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[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Chattisgarh High Court

Suraj Nat vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 26 July, 2024

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                                                                                               NAFR
                  HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
                                     CRA No. 2 of 2023
     Suraj Nat S/o Santram @ Goddad Nat Aged About 21 Years, R/o Village-
     Pausari, P.S. Simga, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
     ---- Appellant
                                             Versus
     State Of Chhattisgarh, Through- S.H.O. Police Station- Siimga, District :
     Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh                 ---- Respondent
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the Appellant : Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate. For the State/Respondent : Mrs. Sunita Sahu, PL.

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Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Judgment on Board 26.07.2024

1. With the consent of the parties, the present matter is heard finally.

2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.11.2022, passed in Special Criminal Case No. H-66/2021 by which the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge F.T.C. (POCSO Act) Bhatapara (CG),whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows:-

                  Convicted                                    Sentenced to
                   under
                  Sections
              363 of the IPC          R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs. 500/- and, in

default of payment fine, additional R.I. for one month 366 of the IPC R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- and, in default of payment fine, additional R.I. for one month 376(2)(n)of R.I. fir 10 years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in de- the IPC fault of payment fine, additional R.I. for one month.

6 of the R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- and, in 2 POCSO default of payment fine, additional R.I. for one month.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant (father of victim) has lodged written report to the concerned Police Station mentioning therein that his daughter is missing from the morning of 16.08.2021 and he has searched every relatives and neighbor but she found missing. An unknown person has abducted his minor daughter (victim). Based upon the said report, FIR (Ex.P/5) was registered against the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. On completion of investigation, final report/charge sheet was filed against appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

4. Prosecution in order to prove its case examined total 7 witnesses. Statements of appellant (accused) was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all incriminating evidence appearing against him, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, no evidence was adduced by him in his defence.

5. After hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating evidence available on record, the trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant in the manner as described above of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

6. Learned counsel for appellant submits that age of the prosecutrix was 17 years and 10 months at the time of alleged incident, but no authentic documentary proof was filed in order to show that the prosecutrix was a minor girl on the alleged date. The date of birth mentioned as 20.09.2003 in 3 Dhakhil Kharij Panji (Aricle A/1C) cannot be said to be conclusive as the author of the said document P.W. 02/Headmaster of the school, in his cross-examination admitted that the entry in Dakhil-Kharij register was not done by him. Also, he cannot tell on what basis the age of the victim was recorded in the register. Further, P.W. 03/father of prosecutrix has categorically admitted in his deposition that he does not know date of birth of the prosecutrix and failed to explain that on what basis said entry was made in Dhakhil Kharij Panji. Further, no ossification test of the prosecutrix has been conducted to ascertain her age.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the evidence available on record. There was love affair between appellant and prosecutrix, she went alongwith appellant of her own will and no alarm was raised by her while she roamed with appellant from one place to another.

8. Learned counsel further submits that trial Court convicted the appellant relying upon the statement of PW-5/victim, but her statement is not reliable as there are many contradictions, omissions and development in her statement, which was not considered properly by the learned trial court. From the statements of the prosecutrix recorded before the police, Magistrate and the Court it reflects that she is not a reliable witness and appears to be a consenting party to the act of appellant. Trial Court also ignored the fact that nothing has been found in the medical report of victim though there is allegation that appellant has established forceful physical relationship with her on many occasion. In fact, there was love affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix and therefore, she willingly went with him and had physical relation with him of her own free will. Medical 4 evidence also shows that there was no sign of forcible sexual intercourse on the body of the prosecutrix. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellant and therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of all the charges.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the Trial Court has rightly appreciated and considered the documentary evidence (Article A/1C) with regard to proving the age of the prosecutrix and has given a clear finding that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of incident,i.e., 16.08.2021. The MLC report (Exh. P/1) also confirmed commission of rape on the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix has categorically incriminate the present appellant in her statement and the appellant has failed to offer any explanation in this regard in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. It is well settled law that the statement of the prosecutrix, in inspired confidence to the judicial conscious of the Court, is alone sufficient to convict the accused who had committed the henious offence of rape and no further corroboration is required. She further contended that the judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court is based on sufficient and reliable evidence tendered by the prosecution and there is no infirmity in the same. As such, even if there was affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix, the act committed by the appellant makes him liable for conviction under Sections 363, 366 & 376 (2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POSCO. Being so, the impugned judgment is strictly in accordance with law and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.

10. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record placed on record.

5

11. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age. The same reads as under :

"94. Presumption and determination of age.--
(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining--
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.

12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : 6

"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It 7 has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

13. In order to consider the age of prosecutrix, this Court has to examine the evidence/material placed on record by the prosecution. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex. Article A/1C), wherein date of birth of prosecutrix is mentioned 8 as 20.09.2003 and on the date of incident, i.e., on 16.08.2021 age of the prosecutrix was 17 years 10 months and 27 days, but the same has not been proved by the prosecution. Considering the statement of P.W.-05/prosecutrix, she has deposed in her cross-examination that at the date of incident she was of the age of 18 years. Thus, there is no documentary evidence available on record that only on the basis of 1st class mark-sheet, date of birth of prosecutrix i.e. 20.03.2003 is marked and also no Kotwari register has been produced regarding date of birth of prosecutrix, nor any Birth certificate has been produced. Even the ossification test of the prosecutrix has not been done. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. The author of the School Admission and Discharge Register also denied that the entry was made by himself. Also, he could not tell who had made the entry in the said register. Thus, the School Admission and Discharge Register cannot be taken into consideration to determine the age of the prosecutrix. School Admission and Discharge Register is a weak type of evidence. There is no Kotwari Register or Ossification report, produced by the prosecution to determine her actual age on the date of incident, that she was below 18 years of age. The father of prosecutrix (PW-3) has also unable to state the date of birth of the prosecutrix.

14. Also, prosecutrix (PW-5) has stated in her deposition that she was having love affair with the appellant and with her own will joined his company and went to Somnath. In her cross-examination, she also stated that while they were returning from Somnath, her brother saw them and in fear of getting beaten by the family members she persistently insisted the accused to take 9 her along with him. After which, they went to the village Nipani.

15. From perusal of statements of prosecutrix (PW-5), her father (PW-3) as well as other prosecution witnesses and after considering the evidence collected by the prosecution, I find that no clinching and legally admissible evidence has been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the prosecutrix/victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, despite the fact that the Trial Court in the impugned judgment has held the prosecutrix as minor. Accordingly, this Court finds it appropriate to set aside the findings given by the trial Court that on the date of incident, the victim was minor as the same has not been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and clinching evidence.

16. The prosecutrix has admitted in her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. that on 09.07.20017 at 05:00 A.M., she has voluntarily gone along with the appellant on the pretext of marriage and she established physical relationship with her own will.

17. Close scrutiny of the evidence led by the prosecution would make it clear that the prosecutrix has nowhere disclosed that at any point of time, the appellant has committed any forceful sexual intercourse with her. Dr. S. Ahluwalia (PW-1) in her deposition has stated that she did not found any external or internal injury on the body of the victim. The secondary sexual organs were fully developed and FSL report is also found negative.

18. Thus, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case particularly, the evidence with regard to the age and conduct of the prosecutrix, this Court is of the opinion that the age of the prosecutrix is not verified and not proved by the prosecution that prosecutrix was minor at the time of incident and she was a consenting party and also it is a case of 10 elopement and further FSL report is also found negative. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Section 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act would not be made out against the appellant.

19. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.11.2022 is hereby set aside. Appellant stands acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. The appellant is reported to be in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

20. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of CrPC, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond in terms of form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs. 10,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

21. The Trial Court record (TCR) along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Madhurima