Chattisgarh High Court
K.A. Ravindranathan vs K. Ravindra Nair And Ors. on 15 February, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005CRILJ3828
ORDER V.K. Shrivastava, J.
1. Petitioner has filed this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., for quashing the criminal complaint and proceeding in Criminal Case No. 797/2001 (K. Ravindra Nair v. K. A. Ravindranathan) pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class (Ku. Pratibha Sathwane), Jabalpur.
2. Both, petitioner and respondent No. 1 are the members of Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Ltd., Head Quarter 592, Malviya Marg, Jabalpur (MP). Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Ltd. has its more than 50 establishments located in the States of M.P., Orissa, Kerala, A.P. and Chhatisgarh etc. The respondent No. 1 is working as a Senior General manager in the said society, prior to him the petitioner was the General Manager of the said society. In the month of March, I 999 for the membership of Managing Committee election took place and The petitioner contested to it, who lost. the same. Thereafter he filed a complaint on 29-1 I -1999 against respondent No. 1 K. Ravindra Nair, O. K. Rajgopalan and P. S. Nair in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Durg, alleging that the Society had no branches at NTPC Nagpur and Padmanabhpur, however, under an illegal agreement, Coffee Houses at these places are running and the income derived therefrom is fraudulently earned by O. K. Rajgopalan who never deposited a single penny in the account of Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Ltd., Jabalpur and misappointed the same. P. S. Nair and K. Ravindra Nair, are also jointly responsible and accountable as they are maintaining the account of the said Society. The offence was committed by these persons at Padmanabhpur/ Durg and the offences committed by them are covered under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg took the cognizance of the offence and after recording the evidence under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and enquiry as envisaged under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., registered a criminal case bearing No. 144/2001. Respondent No. 1, K. plaint and its proceeding challenging the legality and validity, filed a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur which was registered there as Writ Petition No. 1771/2001.
3. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by the High Court of M.P. vide order dated 30-4-2001 holding that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition, however, the petitioner who filed the said writ petition submitted that the writ petition may be disposed of by observing that it would be open to the petitioner to file appropriate proceeding before the competent Court in the Slate of Chhattisgarh and accordingly I he High Court of M.P. refrained itself from addressing in regard to defensibility of the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg and left the matter in the discretion of the said petitioner to assail the same, if so advised, before the Court in the State of Chhattisgarh. K. Ravindra Nair, did not assail the matter before any competent Court in the Slate of Chhattisargh, but instead of doing so he filed a complaint under Sections 499 and 500 of the I.P.C. against the petitioner before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur (Ku. Pralibha Sathwane) who took cognizance under Section 500 of the I.P.C. against the petitioner, K. A. Ravindranathan and registered the criminal case bearing No. 797/2001 against him. K. Ravindra Nair in that complaint very specifically stated that since K. A. Ravindranathan lost the election has started making false report before the Police Authority at Durg, making allegation against K. Ravindra Nair and when the Police refused to register the case, the petitioner, K. A. Ravindranathan filed a false, frivolous, vexatious complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, against Shri K. Ravindra Nair for committing offence under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. Upon the complaint of the petitioner, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg sent the papers to Police Authorities for investigation under Section 156(3) and the Police Authorities after investigation submitted the report, holding that no case is made out against the respondent No. 1.
4. Petitioner, K. A. Ravindranathan made a representation and published imputation concerning K. Ravindra Nair intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that the said imputation will harm his reputation, therefore, K. Ravindra Nair filed a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur under Sections 499 and 500 of the I.P.C. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur after recording the statement under Section 200 of the complainant and taking statement under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., registered the case against the petitioner under Section 500 of the I.P.C.
5. Petitioner unveiled that the criminal case filed by him in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg bearing Criminal Case No. 1771/2001 (K. A. Ravindranathan v. O. K. Rajgopalan and Ors.) is still pending. Although K. Ravindra Nair after decision of Writ Petition No. .1771/2001 did not challenge the validity of the complaint or its proceedings, but other co-accused O. K. Rajgopalan and P. S. Nair have filed a revision before the High Court of Chhattisargh bearing Case No. 205/2001 and succeeded in obtaining an ad-interim stay of criminal ease pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. K. A. Ravindra Nair without challenging the validity of the complaint or its proceedings filed the complaint under Sections 499 and 500 of the I.P.C. against the petitioner before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur knowing the fact that the complaint falls under third, fourth, fifth, eight and ninth exception of Section 499 of I.P.C., took cognizance against the petitioner and proceeded with the case. Therefore, on the grounds as alleged hereinbefore, the petitioner has filed this petition for quashing the criminal complaint and the entire criminal proceeding in Criminal Case No. 797/2001 arising out of that complaint relating to K. Ravindra Nair v. K. A. Ravindranathan pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class (Ku. Pratibha Sathwane), Jabalpur.
6. Learned Counsel for the parties are heard at length not only on merit of the case but also on territorial jurisdiction and the scope of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
7. Responent No. 1 raised a dispute regarding jurisdiction for entertaining this petition by this Court contending that the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur is not subordinate to High Court of Chhattisgarh and defamatory publication has been made at Jabalpur, therefore, the High Court of Chhattisgarh has no jurisdiction to quash the impugned complaint or its proceedings or to issue any direction to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur. Petitioner's contention is that the report is made to the Police at Padmanabhpur, Durg and he filed complaint before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg against the respondent No. 1 and others alleging various offences committed by them under Sections 409, 420. 466 and 471 of the I.P.C.. therefore, the cause of action for publishing defamatory material arose at Padmanabhpur/Durg, and the High Court of Chhattisgarh alone has Jurisdiction to entertain proceeding for quashing complaint whether it has been registered at Jabalpur or any other State of India.
8. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. reads as below :
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court-- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice".
9. From the bare reading, it is apparent that the High Court invoking inherent powers can pass such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. High Court has been defined under Section 2(e) of the Cr.P.C., which reads as below :
"High Court means :--
(i) In relation to any State, the High Court for that State
(ii) In relation to a Union territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court for a State has been extended by law, that High Court;
(iii) in relation to any other Union territory, the highest Court of criminal appeal for that territory other than the Supreme Court of India".
10. According to Article 214 of the Constitution of India, there shall be a High Court for each State. Sofar as jurisdiction and power of High Court arc concerned, Articles 226 and 227 are required to he considered to adjudicate the same. Articles 226/227 of the Constitution empower the High Court as below:--
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs-- (1) Notwithstanding anything in Articles 32***. every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories In relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to Issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, order or writs, Including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandan; us, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose).
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of actions, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or In any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to a petition under Clause (1), without--
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order, and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party In whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32.
227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court :--
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may--
(a) call for returns from such Courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts.
3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such Courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein :
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces".
11. Article 226 of the Constitution of India gives an extraordinary power to High Court. Invoking the said authority, High Court has power to issue directions, orders, writs. Article 226(2) extends the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise these powers beyond the limit of its State, if cause of action wholly or partly arises within its territory.
12. In invoking the jurisdiction outside the State, Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Navinehandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, enunciated the law which is as below :
"Territorial jurisdiction of High Court --"Territories within which cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" -- Cause of action-- Meaning -- High Court will have jurisdiction if any part of cause of action arises within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction even though the seat of Government or authority or residence of person against whom direction, order or writ is sought to be issued is not within the said territory".
13. It: appears that the High Court exercising the writ jurisdiction can issue direction or orders outside the territories of its State if, in criminal matter cause of action wholly or partly arises within its territory. Although such a specific criteria has not been made under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C,. but Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., does not restrict the High Court to pass orders for which they are authorized under Articles 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I am of the considered view that, the jurisdiction allowed under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India is implicit under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. High Court may extend to pass any order beyond its territory in case of action wholly or partly arises for those matters within its territory.
14. In the light of the above view, now if is to be decided whether the jurisdiction of this High Court on the basis of cause of action regarding complaint filed by the respondent No. 1 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, exists or not. Respondent No. 1 in his complaint at para Nos. 6 and 7 stated as below :
"6. Ever since his defeat, in the election he has been making complaint against the members of the Managing Committee without any justification whatsoever. He made a false report to the Police Authorities in Durg, making allegation against the complainant. The Police refused to register the case.
7. Thereafter the accused filed a false, frivolous, vexatious complaint before the Hon. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg, alleging offence against the complainant, under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 471. Copy of the said complaint, is filed herewith as Annexure-A. The learned Magistrate on 6-3-2000 sent the paper for investigation by Police Authorities under Section 156(3). The Police Authority submitted a report holding that there is no ease made out. against the complainant".
15. Respondent's contention is that, the aforesaid imputation concerning complaint has been made, damaging his reputation and in evidence recorded under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., it has been stated that the said complaint has been enquired into by the Police Authorities at Jabalpur. In this way, from the complaint itself it is manifest that the cause of action for offences of defamation arose at Durg as well as at Jabalpur and the Chhattisgarh High Court has jurisdiction over the Courts situated at Durg. Therefore, the complaint filed by the respondent No. 1 who has option to elect the place of filing the complaint either at Durg or at Jabalpur, who, exercising his option filed a complaint at Jabalpur. Therefore, on the basis of cause of action which arose at Durg also, this High Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter regarding quashing of the complaint and proceeding arises therefrom.
16. On the aforesaid discussions, the contention raised by the respondent No. 1 that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint filed by the respondent No. 1 and proceeding arises therefrom at Jabalpur is devoid of substance and hence is repelled.
17. Now the second question for consideration arises whether the complaint filed by the respondent: No. 1 and proceedings arose there from arc liable to be quashed, and the complaint filed by the respondent No. 1 is hit by the exceptions as enumerated under Section 499 of the I.P.C.
18. Petitioner's contention is that the complaint is hit under third, fourth, fifth, eight and ninth exceptions of Section 499 of the I.P.C. Those exceptions are reproduced below.
"Third Exception-- It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Fourth Exception-- It is not defamation to publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings.
Explanation-- A justice of the Peace or other officer holding an inquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.
Fifth Exception-- It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Eighth Exception-- It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.
Ninth Exception-- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good",
19. The nature of complaint clearly show that at the most, the accusation made by the petitioner attracts eighth exception in case it is proved that the accusation are made in good faith. For quashing the complaint Hon'ble the Apex Court has enunciated from time to time several principles and also very specifically ruled that only the powers of quashing the criminal complaint and its proceeding intiated on its basis under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution are to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of the rare cases.
20. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), Hon'ble the Apex Court has given the exhaustive list of cases wherein such power can be exercised and that list is reproduced below :
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a corigriizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of The provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge".
21. In the present, scenario the facts are that: the petitioner filed a complaint against O. K. Rajgopalan, P. S. Nair and respondent No. 1 K. Ravindra Nair. He made various allegations and stated that O. K. Rajgopalan misappropriated the amount and committed offence under Sections 409, 420, 461, 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. and to implicate the respondent No. 1 in para 13 of the complaint made an averment that he is jointly responsible for maintaining the account, therefore, he is also responsible for misappropriation of the funds of the aforesaid society. Certainly, if the allegations levelled against the respondent No. 1 arc false and are not made in good faith or lowering the prestige of respondent No. 1 in the society, the allegation will be said to be defamatory. Respondent No. 1 in his complaint very specifically stated that the allegations levelled against him in the aforesaid complaint are false, frivolous and vexatious and in his statement he deposed that the Police Officials came to Jabalpur to investigate the said matter. Respondent No. 1 stated that the petitioner published the imputation deliberately intending to harm or knowing or having to believe that the said imputation will harm the reputation of respondent No. 1. From the averment made by the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 1 in their respective complaints it is clear that charges have been made by the petitioner against the respondent No. 1 which are certainly of very serious in nature, whether false or true are to be decided on substantial evidence and if not made in good faith are prima facie established the offence of defamation. The question regarding falsity or food faith is not required to be decided at this juncture, because allegations are false are to be proved by the respondent No. 1 by substantial evidence and allegations are made in good faith can be a defence of the petitioner and if pleaded during trial before the trial Court and on substantial evidence alone the trial Court can decide whether the imputations are made in good faith or not.
22. From the law enunciated by Hon'ble the Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the allegations made in the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 (sic), prima facie, constitutes the offence punishable under Section 500 of the I.P.C. and at this juncture it cannot be decided that the allegations levelled against the respondent No. 1 are made in good faith.
23. Neither in my opinion the Court at Jabalpur has abused the process of law nor there is any necessity to issue any order or direction to secure the ends of justice. I am of the opinion that neither extraordinary power as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, nor Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is required to be invoked to quash the impugned complaint or its proceeding.
24. The petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.