Patna High Court
Sugauli Sugar Works (Private) Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. [Alongwith ... on 3 September, 1968
Equivalent citations: 1969(17)BLJR457
JUDGMENT R.J. Bahadur, J.
1. All these appeals filed by the plaintiffs arise out of suits for recovery of different sums of money on account of non-delivery of six different consignments. Four of the suits, out of which these appeals arise, were filed by the Sugauli Sugar Works (Private) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Sugauli Sugar Works) and two of them were filed by the Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill Company (Private) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Majhaulia Sugar Works). I give below a chart showing the appeal number of this Court, the suit number out of which it arises, the name of the plaintiff, the place from where it was consigned, the place where it was consigned to, the wagon number and the amount of claim :
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Appeal Suit Name of the Place Place to Wagon Amount of
No. No. plaintiff. from where which No. claim.
consigned. consigned.
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
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F.A. M.S. Saugali Sugar Rs. An.-Ps.
127/58 238/56 Works (P) Ltd. Sugauli Barh. 28247 9,000 0 0
F.A. M.S. do. do. (N.E.R.) (E.R.)
128/58 235/56 do. Lakhisarai 10604 9,000 0 0
F.A. M.S. do. do. (E.R.)
129/58 236/56 do. Patna Jn. 18028 24,451 10 0
F.A. M.S. do. do. (E.R.) 27761
130/58 237/56 do. Patna Ghat 18000 22,468 10 6
F.A. M.S. Padampat Sugar (E.R.) 16180
246/56 221/56. Mill Co. (P) Majhaulia do. WR22712 15,780 8 0
Ltd. (N.E.R.) 242547
F.A. M.S. do. do.
247/58 220/56 do. Bihar Sarif 14828 8,636 3 0
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2. These appeals were heard by a Bench of this Court consisting of Sahai, J. and myself, who, after hearing all the appeals fully, recorded the findings on all the points in our judgment and took the view that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for the loss suffered by them. The claim for quantum of compensation could not, however, be determined fry us, as the learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suits, has not framed any issue even when the issues were recast, as to the quantum of compensation to which the plaintiffs would have been entitled in case of their success on proof of negligence or want of proper care on the part of the Railway Administration or its employees. We, therefore, framed the following issue in all the appeals:
What is the amount for which the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree in each case ?
Under Order XLI, Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) we sent the said issue for trial to the trial court. Our order in the previous judgment may be usefully quoted here:
...It will be open to both parties to adduce additional evidence on this issue. The Court below shall proceed- to try the issue, and shall return the evidence together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefor to this Court within three months from today. Notice of receipt of the record along with the findings must be given to the learned Advocates for both parties within a very short time of their arrival in this Court. Either party may present its memorandum of objection to any finding arrived at by the Court below within a fortnight after the receipt of the notice by it. As soon thereafter as possible, the appeals will be put up for decision as to the quantum of the decrees and thus final disposal of the appeals.
3. The issue aforesaid was, accordingly, tried by the trial court, which allowed the claims of the plaintiffs with dunnage charges in each case. The trial court, however, did not allow the interest claimed up to the filing of the suit nor did it allow interest pendente lite nor costs of notices, which were claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. These appeals were, therefore, placed before this Bench (as Sahai, J. had since retired).
4. Let me now give shortly the facts. In the four suits filed by the Sugauli Sugar Works, the plaintiff's case is that it despatched consignments of sugar, as detailed above, on the 5th September, 1955, with instruction that the consignments be delivered to the plaintiff's Banker, the Central Bank of India, Ltd., Muzaffarpur Branch (defendant-second party) at different places. The railway receipt or each of the cosignments was endorsed in favour of the Bank; but ownership in the goods remained with the plaintiff. The consignments, which should have been delivered latest by the 5th October, 1955, never reached their destinations, and were not delivered at all. The non-delivery was due to the gross negligence and misconduct on the part of the employees of the North Eastern Railway (defendant No. 2) and the Eastern Railway (defendant No. 3). On these facts, it has prayed for a decree for price of the goods, dunnage charges, interest which the plaintiff had to pay to the Bankers and the cost of notices under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the total amount of claim being as I have already mentioned in respect of each case in the chart. It may be mentioned that all these four suits were instituted on the 15th November, 1956.
5. The Majhaulia Sugar Works' case in the two suits filed by it is that it despatched two consignments, one in question in Money Suit No. 22.0 of 1956 on the 4th September, 1955, and the other on the 5th September, 1965, like those in the four suits of Sugauli Sugar Works. In respect of both these consignments, it was the consignor as well as the consignees. It did not endorse the railway receipts in favour of any other person. It has stated in the plaint of Money Suit No. 221 of 1956 that by letter No. C/37/55 Accodt., dated the 11/16th November, 1956, the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the North Eastern Railway informed it that the goods sank in the river Ganges at Simaria Ghat on the 7th September, 1955, in its plaint in Money Suit No. 220 of 1956, it has stated that by his letter No. COS/ 207/MJL/X/55, dated the 1st July 1958, the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the North Eastern Railway at Gorakhpur repudiated its claim on the ground that the goods in question in that suit sank in the river Ganges at Simaria Ghat on the 7th September, 1955, it has alleged in both the plaints that even if the goods were lost as alleged by the Railway Administration, which is not admitted, the loss was due to negligence and want of proper care on the part of the defendants or their employees, as a result of which the plaintiff has suffered damage. On these facts it has claimed a decree for the price of sugar, cost of dunnage, Bank commission and postage and incidental expenses, including cost of notices, the total amount of claim in each case being as I have already mentioned in the chart. Both these suits were instituted on the 5th November, 1956.
6. The main defence of the defendants Nos. 1 to 3, viz., the Union of India, and the two railways, is that the wagons containing the goods in question in all the six suits were being taken along with other wagons on barge No. 6 from Simaria Ghat to Makamah Ghat on the 7th September, 1955. The barge was being towed by a steamer named "Samastipur". There was an accident due to which the barge, with all the wagons, including the wagons carrying the consignments in question, sank in the river Ganges at a place close to jetty No. 2 at Simaria Ghat, The employees of the defendants were not guilty of any negligence or misconduct.
7. The Central Bank, defendant-second party, has filed a separate written statement in which it has pleaded that the plaints do not disclose any cause of action against it, and it has been unnecessarily made a party.
8. All the six suits were tried together. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Motihari, who held the trial, has held that barge No. 6 met with an unavoidable and unfortunate accident when it was carrying the wagons in question, and sank near jetty No. 2 at Simaria Ghat in spite of the best efforts of the defendants' employees to save it from that fate. In view of his conclusions that the accident could not be avoided and that the defendant railways took all the care that could be expected from a person of ordinary prudence, he has dismissed all the six suits. The plaintiffs, therefore, have filed these appeals to this Court.
9. The appellants did not challenge the finding that barge No. 6 with the wagons containing goods in question sank in the river Ganges near jetty No. 2 at Simaria Ghat on the 7th September, 1965, as alleged by the defendants. It appears that the plaintiffs served interrogatories upon the defendants, and, under the orders of the court, the defendants gave their answers. In Money Suit No. 221 of 1956, one of the interrogatories was to the following effect:
Was any enquiry, committee constituted to enquire into the causes of the accident? If so, what was the report of the said committee, and whether the report was submitted to the Railway Board and published.
The answer to this question given by the. defendants on the 1st September, 1957, was:
Yes, a fact-finding enquiry as to the accident was held by a committee, and reported to the authorities. It was a private enquiry of the railway, and was not published. The matter is subjudice and the opinion of the committee would be illegal to state.
In the other suits also there was a demand for the production of the enquiry report. After hearing counsel for the parties on this point, we held in the previous judgment that Ext. 9, which was the report of an official enquiry committee in respect of one of the important facts in issue, viz., the cause of the accident, was admissible under Sections 5, 7 and 9 of the Evidence Act.
10. In the previous judgment it was further held that the evidence collected by the committee, and the reasons given by it for its conclusion could not be taken into consideration. All that could be considered was that there was an enquiry of the kind contemplated by Rule 18 made by the Railway Board in pursuance of Section 84 of the Indian Railway Board Act (IV of 1905), and that the findings of the committee were that "the sinking of wagon ferry barge No. 6 at Down Goods Jetty of Simaria Ghat was due to the ripping of the forepeak and bottom-plates of the Barge by its own number and anchor-chain resulting in the flooding of the mainhold of the vessel."; that Shri Rasul, the Sarang of "Chapra" was responsible for the accident as (i) he had failed to exercise proper judgment while manufacturing his own vessel for the purpose of heaving up the anchor of barge No. 6 which he was towing, and (ii) he had failed to, exercise initiative to save the barge by beaching her on the nearest char, instead of taking her to the Samariaghat goods jetty; "and that, though the accident occurred mainly due to a mistake in judgment on the part of the crew, it could have been averted if the Assistant Mechanical Engineer, Mokatnahghat, and the Commander of Ferries, Mokamahghat, "had exercised their discretion and stayed on board till barge No. 6 was out of trouble."
11. Some of the findings arrived at in the previous judgment may now be mentioned as they are relevant:
(i) The consignments in question in all the suits were booked at railway risk ;
(ii) None of the suits was barred by limitation, as was contended on behalf of the respondent ;
(iii) There was no satisfactory explanation given for the sinking of the barge; and
(iv) The barge sank due to serious negligence of the railway employees and it was not a case of inevitable accident. The railway did not take the amount of care which it was required to take as a bailee under Section 121 of the Indian Contract Act.
On these findings ail the suits were sent to the trial court for trial on the issue framed by this Court as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment.
12. At the commencement of the resumed hearing before as Mr. B.C. Ghose appearing for the respondents contended that the order in appeal (the previous judgment) did not dispose of the appeal and, therefore, the entire matter was now open for reconsideration by the present Bench. In other words, learned Counsel asked us to disregard the findings of the previous Beach and hear all the appeals afresh. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, whose submissions have also been adopted by Mr. Mitra, has contended for the appellants that the point raised by Mr. Ghose is without substance and wholly misconceived. In my opinion, there is no justification for the point taken by Mr. Ghose. The question that requires consideration upon his submission is as to whether when an appellate court passes an order regarding its findings on certain issues and remands the case for retrial on new issues under Order 41, Rule 25 of the Code, are the findings as recorded by it binding on it at the final hearing of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 26? There has been divergence of opinion amongst various High Courts on this question, Mr. Ghose cited before us a number of decisions, which, upon scrutiny, showed that they were not relevant and had no bearing on the point to be determined, I have therefore, not thought it fit to refer to the scores of decisions which counsel for the parties have cited and shall only consider those that have direct bearing on the point taken before us.
13. Mr. Ghose urged that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mt. Chauli alias Subhadra Devi v. Mt. Meghoo A.I.R. 1945 Alld., 268 (F.B.) was a clear authority to support of his point. It appears that it was held by the Full Bench that order under Order 41, Rule 25 did not dispose of the appeal and the entire matter was open for reconsideration at the final hearing under Order 41, Rule 26. It was competent for the Court at that hearing to question the propriety of the order under Order 41, Rule 25, and of the correctness of the findings given therein. It was, however, observed that whether the Court at the final hearing will do so or not was a matter within its discretion, and that parties could not insist on it as a matter of right. Mr. Ghose also relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Bengal Coal Co. v. Balmukunda Goenka I.L.R. (1951) 1 Cal. 168. It was held in this case that a Court hearing an appeal finally under Order 41, Rule 26 was not relieved of the duty of examining the soundness of a point because of the expression of judicial opinion upon it in the order of remand under Order 41, Rule 25 or the concession by the lawyer of a party on a point of law regarding the same. It also observed that the Court, which decides the appeal finally under Order 41, Rule 26, has jurisdiction to revise the views expressed in the order of remand under Order 41, Rule 26.
14. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, on the other hand, contended that Mr. Ghose has not questioned the order of remand, which was made by the previous Bench in this case. He submitted that it was a final decision on all other points and it was a final order because it had finally disposed of all the rights of the parties. In my opinion, this contention is well founded and must be accepted as correct. It is clear on a perusal of the previous judgment that the order of remand was only on a limited point, namely, for the determination of the quantum; otherwise, the judgment had disposed of all the points arising in the case. Mr. Sinha's contention finds support from the decision of the Privy Council in the ease of Rahimbhoy Hibibhoy v. Turner 18 I.A. 6. In this case the order was one determining the defendant's liability to account and directing accounts to be taken. This was held to be a final order as it determined the cardinal point in the suit, which was the defendant's liability to account.
15. Mr. Ghose's contention appears to be unsound because the true approach to the question is to be found in the case of Baraboni Coal Concern Lid, v. Ram Chandra Marwari A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 580, which is a Bench decision of our Court. It was held :
. .. .The authorities on the whole establish the proposition that if a Bench remands a case to the lower Court either under Order 41, Rule 23 or under Order 41, Rule 25 or under the inherent powers of the Court (the remand in this case comes neither under Rule 23 nor under Rule 25), the matters finally disposed of by the order of remand cannot, any of them, be reopened when the case comes back from the lower Court, but if at the time of remand no final decision is given on a point though some observations only are made in respect of it, it is open to another Bench when finally determining the case to come to its own conclusions on it. Applying this principle, the appellants are, in our opinion, precluded from raising the question now.
On the authority of the aforesaid case, which is binding on us, and with which I am in respectful agreement, I am clearly of opinion that the point raised by Mr. Ghose is without substance. Besides a portion of the judgment by which the case was remanded to the trial court had clearly said that the appeal should be put up for decision as to the quantum of decrees and final disposal of the appeal. I, therefore, hold that the point raised by-Mr. Ghose is untenable and must be rejected.
16. Let me now take the appeals in the order they have been argued.
F.A. Nos. 127 to 130 of 1958.
17. Mr. Sinha for the appellant has urged that the claim of interest had been wrongly disallowed by the trial court. His contention is that the interest was being claimed under the interest Act (Act 32 of 1889). Learned Counsel endeavoured to support his argument from the interest Act and Section 34 of the Code and contended that the findings arrived at by the trial court in its order after remand was afroneous. The trial court has held that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the defendant to pay interest and no such contract had been established at the trial. When Mr. Sinha was confronted by a large number of decisions contrary to his contention, then he conceded with his usual fairness that he could not press this point.
18. Learned Counsel, however, urged that he was entitled to pendente lite interest and future interest at the rate of 4 1/2 per cent per anum, as has been claimed in the plaint, Mr. Ghose, on the other hand, urged that the learned Subordinate Judge had exercised discretion and it has not been shown to us that the discretion exercised was either unreasonable or arbitrary, and, as such, this Court ought not to interfere and hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to the interest pendents lite and future interest. I am not impressed with Mr. Ghose's argument as it is now too well settled that a plaintiff in case of success is entitled to interest pendente lite and future, from the date of demand-See for instance : Chaudhary Mohammad Bux v. Chaudhury Zahrul Hague A.I.R. 1945 Pat. 196; Mt. Chanda Bibi v. Mohanram Sahu A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 134 Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Ramghulam Singh A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 207 and The Union of India v. The West Punjab Factories, Ltd. .
19. Mr. Ghose for the respondents has urged that the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the price of sugar in each suit has been wrongly allowed by the trial court. His contention is that the trial court has not relied upon the oral evidence adduced by the sole witness for the plaintiff, namely, Pi W. 1, Gaya Prasad. He has taken us through the order of the trial court after remand and has urged that there is no discussion of the evidence of the said witness; and, as such, there was no basis for the trial court to have allowed the claim of the plaintiff. It is difficult to accept this contention as correct in view of the evidence of the witnesses which is on the record. Gaya Prasad (P.W. 1), examined before remand, and Jagdish Narain Srivastava (P.W. 6) have respectively proved the relevant bills in respect of sugar despatch, the weight and the price per maund. It is, therefore, clear that the trial court on a consideration of the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses adduced before remand and after remand took the correct view that the price of sugar despatched had been established.
20. The next contention raised by Mr. Ghose is that even if the plaintiff is entitled to the price of sugar, it is the cost of production which has to be determined and not the market rate. In other words, the plaintiff is entitled only to the actual amount of loss sustained by it. It is submitted that there is no evidence of the market price at the destination or the cost price of the producer. For these reasons, there is no evidence to establish the amount to be paid in any one of these suit. Mr. Ghose has, however, urged that the plaintiff has failed to prove any damage as required in law.
21. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Ghose on some decisions and those that are relevant may now be noticed. In the case of the Union of India v. The West Punjab Factories Ltd. , which arose out of a suit for damages to goods by fire at the railway platfrom, on the point of measure of damages it was held that the market price at the time of damage was the measure of damages to be awarded ; the contract price was no measure of damages to be awarded. The observations of their Lordships as appearing in paragraph 15 of the Report may be usefully quoted.
... .The contract price is in our opinion no measure of damages to be awarded in a case like the present. It is well settled that it is the market price at the time the damage occurred which is the measure of damages to be awarded. It is not in dispute that the trial Court has calculated damages on the basis of the market price prevalent on March 8. In these circumstances this contention must also be rejected.
It will be noticed that their Lordships have observed that the contract price was no measure of damages to be awarded "in a case like the present". It is, therefore, clear that the determination of the measure of damage must depend on the special facts of each case.
22. In the case of Bala Prasad Agiwai v. The Union of India , which was also a case where measure of damage payable by railway had to be considered. 'Narasimham, C. J., after reviewing a large number of decisions, held that the normal measure of a damage was the market value of the goods at the place and time or which they should have been delivered less the amount which would have cost to get them to the place of delivery. A person, who claimed damages, would, therefore, have to lead evidence to prove the market value of the goods at the place of delivery. His Lordships further observed as to how the market value had to be reckoned. This case is also of no assistance to Mr. Ghose, because, his Lordship has further observed that it was open to the plaintiff to show, apart from the actual cost price as proved from his bijak., what was the reasonable profit he would have made at the place of destination by the sale of the goods. In absence of evidence the plaintiff was entitled only to the cost price as shown in the bijak, plus the dunnage. It is urged by Mr. Ghose that the trial court's decision cannot be said to be correct because it has only relied on the bijak. The contention is quite clearly against the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Union of India v. The West Punjab Factories, Ltd. .
23. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Ghose on two English decisions; Heskell v. Continental Express, Ltd. (1950) 1 All E.L.R. 1033 and The Arpad 1934 All E.L.R. 326 (Reprint). In Heskell's (1950) 1 All E.L.R. 1033 case it was observed :
Under the ordinary rule the carrier is taken to know that the consigner will lose by non-delivery the value of the goods at the place of delivery, and I suppose that under ordinary market conditions that would compensate the consignee for any loss he in-curs by purchases made at the place of delivery in order to fulfil any sale he may have made. To make the carrier liable for any higher measure or damages it seems to me to be necessary that he should have knowledge, actual or imputed, of something that makes the ordinary measure inadequate....
The case of The Arpad 1934 All E.L.R. 326 (Reprint) was a case of short delivery where measure of damage had to be considered. It was held that the matter to be ascertained was the value of the goods at the date of non-delivery or short-delivery and if there was a market at the time when the goods should be delivered in which goods of a kind fit to implement the contract could be bought or sold, the measure of damages and the value of the goods ascertained by the market price of identically similar goods. Where, there was no such market, the value must be otherwise ascertained, and the price at which the plaintiff had sold them, a substantial time before the non-delivery or short-delivery was not evidence of their value at the time of the breach. Their Lordships observed that the Court was not bound to accept any evidence that may be added as conclusive if the value could otherwise be ascertained. The decision was given on the special facts of the case. It would appear from the said decisions that in each of these cases it had been stated that the measure or quantum of damage was ordinarily to be determined by the market price.
24. The main proposition, as urged by Mr. Ghose, is undoubtedly correct, namely, the measure of damage is to be calculated at the market rate at destination but there is evidence in these appeals, namely, of Gaya Prasad (P.W. 1), who had been examined after remand, which supports all the materials and shows the selling rate of sugar. There is no challenge of this statement in his cross-examination. There is evidence of plurality of transactions and the rates have been quoted and all the relevant documents, which have bearing for the measure of damage, have been exhibited without formal proof. In the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Union of India v. The West Punjab Factories, Ltd. , the observation of their Lordships in paragraph 15 is useful, because, as I have said in the earlier part of the judgment, their Lordships said that the contract price was no measure of damages to be awarded in the case before them. The reason is obvious because the contracts were made in November, 1942, and the goods were booked between February and March, 1943. In the present appeals the goods were despatched on the 4th September, 1955, and the barge sank on the 7th September, 1955, that is, within three days, and, therefore, I am of opinion that applying the -principles laid down in the aforesaid case the observation of the Supreme Court supports the arguments for the appellants and not those that have been raised for the respondent.
25. It is then urged by Mr. Sinha that on the principles laid down in Bala Prasad's case by this Court, the plaintiff has really asked for much less than they were entitled to and, therefore, there is no reason to disturb the findings arrived at by the trial court in the measure of damage which the plaintiff is entitled in these appeals.
26. For the foregoing reasons, I am clearly of opinion that the findings of the trial court are correct that the plaintiff in each case is entitled to claim the cost of sugar. No objection has been raised as far as the amount of dunnage has been allowed in each of the suits.
F.A. Nos. 246 and 247 of 195S.
27. Mr. Ghose's argument is that the trial court has passed its judgment on the bill, Ext. 2A(1) and pen railway receipt, . Ext. 3A(1), and, res therefore, there is no evidence on which decision of the trial court could be are based. In my opinion, the contention is wholly without merit. The bill, Ext. 2A(1) has been proved by Gaya Prasad (P.W. 2) in his evidence before remand. Similarly, Ext. 3A(1) has been proved by P.W. 5, Ram Prasad Verma, who was the clerk of the Central Bank at Bettiah. I might mention that their formal proof was dispensed with in the trial court. Mr. Mitra has urged that the actual loss to the plaintiff is the measure which has to be awarded. He has submitted that Mr. Ghose's contention is quite wrong because the decisions relied on by him are all cases between seller and buyers and the present claim is by a producer, who was both consignor and consignee, and, as such, the principles laid down in the various cases can be of no help for the decision in the present appeals. In support of his contention Mr. Mitra has relied on the decision in India General Nevigation & Railway Company Ltd. v. Eastern Assam Co. Ltd. 33 C. L. J. 72 and has pointed out certain observations of the Court at page 95 of the Report. It has been observed :
... .It is well-settled that as a general rule where goods entrusted to a carrier are not delivered according to the contract, the measure 01 damages is the value of the goods at the place of destination, in the condition in which the carrier undertook to deliver them, at the time when they should have been delivered, less the proper charges of transportation and delivery, if these have not been paid by the consignor....
28. For the reasons expressed above, I am of opinion that the claim of the plaintiff in each of the suits has been rightly determined by the learned Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff is also entitled in each case to the pendente lite interest and future interest, as held by me.
29. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part, the judgment and decrees of the trial court are set aside and the suits are decreed in part with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 4 1/2 per cent per annum as follows:
1. F.A. 247/58 (M.S. 220/56): Rs. 8,583/7/- as price of sugar and Rs. 10/- on account of cost of dunnage.
2. I.A. 246/58 (M.S. 221/56): Rs. 15,709/6/- as price of sugar and Rs. 20/- as the cost of dunnage.
3. F.A. 126/58 (M.S. 235/56): Rs. 8,545/10/- as the price of sugar and Rs. 10/- as dunnage charge,
4. F. A, 129/58 (M.S. 236/56): Rs. 23,240/15/- as the price of sugar and Rs. 20/- on account of dunnage charge.
5. F.A. 130/58 (M.S. 237/56) Rs. 21.352/6/- for the price of sugar and Rs. 20/- as dunnage charge.
6. F.A. 127/58 (M.S. 238/56) Rs. 8,545/10/- as the price of sugar and Rs. 10/- as dunnage charge.
30. The plaintiffs in all the suit would be entitled to costs of both the courts in proportion to their success.
P.K. Banerji, J.
31. I agree.