed at removing inequality in the payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition of land under the same notification. To put it differently, this section gives a chance to the land owner, who may not have applied under S.18 for determination of market value by the Court to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation, if any other similarly situated land owner succeeds in persuading the Reference Court to fix higher market value of the acquired land. Therefore, S.28A has to be interpreted in a manner which WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 17 would advance the policy of legislation to give an opportunity to the land owner who may have, due to variety of reasons not been able to move the Collector for making reference under S.18 of the Act to get higher compensation if market value is revised by the Reference Court at the instance of other land owners, whose land is acquired under the same notification. Of course, this opportunity can be availed by filing application within the prescribed period. In Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (Supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that S.28A is in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor land owners, who are not able to take advantage of the right of reference to the Civil Court under S.18 of the Act and such a provision should be interpreted in a manner which advances the policy of legislation.
xx xx xx
11. If sub-section (3) of S.28A is interpreted keeping in view the object sought to be achieved by enacting the provision for removing inequality in the matter of payment of compensation, it must be held that a person who is not satisfied with an award made under S.28A(2) can make an application to the Collector under S.28A(3) for making a reference to the Court as defined in S.3(d) of the Act and this right cannot be frustrated merely because as a result of a re-determination made under S.28A(2) read with S.28A(1) the applicant becomes entitled to receive compensation at par with other land owners. There is nothing in the plain language of S.28A (3) from which it can be inferred that a peson who has WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 18 not accepted the award made under S.28A(2) is precluded from making an application to the Collector with the request to refer the matter to the Court. Of course, the Court to which reference is made under S.28A(3) will have to bear in mind that a person who has not sought reference under S.18 cannot get compensation higher than the one payable to those who had sought reference under that section."
15. Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the party respondents places reliance on judgment of the High Court of Judicature, Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.54889 of 2003. In this case, it was held that an applicant is entitled to rely on an award passed by the reference court under Section 28A(3) of the Act. He also places reliance on Joseph v. District Collector (2004(2) KLT 1029) already discussed above.
16. In the case of Union of India v. Munshi Ram [2006 (2) KLT 992(SC)] their Lordships dealt with the issue "what is meant by amount which is finally payable. In that context it was held that it would be the amount determined finally as compensation to be paid to the owners of land who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector and have challenged the same under a reference as envisaged under Section 18 of the Act. It also includes compensation payable to owners of land who WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 19 approach the court under Section 28A of the Act for enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court because it has to be understood as the award of the Reference Court as modified by appellate Court. Therefore it is the amount payable to the claimants finally who seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. Refund of excess amount could be ordered in a situation in case superior court reduces the award amount fixed by the Reference Court.
Section 28A(1) (2)(3) of the Act reads as under:
"28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.- (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub- section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re- determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 20 under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18."
17. From the above decisions and provision of law the following principles emerge out. The goal of equality enshrined in the preamble of Constitution and Articles 38, 39 and 46 are attempted to be made a reality by the legislature, so far as payment of compensation to the losers of the land for the benefit of the State, its agencies/instrumentalities and even private parties. Acquisition of land deprives the agriculturist of his livelihood and some times throws them to the streets. Section 28A envisages solace to such owners of land whose lands are also acquired under the same notification but for various reasons like poverty, ignorance and other inabilities could not join others in seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. The scheme under Section 28A thrives at WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 21 removing the disability suffered by the owners of land and removes the inequality, if any, so far as payment of compensation. This gives one more opportunity to the land owners who did not or could not seek reference under Section 18 to seek higher compensation. It could be termed as beneficial legislation so far as land losers. Therefore, there has to be liberal interpretation with a purpose to champion the policy of the legislation giving opportunity to the owners of land who miss their chance by not filing an application under Section 18 of the Act.
18. Though in Babu Ram's case (supra) their Lordships held, the starting point for computation of period of three months must be reckoned from the date of earliest award of reference court, later in Pradeep Kumari's case (supra) this view is modified by saying redetermination of compensation could be sought on the basis of any one of the awards of the reference court as long as it pertains to other lands but covered under the same notification where the claimant had not sought for reference earlier. The period of limitation would start running from the last award provided the award is subsequent to coming into force of Section 28A of the Act if application is filed within WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 22 three months from the date of making award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought. Hence there is no restriction so far the earliest award. The limitation starts from the date of award and not from the date of knowledge of award. Time spent in obtaining copy is to be excluded.
19. So far as not preferring an application it means making an effective application. It does not include an application for reference being dismissed on the ground of limitation, because there is no application fructifying into any reference. In such circumstances, owner can maintain application under Section 28A of the Act as long as other conditions are fulfilled. A person who gets benefit of higher compensation under Sec. 28A(1) of the Act can make an application to the Collector under Sec. 28A(3) for making a reference to the court as defined in Sec. 3(d) of the Act and this right cannot be denied.
20. Once application is filed before the Collector, he has to take into account all relevant facts into consideration such as the latest award, date of award, effective application, enhancement or reduction of compensation. As long as the applicant fulfills the conditions envisaged under Section 28A, there will be no WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 23 embargo to proceed with the application. If an award is passed by Reference Court after remand of the matter by appellate court, it is also an award under Section 28A.
21. In the case on hand Reference Court decided application by award dated 20.03.1990, but it was set aside by the appellate court by remitting the matter for fresh consideration. Thereafter, again fresh award was passed on 3.9.1997.
In all the above appeals there has to be reconsideration of the applications under Section 28A of the Act in the light of observations above within 4 months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. Accordingly appeals are allowed. No order as to costs.
MANJULA CHELLUR, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE V.CHITAMBARESH, JUDGE vgs The words "Accordingly appeals are allowed" occurring in the last paragraph of the judgment dated 14.09.2012 in W.A.557/2010 and connected WA.No.557/10 & con. Cases 24 cases (WA.761/2010, WA.1676/2010, WA.1736/2010, WA.1738/2010, WA.1739/2010, WA.1747/2010) are corrected and substituted with the words "Accordingly the appeals are dismissed" as per order dated 13.12.2012 in I.A.903/2012 in W.A.557/2010, I.A.851/2012 in WA.1676/2010, I.A.857/2012 in WA.1736/2010, I.A.848/2012 in W.A.1738/2010, I.A.849/2012 in WA.1739/2010, I.A.850/2012 in WA.1747/2010 and in W.A.761/2010.
Sd/-
VREGISTRAR JUDICIAL