Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Rupendra Kumawat S/O Shiv Bhagwan vs State Of Rajasthan on 26 August, 2019
Bench: Sabina, Goverdhan Bardhar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 113/2019
Rupendra Kumawat S/o Shiv Bhagwan, aged About 32 Years, R/o
Plot No 3A, Near New Bus Satnd, Sambhar Road, Phulera, PS
Phulera District Jaipur. At Present Lodged in the Central Jail
Jaipur
----Accused-Appellant
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, through the Public Prosecutor.
----Non-petitioner Connected With D.B. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 232/2019
1. Shiv Bhagwan S/o Surajmal, Aged About 73 Years, B/c Kumawat R/o Plot No 3A, Near New Bus Stand, Sambhar Road, Phulera, PS Phulera Dist. Jaipur 2 Smt. Rukmani Devi W/o Shiv Bhagwan, Aged About 67 Years, B/c Kumawat R/o Plot No 3A, Near New Bus Stand Sambhar Road Phulera PS Phulera Dist. Jaipur
----Appellants-Accused Versus State Of Rajasthan, through the Public Prosecutor.
----Non-petitioner For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashvin Garg, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Rekha Madnani, for the State HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GOVERDHAN BARDHAR Judgment 26/08/2019 (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (2 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] Vide this order above mentioned two appeals would be disposed of.
FIR No.185 dated 17.11.2009 was registered at Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur Rural for offence under Section 498-A and 307 Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') on the basis of the statement of the victim (since deceased) Manju Devi.
As per the FIR, prosecution story, in brief, is that victim Manju Devi was married to appellant Rupendra on 27.6.2004. For 2-3 months there were cordial relations between the married couple. Thereafter, victim was being harassed by her father-in-law Shiv Bhagwan, mother-in-law Rukmani Devi, her husband Rupendra and her two sisters-in-law and their husbands. She informed her parents with regard to the harassment meted out to her. Rupendra sought pardon and victim was again sent back to her matrimonial home. On 27.7.2009, dispute again arose between the victim and her in-laws family and she lodged a report with the police station. Thereafter, victim and her husband started residing separately in a rented accommodation. On 16.11.2009, at about 8:00 p.m., victim was talking on phone to her younger sister Sanju. In the meantime, Rupendra started quarreling with the victim and started abusing her. Then, Rupendra poured kerosene oil on the victim from a plastic bottle and set her on fire. Thereafter, Rupendra made efforts to extinguish the fire and put the victim under a water tap. Rupendra also called Mahesh and his wife and some other persons to the spot and these persons took her along with appellant Rupendra to the hospital for treatment.
Statement of the victim was also recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (3 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') by the Magistrate. A perusal of Exhibit-D3 reveals that the victim had stated that a quarrel had taken place between her and Rupendra. As a result, her husband lost his temper and set her on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her. She also stated that she was being harassed by her father-in-law, mother-in-law and her two sisters-in-law and their husbands. She further stated that for the last about two months, she was residing separately with her husband and children in a rented accommodation.
After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against appellants.
Charges were framed against appellant Rupendra under Sections 302, 498-A IPC whereas, against appellants Shiv Bhagwan and Rukmani Devi, charge was framed under Section 498-A IPC.
In order prove its case, prosecution examined thirty witnesses. Appellants when examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. prayed that they were innocent.
Appellants examined six witnesses in their defence. Trial Court vide judgment/order dated 14.3.2019, ordered the conviction and sentence of appellant Rupendra under Sections 302 and 498-A IPC, whereas, appellants Shiv Bhagwan and Rukmani Devi were convicted and sentenced qua offence under Section 498-A IPC. Hence, the present appeals by the appellants.
Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that a perusal of the FIR itself reveals that the deceased had never been harassed on account of demand of dowry. The incident had occurred on the spur of the moment. Some quarrel took place (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (4 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] between the victim and her husband which resulted in burn injuries suffered by the deceased. Appellant Rupendra had made efforts to save his wife and while doing so he himself had suffered 20% burn injuries. Appellant Rupendra had taken his wife to the hospital for treatment and had called other friends to the spot to save her life. Hence, it could be said to be a case falling under Section 304 Part II IPC qua appellant Rupendra. So far as appellants Shiv Bhagwan and Rukmani are concerned, they were liable to be acquitted of the charge framed against them. Elder sister of the victim is married to the elder brother of appellant Rupendra, i.e., PW-15. Elder sister of the deceased had never been harassed on account of demand of dowry by her mother-in- law and father-in-law. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.1091 of 2005, Bijendra Singh S/o Ganga Singh vs. State of Rajasthan through P.P., decided on 30.1.2015, wherein it has been held as under:
"Therefore, the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, cited by the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, in the case of Kalu Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 10 Supreme Court Cases, 324 is close to the facts and circumstances of the case:
It will be apposite for us to reproduce here Paras 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment :-
6. We find no good reason to discard the two dying declarations given by the deceased regarding the actual occurrence. The Courts below have rightly acted on such dying declarations.
7. But then, what is the nature of the offence proved against him. It is an admitted case that appellant was in a highly (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (5 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] inebriated stage when he approached the deceased when the demand for sparing her ornaments was made by him. When she refused to oblige he poured kerosene on her and wanted her to lit the match-stick. When she failed to do so he collected the match box and ignited one match-stick but when flames were up he suddenly and frantically poured water to save her from the tongues of flames. This conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. We are inclined to think that all what the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore, we are persuaded to bring down the offence from the first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
8. We, therefore, alter the conviction from Section 302, I.P.C. to Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C. Both sides conceded that appellant is continuing in jail. We impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years on him. It is for the jail authorities to count whether the period he had already undergone would be sufficient to complete the period of sentence imposed by us and if so, the jail authorities shall release him from jail. Otherwise he will continue in jail until completion of the period of seven years of imprisonment. The appeal is disposed of accordingly."
The learned counsel appearing for the accused- appellant has further submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govind Narayan & Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2008 (4) Western (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (6 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] Law Cases 123 relying on the case of Kalu Ram (supra), had also converted the offence.
We shall also reproduce here Paras 11 and 12 of Govind Narayan's case (supra) :-
"11. From the totality of circumstances it appears that in the odd hour of night Govind and Vinita had a quarrel on some matter and after quarrel Govind poured kerosene on her and ignited lighter but when the flames were up he suddenly and frantically made attempt to save her from the tongues of flames and himself received burn injuries. This conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of circumstances. Very probably Govind would not anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such proportion that Vinita might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to make effort to rescue her and took her to the hospital. We are inclined to think that all that Govind thought of wat to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and went to the fatal extent. Govind would not have intended to inflict the injuries which Vinita sustained on account of his act. Therefore, we are persuaded to bring down the offence to culpable homicde not amounting to murder. In a similar situation the Apex Court in Kalu Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 324 altered the conviction from 302 to 304 Part II IPC.
12. It also appears that appellant Hari Narain, (father-in-law of deceased Vinita), also made attempt to save Vinita and sustained burn injuries. Since the Investigating Officer himself persuaded Vinita not to speak the truth, possibility of over implication of other family members in the case cannot be ruled out. The prosecution failed to establish charges against appellants Ram Janki (Mother-in- law), Hari Narain, India Devi, Smt. Santosh (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (7 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] and Ganesh Narain and they are entitled to benefit of doubt."
Considering the two judgments, cited before us and the fact that the appellant was in an inebriated state and may be due to some remark made by his wife lost his sense of proportion and became infuriated and had put his wife on fire and immediately, thereafter made an attempt to save his wife. The appellant had suffered 18-20 % burns; his hands, face and hair were also burnt and he also remained admitted in the hospital. Thus, we are of the view that the ends of justice will be met fully, in case conviction of the appellant from offence under Section 302 I.P.C. is converted to offence under Section 304 Part-II, as was converted in the cases of Kalu Ram and Govind Narayan & others (supra), relied by the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant.
Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. prescribe maximum imprisonment of ten-years. Taking totality of circumstances, we are of the view that in the present case, maximum sentence ought to be awarded."
Learned State counsel has opposed the appeals and has submitted that the prosecution had been successful in establishing its case. From the statements of PW-5 Somya, son of the deceased and PW-15 Dinesh, elder brother of the appellant Rupendra, it is evident that the deceased was being harassed on account of demand of dowry and had been murdered by appellant Rupendra.
Present case relates to murder of Manju W/o appellant Rupendra. Deceased has died on account of burn injuries. As per post-mortem examination report Exhibit-P22, cause of death of the deceased was septicemia brought about as a result of secondary infection to the burn area. Exhibit-P22 post-mortem (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (8 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] report was proved by PW-25 Dr. Manoj Saini. Exhibit-P16 is the medico-legal-examination report of the deceased and perusal of the same reveals that she had received about 80-85% burn injuries. The said report was proved by PW-18 Dr. Mahendra Kumar Agarwal.
FIR was lodged on the statement of the victim Manju. As per the said statement, victim had stated that she was married to Rupendra on 27.6.2004 and she was being harassed by her father-in-law, mother-in-law and her sisters-in-law and their husbands. She had lodged a report with the police on 27.7.2009 and thereafter, on account of the fact that her husband tendered apology and had assured that he would not beat her in future, she had started residing separately with her husband in a rented accommodation. On 16.11.2009 at about 8:00 p.m., her husband started abusing her and quarreled with her and had thereafter, poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. She had also stated that her husband made efforts thereafter to save her and had kept her under water tap and had also called other persons to the spot. Her husband had also suffered burn injuries while trying to save her. She had been taken to the hospital along with her husband for treatment. Statement of the victim was also recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate and in the said statement Exhibit-D3, she has stated that a quarrel had taken place between her and her husband. Her husband poured kerosene oil on her as he has lost his temper and had set her on fire. She also stated that she was residing separately for the last two months with her husband and children in a rented accommodation. Victim died on 29.11.2009. (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM)
(9 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] Thus, the present case rests on dying declarations suffered by the deceased as well as the other evidence led by the prosecution during trial.
Learned counsel for the appellants has not disputed the fact that the deceased had suffered burn injuries at the hands of appellant Rupendra, but has submitted that the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC and not under Section 302 IPC.
PW-3 Sanju has deposed that her sister Manju was married to Rupendra on 27.6.2004. Manju was being harassed by her in-laws family. She has further deposed that on the day of incident, her sister Manju was talking to her on phone and she had heard the cries of her sister and they came to know that her sister had been set on fire by her husband. In her cross-examination, she deposed that her elder sister Nikki Kumawat was married to elder brother of Rupendra. Nikki was never harassed on account of demand of dowry.
PW-4 Nikki Kumawat deposed that Manju was her younger sister. On 16.11.2009, she has received a phone-call from her parental family that Rupendra was giving beatings to Manju. She immediately inquired about the matter and came to know that her sister was admitted in the hospital on account of burn injuries. Her sister had told her that she had been set on fire by Rupendra. She also deposed that Rupendra used to give beatings to her sister under the influence of liquor. She also stated that Manju was residing separately with her husband from 25/26.7.2009.
PW-5 Somya, son of the deceased, deposed that his mother had been killed by his father. Earlier they used to live together with their grand-parents but now they were residing separately. His father had given beatings to his mother and had (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (10 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] poured kerosene oil on her and had set her on fire. Thereafter, his father had put his mother under the water tap and had called 2/3 other persons to the spot and they had taken his mother to the hospital.
PW-6 Rukmani Kumawat, mother of the deceased, has deposed that her daughter had been murdered by appellant Rupendra by setting her on fire.
PW-7 Naresh Kumawat deposed that the deceased was his sister and was married to appellant Rupendra. His sister Manju was being harassed by her in-laws family on account of demand of dowry. On 27.7.2009, a report was lodged with the police station against Rupendra and his parents by her sister. Thereafter, Rupendra stated that he would not give beatings to his wife in future. His sister Manju along with her husband started residing separately in a rented accommodation. On 16.11.2009, he came to know that his sister Manju has been set on fire by her husband.
PW-8 Mahesh Dadhich, PW-9 Sunita Dadhich, PW-10 Bhag Chand Kumawat, PW-11 Durga Lal Kumawat, PW-14 Kamal Kishore Kumawat, PW-21 Devi Narayan and PW-22 Sheojiram have not supported the prosecution case during trial.
PW-12 Prem Verma has not deposed against the accused with regard to the incident.
PW-15 Dinesh Kumawat, elder brother of appellant Rupendra has deposed that appellant Rupendra got married in the year 2004 to his sister-in-law Manju and two children were born out of the said wedlock. He was residing separately from their family members since the year 2000. There had been dispute between his brother Rupendra and his wife Manju on 27.7.2009 and, thereafter, his brother Rupendra had started residing (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (11 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] separately with is wife. On 16.11.2009, he had received a phone- call from Bhagchand that Manju as well as Rupendra had suffered burn injuries.
PW-16 Kalu Ram, father of the deceased has deposed that his daughter Manju had got married to appellant Rupendra. Accused used to demand money from his daughter and he used to fulfill their demand. Manju used to be given beatings by her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and sisters-in-law. On 27.7.2009, a dispute had occurred between Manju and Rupendra as he had given beatings to her. Report was lodged in the police station in this regard and Rupendra had tendered apology. Thereafter, Rupendra had started residing separately with his wife and children. On 16.7.2009, he received a phone-call from Bhagchand that his daughter Manju had suffered burn injuries.
PW-26 Manoj Meena deposed that on 17.11.2009, he was posted as Judicial Magistrate and had recorded the statement of Manju Exhibit-D3, after obtaining fitness certificate of the victim from the doctor.
DW-1 Kundanmal Kumawat deposed that Manju poured kerosene oil on herself and had set herself on fire. When he reached the hospital, Manju was saying that she had committed a mistake.
DW-2 Vishnu Praksh Kumawat, DW-3 Alok Tiwari, DW-4 Suresh Kumar Mishra and DW-5 Shyam Singh Chauhan have corroborated the statement of DW-1 Kundanmal Kumawat.
Appellant Rupendra while appearing in witness-box as DW-6 deposed that his marriage was performed with Manju on 27.6.2004. It was a love marriage. For the last 6-7 months from the date of incident, they were residing separately. Two children (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (12 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] were born out of his wedlock with Manju. His wife was a short tempered lady and dispute had arisen between him and his wife about 2/4 months prior to the incident in connection with money. He was present at the time of incident. His wife was fighting with her sister on phone and in anger, she had cut the phone-call and poured kerosene oil on herself and had set herself on fire. He had tried to extinguish the fire and had suffered burn injuries. Persons from the neighbourhood had also reached the spot.
Thus, in the present case, the fact that deceased Manju had suffered burn injuries is not in dispute. Appellant Rupendra was also present at the spot, at the time of incident. Appellant had suffered burn injuries while trying to extinguish the fire. Exhibit- P17 is the medico-legal-examination report of the appellant Rupendra, which has been proved by PW-18 Dr. Mahendra Kumar Agarwal. As per the said report, appellant had suffered 20% burn injuries on his arms and face.
The question that requires consideration is as to whether the deceased had been set on fire by appellant Rupendra as stated by her in her statements before the police as well as Magistrate or she had set herself of fire as pleaded by appellant Rupendra.
It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N. in (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 113, as under:-
"Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (13 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR(1992) SC 1817:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764)
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164)
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994].
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264).
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021].
(vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC
654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617].
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(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505].
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912].
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519].
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839]."
Deceased has stated in her statements before the police as well as Magistrate that on account of a quarrel between her and her husband, she had been set on fire by her husband after pouring kerosene oil on her. Deceased has also stated in her police statement that her husband had suffered burn injuries on his hands while trying to extinguish the fire. The dying declaration Exhibit-D3 suffered by the deceased before the Magistrate has been duly proved by PW-26 Manoj Meena. The dying declarations suffered by the deceased appear to be voluntary and inspire confidence. The deceased has also explained injuries suffered by appellant Rupendra in her statement recorded before the police. PW-5 Somya has deposed in a most natural manner. He has also deposed with regard to the fact that after his mother had been set on fire by his father, thereafter, he had made efforts to extinguish the fire. Hence, from the dying declarations as well as the (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (15 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] statement of PW-5 Somya (son of the appellant Rupendra and the deceased), it stands duly established that the deceased had been set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene oil on her. The statements of defence witnesses as well as appellant Rupendra fail to rebut the dying declarations suffered by the deceased as well as the statement of PW-5 Somya (son of the appellant Rupendra and deceased Manju).
The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether appellant had the intention to commit murder of the deceased or he had set his wife on fire out of sudden heat of passion and had lost his sense of proportion on account of the fight which he had with his wife.
From the dying declarations as well as statement of PW5 Somya, it is evident that there was some quarrel between appellant Rupendra and deceased Manju. It appears that appellant lost his temper as well as his sense of proportion and had set his wife on fire. Thereafter, appellant Rupendra immediately repented and made an attempt to save his wife and put her under the water tap. Appellant Rupendra had also suffered burn injuries to the extent of 20%. Appellant called other persons to the spot and, thereafter, victim Manju as well as appellant Rupendra was taken to the hospital for treatment.
Hence, after examining all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the present case would fall within the ambit of Section 304 Part II IPC and not under Section 302 IPC because the appellant Rupendra had the knowledge that the act committed by him could cause the death of his wife Manju but he had no intention to commit her murder.
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(16 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] Accordingly, appellant Rupendra is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 302 IPC and is held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and is convicted thereunder.
The next question that requires consideration is as to as to whether offence under Section 498-A IPC is made out in the facts of the present case.
In-fact, from the dying declarations suffered by the deceased as well as statement of PW-5 Somya, it is evident that appellant Rupendra and his wife Manju along with their children were residing separately in a rented accommodation. From the dying declarations suffered by the deceased, it cannot be said that on the day of incident, appellant Rupendra had poured kerosene oil on her and had set her on fire on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. Rather, from the dying declarations of the deceased, it is evident that on account of quarrel between her and her husband, appellant Rupendra lost his temper and had set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her.
In these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that learned trial Court had erred in holding that prosecution had been successful in proving charge against the appellants under Section 498-A IPC. Rather, in the present case, appellants were liable to be acquitted of the charge framed against them under Section 498-A IPC. Hence, appellants are acquitted of the charge framed against them under Section 498-A IPC.
Appellant Rupendra is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years qua offence punishable under Section 304 part II IPC with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment (Downloaded on 06/06/2021 at 06:18:32 PM) (17 of 17) [CRLAD-113/2019] of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. D.B. Criminal Appeal No.113/2009 stands disposed of accordingly. D.B. Criminal Appeal No.232/2019 is allowed.
(GOVERDHAN BARDHAR)J. (SABINA)J.
Dheeraj /402
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