Bombay High Court
Musa Annu Sayyed vs The State Of Maharashtra on 25 November, 2022
Author: M. S. Karnik
Bench: M. S. Karnik
1.BA-172-21.doc
Darshan Patil
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION NO. 172 OF 2021
Musa Annu Sayyed ..Applicant
vs.
The State of Maharashtra ..Respondent
Ms. Dhanashree M. Lad a/w Abdul Aziz Khan for applicant.
Ms. P.N. Dabholkar, APP for State
Mr. Kamlakar K. Sontakke, API, Vashi Police Station, Navi
Mumbai.
CORAM : M. S. KARNIK, J.
DATE : NOVEMBER 25, 2022
P.C. :
1. This is an application for bail for the offence
punishable under Sections 392, 414, 401 and 34 of Indian
Penal Code (hereafter 'IPC', for short) along with Sections
3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised
Crime Act, 1999 (hereafter 'MCOCA', for short), registered
vide C.R. No. 488 of 2014 lodged with Vashi Police Station
on 04/12/2014. The applicant came to be arrested on
21/09/2015. The applicant is in custody for more than
1
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
seven (7) years and four (4) months. The charge-sheet
was filed on 23/11/2015. The trial has not made any
progress. Apart from other grounds, long incarceration and
the right for the speedy trial are pleaded by the learned
counsel for the applicant to secure his release on bail.
2. At the relevant time when the offence was committed,
the applicant was around twenty (20) years of age. It is
submitted that a co-accused Ali Abbas Firoz Sayyed @ Ali
has been released on bail by the Trial Court by the order
dated 05/03/2018.
3. It is prosecution case that on 04/12/2014 at about
20:20 hours near V.C.S in front of Circle Hotel, Vashi, Navi
Mumbai, the main accused Sadik Ali Yusuf Ali Sayyed (Gang
leader) and the applicant were on one motorcycle whereas
Ali Abbas and Kakoo were on the other motorcycle. The
accused Sadik Ali Yusuf Ali Sayyed snatched a golden chain
from the neck of the complainant. At that time, Ali Abbas
and Kakoo were on watch. Sadik Ali Yusuf Ali Sayyed is the
head of the organised crime syndicate whereas the
applicant along with others are the members of the said
2
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
gang. During the investigation, it was found that the
accused persons have committed offences for pecuniary
gain by their organised crime syndicate headed by the
Sadik Ali Yusuf Ali Sayyed. After invoking the provisions of
the MCOCA and after seeking previous sanctions, charge-
sheet under Sections 392, 414, 401 and 34 of IPC along
with Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of MCOCA was filed.
4. It is the submission of the learned counsel appearing
for the applicant that on the basis of the confessional
statement of one accused - Jaffer Irani, who was arrested
in 2015, the applicant was implicated. The confessional
statement of the applicant came to be recorded on
25/09/2015 under Section 18 of the MCOCA wherein he
confessed to and narrated the entire incident by assigning
specific roles to all the accused persons including himself.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has further pointed
out that applicant's father has expired in August-2022.
6. Learned APP invited my attention to the affidavit in
reply filed on behalf of the investigating agency and
strongly opposed the grant of bail. As per the crime chart
3
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
annexed to the affidavit in reply, it reveals that out of 44
offences registered under Section 392 of IPC against the
gang, during the period 2014-2015, the applicant is actually
involved with the gang in 17 offences.
7. I need to make a reference to the decision of this
Court in Ajit Bhagwan Tiwde Vs. The State of
Maharashtra1 to seek guidance for deciding this
application. His Lordship referred to the law laid down by
the Supreme Court, on the aspect of the Right of the
Speedy Trial which flows from Right to Life and Right to
Liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Paragraphs No. 13 to 18 of the decision reads thus:
"13. In the case of Shaheen Welfare Association
Vs.Union of India and others (1996) 2 SCC 616, it was
observed by the Supreme Court that it was necessary to
grant relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any
prospect of trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and of the nation
needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of the offences
these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate
justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can
only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they
have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be
1 Bail Application No. 995 of 2021
4
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
arrived at within a reasonable time some relief becomes
necessary. The Court was dealing with the cases registered
under the provisions of TADA Act. The Court was conscious of
the fact that there is embargo for release of prisoners
prosecuted for the offences of TADA u/s.20(8) of the said
Act. The Supreme Court divided the undertrial prisoners
under TADA based on their role/hard core criminals into
various classes and by adopting pragmatic and just approach
relief was directed to be granted considering gravity of the
charges. The Courts were given discretion to consider
grant/refusal of bail based on antecedents and on conclusion
that there is no likelihood of harm to lives of complainant and
others in the event of their release.
14. In the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI AIR 2012 SC
830, it was observed that object of bail is to secure the
appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable
amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a
punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an
accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The
courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that
punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is
deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in
custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great
hardship. Apart from the question of prevention being the
object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
refuse bail to an un-convicted person for the purpose of
5
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. The grant or
denial is regulated to a large extent by the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. But at the same time,
right to bail is not to be denied merely because of the
sentiments of the community against the accused. The
primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the
accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden
of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to
keep the accused constructively in the custody of the Court,
whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and be in attendance
thereon whenever his presence is required.
15. In the case of Thana Singh Vs. Central Bureau of
Narcotics (2013) 2 SCC 596, it was observed that the
accused was languishing in prison for more than 12 years
and awaiting his trial for the offences under the provisions of
NDPS Act. He was consistently denied bail. The maximum
punishment for the offence was 20 years and he remained in
detention for the period exceeding one half of the maximum
period of imprisonment. The Court issued directions on
various issues, which would be of assistance to conclude
trials pending in Courts expeditiously.
16. In the case of Hussain and another Vs. Union of
India (2017) 5 SCC 702, it was observed that the Supreme
Court has given directions in number of cases about speedy
conclusion of trials. Speedy trial is part of reasonable, fair
and just procedure guaranteed under Article 21 of
Constitution of India. Deprivation of personal liberty without
ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While
deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not be
avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot
6
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
be unduly long. While a person in custody for a grave offence
may not be released if trial is delayed, trial has to be
expedited or bail has to be granted in such cases. The Court
issued directions and one of them was, as a supplement to
Section 436-A but consistent with the spirit thereof, if an
undertrial has completed period of custody in excess of the
sentence likely to be awarded if conviction is recorded, such
undertrial must be released on personal bond. Such an
assessment must be made by the Trial Courts concerned
from time to time. Timely delivery of justice is a part of
human rights. Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public
confidence in the administration of justice.
17. In Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.R.Nayak (1992) 1-
SCC-225, while holding that speedy trial at all stages is part
of right under Article 21. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon
Vs. State of Bihar (1995)5-SCC-326, it was observed that
general orders for release of undertrials without reference to
specific fact situations in different cases may prove to be
hazardous. While there can be no doubt that undertrial
prisoners should not languish in jails on account of refusal to
enlarge them on bail, for want of their capacity to furnish
bail, these are matters to be dealt with on case to case basis
keeping in mind guidelines laid down by Court. Sympathy for
undertrials who are in jail for long time on account of the
pendency of cases, has to be balanced having regard to the
impact of crime.
18. In Vivek Kumar Vs. State of U.P. (2000) 9-SCC-443,
bail was granted to accused by Supreme Court on the ground
that it is quite a long period that he is in custody. In Babba
Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005)11-SCC-569, the accused
was in custody for a long period for offence under TADA Act.
7
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
In Paramjit Singh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), the Supreme
Court granted bail. The accused was prosecuted under TADA
Act. Earlier the application was rejected and trial was
expedited. There was no progress in trial. In the case of
Angela Sontakke Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the
Supreme Court granted bail to the accused facing
prosecution under UAPA Act on the ground that accused is in
custody for five years. In the case of Chintan Vidyasagar
Upadhyay (Supra), the Supreme Court granted bail to the
accused charged for the offence under Section 302 of IPC
which the trial was in progress, 28 witnesses were examined
and 12 more were to be examined on the ground that
accused was in custody for 6 years."
8. His Lordship in paragraph No. 19 observed that "the
settled principle of law is that prolonged custody affects
fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. There is no debate that incarceration in custody for
long period without trial or completion of trial affects
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India".
9. The decision in Ajit Bhagwan Tiwde (supra) then
goes on to consider the aspect of prolonged custody in the
context of restrictions for granting bail in relation to some
offences under special legislation, Section 21(4) of the
8
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
MCOCA being one of them. After referring to the
observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of
Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb2, His Lordship then went
on to notice the observations of the Supreme Court in the
case of Ranjitsingh Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra
and another3 in paragraphs No. 25 and 26. Paragraphs
no. 25 and 26 reads thus:
"25. Although it is not necessary to go deep into the
restrictions like Section 37 of NDPS Act, Section 20(8) of
TADA Act and Section 21(4) of MCOC act, since the right to
speedy trial is supreme, it is required to be noted that above
provisions carrying embargo for grant of bail under TADA Act,
NDPS Act and MCOC Act are pari materia. It is true there is
distinction in embarto for bail, qua UAPA act. However, that
should not be hurdle in granting bail on the ground of
infringement of Article 21 of Constitution of India. No
decision has been brought to notice of the Court wherein bail
has been refused by Supreme Court, in spite of accused
being in prolonged custody on the basis of such restrictions.
It is also pertinent to note the extent to which such rigours
can be interpreted while granting bail. In the case of
Ranjitsingh Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra and another
2005-ALL.MR (Cri)-1538-(SC), it is observed in quoted
paragraphs as follows :
"28. Section 21 provides for modified application of
certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sub-
2 (2021) 3-SCC-713
3 2005-ALL.MR (Cri)-1538-(SC)
9
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
section (4) whereof is as under:
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
person accused of an offence punishable under this Act
shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own
bond, unless -
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that
he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."
45. The Act is deterrent in nature. It provides for
deterrent punishment. It envisages three to ten years of
imprisonment and may extend to life imprisonment.
Death penalty can also be imposed if somebody commits
a murder. Similarly, fines ranging between three to ten
lakhs can be imposed.
46. Presumption of innocence is a human right (See
Narendra Singh and another Vs. State of MP (2004)10-
SCC-699:2004 ALL MR (Cri)2557 (SC). Para31). Article 21
in view of its expansive meaning not only protects life and
liberty but also envisages a fair procedure. Liberty of a
person should not ordinarily be interfered with unless
there exist cogent grounds therefor. Sub-section (4) of
Section 21 must be interpreted keeping in view the
aforementioned salutary principles. Giving an opportunity
to the public prosecutor to oppose an application for
release of an accused appears to be reasonable restriction
but Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 21 must be
given a proper meaning.
10
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
47. Does this statute require that before a person is
released on bail, the Court, albeit prima facie, must come
to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is
it necessary for the Court to record such a finding ? Would
there be any machinery available to the Court to ascertain
that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not
commit any offence whatsoever ?
48. Such findings are required to be recorded only for
the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the
basis of materials on records only for grant of bail and for
no other purpose.
49. We are furthermore of the opinion that the
restrictions on the power of the Court to grant bail should
not be pushed too far. If the Court, having regard to the
materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all
probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order
granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the Court
as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence
while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under
the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or
major offence. If such an expansive meaning is given,
even likelihood of commission of an offence under Section
279 of the Indian Penal Code may debar the Court from
releasing the accused on bail. A statute, it is trite, should
not be interpreted in such a manner as would lead to
absurdity. What would further be necessary on the part of
the Court is to see the culpability of the accused and his
involvement in the commission of an organized crime
either directly or indirectly. The Court at the time of
considering the application for grant of bail shall consider
the question from the angle as to whether he was
11
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
possessed of the requisite mens rea. Every little omission
or commission, negligence or dereliction may not lead to
a possibility of his having culpability in the matter which is
not the sine qua non for attracting the provisions of
MCOCA. A person in a given situation may not do that
which he ought to have done. The Court may in a
situation of this nature keep in mind broad principles of
law that some acts of omission and commission on the
part of a public servant may attract disciplinary
proceedings but may not attract a penal provision.
55. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does
not lead to the conclusion that the Court must arrive at a
positive finding that the applicant for bail has not
committed an offence under the Act. If such a
construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail
must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not
committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be
impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of
conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention
of the Legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore,
must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed
that the Court is able to maintain a delicate balance
between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an
order granting bail much before commencement of trial.
Similarly, the Court will be required to record a finding as
to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of
bail. However, such an offence in future must be an
offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it
is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the
court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter
having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his
propensities and the nature and manner in which he is
12
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
alleged to have committed the offence."
26. Thus, embargo under the provisions of Special Acts
shall not be an impediment in grant of bail by this Court on
the ground of incarceration of accused in custody for a long
time, more particularly in the light of various decisions of
Supreme Court."
Having noticed thus, I draw support from the decision
of this Court in Ajit Bhagwan Tiwde (supra) for
considering the issue involved in the present application
whether the incarceration in custody for long period of trial
or completion of trial affects the personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in the context
of restrictions for granting bail in relation to some offences
under special legislations like MCOCA.
10. I must also bear in mind the observations of this Court
in Ajit Bhagwan Tiwde (supra) in paragraph No. 31
reading thus:
"In the light of observations of Supreme Court and this Court
as stated above, the Court has to perform balancing act. The
sympathy for undertrials who are in custody has to be
balanced with gravity/magnitude of crime, likelihood of threat
to witnesses. The analysis may be based on facts of each
case."
13
::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc
11. Having analysed the law laid down in regard to long
incarceration of the undertrials in custody, in the context of
stringent provisions of the MCOCA for the purpose of grant
of bail, I am of the opinion that in the facts of the present
case, the applicant having spent seven years and four
months in custody, deserves to be released on bail. The
applicant is not the gang leader. There was no recovery
from the applicant. Further, there is no possibility of the
trial commencing and concluding in the near future. The
co-accused of the applicant has been released on bail.
Though there are criminal antecedents which resulted in the
grant of sanction for the prosecution under the MCOCA, I
find that having regard to the period spent by the applicant
in custody, the applicant should not be deprived of his
liberty on this ground alone. Hence the following order.
ORDER
(a) The applicant - Musa Annu Sayyed, shall be released on bail in connection with C.R. No. 488 of 2014 registered with Vashi Police Station on furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one or 14 ::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc more sureties of the like amount.
(b) On being released, the applicant shall immediately remove himself from the jurisdiction of Thane District and shall not enter Thane District except on the date fixed by the Trial Court.
(c) The applicant shall furnish details of his residential address to the Trial Court as well as the concerned police station and shall report to the nearest police station at the place of his residence, outside Thane District, on every Friday between 4.00 p.m. and 6.00 p.m.
(d) The applicant shall not leave India without prior permission of the Special Court, under the MCOCA.
(e) In the event, the applicant has passport, the same shall be deposited with the Trial Court. If he does not possess any passport, he shall file an affidavit in that regard before the Trial Court.
(f) The applicant shall attend the Trial Court regularly on the date of hearing unless exempted 15 ::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::
1.BA-172-21.doc by the Court.
(g) The applicant shall not tamper with the evidence nor threaten any prosecution witness.
12. The application is disposed of.
(M. S. KARNIK, J.) 16 ::: Uploaded on - 25/11/2022 ::: Downloaded on - 26/11/2022 19:22:26 :::