Karnataka High Court
United India Fire And General Insurance ... vs Chennamma And Ors. on 13 November, 1980
Equivalent citations: 1981(1)KARLJ245, AIR 1982 KARNATAKA 1, ILR (1981) 1 KANT 684, (1981) 1 KANT LJ 245, (1982) TAC 129
JUDGMENT Sabhahit, J.
1. These two appeals arise out of the judgment and award dated 6-12-1975 passed by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chickmagalur, in Miscellaneous Case (MVC) No. 8 of 1974, on his file awarding compensation of Rs. 30,000/- in favour of the claimant from the respondents.
2. Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 339 of 1976 is filed by respondent 5 the United India Fire and General Insurance Company and Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 299 of 1976 is filed by the respondent 4 Mushir Ahamed.
3. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation as the insured, owner of the vehicle, transferred the vehicle before the accident in favour of Syed Ahamed (respondent 3) under Exhibit D-3 on 16-11-1973, the accident having happened on 7-12-1973. Thus, the Insurance Company contends in the appeal that the Tribunal was in error in saddling the liability on the Insurance Company as by virtue of the transfer of the vehicle by the original owner Syed Ahamed (respondent 3), the policy lapsed.
4. It is the case of respondent 4 (the appelant in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 299 of 1976) that he is a transferee for value of the truck subsequent to the accident and, therefore, he is not liable to pay any compensation.
5. The points, therefore, that arise for our consideration in these two appeals are:-
(1) Whether the Insurance Company (original respondent 5 and appellant in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 339 of 1976) is liable to pay any compensation on the facts of ft present case.
(2) Whether the appellant in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 299 of 1976 (original respondent 4) is liable -to pay any coriwensation 2
6. It is not in dispute and the Tribunal has found, on the evidence on record, that the accident happened on 7-12-1973 due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry in question by its driver. The Tribunal has further come to the conclusion that the lorry was transferred by its registered owner and insured (respondent I in the petition) in favour of respondent 3 on 16-11-1973 for Rs. 8,0001/-.
7. It is no doubt true that the learned Advocate for the claimant vehemently contended that Exhibit D-3 is a document brought about for the purpose and that it should not have been relied upon by the Tribunal. The submission so made was resisted by the learned Advocates for the appellants.
8. There was absolutely no need for respondent 1 to create a fake document in favour of respondent 3 as he was not to gain anything out of it. In fact, if the lorry stood in the name of respondent 1 and the accident was committed by the negligence of his driver, he could have claimed that the Insurance Company (respondent 5 in the petition) should have indemnified him. He was not to pay the compensation from his pocket. That being so, there was no need for him to attempt to create any fake document. The attestor of the document, in addition to re spondents I and 3 (R. W4. 2 and 3) has been examined before the Tribunal. They have spoken to the transfer. Not merely that, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, respondent 3 has got the lorry released from the Criminal Court, as , can be seen from Exhibit P-9. That being so, we have no hesitation whatsoever to confirm the finding of the Tribunal that the lorry was transferred by its registered owner Imthiaz Ali (respondent 1) in favour of respondent 3 on 16-11-1973, as per Exhibit D-3.
9. The learned Advocate appearing for the Insurance Company further pointed out that it was respondent 3 who got the driver bailed out in the criminal case, which further supports that the lorry was transferred in favour of respondent 3, by sale under Exhibit D-3.
10. That being go, it is obvious that the policy lapsed as there was no consent taken of the Insurance Company as no notice in the prescribed form was given to the Company under Section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Such a contention is open to insurer. (Vida Queensland Insurance Company Limited v. Rajalakshmi, 1970 Acc C1 104 (High Court of Madras), followed in and ). The Tribunal was confused in thinking that the policy was to be cancelled by the Company. The question of cancelling the policy comes, in when there is suppression of material facts or fraud practised on the company. There is no such allegation here and what the Insurance Company has pleaded is that the policy has lapsed. Hence, the Tribunal was not justified in relying on the decisions which speak about cancellation of policy. If the company was entitled to cancel the policy and if it did not cancel the policy, it is no doubt true that the Company would be liable for third party risks, (Vide New Asiatic Insurance Company Limited v. Pessumal, ). But the facts of the present case are entirely different. It is the case of the policy lapsing, the insured having transferred the vehicle. It is well settled that the policy of insurance forms a contract of indemnity. When the insured is no longer the owner of the vehicle, the contract fails and lapses, (vide: Gulab Bai v. Peter, 1975 Ace CJ 100, (High Court of Bombay)). It is that way that the liability of the Insurance Company is not available, not because, Company had to cancel the policy.
11. For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the Tribunal erred in thinking that the Insurance Company could be saddled with the liability because it has not cancelled the policy. We hold that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation because the policy has lapsed by virtue of the transfer of the vehicle by the insured (owner) under Exhibit D-3 to original respondent 3.
12. Adverting to the case of respondent 4, the evidence on record clearly establishes that the lorry was transferred in his favour in the year 1974. That is long after the accident That being so, he is in no way liable to pay compensation on account of the accident prior to his purchase. Hence, his appeal is entitled to succeed.
13. In the result, therefore, both the appeals are allowed. The liability of the Insurance Company (original respondent 5) in hereby set aside. Similarly, thi liability saddled on the original respondent 4 (the appellant in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 299 of 1976) is hereby set aside.
14. No costs of these appeals.
15. Appeals allowed.