Karnataka High Court
Usman Saheb Shiraj Saheb Attar vs The Karnataka Board Of Wakfs, Bangalore ... on 28 November, 1980
Equivalent citations: AIR1981KANT206, 1981(1)KARLJ247, AIR 1981 KARNATAKA 206, ILR (1981) 1 KANT 442 (1981) 1 KANT LJ 247, (1981) 1 KANT LJ 247
ORDER
1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the orders Nos. (1) KTW 4754 AGW 74 dated 22/25-11-1974 (Annexure E) and (2) KTW 4754 AGW 74 dated 29-6-1976 (Annexure K) of the Karnataka Board of Wakfs, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Board).
2. At Terdal village of Jamkhandi Taluk, Bijapur District, there is a dargah called 'Peer Abbawali Khan Dargah' which had been registered as a public trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act of 1950 that was then in force in the erstwhile Bombay area. On the extension of the uniform Wakf Act of 1954 (Central Act No. 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the erstwhile Bombay area, the same is deemed to be registered and is also registered as a wakf in the register of wakfs maintained by the Board. The wakf is managed by a committee of trustees and the petitioner is its Managing Trustee and in that capacity he is a 'mutawalli' within the meaning of that term occurring in Section 3(f) of the Act.
3. Between the petitioner and respondent No. 4 there have been a number of civil disputes, touching the wakf and the right to manage the same. A detailed narration to the same is not necessary for deciding the issues that arise in this case.
4. For some time past, there are a number of complaints against the functioning of the petitioner as a mutawalli of the wakf. By a show cause notice No. 355/71 dated 28-7-1974 (Annexure C), the District Wakf Committee, Bijapur-respondent No. 2 called upon the petitioner to file his reply and appear before it on the allegations specified thereto, in response to which, the petitioner filed his objections on 5-9-1974 (Annexure D) denying the allegations made against him. On a report inside by the Dist. Wakf Committee, the Board by its order D/- 22/25-11-1974 (Annex. E) placed the petitioner under suspension pending enquiry into the complaints, with a direction that he should hand over the complete charge of the wakf to the I.C.A. of District Wakf Committee, Bijapur. By a letter/order dated 29-6-1976 (Annexure-H) the Board has appointed respondent No. 4 to look after the affairs of the wakf in place of the petitioner.
5. The petitioner has urged that the suspension is removal and the same made without holding and completing the enquiry into the alleged misconduct is contrary to Section 43 of the Act and illegal.
6. In their joint return, respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have set out various omissions and commissions committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties as a mutawalli and the immediate necessity to place the petitioner under suspension in the interest of wakf and its properties. Respondent No. 4 though he has not filed a separate return, supports respondents 1 to 3.
7. Sri Jayaprakash Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Board has no power to remove the petitioner, a mutawalli, without holding an enquiry contrary to Section 43 of the Act.
8. Sriyuths N. Y. Hanumanthappa, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 and V. N. Satyanarayana, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 urged that The power to suspend is inherent in the very right of the Board to appoint a muatwalli, the circumstance and grounds on which the Board has placed the petitioner under suspension and appoint respondent No. 4 in his place, cannot be examined by this Court, as if it is an appeal. In support of their contention, counsel for the respondents, strongly relied on the rulings of the Supreme Court in Management of Imperial Hotel, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union ; R. P. Kapur v. Union of India and V. P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh .
9. A mutawalli under the Muslim law is the manager of a wakf. Section 3 (f) of the Act that defines a mutawalli, recognizes the same.
10. The uniform Act makes provisions for the proper administration and supervision of wakfs in the country. The only section that deals with the removal of a mutawalli is Section 43 of Act and there is no other provision empowering the Board to suspend or remove a mutawalli.
11. The term 'suspension' is not defined in the Act or in the General Clauses Act. The term suspension is not a term of art. Whatever be the source of power, suspension has the effect of keeping a person removed from the office for the period the order is in force. When a person is kept under suspension, be cannot attend to his duties and is prevented from attending to his duties Irrespective of the nature of duties he has to perform. Me impugned order of suspension and the later order appointing respondent No.4 in his Place has, undoubtedly that effect. Apart from this, the dictionary meaning of the word 'remove' viz., to withdraw, to displace, supports the same conclusion.
12. The heading of Section 43 is 'removal of mutawallis'. The heading of a section gives a clue in understanding the scope and ambit of that section though the same cannot control the plain language of the section. Section 43 provides for the removal of a mutawalli by the Board which is a creature of the Act. As a creature of the Act, the Board can only exercise those powers that are conferred on it and cannot claim to exercise 'inherent powers'.
13. On my earlier conclusion, it follows that the petition has been removed from the office of mutawalli to be operative till the enquiry is held against him.
14. Section 43 (4) of the Act directs that a mutawalli cannot be removed without holding an enquiry into the misconduct in the prescribed manner and a decision is taken by the majority of the Board consisting of not less than 3/4 th Of the members of the Board. Section 43 (4) of the Act, which commences with negative terms, also employs the term 'shall'. Whenever the legislature employs negative terms and also the word 'shall' in a provision, unless there are other compelling circumstances, such a provision has to be construed as mandatory or peremptory, the disobedience, of which renders the action as absolutely illegal looking at the scheme of Section 43 (4) and the civil consequences that will ensue on a mutawalli I am, clearly of the view, the said provision is mandatory.
15. In the order dated 22/25-11-975, the Board has expressly stated that the petitioner is kept under suspension pending an enquiry and the later order dated 29-6-1976 appointing respondent No. 4 is only in the nature of a follow up order to the order made on 22/25-11-1975. Sri Hanumanthappa does not dispute that the enquiry against the petitioner into misconducts alleged against him has not been completed. In the absence of an enquiry, the Board taking a decision for removal does not arise. From the foregoing, it follows that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner is plainly in contravention of Section 43 (4) of the Act and is, therefore, liable to be quashed. With the quashing of the order of suspension, the order appointing respondent No. 4 which has its source only to the order of suspension is also liable to be quashed.
16. In my opinion, the ratio of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Management of Imperial Hotel's , R. P. Kapur's and V. P. Gindroniya's cases dealing with the cases of suspension of civil servants or an employee under the ordinary law of master and servant do not really bear on the point and do not assist the respondents.
17. While this Court had only stayed operation of the order of suspension and had not stayed the further proceedings, for reasons that are not clear, the Board had not so far completed the enquiry against the petitioner. As could be seen from the report of the ICW and other complaints, there are serious complaints made against the petitioner. When there are serious complaints, it is not desirable for the Board to delay the completion of the enquiry and the final orders to be made under Section 43 (4) of the Act. I do hope that the Board will not allow the matters to further drift and complete the enquiry with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of the case.
18. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. I, therefore, quash the impugned orders. But, this order does not prevent the Board from completing the enquiry and pass final orders in accordance with law.
19. Rule issued is made absolute.
20. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
21. Let a copy of this order be communicated to respondents Nos. 1 to 3 within 10 days from this day.
22. Petition allowed.