Calcutta High Court
Berger Paints India Ltd vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax on 20 May, 2011
Author: Indira Banerjee
Bench: Indira Banerjee
1
Order Sheet Serial No........
W.P. 858 of 2008
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
In the matter of :
Berger Paints India Ltd.
Vs
Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,
Circle -12, Kolkata & Ors.
Before:
The Hon'ble Justice
INDIRA BANERJEE
Date: 20.05.2011
JUDGMENT
In this writ application, the petitioner has challenged a proposal dated 14 th December, 2007 of the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range -12 seeking approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-IV for special audit of the accounts of the petitioner company for the Assessment Year 2005-06 in terms of Section 142 (2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and an order dated 24 th December, 2007 of the Commissioner approving the said proposal for special audit.
The facts giving rise to this writ application are very briefly enumerated hereinafter.
The petitioner company filed its income tax return for the Assessment Year 2005-06 on 28th October, 2005, declaring a total income of 2 Rs.38,15,59,980/- after claiming aggregate deduction of Rs.18,41,83,007/- under Section 80-1B of the Income Tax Act in respect of four of its industrial undertakings, two of which are located in Pondicherry and Goa respectively.
Along with its return, the petitioner company duly enclosed its audited Profit & Loss Accounts and Balance Sheet, Tax Audit Report under Section 44AB of the Income Tax Act and other relevant documents including four Auditors' Reports, all dated 26 th April, 2005 certifying the amount of profits derived from the industrial undertakings located at Pondicherry and Goa units and the two units located at Jammu.
As in previous years, the petitioner company apportioned the Head Office and other common expenses and made proportional allocation of such expenses to its units at Pondicherry, Goa and Jammu, on the basis of the ratio of the turnover of the said units to the total turn over of the petitioner company, thereby reducing the profits of the said units during the Financial Year 2004-2005 corresponding to the Assessment Year 2005-2006.
For allocation of Head Office and other common expenses to the Pondicherry unit, the petitioner company adopted the method of deducting from the actual expenses incurred during the year, an amount equivalent to 3 the expenditure incurred in 1996-1997 plus a further amount calculated upon application of the inflation factor of 5% per annum.
Dr. Pal rightly argued that irrespective of whether any new unit was set up or not, the expenditure incurred in 1996-1997 would have to be incurred in subsequent financial years. The amount would not remain static, but would increase by reason of inflation. This amount could not, therefore, be attributed to the Pondicherry unit.
The difference between the actual expenditure incurred in the Financial Year 2004-2005 by and the expenditure, on the basis of the Financial Year 1996-97, upon application of the inflation factor of 5% per annum could be said to have connection with the new unit at Pondicherry and was, therefore, allocated to the Pondicherry unit, even though, as submitted by Dr. Pal, the Pondicherry unit being a self contained unit, had actually run on its own. The petitioner company had already considered in the Profit and Loss Account of the Pondicherry unit, the advertisement and sales promotion expenditure of goods manufactured at the Pondicherry unit.
The petitioner company had apportioned to the Pondicherry unit, expenses incurred at the sales offices/depots through which the goods manufactured at the Pondicherry unit were sold.
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In this case also, the expenditure incurred in the Financial Year 1996- 97 was taken as the base figure, to which the inflation rate of 5% was applied, to arrive at the real expenditure for the Financial Year 2004-05.
The incremental expenditure was determined by deducting the real expenditure from the total expenditure incurred in the Financial Year 2004-
05. Allocation to the Pondicherry unit was done by apportionment in the ratio of Pondicherry unit turn over to total turn over of the petitioner company.
A similar basis of apportionment was adopted in case of the Goa unit and two other units located at Jammu, both of which commenced manufacture during the Financial Year 2004-05. The deduction in respect of the said two units under Section 80-1B was claimed for the first time in 2004-05.
The petitioner company claims to have been following the aforesaid basis of apportionment of common head office and selling expenses from the Assessment Year 1998-99 onwards.
The petitioner company also filed four certificates all dated 28th November, 2006 in amended Form No.10 CCB, in the office of its Assessing Officer on 18th January, 2007. Besides Profit and Loss Account and 5 Balance Sheet of the respective units, the allocation of common head office and selling expenses to the units eligible for deduction under Section 80-1B were also certified in the said Form No.10CCB filed with the Assessing Officer.
In 1998-99 also, a similar note was given by the auditors, in the Auditors' Report, certifying profits in respect of the Pondicherry unit. By an order dated 10th May, 2002 in Appeal No.DCIT Cir. 12/2001-02, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the basis adopted by the petitioner company. The Department did not contest the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal.
For the Assessment Year 1999-2000 the Department duly accepted the profit as computed in respect of Pondicherry unit for the purpose of Section 80-1B whereunder the assessee had, as in the previous year, computed such profit by including the proportionate head office and selling expenses, on a similar basis as the Assessment Year 1998-99.
The Department, however, issued a notice under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Year 1999-2000, on the purported ground that the head office and selling expenses had not been properly allocated in respect of the Pondicherry unit. Challenging the notice, the 6 petitioner moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being W.P. No.2139 of 2003 in this Court, which was entertained and admitted and an interim order was passed.
The issue of allocation of common head office and selling expenses in the Assessment Years 2000-2001 and 2001-02 came up before consideration of the Tribunal in the appeals being ITA Nos.1889 (r)/04 and 268(k)/05 filed by the Department. In those years also, similar notes were given by the auditors, in the Auditors' Reports, certifying the profits derived from the undertakings eligible for deduction under Section 80-1B of the Act, including the undertaking located at Pondicherry, for the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02.
In the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02 the same method was adopted in computing the profits. A portion of the Head Office and selling expenses were apportioned to the unit at Pondicherry. The Audit Report certified the profits derived from the undertakings eligible for deduction under Section 80-1B of the Income Tax Act.
By an order pronounced on 20th October, 2006, the learned Tribunal analyzed the basis of apportionment of common head office and selling expenses adopted consistently by the petitioner company while arriving at deductions admissible under Section 80-1B of the Income Tax Act and held 7 that the basis adopted by the petitioner company for allocation of common expenses was a reasonable and scientific basis, that did not call for any modification.
The Tribunal also took note of the fact that the Department had accepted the basis of apportionment of common head office and selling expenses in the Assessment Year 1998-99.
For the Assessment Year 2002-03, the Commissioner of Income Tax did not accept the basis of allocation of Head Office and selling expenses. The order of the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act was challenged before the Tribunal.
By an order dated 13 th August, 2007, in ITA No.290/KOL/2006 & ITA No.1166/KOL/2006, the learned Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner, following its earlier decision dated 17th October, 2006 for the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02.
In view of the order dated 17 th October, 2006 passed by the learned Tribunal for the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02 and the order dated 13th August, 2007 of the learned Tribunal quashing the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 263 in respect of the Assessment Year 2002-03, the mode of computation of income was not open to question. 8
The return filed by the petitioner company for the Assessment Year 2005-06 was selected for scrutiny by issuance of a notice dated 20 th October, 2006 under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The return was processed under Section 143(1) on 26th July, 2006. Subsequently, another notice dated 14 th September, 2007 under Section 142 (1) was issued enclosing a questionnaire requiring the petitioner company to furnish certain details and to answer certain queries in connection with the assessment proceedings for the Assessment Year 2005-
06. On or about 6th December, 2007 the petitioner company received show cause notice dated 3 rd December, 2007 directing the petitioner company to inter alia show-cause why the case of the petitioner company should not be referred to the Chief Commissioner/ Commissioner of Income Tax for special audit as per the provisions of Section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act.
The petitioner company gave a detailed reply to the show-cause notice. According to the petitioner, the petitioner company duly furnished all the required details along with documents. On or about 20 th December, 2007, the petitioner company received a letter dated 20 th December, 2007 issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax requiring the petitioner company to 9 inter alia justify certain transactions entered into by the petitioner company with M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd., and fixing the hearing in connection therewith on 24 th December, 2007.
Significantly, as pointed out by Dr. Pal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, there was no whisper of any transactions between the petitioner company and M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. in the proposal for special audit, submitted by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax.
Dr. Pal submitted that the notice dated 3rd December, 2007 whereby the petitioner company was required to show cause why the case should not be referred to the Chief Commissioner for special audit under Section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act, referred to the communications dated 17 th November, 2006 and 26th October, 2006 requiring the petitioner company to answer certain queries and furnish details/documents. The petitioner company was not called upon to furnish any information or any details of any transaction with M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd.
Under cover of a letter dated 17th December, 2007, the Commissioner of Income Tax forwarded the proposal made by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax to the petitioner company, and sought the comments/objection of the petitioner company on the proposal. The said letter was received on 18 th December, 2007.
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By the aforesaid letter dated 17 th December, 2007, the petitioner company was directed to file its objections/comments on the proposal through its authorized representative on 24th December, 2007. The petitioner company gave its detailed comments/objections to the proposal for special audit on 24th December, 2007, as directed, and requested the Commissioner of Income Tax not to approve the proposal. On 24 th December, 2007 itself, the Commissioner of Income Tax passed an order under Section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, approving the proposal for special audit.
Ex facie, the impugned order of approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax has been passed in hot haste, without proper application of mind to the lengthy objection of the petitioner company, running into numerous pages. The contentions of the petitioner company were not even discussed in the impugned order of approval. On the other hand, on a reading of the impugned order, it is patently clear that the approval has been prompted by reason of purchase of gold coins from P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. The Commissioner of Income Tax purported to proceed on the basis of transactions with P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd., of which there is not a whisper in the proposal of the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, as observed above, and approved the proposal.
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As argued by Dr. Pal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, an approving authority can only approve or disapprove the proposal. The approving authority cannot travel beyond proposal and utilize materials on which the proposal is not based, for the purpose of approving the proposal.
In Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia & Anr. vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 83, cited by Dr. Pal, the Supreme Court held:
"What is provided under the proviso to Section 11(1) is that the proposed award made by the Collector must have the approval of the appropriate Government or such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in that behalf. In our opinion, this power of granting or not granting previous approval cannot be equated with an appellate power. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., defines "approval" to mean an act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting to some act or thing done by another. In the context of an administrative act, the word "approval" in our opinion, does not mean anything more than either confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting. It will be doing violence to the scheme of the Act if we have to construe and accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the word approval found in the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act under the scheme of the Act amounts to an appellate power. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that this is only an administrative power which limits the jurisdiction of the authority to apply its mind to see whether the proposed award is acceptable to the Government or not. In that process for the purpose of forming an opinion to approve or not to approve the proposed award the Commissioner may satisfy himself as to the material relied upon by the Collector but he cannot reverse the finding as if he is an Appellate Authority for the purpose of remanding the matter to the Collector as can be done by an Appellate Authority; much less can the Commissioner exercising the said power of prior approval give directions to the statutory authority in what manner he should accept/appreciate the material on record in regard to the compensation payable. If such a power of issuing direction to the Collector by the Commissioner under the 12 provision of law referred to hereinabove is to be accepted then it would mean that the Commissioner is empowered to exercise the said power to substitute his opinion to that of the Collector's opinion for the purpose of fixing the compensation, which in our view is opposed to the language of Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Act has not conferred an appellate jurisdiction on the Commissioner under Section 15(1) proviso of the Act."
The judgment in Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia (supra) was rendered under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as argued by Mr. Ranjan Sinha, appearing for the Department. The judgment, however, reaffirms the proposition of law that approval means an act of confirming, rectifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting to an act done by another and that an approving authority cannot exercise appellate power. The proposition of law laid down in Vijayadevi Naval Kishore Bhartia (supra) is applicable in this case.
The Supreme Court clearly held that the power of approval is only an administrative power, which limits the jurisdiction of the authority to apply its mind to see whether the proposed award was acceptable or not. For the purpose of forming an opinion to approve or not to approve, the approving authority might satisfy itself as to the materials relied upon, but cannot give directions to the statutory authority, as to the manner in which the statutory authority should accept and/or appreciate materials in regard to the compensation payable. The Commissioner cannot substitute his own opinion for that of the Collector.
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On an analogy of reasoning, the Commissioner of Income Tax could not have asked for information regarding transactions with M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd., as he has done by his letter dated 14 th December, 2007, since, the transactions relating to M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. was not a reason for which the Assessing Officer proposed special audit of accounts of the petitioner company under Section 142(2A). In his order of approval under Section 142(2A), the Commissioner of Income Tax stated that the facts and deficiencies relating to the assessee's transactions with M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. were enough to justify the appointment of a Special Auditor.
In Gurunanak Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. reported in 259 ITR 637, cited on behalf of the Department, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court observed and held that under Section 142(2A) a very heavy duty has been cast on the Chief Commissioner and/or a Commissioner, an authority of very high rank, to see that the requirement of previous approval, envisaged in the said Section, is not turned into an empty ritual. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Gurunanak Enterprises (supra). As held by the Division Bench, the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner, as the case may be, must have before him, the materials on the basis whereof an opinion in this behalf has been formed by the 14 Assessing Officer. The requirement of previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner is an inbuilt protection against arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer. The judgment of the Delhi High Court has been quoted with approval by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Sahara India (firm) vs. Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. reported in 300 ITR 403.
An approval must necessarily be granted on the basis of the materials on which the proposal is based. The proposal of the Assessing Officer for appointment of Special Auditor, as contained in his letter dated 14 th September, 2007, is annexed to the writ petition. There is no whisper in the said proposal to any transactions with M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. The Assessing Officer had no occasion to examine the payments made by the petitioner to M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. for purchase of gold coins, which, according to the petitioner, were distributed, as per the policy of the petitioner company, for the purpose of sales promotion.
Dr. Pal argued that the same Commissioner of Income Tax, who passed the order of approval, approving special audit for the Assessment Year 2005-2006, had earlier passed an order under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, for the Assessment Year 2002-03, opining that a special audit under Section 142(2A) was required to be made, but he could not 15 direct special audit as he was only empowered to exercise power of revision under Section 263. Dr. Pal argued that it was thus clear that the Commissioner of Income Tax had already formed an opinion that in case of Head Office and other expenses of those units which were eligible for deduction under Section 80-1B, a Special Auditor was required to be appointed.
As pointed out by Dr. Pal, the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263 for the Assessment Year 2002-03 had been reversed and set aside by the order of the learned Tribunal dated 13 th August, 2007.
In reversing and setting aside the order of the Commissioner, the learned Tribunal relied upon its earlier decision dated 17 th October, 2006 where the learned Tribunal had dealt with the question of allocation of Head Office and Selling expenses attributable to the Pondicherry unit and Goa unit for the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02 and held in favour of the petitioner company. The order of the Tribunal for the Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02 had become final, the same not having been challenged either before the High Court or before the Supreme Court.
The allocation of common expenses like Head Office and Selling expenses, having been upheld by the learned Tribunal and in effect held to be based upon scientific and reasonable basis and followed for several 16 years, and such view having assumed finality, the Commissioner ought not to have disregarded the view of the learned Tribunal, just to implement his own view and refer the accounts of the petitioner company, for special audit, which he could not do earlier, for want of power.
In Union of India & Ors. vs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. reported in AIR 1992 SC 711, cited by Dr. Pal, the Supreme Court has observed that in disposing of quasi-judicial issues, the Revenue officers are bound by the decisions of Appellate Authorities. The order of the Appellate Collector is binding upon the Assistant Collector working within his jurisdiction and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors who function under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The principle of judicial discipline requires that the orders of the higher and/or appellate authorities should be followed by the subordinate authorities without any reservation.
In Radhasoami Satsang vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 193 ITR 321, the Supreme Court held that even though strictly speaking the principle of res judicata does not apply to income tax proceedings, a fundamental aspect permeating to different assessment years and accepted as a fact cannot be changed.
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As pointed out by Dr. Pal, the Commissioner had in his own order under Section 263, for the Assessment Years 2002-03, observed that the facts of the case required a Special Auditor to be appointed under Section 142 (2A), but he could not make such appointment, as he was exercising power under Section 263. The Commissioner had, thus, pre-decided the same. There is substance in Dr. Pal's submission that the approval of the Commissioner is vitiated by bias.
As submitted by Dr. Pal the test of bias is, whether there is clear likelihood of bias, even though the decision may not actually have been biased. Where there is substantial possibility of bias, it can reasonably be deduced that there is a real likelihood of bias.
In Rattan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co- education) H.S. School & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2155, cited by Dr. Pal, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"A predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. A Judge should be impartial and neutral and must be free from bias. He must be in a position to act judicially and to decide the matter objectively. If the Judge is subject to bias in favour of or against either party to the dispute or is in a position that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified to act as a Judge."
In Halsbury Laws of England 4 th Edition, Vol.2, it has been pointed out that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances would feel a serious apprehension of bias. 18 In this case, having regard to the entire facts and circumstances, and in particular, the view taken by the Commissioner, the apprehension of bias expressed by the petitioner is not unjustified.
For exercising power under Section 142(2A) the following principles have to be borne in mind i) the Assessing Officer should form an opinion that the nature of the accounts of the assessee is complex; ii) the opinion of the Assessing Officer should be formed objectively on the basis of materials before him and should be based on relevant considerations; iii) the interest of the Revenue would be adversely affected if special audit is not directed;
iv) the Chief Commissioner should grant approval to such proposal after applying his mind to the materials before him; v) the guidelines issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, as contained in Instruction No.1076 dated 12th July, 1977 is binding on the Department and a Special Auditor can only be appointed if the case falls under any of the clauses mentioned therein, provided the conditions mentioned in Section 142(2A) are fulfilled. In this context, reference may be made to the judgment of Allahabad High Court in U.P. Financial Corporation vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2005) 147 Taxman 21 (All.) Power under Section 142(2A) can be exercised in strict compliance of principles of natural justice. Even when there was no express provision for affording opportunity of pre-decisional hearing to an assessee, the Supreme 19 Court read compliance with principles of natural justice into Section 142(2A). With effect from 1st June, 2007, the Finance Act, 2007 inserted the proviso to sub-section 142(2A) which reads "provided that the Assessing Officer shall not direct the assessee to get the accounts so audited, unless the assessee has been given a reasonable opportunity of hearing." After incorporation of the proviso, the requirement to give reasonable opportunity of hearing is mandatory. The requirement to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing cannot be dispensed with.
Inbuilt in the requirement to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, is the requirement to inform the assessee of the exact grounds on which special audit is proposed, to enable the assessee to effectively deal with those grounds. When special audit is proposed on one ground, such special audit cannot be approved on a different ground, for this would amount to violation of principles of natural justice.
In this case, as observed above, the purchase of gold coins from M/s. P.C. Chandra Jewellery Apex Pvt. Ltd. was not a ground for which special audit was proposed. It was only at the stage of approval that certain queries were raised with regard to these transactions.
The petitioner company could not have anticipated that those grounds would constitute the main grounds for referring the accounts to special 20 audit. By approving the special audit, on a ground that was not a ground for proposal of special audit by the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner acted in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice.
The Commissioner has also acted in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice in not dealing with the elaborate submissions made by the petitioner company against special audit. It appears that the Commissioner has not properly applied his mind to the aforesaid submissions. Moreover, the petitioner company, as required, submitted its objection on 24 th December, 2007. On the same date, that is, 24th December, 2007, the Commissioner approved special audit in hot haste without proper consideration of the objection of the petitioner company. The hearing given to the petitioner was thus, only illusory and not a reasonable, effective hearing. Natural justice could not have been compromises to avoid limitation, as has been done in this case.
In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 1988 (171) ITR 64 (All.) the Court held that honest attempt to understand the accounts must first be made. Special Audit should not be directed upon a cursory look at the accounts. For an order of special audit, the Assessing Officer must scrutinize accounts and be satisfied about the complexity of the accounts. This decision would have to be made after 21 looking into the accounts. Even if there was difficulty in appreciating entries, an explanation would have to be obtained from the assessee.
In Bata India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2002) 257 ITR 622 this Court held that the power to order special audit must be based on proper investigations and reasons. The two pre- conditions justifying action under Section 142(2A) are the nature and complexity of the accounts and the interests of the Revenue. There can be no doubt that before an approval is sought for, the Assessing Officer must form an opinion as regards the said two conditions. The satisfaction is to be based on objective considerations. There has to be an application of mind on the part of the Assessing Officer. If any vital information cannot be ascertained from the accounts the Assessing Officer should call for particulars from the assessee, which he is entitled to do. There should be an honest attempt to understand the accounts of the assessee.
The power to appoint a Special Auditor cannot be lightly exercised. Complexity of the accounts cannot be equated with doubts being entertained by the Assessing Officer, either with regard to the correctness, or the need to obtain certain vital information not ascertainable from the accounts. In the absence of reasons based on which it can be said that the accounts are complex or not, mere assumption that they are complex would not satisfy the test, nor would the appointment of Special Auditor merely for 22 the purpose of examination of related supporting vouchers, bring the matter within ambit of Section 142(2A).
In the instant case, it is apparent that what weighed with the Commissioner was certain acts and omissions. The Commissioner did not approve the mode of allocation of expenditure. The reasons do not indicate what exactly was so complex in the accounts of the petitioner company, that required special audit.
The impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is set aside and quashed.
Mr. Sinha appearing on behalf of the Revenue prays for stay of operation of this order. Such prayer is granted for a period of four weeks from date.
Urgent certified copy of this order be supplied to the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all requisite formalities.
(Indira Banerjee, J.)