Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Tara Kanwar vs State & Ors on 25 November, 2008
Author: Dinesh Maheshwari
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari
1
S.B.CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.5409/2006
(Arjun Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.)
S.B.CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.5423/2006
(Tara Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.)
Date of Order :: 25th November 2008.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
Mr.S.G.Ojha for the petitioners
Mr.Rishi Vaishnav, Govt. Counsel]
Mr.D.L.R.Vyas for Mr.B.M.Bohra ]for the respondents.
BY THE COURT:
These two writ petitions having similar facts and involving an identical issue regarding interpretation of Clause
(vii) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 27 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concessions Rules, 1986 have been heard together; and are taken up for disposal by this common order.
The Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concessions Rules, 1986 ('the Rules of 1986' hereafter) have been made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 for regulating the grant of quarry licences, mining leases, and other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for connected purposes. Chapter-III of the Rules of 1986 deals with grant of quarry licences wherein Rule 22 provides that no quarry licence shall be granted for any mineral deposit 2 unless it is notified by the Mining Engineer/Assistant Mining Engineer after due approval of the Director in the Gazette or in the newspaper as provided therein; and such notification is to be made after delineating the plots of quarries and is required to mention the dimension of area for each licence; but such notification may not be necessary for the areas in respect of which Rent-cum-Royalty leases had been granted earlier and had been converted into quarry licences in accordance with the Rules. The said Rule 22 also provides for maximum number of the licences that will be issued to a person and also for restriction on grant of licence to a person standing in dues with the Department. Rule 23 provides for the form of an application for grant of quarry licence, the documents required to be submitted therewith, and the requisite fees; Rule 24 provides for maintaining of the register of quarry licence applications and the register of quarry licences issued; Rule 25 provides for minimum and maximum area under a quarry licence; and Rule 26 provides for the procedure for grant and renewal of quarry licence. Rule 27 with which we are concerned in these matters provides for reservation and preferential right of certain categories of persons for grant of quarry licences when a new block of quarry is delineated in respect of minerals other than those specified therein and as per the percentage indicated. Rule 27 (1) as in operation at 3 the relevant time read as under:-
''27. Reservation and preferential right of certain categories of persons:- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, when a new block of quarries is delineated, quarry licences for minerals other than marble, dolomite, rhyolite, granite, serpentine, diorite and any other rock used for slab or tile making shall be kept reserved for the following categories of persons as per percentage indicated against each category:-
(i) Manual workers belonging to Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribes / Other Backward Classes employed in mines. 10%
(ii) Manual workers other than Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribes / Other Backward Classes 20%
(iii) Persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribes / Other Backward Classes 20%
(iv) Persons selected under ''Integrated Rural Development Program'' or ''Antyodaya Yojana'' of the State Government. 10%
(v) Village artisans and land-less labourers. 10%
(vi) Ex-soldiers including members of para military forces belonging to Rajasthan who have been permanently disabled and the dependents of those who have been killed in action. 10%
(vii) Rajasthan State Government servants who have become permanently disabled while on duty or the dependents of those who have been killed while on duty 10%; and
(viii) Other applicants. 10%'' It appears that in a mining area situated at Bhomiyaji-
Ka-Than within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Mining Engineer, Balesar District Jodhpur certain plots of quarries were delineated for the purpose of grant of quarry licences in 4 accordance with the categories provided by Rule 27 aforesaid. Quarry No.2365 and No.2368, amongst others, were reserved for the category number (vii) applicants i.e., the Rajasthan State Government servants who have become permanently disabled while on duty or the dependents of those who have been killed while on duty.
Late Shri Padam Singh, father of the petitioner Arjun Singh (CWP No.5409/2006) and husband of the petitioner Tara Kanwar (CWP No.5423/2006) was in the State Government service as Head Constable No.558 and, on 21.11.1989, while being posted at Dhola Jagir Polling Booth in Lok Sabha Election Duty as a part of Polling Party No.962, died for heart failure. The case of the petitioners herein is that they made applications for grant of quarry licences in relation to the aforesaid Quarry No. 2365 and No.2368 respectively when the applications were invited for the purpose on 23.02.1998. According to the petitioners, on their applications neither any sanction was conveyed nor rejection and, upon enquiry, it was given out that no action was being taken on their applications for their failure to adduce adequate proof of falling in category No. (vii) aforesaid. According to the petitioners, on 11.12.2000, they were informed upon visit to the office of the respondent No.4, the Assistant Mining Engineer that the quarries in question had again been notified 5 under a Notice Inviting Applications dated 26.02.2000 with the stipulation that all the previous applications stood rejected.
While challenging the notification dated 26.02.2000, the petitioners filed respective appeals before the Additional Director (Mines), Jodhpur who proceeded to dismiss such appeals by similar nature orders dated 22.01.2002 particularly with the finding that the petitioners were not falling in the said category No. (vii) because the deceased employee Padam Singh was not killed while on duty but died of natural death for heart failure.. The petitioners allege that the appeals were dismissed without even supplying the copy of reply filed by the respondent No.4 and without hearing their counsel The petitioners have pointed out that while their appeals were dismissed on 22.01.2002, the very next day the Assistant Mining Engineer concerned proceeded to sanction the respective quarries in favour of the persons joined as respondent Nos.5 in each of these writ petitions.
The petitioners submitted respective second appeals against the orders dated 22.01.2002 so passed by the Additional Director (Mines), Jodhpur and so also preferred respective revision petitions against the order issued by the Assistant Mining Engineer, Balesar on 23.01.2002 making sanction in favour of the private respondents. In the case of Arjun Singh (CWP No.5409/2006) the Dy. Secretary to the 6 Government has dismissed the appeal (No.24/2002) and revision petition (No.19/2003) by a common order dated 05.09.2006 (Annex.12); and in the case of Smt.Tara Kanwar (CWP No.5423/2006) has similarly dismissed the appeal (No.25/2002) and revision petition (No.20/2003) by a similar nature order of the even date (Annex.14). In both the cases, the learned Dy. Secretary has been of the opinion that the petitioners were not falling in the aforesaid category No. (vii) of Rule 27 (1) as the employee concerned died for a natural death and it could not be taken that he was killed while on duty. Certain other orders as made in relation to other persons were sought to be referred but the learned Dy. Secretary observed that the records pertaining to such other cases were not produced nor such orders were put to challenge and even if there had been some mistake in relation to any other person, the same could not be repeated. The relevant portion of the order dated 05.09.2006 as made in the case of the petitioner Smt. Tara Kanwar (CWP No.5423/2006) reads as under:-
"उक न यम म वर त प वध क अ सर कटगर सखय -7 म ऐस सदसय श नमल ककय ज सकत ह% , ज& र जक'य डय)ट क द*र स+ ई रप स अप कहज ह& गय ह& अ+व म र गय ह& । च)कक पसतत पकर म अप1ल +2 क पनत क' म3तय डय)ट क द*र हदय गनत रक स हई +1, ज& एक सव भ ववक (प क3 नतक) म3तय +1, ज& डय)ट क द*र "म र ज (Killed)" ह म ज सकत ह9 ।
जह : तक अनय पकर क नभन -नभन आदश प ररत कर क पश ह9 , इस नय य लय क समक अनय पकर क त& ररक र पसतत ककय ह 7 च *त1 द गई ह9 । अगर अध1 स+ नय य लय द र ककस1 ववशष पकर म गलत आदश प ररत ककय गय ह9 त& उस आध र ब कर ऐस1 गलत1 क' प र व3नत इस नय य लय द र ककय ज कतई नय य&नचत ह ह9 ।
अत: परररस+नतय म सपष रप स कटगर सखय -7 क सदसय ह म ज सकत ह9 ।
अध1 स+ नय य लय द र प ररत आदश कद क 22.1.2002 एव सह यक खन अनभयत द र प ररत आदश कद क 23.1.2002 म हसतकप कर क' क&ई गज इश उनचत पत1त ह ह&त1 ह9 । अत:
पसतत कदत1य अप1ल एव ररव1ज ख ररज क' ज त1 ह9 ।"
It may be pointed out that in the petition relating to CWP No.5423/2006 an additional fact has been stated that the respondent No.5 allottee submitted a false affidavit for grant of quarry licence while asserting that she had not been sanctioned any other quarry in any area though the fact remained that she had been granted quarry No.515 in Kalore- A area under the order dated 22.06.1995. Be that as it may, this fact has only been noticed and else shall have no bearing on the questions involved in the case because this aspect seems not to have been put in issue before the mining authorities. Essentially the case of the petitioners has been that they were entitled to be considered as the applicants falling in category No. (vii) aforesaid.
Assailing the orders aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the aforesaid Rule 27(1) 8 and particularly category No.(vii) has already been considered and interpreted by this Court in the case of Budh Mal and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and another: 2001 WLC (Raj.) UC 738 and, for the said Rule having been held valid and found having its nexus to social welfare, there is no reason that the same be given restricted meaning and as to why the same be not given the fullest effect. According to the learned counsel, even when the said rule carries the expression 'killed', in its context, the expression covers all the cases of the employees dying while on duty particularly when the purpose of the provision is to extend support to the needy dependents of government servants. Learned counsel submitted that there is no warrant for interpretation that the Government servant must have been killed by some other person so that the case would fall in category No.(vii) but, according to the learned counsel, when a Government servant perishes while discharging duties, in the true operation of the Rule, his dependents are entitled to be considered in category No.(vii) aforesaid.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents and the learned Government Counsel, while supporting the orders impugned, submitted that the conscious use of the expression ''killed while on duty'' makes it clear that not all the cases of the Government servants dying while on 9 duty are intended to be covered under the said category No.
(vii). Learned counsel for the respondents would maintain that a person gets killed only by some external force or act and it is only for the dependants of such category of the employees of the State Government that the Rule intends to provide some reservation. According to the learned counsel, for the interpretation as made, where the provision contained in Rule 27 (1) (vii) has been considered by this Court akin to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the said decision in Budh Mal's case (supra) rather operates in favour of the respondents.
Having given a thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having considered the relevant provisions, this Court is clearly of opinion that the submissions of the petitioners remain untenable; and the claim of the petitioners cannot be held covered in category No. (vii) of Rule 27 (1) of the Rules of 1986.
Rule 27 of the Rules of 1986 in its Chapter III dealing with grant of quarry licence of course provides for preferential right of certain categories of persons and, when a new block of quarries is delineated, amongst others, ten per cent of quarry licences are kept reserved for the State Government servants who have become permanently disabled while on duty or the dependants of those who have been killed while on duty. 10 Though it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the said provision is that of a welfare measure intended to provide relief to the employees of the State Government who die while on duty and hence, mere use of the expression "killed" cannot restrict its operation but, in the opinion of this Court, the submissions cannot be accepted.
So far the dependants of the deceased State Government servants are concerned, the reservation and preferential right for grant of quarry licence has been provided for the dependants of such of the State Government servants who have been 'killed while on duty'. Obviously, the preferential right has been limited for the specific class of persons, namely the dependants of those Government servants who had died because of being killed while on duty; and not for the dependants of all the Government servants dying while on duty. There appears no reason to read the provision as if the expression "killed" has been used synonymous, or as alternative, to the expression "died". On the contrary, the legislative intent is clear from the use of expression itself; dependants of the employees who are killed while on duty are extended the benefit and not the dependants of all the employees who die while on duty. It does not need much of the emphasis that the first and foremost principle of statutory interpretation is the literal rule. When the words of a 11 statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous; and if the legislative intent is clear from the provision itself, other rules of interpretation are not required to be called in aid. Other rules of interpretation come into play only if there is any doubt with regard to the express language used, or if the plain meaning would lead to an absurdity. There is neither any ambiguity in nor any doubt about the language of the said provision contained in Rule 27(1) (vii) of the Rules of 1986.
When consciously the expression ''killed while on duty'' has been used, the same cannot be taken covering all the cases of the employees who die while on duty. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the exposition of the word ''killed'' as taken from website ''http://en.wikipedia.org'' thus:
''To kill, killing or to have killed means to cause the death of a living organism.
The act of killing an animal, plant, or other life form can be said to have occurred when an outside force, usually another life form, has done something to cause it to die. This may be a result of several actions:
■ a deliberate action such as war
■ in the case of animals, slaughter;
■ the result of a criminal act, the action or
fault of another human being,
■ the result of an accident, such as a car
crash.
■ suicide (to kill oneself)''
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The particular action of killing occurs only when some outside force is applied or something is done or, may be, omitted to be done that results in causing death. Of course, the action of killing would result in death of the person concerned, but then, the expression 'killed' itself pre-supposes that the death has resulted for something done or omitted to be done by somebody or because of some other force; and in any event, it cannot be placed at equal pedestal with death of a person that occurs not for killing but otherwise, like that of natural death. The expression 'killed while on duty' as used in Rule 27 (1) (vii) makes it clear that the reservation has been provided to extend support to the dependents of those State Government employees who are killed while discharging their duties; as distinguished from the cases of the employees who die while on duty, but their demise is for a reason other than killing. Even when the said Rule is that of a welfare measure, it cannot be said that limiting the preferential rights for grant of quarry licence in relation to the dependents of such of the State Government employees who are killed while discharging their duties does in any manner defeat or frustrate the purpose. On the contrary, extending of State support to the dependents of those State Government employees who lay down their lives while and because of discharging their duties 13 appears to be real intent and purpose of the provision aforesaid; and hence is used the expression 'killed while on duty' instead of 'died while on duty'.
This Court is clearly of opinion that for sustainability of a claim by the dependant of a deceased Government servant under category No. (vii) of Rule 27(1) of the Rules of 1986, it has to be established that the said Government servant died because of being killed while he was on duty; and if the Government servant died because of some other cause, like the case of the present nature where the employee expired for heart failure, it is difficult to agree that his dependants too could make a claim under the said category No. (vii) of Rule 27(1).
Though reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Budh Mal (supra), however, the observations therein also operate against the claim as made by the petitioners. This Court, while examining the validity of Clause (vi) and Clause (vii) of Rule 27 (1) of the Rules of 1986 has pointed out in the case of Budh Mal that,-
''4. Clause (vi) and (vii) is a welfare measure for the employees of the State to give them relief in case an employee has died in the course of employment or suffered permanent disability in the course of his employment. This is apparent from the fact that in clause (vi) the benefit is conferred on such soldiers or ex-soldiers who have suffered permanent disability or killed in action, and soldiers or ex-soldiers, who have become permanently disabled or killed otherwise 14 than while in action have not been conferred with any benefit of priority consideration under Clause
(vi). Likewise term 'while on duty' has been used for expression 'killed in action' for the purpose of extending the benefit of similar priority consideration to civilian employees of the State of Rajasthan.
This Court has further pointed out,-
''5. This making of welfare legislation by the State of Rajasthan as delegate of power under Mines and Mineral Regulation & Development Act, by framing rules with the objecting for extending the benefit of considering application for grant of mining lease to such permanent disabled soldiers including ex-soldiers as well as State employees, who have suffered such permanent disability in the course of action/in the course of employment (while on duty) as the case may be and to the dependents of deceased soldiers/ex-soldiers from the State who died while in action, or employees of State who have died in the course of employment at No.(vi) & (vii) or the Mining Mineral Concession Rules, has rational nexus to object sought to be achieved, namely fixing the priority in the matter of consideration, on need basis for providing equal opportunity of economic development. Therefore, it cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary or founded on unreasonable classification.'' This Court has drawn parallel of these provisions with those contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation is made available when the employee concerned has suffered employment injury caused by an 'accident arising out of and during the course of employment' (vide Section 3 thereof). 15 Such an aspect clearly takes into its compass the nexus of duties with the injury suffered; and the expression 'arising out of and during the course of employment' obviously postulates causal relationship between the accident and the employment. In relation to the provision as contained in Rule 27(1) (vii) of the Rules of 1986, this Court has indicated in Budh Mal (supra) that the benefit is not conferred on the persons who died otherwise and, while issuing directions to consider the cases of the persons having made such applications in the light of the principles of the Workmen's Compensation Act, this Court said,-
"9. In view of the aforesaid interpretation, that Clause (vii) of Rule 27 applies to the cases akin to any employee, suffering injury resulting in permanent disability or death in the course of employment as in the case of Workman Compensation Act, the case of the petitioners for the purpose of determining priority may be examined in that light by the concerned Mining Engineer/Assistant Mining Engineer as the case may be on the facts of the case after giving an opportunity of hearing to the applicant in whose favour lease was sanctioned but the same has been cancelled, before finally deciding their application.'' Thus, applying the literal rule of interpretation, the expression 'killed while on duty' in Rules 27(1) (vii) of the Rules of 1986 could only be read as covering the cases where the employee concerned, while on duty, gets killed for some reason and not otherwise. Further, for the purport and 16 operation of the said Rule as explained by this Court in Budh Mal's case, it is apparent that the same is intended only to extend benefit to the dependents of the State Government employees who have been killed while on duty and not for all cases of the employees dying while on duty.
It is not in dispute that late Shri Padam Singh, father of the petitioner Arjun Singh and husband of the petitioner Tara Devi with reference to whose demise, the petitioners have made claim under Rule 27 (1) (vii), died for heart failure, of course, while on duty. There is no indication whatsoever on record that his demise could at all be co-related with any other force or circumstance so as to treat it as a case of the employee having been ''killed while on duty''.
For the aforesaid reasons, the view as taken by the authorities concerned cannot be said to be unjustified; and the authorities cannot be said to have committed any error or illegality in rejecting the claim as made by the petitioners. There is no warrant for interference in these cases.
The writ petitions fail and are dismissed; however, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.
(DINESH MAHESHWARI), J.
MK