Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Kukkadapu Bala Krishna vs State Of A.P. on 1 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(1)ALD(CRI)603, 2000CRILJ2555
Author: Vaman Rao
Bench: Vaman Rao
ORDER Vaman Rao, J.
1. This petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeks quashing of the orders of the learned Sessions Judge, Nalgonda dated 21-2-2000 passed in Crl. M.P. No. 201 of 2000 (common order passed along with Crl. M.P. No. 194 of 2000,232 of 2000 and 238 of 2000) in Cr. No. 12 of 2000 of P.S. Huzurnagar under which the bail granted to the petitioner has been cancelled.
2. The petitioner herein is accused of offences under Sections 409, 420, 419, 468, 471 read with Section 34, I.P.C. along with other accused in the First Information Report recorded as Cr. No. 12 of 2000 at Huzurnagar Police station. The petitioner moved an application for bail before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurnagar and was directed to be released on bail by the learned Magistrate by an order dated 7-2-2000 in Cr. No. 12 of 2000.
3. 0n behalf of the prosecution the said Crl. M.P. No. 201 of2000 was filed for cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner. The cancellation of the bail was sought for the following reasons.
1) that the case in which the petitioner was involved related to cheating of a minor out of the benefits of compensation awarded by the Revenue authorities for the death of adoptive father of the said minor.
2) that it was a case of impersonation in collision with the Public servants in Mandal Revenue Office, inasmuch as a person was made to impersonate for the real claimant to receive the benefits.
3) that the petitioner was a practising advocate and that it was alleged on behalf of the prosecution that the petitioner was an influential person in Huzurnagar town.
4) that the Investigating Agency had to collect the original cheques issued by the petitioner and trace some other Fixed Deposit Receipts and documents and that in view of this, if the petitioner is allowed to be at large, he was likely to interfere with the investigation and tamper with the evidence and create hurdles for collecting documentary evidence by managing the concerned officials.
4. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have accepted the pleas advanced on behalf of the prosecution as above. The learned Sessions Judge observed that as stated by the learned Magistrate himself in the order granting bail, the petitioner was a practising advocate and Ex-President of the Bar Association, Huzurnagar, which, it would appear, was a circumstance to show that the petitioner was an influential person. The learned Sessions Judge further observed that when there was an apprehension of tampering of evidence, the learned Magistrate should not have granted bail and prosecution ought to have been given reasonable opportunity to collect evidence before granting bail. Finally, the learned Sessions Judge held that the learned Magistrate did not exercise his discretion judiciously in granting bail and as such the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be allowed to stand and it deserves to be cancelled and 'accordingly allowed the petition for cancellation of bail.
5. The observations of the learned Sessions Judge would disclose that he found fault with the Magistrate for granting bail, mainly on the ground that the learned Magistrate failed to take note of the fact that the petitioner was an influential person and that there was allegation of likelihood of tampering with evidence and that the prosecution had some documents to be recovered from the petitioner. A reading of the order of the learned Sessions Judge would show that the learned Sessions Judge dealt with the order of the Magistrate granting bail as if he was hearing an appeal against the said order granting bail. In the process, the learned Sessions Judge appears to have lost sight of the considerations which should weigh in cancelling bail already granted to an accused as pointed out by Supreme Court in the case of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra . It would be apposite to extract the observation of the Supreme Court on this question, which were quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana .
...Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court, it appears to us, overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted.
6. The Supreme Court has laid down that the principles, which are relevant in granting bail, are altogether different from the considerations which should weigh for cancelling bail already granted to an accused. It has been emphasised that cancellation of bail can be justified only when there are supervening circumstances after the grant of bail, which could justify cancellation of bail.
7. In this case, the order of the learned Sessions Judge would show that all the pleas on which the bail was cancelled were available at the time when the learned Magistrate granted bail. There is not even an allegation that after the grant of bail the petitioner had mis-used the facility of bail and made any attempts for tampering the evidence or creating hurdles in investigation by the Investigating agency. In the absence of any allegations as to subsequent developments or supervening circumstances, the cancellation of bail on the mere ground that the petitioner was likely to tamper with evidence and that he was influential cannot be considered as an adequate ground for cancelling bail in the light of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited judgments. While dealing with a petition for cancellation of bail, the learned Sessions Judge cannot substitute his own reason for the reasons of the Magistrate granting bail. What is necessary is to find whether there are any supervening circumstances or whether there are any specific acts attributed to the accused, which he resorted to after the grant of bail, to justify cancellation of the bail. Inasmuch as the learned Sessions Judge seems to have lost sight of the principles germane to the cancellation of bail, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
8. In the above circumstances, the order of the learned Sessions Judge Nalgonda dated 21-2-2000 cancelling, bail in Crl. M.P. No. 201 of 2000 in Cr. No. 12 of 2000 of P.S. Huzurnagar is fit to be and is hereby quashed.