Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Arun Kumar Debnath vs State Bank Of India & Ors on 24 October, 2025
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2020:CHC-AS:282
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
W.P.A. 30110 of 2014
Arun Kumar Debnath
-Vs-
State Bank of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ayan Banerjee
Ms. Debasree Dhamali
Ms. Riya Ghosh
For the Respondents/Bank : Mr. S. Pal Chaudhuri
Ms. Tithi Paul
Ms. Shilpi Paul
Heard on : 26.06.2024, 24.07.2024, 27.09.2024,
05.11.2024, 18.02.2025, 13.06.2025,
19.08.2025
Judgment on : 24.10.2025
Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
1. The petitioner, a long-serving and dedicated officer of the State Bank of
India, commenced his career as an Agricultural Assistant on 14th
October, 1977, at the Jangipur Branch and, through consistent diligence
and integrity, rose to the post of Chief Manager (SMGS-IV), lastly serving
at the Dhakuria Branch, Kolkata. His tenure, marked by unblemished
service, was abruptly interrupted when he was placed under suspension
by the respondent authorities on 23rd November, 2012, under Rule
68(A)(1) of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules (SBIOSR), in
contemplation of disciplinary proceedings.
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2. Subsequently, a memorandum of charge-sheet dated 15th March, 2013, 2020:CHC-AS:282
was issued, imputing six charges against the petitioner, primarily alleging
fraudulent manipulation of entries relating to issuance of an 8% RBI
Savings Bond in 2006, unauthorised credit of 5,00,000/- to his own
account, and irregular payments to one Chandra Sekhar Chatterjee. The
gravamen of the allegations was that the petitioner, while functioning as
Manager (Accounts & Administration) at Asansol Branch, had asted in
gross negligence and in violation of Rule 50(4) of the SBIOSR.
3. The petitioner, while denying all allegations, laid bare the factual
substratum in which the alleged events occurred. It was urged that in
2006, the petitioner had been facing dire personal and financial distress
owing to the grave illness of both his parents-his mother suffering from
cancer and his father being bedridden. Depleted of resources, the
petitioner had approached all lawful avenues for financial assistance to no
avail. In such vulnerable circumstances, one Chandra Sekhar Chatterjee,
a known customer, offered to extend a temporary loan of 5,00,000/- with
a peculiar condition that the amount be routed through the Bank as a
notional investment in 8% RBI Savings Bonds, with the petitioner,
obligated to pay periodic interest and to refund the principal upon
maturity.
4. It was contended that, under bona fide belief and without any intent to
defraud or cause pecuniary loss to the Bank, the petitioner issued the
Bond and appropriated the funds under the conviction that the
arrangement was private and non-prejudicial to Bank interests.
Significantly, the petitioner himself voluntarily disclosed the entire
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transaction to the Assistant General Manager of the Asansol Branch on 2020:CHC-AS:282
19th October, 2012-an act wholly inconsistent with fraudulent intent.
Upon such disclosure, an internal enquiry was conducted by the
Assistant General Manager, who categorically reported on 8th November,
2012, that no financial loss whatsoever had been sustained by the Bank,
and that the petitioner's disclosure was the sole source through which the
matter came to the Bank's knowledge.
5. Notwithstanding such exculpatory findings, the disciplinary machinery
was set in motion. The Enquiry Officer, by his report dated 29th July,
2013, held all charges to be proved. The petitioner, in his detailed written
statement of defence dated 25th July, 2013, denied the allegations,
asserting that the enquiry was vitiated by procedural impropriety, bias,
and non-consideration of material evidence. He further contended that
the enquiry authority acted mechanically and with a pre-determined
mind, disregarding his written and oral submissions, and his request for
production of crucial documents-five out of eight-was arbitrarily refused,
thereby frustrating his defence and violating the principles of natural
justice.
6. The petitioner's written representation dated 8th August, 2013, against
the enquiry report was discarded without reasoned consideration. He
emphasized therein his voluntary disclosure to the Bank was itself
evinced bona fide intention fortified by the internal report which clearly
established absence of monetary loss, disregarding the same, the
disciplinary process culminated in the Chief General Manager proposing,
by Memo dated 30th August, 2013, to impose the major penalty of
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dismissal under Rule 67(1) of the SBIOSR. The petitioner was served with 2020:CHC-AS:282
the said Memo at 10:15 A.M. on 31st August, 2013, merely fifteen
minutes prior to the scheduled personal hearing at 10:30 A.M. His
request for adjournment was summarily rejected, and by noon of the
same day, an order of dismissal from service was issued to him,
demonstrating the decision to have been premeditated and the show
cause proceeding to have been mere formality devoid of fairness. The
order, bereft of reasoning, was non-speaking and reflective of total non-
application of mind, thereby violating the settled canons of service
jurisprudence.
7. It was further contended that the disciplinary authority-General Manager
(NW-2)-was subordinate to the appointing authority, rendering the entire
proceeding coram non judice. The Chief General Manager, in merely
approving the pre-conceived findings of the lower authority without
independent application of mind, abdicated his quasi-judicial duty,
thereby vitiating the order of punishment.
8. The punishment of dismissal, being manifestly disproportionate to the
alleged misconduct, was arbitrary, capricious, and startling severe,
particularly when no element of fraud or mala fide Intention was
established when predominantly the Bank admittedly did not suffer
pecuniary loss. The petitioner's conduct, at worst, could amount to an
irregularity induced by distressing personal circumstances, and not
dishonesty warranting dismissal.
9. The appeal preferred by the petitioner on 17th September, 2013,
reiterating violation of audi alteram partem, non-compliance of SBIOSR,
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and disproportionality of punishment, was perfunctorily rejected by the 2020:CHC-AS:282
Appellate Committee on 11th March, 2014, without due consideration of
the grounds raised. The appellate order was cryptic, non-reasoned, and
failed to appreciate that the absence of fraud and the Bank's recovery of
all amounts rendered the imposition of dismissal legally unsustainable.
10. The petitioner further alleged vindictive conduct on the part of the
respondent Bank in withholding his lawful retiral benefits, including
Provident Fund, Gratuity, and Leave Encashment, and in unauthorisedly
adjusting his outstanding personal and educational loans from such
statutory dues, which were exempted from attachment or adjustment. In
totality, the proceedings were tainted by: (i) violation of the principles of
natural justice, (ii) non-compliance with the procedural mandates of
SBIOSR, (iii) exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by an incompetent
authority, (iv) absence of independent application of mind by the
appointing authority, and (v) imposition of a shockingly disproportionate
punishment in the face of established absence of loss or mala fide intent.
11. Thus, the cumulative effect of the actions of the Enquiry Officer,
Disciplinary Authority, Appointing Authority, and Appellate Authority
manifested a proceeding conceived and conducted in flagrant disregard of
fairness, reason, and justice. The petitioner, having served the institution
with distinction for over three decades, was condemned unheard and
unjustly divested of his livelihood. The impugned orders, being
unsustainable in law and equity, deserved to be quashed, restoring to the
petitioner the dignity of service that was unlawfully taken away.
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12. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner submitted the 2020:CHC-AS:282
conspectus of facts that the respondent authorities, in its entire course of
conduct, acted with palpable arbitrariness and in derogation of the
established tenets of service jurisprudence. The impugned order of
dismissal from service, far from being an outcome of a fair and reasoned
adjudication, bore the indelible mark of predetermined bias and
procedural impropriety. The disciplinary machinery of the respondent
Bank appeared to have been set in motion not in bona fide exercise of
statutory discretion but rather in disguise, actuated by an ulterior motive.
The dismissal of the petitioner was effected not upon a judicious appraisal
of evidence but through a mechanical exercise, thereby rendering the
impugned order legally unsustainable.
13. It was contended that the entire disciplinary proceeding was vitiated by
non-observance of the procedural safeguards envisaged under the State
Bank of India Officers' Service Rules (SBIOSR). The respondents failed to
adhere to the settled parameters of fairness, equity, and transparency
which are the sine qua non of any quasi-judicial proceeding. The
punishment of dismissal from service, in the backdrop of the petitioner's
long and unblemished tenure, is ex facie disproportionate to the gravity of
the alleged lapse. The absence of any financial loss to the Bank, coupled
with the petitioner's voluntary disclosure of the transaction in question,
renders the imposition of the extreme penalty wholly excessive and
unconscionable in law.
14. It was further contended that the respondents, in a manifest display of
procedural impropriety, issued the notice proposing punishment and the
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final order of dismissal on the selfsame day, thereby depriving the 2020:CHC-AS:282
petitioner of any meaningful opportunity to defend his cause. Such hasty
action stands in egregious violation of the audi alteram partem rule the
foundational pillar of natural justice. The Appellate Committee, instead of
discharging its duty as a revisional forum, abdicated its responsibility by
mechanically affirming the order of dismissal. The Committee failed to
appreciate the multifarious grounds raised in the petitioner's appeal and
rendered a cryptic affirmation, betraying non-application of mind. The
record is conspicuously silent as to any specific finding of fraudulent
intent or wrongful gain on the part of the petitioner. In the absence of a
definitive finding of fraud, the invocation of the term "fraudulent activity"
is a mere ipse dixit unsubstantiated by cogent proof. The imposition of
dismissal, therefore, suffers from perversity and disproportionality.
15. It was further submitted that the petitioner was denied a fair chance to
respond to the proposed punishment, as the show-cause notice and the
punishment order were issued almost contemporaneously. Such an
approach rendered the proceeding an empty formality, amounting to a
denial of fair hearing and violating the sacrosanct principles of natural
justice.
16. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner submitted that the
charge-sheet and disciplinary proceeding had been vitiated due to bias
and preconceived mind and relied on the decision in Oryx Fisheries
Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 427, wherein
the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:-
"31. It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read
hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably.
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But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person 2020:CHC-AS:282
who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective
opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show-cause notice
and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause
notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to
the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely
knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion,
such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure
especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a
statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded
against a reasonable opportunity of defence."
17. Reliance was further placed upon the decision in Khaitan (India)
Limited Versus Learned Judge, Eighth Industrial Tribunal, (2009) 4
CHN 380, of the Division Bench of this Court.
18. It was further submitted by the Learned Advocate for the petitioner that
enquiry report vitiated due to complete non-application of mind and
relied on the decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank,
(2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial
proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The
charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have
been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon
taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties.
The purported evidence collected during investigation by the
investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be
treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was
examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses
merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof.
Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which
could not have been treated as evidence.
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2020:CHC-AS:282
....
"25. ... Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with."
19. Reliance was further placed upon the decisions in Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, (2013) 6 SCC 515 and in State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
20. Learned Advocate representing the petitioner further submitted that the order of the disciplinary authority is cryptic without any legal analysis and application of mind and relied on the decision in G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society, (2010) 2 SCC 497, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"19. In his order, the Chairman of the Managing Committee did refer to the allegations levelled against the appellant and representation submitted by her in the light of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, but without even adverting to the contents of her representation and giving a semblance of indication of application of mind in the context of Rule 120(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules, he directed her removal from service. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of punishment was passed by the Chairman without complying with the 10 mandate of the relevant statutory rule and the principles of natural 2020:CHC-AS:282 justice. The requirement of recording reasons by every quasi-judicial or even an administrative authority entrusted with the task of passing an order adversely affecting an individual and communication thereof to the affected person is one of the recognised facets of the rules of natural justice and violation thereof has the effect of vitiating the order passed by the authority concerned.
20. A careful reading of the Tribunal's order shows that though it did not find any procedural infirmity in the enquiry against the appellant, the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee was nullified only on the ground of violation of Section 8(2) of the Act read with Rule 120(2) of the Rules inasmuch as permission of the Director was not obtained before removing the appellant from service. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and indirectly restored the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee because it was of the view that Section 8(2) is not applicable to the minority institutions. Neither the Tribunal nor the Division Bench of the High Court dealt with and decided the appellant's challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and her plea that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on her was not justified because she was not found guilty of any serious misconduct.
21. Since the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice, we may have remitted the matter to the Tribunal with a direction to consider whether or not the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the appellant was disproportionate to the misconduct found against her or the action taken by the management was wholly arbitrary or unjust but keeping in view the fact that the appellant was removed from service more than 13 years ago, we do not consider it proper to adopt that course."11
21. Reliance was further placed in B.A. Linga Reddy v. Karnataka State 2020:CHC-AS:282 Transport Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 515, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"18. In Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 981], it was held: (SCC pp. 986-87, para 6) "6. ... It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd. [(1979) 3 SCC 225 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 261] But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated 8-12-1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated 4-6- 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to 12 be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram 2020:CHC-AS:282 partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law."
.....
20. A Constitution Bench of this Court has laid down in Krishna Swami v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 605] that if a statutory or public authority/functionary does not record the reasons, its decision would be rendered arbitrary, unfair, unjust and violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This Court has laid down thus : (SCC p. 637, para
47) "47. ... Undoubtedly, in a parliamentary democracy governed by rule of law, any action, decision or order of any statutory/public authority/functionary must be founded upon reasons stated in the order or staring from the record. Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21. But exceptions are envisaged keeping institutional pragmatism into play, conscious as we are of each other's limitations."
22. It was further submitted by the Learned Advocate for the petitioner that order passed by refusing prayer for adjournment violates natural justice and relied on Union of India v. I.S. Singh, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 518, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"2. So far as the first ground is concerned, it stands negatived by the recent decision of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704 : JT (1993) 6 SC 1] , inasmuch as the order of punishment is of the year 1980. So far as the second ground is 13 concerned, a few facts need be stated. An inquiry was held, in the first 2020:CHC-AS:282 instance, which was not found to be in order by the disciplinary authority who directed a fresh inquiry. When notices were issued in the second inquiry, they could not be served on the respondent. On a later date, the respondent sent an application stating that he is suffering from unsoundness of mind and that the inquiry may be postponed till he regains his mental health. The respondent also states that he sent his medical certificate along with his application. (Indeed, according to him, he sent not one but three letters to the said effect.) The report of the Enquiry Officer, however, does not show that he paid any attention to these letters. If, indeed, the letters were not accompanied by medical certificates, as is now asserted by Shri Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellants, the proper course for the Enquiry Officer was to have called upon the respondent either to produce a medical certificate or to direct him to be examined by a medical officer specified by him. The inquiry report does not even refer to the request contained in the said application nor does it mention why and for what reasons did he ignore the said plea of the respondent. The Enquiry Officer proceeded ex parte, in spite of the said letters and made his recommendation on the basis of which the aforesaid penalty was imposed. It is evident from the facts stated above that the Enquiry Officer has not only conducted the inquiry in a manner contrary to the procedure prescribed by Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules but also in violation of the principles of natural justice. The result of this finding would have been to set aside the order of punishment and allow the authority to proceed with the inquiry afresh.
In our opinion, however, this is not advisable at this distance of time and also having regard to the nature of the charges levelled against the respondent. We think that the more appropriate course would be to give a quietus to the matter at this stage itself, at the same time providing for some measure of penalty to the respondent. We suggested to the learned counsel for the respondent whether he is agreeable to our suggestion, viz., that the respondent should forego the emoluments for the period commencing from June 1, 1980 to August 14 31, 1985 (approximating to the date of punishment and the date on 2020:CHC-AS:282 which the respondent approached the High Court). Learned counsel, Shri H.M. Singh, agrees to the said course after consulting his client. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeal but direct that the respondent shall not be entitled to any emoluments for the period June 1, 1980 to August 31, 1985. The said period shall, however, count for seniority and other purposes. The respondent shall be reinstated forthwith."
23. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that punishment is shockingly disproportionate and relied on the decision in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:-
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
...
22. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I have no doubt that a High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has, in view of a long line of decisions of this Court, to 15 which reference is not deemed necessary, as the position is well 2020:CHC-AS:282 settled in law. It may, however, be stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be invoked by a High Court only when the punishment/penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience.
...
24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of a dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted, and, in view of the interdependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case [Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : (1970) 3 SCR 530] , which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597] , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342 : AIR 1983 SC 454] also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it."
24. Reliance was further placed upon the decision in Shankar Dass v. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 358, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, wherein the following was observed:-
"6. The learned Magistrate, First Class, Delhi, Shri Amba Prakash, was gifted with more than ordinary understanding of law. Indeed, he set an example worthy of emulation. Out of the total sum of Rs 1607.99 which was entrusted to the appellant as a cash clerk, he deposited Rs 1107.99 only in the Central Cash Section of the Delhi Milk Scheme. Undoubtedly, he was guilty of criminal breach of trust and the learned Magistrate had no option but to convict him for that offence. But, it is to be admired that as long back as in 1963, when 16 Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not on the statute 2020:CHC-AS:282 book and later refinements in the norms of sentencing were not even in embryo, the learned Magistrate gave close and anxious attention to the sentence which, in the circumstances of the case, could be passed on the appellant. He says in his judgment: The appellant was a victim of adverse circumstances; his son died in February 1962, which was followed by another misfortune; his wife fell down from an upper storey and was seriously injured; it was then the turn of his daughter who fell seriously ill and that illness lasted for eight months. The learned Magistrate concluded his judgment thus:
"Misfortune dogged the accused for about a year. . .and it seems that it was under the force of adverse circumstances that he held back the money in question. Shankar Dass is a middle-aged man and it is obvious that it was under compelling circumstances that he could not deposit the money in question in time. He is not a previous convict. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that he should be dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958."
7. It is to be lamented that despite these observations of the learned Magistrate, the Government chose to dismiss the appellant in a huff, without applying its mind to the penalty which could appropriately be imposed upon him insofar as his service career was concerned. Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution confers on the Government the power to dismiss a person from service "on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge". But, that power, like every other power, has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) makes the provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the right to impose a 17 penalty carries with it the duty to act justly. Considering the facts of 2020:CHC-AS:282 this case, there can be no two opinions that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant is whimsical."
25. It was further submitted by the Learned Advocate for the petitioner that termination without giving a proper notice and hearing is violative of natural justice and relied on the decision of SBI v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty, (2018) 12 SCC 807 rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it was held as follows:-
"2. The respondent was charge-sheeted and an informal enquiry was held against him and he was found guilty of all the charges except one charge. However, the disciplinary authority was not competent to pass a major penalty. Therefore, all the papers were placed before the competent authority for passing the major penalty. The appointing authority passed the major penalty of dismissal from service without hearing the delinquent. This was challenged by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Calcutta. The learned Single Judge dismissed [Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty v. SBI, WP No. 1273 of 1995, order dated 28-3-2001 (Cal)] the petition and the appeal filed by the delinquent is succeeded. The Court interpreted Rule 68(3)(iii) which reads as under:
"68. (3)(iii) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 67 should be imposed on the officer, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (4), make an order imposing such penalty:
Provided that where the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that the penalty to be imposed is any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of Rule 67 and it is lower in rank to the appointing authority in respect of the category of officers to which the officer belongs, it shall submit to the appointing authority the records of the enquiry specified in clause (xxi)(b) of sub-rule (2), together with its recommendations regarding the penalty that may be imposed and the appointing authority shall make an order imposing such penalty as it considers in its opinion appropriate."18
3. In this case, the respondent, who was punished with a major 2020:CHC-AS:282 penalty, was not heard. Therefore, the order of removal was set aside. We have been taken through Rule 68(3)(iii) and we are in full agreement with the view taken by the High Court. When the disciplinary authority is not competent to pass a major penalty, that is, of the removal or other major penalty prescribed in the Rule, the papers are required to be placed by the disciplinary authority to the appointing authority who is competent to pass a major penalty. In the present case, the disciplinary authority was not competent to pass major penalty, therefore, the matter was placed before the appointing authority and the appointing authority passed major penalty of dismissal without hearing the delinquent. Such order which is on the face of it is against the principles of natural justice, cannot be countenanced as it is void ab initio. The proviso certainly says that the appointing authority, on the recommendation given by the disciplinary authority, shall be competent to pass the major penalty. Simply by recommending the matter and sending the papers to the appointing authority, does not mean that the incumbent who is going to be served with the major penalty is not required to be heard in the matter. It is now settled principle that wherever the Rule is silent, the principles of natural justice shall be read in it. A hearing should be given to a person who is being punished with a major penalty. Therefore, the principle of natural justice has to be read in this Rule. A notice ought to have been issued to the delinquent by the authority to whom papers were sent to show cause why the major penalty may not be imposed on him. It is true that the competent authority could pass the order of major penalty but not without hearing the incumbent. Therefore, in this context of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench [Ranjit Kumar Chakrabarty v. SBI, APOT No. 316 of 2001, order dated 20-8-2004 (Cal)] of the Calcutta High Court is correct and there is no ground for interference in this appeal." 19
26. Reliance was further placed in Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT 2020:CHC-AS:282 of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"29. No doubt, rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be lifted to the position of fundamental rights. However, their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is now well-established proposition of law that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, in exercise of power prejudicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice.
....
31. When it comes to the action of blacklisting which is termed as "civil death" it would be difficult to accept the proposition that without even putting the noticee to such a contemplated action and giving him a chance to show cause as to why such an action be not taken, final order can be passed blacklisting such a person only on the premise that this is one of the actions so stated in the provisions of NIT. The "prejudice" argument
32. It was sought to be argued by Mr Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent, that even if it is accepted that the show-cause notice should have contained the proposed action of blacklisting, no prejudice was caused to the appellant inasmuch as all necessary details mentioning defaults/prejudices committed by the appellant were given in the show-cause notice and the appellant had even given its reply thereto. According to him, even if the action of blacklisting was not proposed in the show-cause notice, the reply of the appellant would have remained the same. On this premise, the learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that there is no prejudice caused to the appellant by non- mentioning of the proposed action of blacklisting. He argued that unless the appellant was able to show that non-mentioning of 20 blacklisting as the proposed penalty has caused prejudice and has 2020:CHC-AS:282 resulted in miscarriage of justice, the impugned action cannot be nullified. For this proposition he referred to the judgment of this Court in Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [(2008) 9 SCC 31 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 789] : (SCC pp. 38, 40-41 & 44, paras 21, 31, 36 & 44) "21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar [ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside.
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31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalised, can it not be argued that 'notice would have served no purpose' or 'hearing could not have made difference' or 'the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever'. In this connection, it is interesting to note that under the English law, it was held few years before that non- compliance with principles of natural justice would make the order null and void and no further inquiry was necessary.
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36. The recent trend, however, is of 'prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the 21 action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is 2020:CHC-AS:282 shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant.
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44. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of the inquiry officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show 'prejudice'. Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down."
33. When we apply the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case, it becomes difficult to accept the argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General. In the first instance, we may point out that no such case was set up by the respondents that by omitting to state the proposed action of blacklisting the appellant in the show-cause notice, has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. Moreover, had the action of blacklisting being specifically proposed in the show-cause notice, the appellant could have mentioned as to why such extreme penalty is not justified. It could have come out with extenuating circumstances defending such an action even if the defaults were there and the Department was not satisfied with the explanation qua the defaults. It could have even pleaded with the Department not to blacklist the appellant or do it for a lesser period in case the Department still wanted to blacklist the appellant. Therefore, it is not at all acceptable that non-mentioning of proposed blacklisting in the show-cause notice has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. This apart, the extreme nature of such a harsh penalty like blacklisting with severe consequences, would itself amount to causing prejudice to the appellant."
22
27. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner concluded that 2020:CHC-AS:282 considering the legal as well as the factual position, unless the enquiry report, order of Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are set aside, the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.
28. The petitioner was entitled to the following reliefs:-
a. Re-instatement of his service with full back-wages. (Since the petitioner was attained the age of superannuation, this relief not claimed for);
b. Pension;
c. The subsistence allowance along with interest;
d. Sums on account of provident fund (both employee and employers' contribution) along with interest;
e. Sums on account of gratuity along with interest;
f. Accumulated leave encashment along with interest.
29. The Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent bank submitted that the present writ petition was wholly devoid of merit and was instituted with the sole intent of assailing a well-reasoned disciplinary action, which had been conducted in accordance with law, adhering to the procedural safeguards embodied under the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules (hereinafter referred to as "SBIOSR").
30. It was argued that the petitioner, while serving as a Manager (Accounts and Administration) at the Asansol Branch of the State Bank of India, was vested with fiduciary responsibility over sensitive financial operations, including the management and issuance of 8% RBI Savings Bonds -- an instrument directly backed by the sovereign guarantee of the Government 23 of India. In the discharge of such public and fiduciary functions, the 2020:CHC-AS:282 petitioner was bound by the cardinal principles of utmost integrity, honesty, and transparency. However, contrary to these obligations, he committed acts of manipulation and misappropriation, amounting to gross misconduct and moral turpitude.
31. The Learned Counsel elaborated that, during the course of internal audit and reconciliation, it was discovered that the petitioner had fraudulently diverted Rs.5,00,000/- from the branch's "Sundry Deposit Account" and caused it to be credited to his own personal account, thereafter utilising the said amount for private gain. The said act was not a mere procedural lapse but a deliberate and conscious falsification of the bank's financial records, thereby eroding institutional trust and exposing the bank to reputational and regulatory risk.
32. In consequence thereof, a memorandum dated 15th March 2013 was duly issued under Rule 68(1)(i) of the SBIOSR, containing detailed articles of charge, statement of imputations, and the list of witnesses and documents relied upon. The petitioner was duly served, afforded an opportunity to inspect all relevant documents, and granted liberty to file a written statement of defence within the stipulated timeframe. It was submitted that the petitioner did file a written explanation, which, however, was evasive, inconsistent, and incapable of dislodging the evidentiary foundation of the charges levelled against him.
33. The disciplinary proceedings, it was contended, were conducted in strict conformity with the procedural tenets governing such enquiries. The Enquiry Officer, an independent authority, afforded the petitioner full 24 opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, adduce documentary evidence, 2020:CHC-AS:282 and submit his written arguments. The enquiry thus met every element of natural justice and fair play, ensuring that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer at any stage.
34. The Learned Counsel, in furtherance of the argument, drew attention to the six distinct charges framed against the petitioner, each touching upon acts of dishonesty, falsification, and abuse of fiduciary position. The charges included unauthorised debit entries, non-remittance of the customer's investment amount to the designated branch, issuance of false bond certificates, and delayed repayment through personal accounts. Each of these acts, individually and collectively, demonstrated gross breach of trust, incompatible with the standards expected of an officer of a nationalised bank.
35. The Enquiry Officer, after exhaustive examination of records and evidence, found all the charges proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner was duly furnished with a copy of the Enquiry Report, and he availed the opportunity to submit a representation against the findings. The disciplinary authority, upon independent appraisal of the record and after granting the petitioner a personal hearing, concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service under Rule 67j) of the SBIOSR.
36. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal, which was meticulously considered by the Appellate Authority and rejected through a reasoned and speaking order dated 11th March 2014. The appellate authority, upon thorough examination, recorded its concurrence 25 with the disciplinary findings, holding that the petitioner's conduct was 2020:CHC-AS:282 unbecoming of a bank officer and destructive of the essential trust underlying the banker-customer relationship.
37. The Learned Counsel for the bank asserted with emphasis that the entire disciplinary process was fair, transparent, and legally unimpeachable. The petitioner was not only afforded ample opportunity at every stage but had in fact participated in the proceedings without demur. The allegation of procedural irregularity or violation of natural justice was, therefore, an afterthought, raised only to obfuscate the seriousness of the established misconduct.
38. The Learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 1669), wherein it was held that unless the delinquent demonstrates specific prejudice occasioned by procedural irregularity, the enquiry cannot be invalidated. It was further submitted that the doctrine of proportionality had limited application in cases of proven dishonesty or moral misconduct, especially where the employee is entrusted with handling public funds.
39. The respondent bank submitted that the petitioner's plea of "no loss caused to the bank" was wholly irrelevant, as the core issue was the loss of institutional faith and moral integrity, not financial damage. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decisions of Lalit Popli V. Central Bank of India (2003) 3 SCC 583; SBI v. Bela Bagchi (2005) 7 SCC 435; Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain (2005) 10 SCC 84; United Bank of India v. Bachan Prasad Lall (AIR 2022 SC 943); and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Rajendra D. Harmalkar (2022 SCC 26 OnLine SC 486), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court consistently held 2020:CHC-AS:282 that acts of dishonesty, even without pecuniary loss, strike at the root of fiduciary trust and warrant the severest disciplinary action.
40. The Learned Counsel also referred to SBI v. T.J. Paul (AIR 1999 SC 1994), SBI v. R.D. Pandey (2006) 7 SCC 212, and Pravin Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 9 SCC 471, contending that leniency or misplaced sympathy has no role to play where integrity of an officer is compromised. It was urged that honesty is the fulcrum of the banking system, and once that foundation is shaken, the continuance of such an officer is impossible.
41. The respondent bank, referring to Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (2006) 3 SCC 150* and A.P.S.R. T.C. v. Raghuda Siva Sankar Prasad (2007) 1 SCC 222, submitted that in cases involving proven financial misconduct, dismissal from service is not only justified but imperative, to preserve the credibility of the institution. It was further submitted that the penalty imposed cannot be termed "disproportionate" merely because of its severity; rather, it was commensurate with the gravity of the proven charges.
42. The Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner's attempt to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution was misconceived. The Writ Court is not an appellate forum to re-evaluate evidence or reappreciate factual findings arrived at in a properly conducted departmental enquiry. Unless the petitioner demonstrates perversity, mala fides, or manifest violation of natural justice, judicial interference is wholly unwarranted.
43. To fortify this proposition, reliance was placed upon B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749*, State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama 27 Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1723), and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 2020:CHC-AS:282 SCC 610, wherein the Supreme Court authoritatively held that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited to testing the decision- making process, not the decision itself.
44. It was submitted that in the instant case the plea was taken that the Disciplinary Authority of the Bank did not assign the reasons in awarding punishment on the writ petitioner and the order of the Appellate Authority was also very cryptic and a non speaking one. It was submitted that the Disciplinary Authority of the Bank had in the instant case rightly passed the order with reasons after giving an opportunity of fullest hearing to the writ petitioner. The Appellate Authority of the Bank also dealt with the appeal on the basis of the submissions made before him by the writ petitioner and also passed the speaking and reasoned order. It was the settled principles of law that Disciplinary Authority was not bound to restate reasons if he concurs with the Enquiry Officer as held in the case of National Fertilizers Ltd. & another - Vs. - .K. Khanna reported in (2005) 7 SCC - Page 597 at Paras 9 to 11. The scope of the Appellate Authority was dealing with the appeal was specifically be served by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Bhatt Vs. Union of India & Others reported in (1986) 2 SCC Page 651 at Paras 4 & It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder. ohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. [(2006) 4 CC. 713 at Para 33 & 35 that the order of the Appellate Authority might not be speaking one. It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. H.K. Dogra reported in (1995) 5 SLR Page 358 at Para 14 that the order of the 28 Appellate Authority might not be elaborate. In the instant case the 2020:CHC-AS:282 Appellate Authority of the Bank duly considered the grounds of appeal submitted by the writ petitioner passed his reasoned order.
45. It was submitted that the order of the Disciplinary Authority in the instant case could not be said to be cryptic, non-speaking and unreasoned in view of the fact that the Disciplinary Authority after considering all the aspects of the matter including the written submissions made by the writ Petitioner on the report and findings of the Enquiry Officer had passed his final order. The reasons were given in the said order itself as would appear from the said order. Since the authority that passed the order was not a judicial authority and as such he did not pass such type of order as usually the Judicial Officers did and on that score the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in this regard could not be said to be violative of principles of natural justice and fair play. It was also settled principle of law that the submissions on Enquiry Officer's report and findings were not required to be dealt with paragraph by paragraph, line by line while passing the final order by the Disciplinary Authority. What was required was that the Disciplinary Authority before passing his final order duly applied his mind to all the records of the case and to assign reasons for passing such order. In the instant case the Disciplinary Authority passed the final order after applying his mind and also by assigning the reasons. The question of setting aside and/or quashing the said order of the Disciplinary Authority particularly in the instant case did not and could not arise at all.
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46. It was submitted that assuming but not admitting that the order of the 2020:CHC-AS:282 Disciplinary Authority is cryptic, non-speaking and unreasoned, the lacunae in the same had already been filled up by the order of the Appellate Authority. It was a settled principle of law that the Appellate Authority had ample power and scope to deal with the appeal from every corner and in all respects as had been held in United Planters Association of Southern India Vs. K.G. Sangameswaran & Another reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court, Page 1300 at Para 17, 20, 25 and 27 and also in 2002 Volume 3 Calcutta High Court Notes Page 386 at Para 23 and also reported in Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P., Bhopal Vs. M/S Nirbheram Deluram reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court Page 1971 Para 5 & 7.
47. It was submitted that assuming but not admitting the order of the Disciplinary Authority was cryptic, non-speaking and unreasoned one but the same, since could be cured by the Appellate Authority, there was no necessity to set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority on that score and the Appellate Authority could be directed to reconsider the case of the writ petitioner as held in National Fertilizers Limited & Another Vs. P.K. Khanna reported in 2005 Volume 7 SCC Page 597 Para 14 & 15.
48. From the above discussion it could safely said as held in SBI - Vs Ajay Kumar Srivastava Reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 that the in case of disagreement, disciplinary authority must reason for disagreement (Para26,33,35), Bank employee to maintain good conduct and discipline since he dealt with money of customers on trust (Para 42).
49. It was submitted that the respondents had not violated any of the legal rights of the writ petitioner by inflicting punishment upon him as was 30 passed in law as well as on the facts and circumstances of the case 2020:CHC-AS:282 inasmuch as the writ Petitioner had no legal right to ask before this Hon'ble Court for quashing and/or setting aside of the disciplinary proceedings and/or the said orders of the authorities.
50. The decision reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case (2009) 2 SCC 570. It was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as the charge levelled against the petitioner had duly been proved by way of the admission in the enquiry and the enquiry officers had duly arrived at findings taken into consideration the materials brought on record. paragraph No. 20 of the instant Judgment was not at all applicable in the instant case as the sufficient materials on record to prove the misconduct.
51. The ratio in the decision reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 had not been violated by the respondent authorities and the Enquiry Officer had duly discharged his function and the examination evidences presented before him.
52. With regard to the decision being (2010) SCC 497 which had seen duly complied by the Enquiry Officer. It would be clearly demonstrated from the reading of the enquiry report in its entirety.
53. With regard to the decision reported in (2015) 4 SCC it was stated that the enquiry officer had duly complied with the requirements as indicated in the instant decision.
54. With regard to the decision reported in (1999) Supp.2 518 it was not applicable in the instant case, as the subject matter of the said case was 31 different and the ratio of the decision could not be applied in the instant 2020:CHC-AS:282 case.
55. With regard to the decision reported in (1999) 6 SCC it was stated that the order of the disciplinary authority could not be said as cryptic one and it would satisfy the tests laid down in the said decision.
56. With regard in 2009 for CHN 380 was not applicable in the instant case as it was clear from the action of the petitioner could not be stated that the charge sheet was issued as closed and biased mind.
57. The Learned Counsel concluded by submitting that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on overwhelming and unimpeachable evidence, duly corroborated by documentary records and admissions of the petitioner himself. The punishment imposed was neither arbitrary nor excessive, but was a logical and proportionate consequence of deliberate and fraudulent misconduct. Hence, the writ petition deserved outright dismissal with exemplary costs, to discourage abuse of judicial process in service jurisprudence.
58. One of the ethical codes in service conditions should be maintenance of transparency in discharging official duties. Maintaining transparency is strict adherence to the obligations statutorily prescribed in service rules. It is incumbent upon an employee to act conspicuously to the best of his knowledge as well as the others irrespectively being a senior or a junior to the same.
59. This Court, upon a holistic consideration of the records, is compelled to note that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of departmental proceedings is narrow and circumscribed. It is 32 not the function of the writ court to reappreciate evidence or substitute its 2020:CHC-AS:282 own view for that of the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction is limited to examining whether (i) the inquiry was conducted in adherence to the prescribed procedure, (ii) the findings were supported by some evidence, and (iii) the punishment was shockingly disproportionate or actuated by mala fides.
60. The doctrine of proportionality and procedural fairness has been judicially expounded in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 1669), BC. Chaturvedi v. Union of India ((1995) 6 SCC 749), and Union of India v. G. Ganayutham ((1997) 7 SCC 463), where the Supreme Court held that unless the punishment shocks the judicial conscience of the Court or the decision-making process is perverse, interference is unwarranted.
61. In the present case, the allegation is not one of mere negligence or procedural lapse, but of deliberate diversion of depositor's funds an act that undermines the very foundation of banking ethics. The petitioner's defence that the amount was refunded to the depositor does not mitigate the misconduct. The mens red accompanying the act of unauthorised appropriation is sufficient to establish culpability, and subsequent restitution cannot wash away the taint of initial dishonesty,
62. It is settled law that in cases involving moral turpitude and financial impropriety, the question of quantum of loss is immaterial. The Supreme Court in SBI v. Bela Bagchi ((2005) 7 SCC 435), Lalit Popli v. Central Bank of India [(2003) 3 SCC 583), and United Bank of India v. Bachan Prasad Lall (AIR 2022 SC 943) has consistently held that a bank officer is 33 expected to act as a sentinel of public trust, and any compromise with 2020:CHC-AS:282 integrity invites the severest disciplinary consequence.
63. The plea of non-supply of documents is equally devoid of substance. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate specific prejudice caused by such alleged non-supply. It is well settled in State Bank of India v. Bidyut Kumar Mitra [(2011) 2 SCC 316) that unless prejudice is proved, procedural lapses cannot vitiate disciplinary proceedings.
64. As to the argument that the orders of the disciplinary and appellate authorities were unreasoned, it is trite that while administrative orders must reflect application of mind, they need not be elaborate judicial pronouncements. The authorities' orders in the instant case reveal adequate reasoning and due application of mind, satisfying the standard of fairness.
65. The Appellate Authority's reasoned affirmation further cures any deficiency, as held in CIT v. NirbheramDeluram [AIR 1997 SC 1971] ard United Planters Association of Southern India v. K.G. Sangameswaran [AIR 1997 SC 1300].
66. The act of an employee must be discreet and direct without leaving any scope for speculation, suspicion, doubt or apprehension. An employee must be in a position to answer any question challenging his official duty without any deviation from the stipulated and/or prescribed rules. Unintentional error is common and can be negligible in course of the function of an employee if it is devoid of ill-intention or motive without causing any prejudice to any of the stakeholders which again may be a 34 technical or a mechanical mistake which can immediately be rectified 2020:CHC-AS:282 citing plausible reason for acceptance.
67. The petitioner in the instant case at the very inception entered into a relationship with the customer of the bank to sub-serve his personal interest in the disguise of a banking transaction without knowledge of the banking authorities. Though the bank, as had been claimed, did not suffer any financial loss, however, had been betrayed by the suppression of the action on the part of its employee who had been duty-bound to disclose each and every transaction entered into with the bank and its continuation, thereafter, with the involvement of a third party etc. including the customer of a bank.
68. The internal arrangement to grapple or surmount the financial constraint of the petitioner to tide over his parents' ailments without the knowledge of the bank authorities, had been a deliberate act on the part of the petitioner attracting misconduct.
69. The petitioner's justification to have revealed his act to the banking authorities by himself cannot accord protection and exculpation since his initial act of suppression to have entered into a personal transaction with the customer is contrary to the service rules, moreover, such personal transaction is entered into with the motive of acquiring financial benefit by the petitioner unaccepted in view of the banking norms.
70. The petitioner's claim that the banking authorities could not have detected such transaction unless the petitioner disclosed the same in itself was audacious exercise of official duties frustrating the banking procedures. Such berating abrogation is indubitably atrocious contrary to 35 the prevailing terms and conditions, liabilities and responsibilities of a 2020:CHC-AS:282 banking employee condemnable and despicable which otherwise replicated on several occasions either by the employee himself or by the other employees in a bank will surely uproot the foundation of the banking system and the petitioner cannot claim any respite on such ground with a pretentious acknowledgement of financial instability in the garb of exercising dishonesty.
71. The petitioner cannot plead lack of audi alteram partem since he had admittedly accepted to have divulged his act of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, after granting opportunity to the petitioner, conclusively determined misconduct on the part of the petitioner imputing him with the punishment as aforesaid.
72. The relevant portion of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rules, 1992 in Chapter Xi-Conduct, Discipline And Appeal Section 1 - Conduct replicated as follows:-
"50. (4) Every officer shall, at all times, take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of an officer."
73. Regulation No.14 of the State Bank Of India Employees' Pension Fund Regulations 2014 stated as follows:-
"14. Forfeiture or Accrual of pension.- An employee dismissed from the Bank's service for wilful neglect or fraud shall forfeit all claims upon the Fund for pension."
74. The word 'fraud' according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary means :
"a : DECEIT, TRICKERY 36 specifically : intentional perversion of truth in order to induce 2020:CHC-AS:282 another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right was accused of credit card fraud b : an act of deceiving or misrepresenting : TRICK automobile insurance frauds"
75. The petitioner entered into the transaction with Chandra Sekhar Chatterjee misrepresenting the bank with an act of deceiving the same to acquire personal benefit. Whether such arrangement was proposed by Chandra Sekhar Chatterjee was immaterial since the crux of the transaction was to accrue personal benefit in favour of the petitioner in the disguise of a regular transaction deceiving the bank in its normal course of functioning, therefore, the Regulation No.14 of the State Bank Of India Employees' Pension Fund Regulations 2014 is directly attracted in the case of the petitioner.
76. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA 30110 of 2014 is dismissed.
77. There is no order as to costs.
78. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)