Patna High Court
Nandlal Thana Ram vs Ghani Khan Monaf Khan And Ors. on 2 September, 1960
Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT313, AIR 1961 PATNA 313
Author: V. Ramaswami
Bench: V. Ramaswami
JUDGMENT
1. In this case the petitioner has applied to the High Court for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of respondent No. 2 dated 18th November, 1958, dismissing an appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of respondent No. 3, dated the 26th February, 1958, granting an extension of 16 miles of the stage carriage permit of respondent No. 1.
2. It appears that the petitioner is a holder of a permanent stage carriage permit for the route Bettiah to Ramnagar via Lauria. This route is 16 miles in common with the route on which respondent No. 1 runs his vehicle. It appears that respondent No. 1 applied for an extension of his permit up to Lauria. This application was allowed by respondent No. 3 on the 26th February, 1958. Against this order the petitioner appealed to respondent No. 2 who dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was no valid objection filed by the petitioner to the grant of the extension of the route to respondent No. 1 and hence his appeal was not maintainable under Section 64 (f) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
3. The submission of learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of the Appeal Board dated the 18th November, 1958, is erroneous in law, because the appeal of the petitioner was maintainable under Section 64, Clause (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which runs as follows :
"64. Any person--
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(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, ..... may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being, heard."
We do not think there is any substance in the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner. In our opinion the petitioner had no right of appeal under Section 64 (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act against the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated the 26th February, 1958. The reason is that the petitioner is not aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of any permit granted to him, nor is he a person aggrieved by any variation of the condition of any permit granted to him. He is a third party operator of a motor vehicle permit and, in the circumstances of the present case, it is manifest that he has no right to appeal within the meaning of Section 64, Clause (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We think that the case of the petitioner falls within Section 64, Clause (f) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is in the following terms :
"64. Any person-
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(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto ..... may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard."
In the present case the petitioner did file an objection for grant of a permit before the Regional Transport Authority, but his petition was time-barred and so the Appeal Board was right in law in holding that the petitioner was not competent to prefer the appeal under Section 64, Clause (f) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 64, Clause (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act and so he had a right of appeal to the Appeal Board against the order of the Regional Transport Authority. We do not accept this argument as correct. In our opinion, the expression "the permit" in Clause (b) of Section 64 must refer to the permit mentioned in Clause (a) of that section, which runs as follows :
"64. Any person--
(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, ..... may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard."
We consider that the language of Section 64, Clause (b), must be read in the colour and context of the language of Clause (a), and if these clauses are read together it is manifest that the expression "the permit" in Clause (b) must refer to the permit mentioned in Clause (a), and that permit is a permit granted to any person by the Regional Transport Authority. It follows, therefore, that the proper construction of Section 64, Clause (b), is to confine its application to the persons aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permits granted to them or to persons aggrieved by any variation in the conditions of such permits granted to them. We think that Section 64, Clause (b), does not confer a right on a third party to appeal against an order varying the conditions of the permit granted to another person.
The view we have expressed is borne out by the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Iyar, J. in M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545 in which the same view was expressed as regards the interpretation of Section 64, Clause (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Heeralal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1959 Raj 41, but with great respect we are unable to accept this decision as correct. For these reasons we hold that the order of the Appeal Board or of the Regional Transport Authority is not vitiated by any error of law and 110 case has been made out by the petitioner for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. We accordingly dismiss this application with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/- to be paid to respondent No. 1.