Punjab-Haryana High Court
Haryana State Electricity Board And ... vs Phool Chand Staya Pal Engineers And ... on 9 October, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1994)106PLR368
Author: H.S. Bedi
Bench: H.S. Bedi
JUDGMENT H.S. Bedi, J.
1. Respondent No. 1, Messra Phool Chand Satya Pal Engineers and Contractors, filed a petition under Sections 20 and 22 of the Indian Arbitration Act (hereinafter called the 'Act') before the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Jagadhri seeking appointment of an arbitrator as per clause 75 of the agreement for settling the dispute which had arisen between the parties. This petition was allowed on 23rd November, 1990, and one Sh. S. P. Ajmani, Superintending Engineer, Haryana State Electricity Board was appointed as the Arbitrator. The Haryana State Electricity Board aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Jagadhri, under Section 39(1)(iv) of the Act and the same having been filed belatedly, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also moved. The Additional District Judge, however, vide his order dated 24th July, 1991 held that as no sufficient cause had been made out to condone the delay in filing the appeal, dismissed the same as being time barred. The reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge, was that it was well settled that in seeking condonation of delay, the person(s) claiming the benefit was required to explain each days' delay and if this was not done, limitation could not be condoned. The present petition has been filed impugning the order of the Additional District Judge.
2. Mr. R.C. Setia, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has urged that the finding of the Additional District Judge, that each days' delay was required to be explained for seeking condonation of delay was contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353. He has also urged that the Supreme Court in the above cited case as well as in G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 897 has held that in cases of condonation of delay some special discretion and latitude must be shown to governmental authorities.
3. Mr. S.P. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has in support of his case cited Balaram Das v. Sarathi Dalapai and Ors. A.I.R. 1988 Orissa 10 and United India Insurance Company Limited v. Karam Singh and Ors. 1992 H.R.R. 289 to assert that sufficient cause must be shown for condoning the delay and conclusion had been reached in the first two cited cases on a consideration of the judgments of the Supreme Court, above referred. He has further urged that the petitioner initiated the move for filing the appeal on 28th December, 1990 which was the last date of limitation for doing so and as such it could not be said that there was no negligence or inaction on its part.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments cited by them. In Mst. Katiji's case (supra) the Supreme Court has clearly laid down the broad principles in matters pertaining to applications for condonation of delay and the first basic principle is that a] liberal approach is to be adopted and sufficient cause must be made out in a pragmatic manner and a pedantic approach calling upon a party to explain each days delay is to be avoided. It has also been held that as the filing of an appeal late does not confer any right on the other side, it is just and proper that the parties must fight the litigation on its own merit without taking any recourse to technicalities of law. In this case, as also in G. Ramegowda's (supra) it has also been observed that in limitation matters some special discretion should be exercised in favour of governmental authorities as indifference or lethargy is bound to creep in and litigation being impersonal to those pursuing it, some delay was caused due to some mistake on the part of the government counsel and the order of the High Court in condoning the delay while entertaining the appeal was held to be good. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, it would be apparent that there was no justifiable reason for declining the application for condonation of delay. It has been impliedly admitted in the application that the matter with regard to filing of an appeal was initiated on 28th December, 1990 which was apparently the last date of limitation and the case was forwarded to Shri, Hemant Gupta Advocate for his opinion. It appears that Shri Gupta took some time in examining the matter and a letter was received in the office of the petitioner Board on 15th January, 1991 and the appeal was concededly filed the next day. It is, therefore, apparent that the Board was not guilty for the period between 28th December, 1990 to 15th January, 1991.
5. The judgments cited by Mr. Gupta are distinguishable on the facts of the present case. In Karam Singh's case (supra) which is a short order; a delay of 60 days had occurred as the file had not been received from the Head Office. In the other cited judgment the decision was taken on the facts of that case.
6. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is allowed; the order of the Additional District Judge is set aside and the delay in filing the appeal condoned. The parties are directed to appear before the Addl. District Judge, Jagadhri, on 18th November, 1993.