Karnataka High Court
Sri K Rajendran vs The Deputy Commissioner on 28 March, 2018
Author: B.V.Nagarathna
Bench: B.V.Nagarathna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
W.P.NO.12242/2018 (SC-ST)
Between:
Sri. K. Rajendran,
S/o Late Krishnan,
Aged about 55 years,
R/o No.17, 1st Floor,
P.U. Building, M.G. Road,
Bengaluru - 560 001. ... PETITIONER
(By Shri.S.M. Chandrashekar,
Senior counsel for Sri.Vishwanath H M, Advocate)
AND:
1. The Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District,
Bengaluru.
2. The Asst. Commissioner,
Bengaluru South Sub-division (Anekal),
Kandaya Bhavan, K.G. Road,
Bengaluru - 560 009.
3. Sri.Chikkavenkatappa,
S/o Venkataswamy,
Major,
4. Smt.Venkatamma,
S/o Venkataswamy,
2
Major,
5. Sri.C.B. Doddamuniswamy,
S/o Chikkabiddappa,
Major,
6. Smt.Ramakka,
W/o Late Muniyappa,
Major,
7. Sri.Narayanappa,
S/o Thoti Muniswamy,
Major,
8. Sri.Jangappa,
S/o Muniswamy,
Major,
9. C.N. Venkatesh,
S/o Narayanappa,
Major,
10. Smt. Akkayamma,
W/o Thimmarayappa,
Major,
11. Sri.Ramappa,
S/o Muniswamy,
Major,
12. Smt. Muniyamma,
W/o Late Muniswamy,
Major,
13. Smt.Shankaramma,
S/o Seenappa,
Major,
14. Sri.Narayanappa,
3
S/o Muniswamy,
Major,
Respondent Nos.3 to 14 are
Residing at Chokkasandra Village,
Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk,
Bengaluru District - 562 106.
... RESPONDENTS
(By Smt. Savithramma, HCGP for R1 & R2)
This writ petition is filed Under Articles 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India praying to quash the impugned
order dated 27/02/2018 passed by the respondent
No.1/Deputy Commissioner in SC/ST(A).230/2011-12 at
Annexure-A as illegal etc.
This writ petition coming on for orders this day, The
Court made the following:
ORDER
Petitioner has assailed order dated 27.02.2018 passed by respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner. Bengaluru Urban District, Bengaluru in SC.ST(A).230/2011-12 (Annexure-A) as well as order dated 12.03.2012 passed by the Assistant Commissioner - respondent No.2, Bengaluru South, Sub-division (Anekal), 4 Bengaluru in K.SC.ST(A)22-29, 37, 79, 143 and 153/2005- 2006 (Annexure-P).
2. It is the case of petitioner that land bearing Old Sy.No.25 (New Sy.Nos.110, 109, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 136, 106, 105, 25) measuring 12 acres situated at Chokkasandra Village, Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk, (hereinafter referred to as 'the lands in question'), were purchased by the petitioner on 14.10.1996 under registered sale deeds dated 14.10.1996 rectified on 21.08.2004. According to the petitioner, he became the owner and in possession of the said lands pursuant to the said registered sale deeds.
3. When the matter stood thus, respondents Nos.3 to 14 filed applications under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PTCL Act' for sake of convenience), seeking resumption and restoration of the lands in question on the premise that neither respondents 5 No.3 to 14 who had alienated the said lands to the petitioner nor the petitioner had obtained prior permission under Section 4(2) of the said Act from the State Government before transfer of the said land in favour of the petitioner. The second respondent by order dated 12.03.2012 allowed the applications and ordered for resumption of the lands in question to the government free from all encumbrances so as to be restored in favour of original grantee or his legal heirs.
4. Being aggrieved by that order, petitioner herein preferred an appeal under Section 5-A of the said Act before respondent No.1 - Commissioner, who by his order dated 27.02.2018 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner. Being aggrieved by those orders, petitioner has preferred this writ petition.
5. Learned senior counsel Sri. S.M.Chandrashekar, appearing for the petitioner, at the outset, submitted that even prior to the impugned orders, 6 there were orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and in the earlier round, the application filed by the respondents No.3 to 14 was rejected, but under the impugned orders the application has been accepted and allowed.
6. Learned senior counsel submitted that the lands in question were granted to the respondents No.3 to 14 under an order of grant dated 12/07/1978. They conveyed or transferred the lands in question to the petitioner under registered sale deeds dated 14/10/1996 and 21/08/2004. That the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the PTCL Act, is belated as it was filed in the year 2005, whereas the alienation was made way back in the year 1996 i.e. on 14.10.1996 and subsequently on 21.08.2004 some defects in the registered sale deeds were removed but the sale must be construed to have been taken place in the year 1996.
7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on the recent decision of the Hon'ble 7 Supreme Court in case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi .v. State of Karnataka and Another in Civil Appeal No.1390 of 2009, contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that when there is an application filed by the grantee or by his legal representatives after long lapse of time, such an application cannot be considered by the Assistant Commissioner and the same must be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. He contended that although the Act does not specify any period of limitation for making an application under Section 5 of the Act, nevertheless the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions of the Act to hold that such an application under Section 5 of the Act must be made within a reasonable time, and in the absence of the applications being made within a reasonable time, it must be dismissed summarily as belated on account of delay and laches, referring to the facts of the present case.
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8. Learned senior counsel contended that the application in the instant case was made in the year 2005, whereas the alienation had taken place on 14.10.1996, which is almost a decade after the alienation had taken place and therefore, on the strength of the recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, impugned orders must be quashed. He relied upon certain decisions in support of his submission.
9. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 on advance notice submitted that in the instance case, there is no gross delay in approaching the authorities concerned and that the impugned orders are in accordance with law. Admittedly, the petitioner or the respondent Nos.3 and 4 grantees did not comply with the requirements of Section 4(2) of the Act and therefore, the alienation made by the grantees in favour of the petitioner is deemed to be null and void. In the circumstances, the application filed by the respondents/grantees has been rightly allowed by the 9 respondents No.1 and 2/authorities. She drew my attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manchegowda and Others V/s State of Karnataka and others reported in 1984(3) SCC 301 to submit that the object and purpose of the Act is to achieve social justice and therefore the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be applied in a straight jacket manner particularly, having regard to the facts of the present case.
10. On hearing learned senior counsel for the petitioner and learned High Court Government Pleader for respondents No.1 and 2, it is noted that the grant made in favour of the respondents No.3 to 14 herein, was on 12.07.1978. It is admitted that on 14.10.1996 the said grantees alienated the lands in question to the petitioner under a registered sale deed. That after removing certain defects in the sale deeds, one more sale deed dated 21/08/2004 was handed over to the petitioner. Section 4 of the Act reads as under:
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"4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands: (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract of instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.
(2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or of any award or order of any other authority."
A reading of said section would indicate that if transfer of granted land is made either before or after the commencement of the Act, (a) in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land, or (b) the law providing for such lands or(c) in contravention of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act, then the said transfer shall be null and void and 11 no right, title and interest on such land shall be conveyed or deemed ever to be conveyed by such transfer. The said provisions apply also to sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or any award or order of any other authority. Therefore, there is a statutory declaration to the effect that if any of the aforesaid conditions are violated or infracted, such transfer is deemed to be null and void; the same is by a statutory fiction. The expression granted land is defined in Section 3(b) as under;
"Granted land" means any land granted by the Government to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and includes land allotted or granted to such person under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings abolition of imams, other than that relating to hereditary offices or rights and the word "Granted" shall be construed accordingly."
The word "transfer" is defined under Section 3(e) as under;
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"Transfer" means a sale, gift, exchange, mortgage (with or without possession), lease or any other transaction not being a partition among members of a family or a testamentary disposition and includes the creation of a charge or an agreement to sell, exchange, mortgage or lease or enter into any other transaction."
Though the expression 'Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes ' does not find a place in Section 4(2) of Act, but having regard to the definition under Section 3(d) of the Act, it is evident that when land has been granted to any member of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and such land is transferred, then the prohibitions under Section 4 would apply and if there is non-compliance of the requirements under the said Section, the transfer would be deemed to be null and void and there would be no conveyance of title to the purchaser.
Section 5 of the Act reads as under:
"5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands: (1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo motu, and after 13 such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may.
(a) By order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard:
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. "
[(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.] (2) 2[Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-A, any order 14 3 passed] under [sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other than the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4."
Section 5 enables an interested person to apply to the Assistant Commissioner to seek possession of such land which is transferred in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act after evicting all such persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed. Of course, the said order could be passed only after giving the affected person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Section 5(1) also enables the Assistant Commissioner to suo motu conduct 15 an enquiry, if he deems necessary in respect of any transfer of any granted land which is null and void under sub- section (1) of Section 4. The object and purpose of enquiry is not to make a declaration that the transfer of granted land is null and void. Such a declaration is in fact found in Section 4(1) of the Act. It is a statutory declaration. The object and purpose of the enquiry is for the Assistant Commissioner to satisfy himself that there is indeed a transfer of granted land in violation of sub-section (1) of Section 4. Once the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that there is an infraction of sub-section (1) of Section 4, in the enquiry conducted by him, thereafter he may order for resumption or taking possession of the land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in the prescribed manner.
Section 5(b) states that once the possession of such land is taken and pursuant to his orders it could be restored to the original grantee or his legal heirs. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such 16 grantee or his legal heir, such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. Once again, the deeming provision by a legal fiction is introduced in sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act. The Government may thereafter grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in accordance with rules relating to grant of land. Section 5(1-A) is inserted by an amendment with effect from 13.04.1992. It states that if the Assistant Commissioner after enquiry is satisfied that the transfer of granted land is not null and void, he may pass an order accordingly. Section 5(2) states that subject to any order to be made by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5- A of the Act, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner shall be final and cannot be questioned in any court of law. Further, no injunction can be granted by any court in respect of any proceedings taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act.
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Section 5(3) is also significant. It introduces a statutory presumption which is in favour of the original grantee or his legal heir. It states that for the purpose of Section 5, where any granted land is in the possession of a person other than the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4. Therefore, the burden is cast on the purchaser or any other person, who is a transferee of granted land to establish that he has acquired the land by a transfer which is not null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4. In the absence of such a proof by a person who is in possession of granted land by way of transfer, the Assistant Commissioner would have to presume that the transfer is null and void under sub-section (1) of Section 4.
11. Keeping in mind, the aforesaid provisions and applying the same to the present case, it is noted that 18 while the grant was made to the respondents No.3 to 14 on 12.07.1978, the alienation was made by the petitioner on 14.10.1996, which is after enforcement of the PTCL Act, with effect from 01.01.1979. Therefore, in the instant case the significant date to be noted is the date of alienation which is 14.10.1996. In the year 2005, the respondents No.3 to 14 made an application before the Assistant Commissioner seeking resumption and restoration of the land in question. The Assistant Commissioner has held in favour of the respondents No.3 to 14 which has been confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner.
12. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner however contended that when an alienation has taken place in the year 1996, respondents No.3 to 14 grantees could not have approached the Assistant Commissioner in the year 2005 seeking resumption and restoration and that the filing of such an application was highly belated; it should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and that the impugned orders 19 are contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi referred to above.
13. Before considering the said submission, it would be useful to refer to the case of Manchegowda & others V/s State of Karnataka reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301, wherein the constitutional validity of Section 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act came up for consideration and the Hon'ble Supreme Court on analysis of the said provisions considered the objects and reasons of the enactment and on analysing the said Sections upheld their validity by observing that passing of the PTCL Act, there is a change introduced in the legal position with regard to transfer of granted land in breach of the condition relating to prohibition of such transfer. By rendering the transfer void the object of such a condition regarding prohibition of transfer of granted land has been introduced in the interest of the grantees for the purposes of upkeep of all the grants and for preventing the economically dominant 20 sections of the community from depriving the grantees belonging to the weaker section of the people of their enjoyment and possession of these lands and for safeguarding their interests against any exploitation by the richer sections in regard to the enjoyment and possession of these lands granted essentially for their benefit. That the Act has been made by Legislature in consonance with the directive principles of the Constitution to preserve, protect, promote the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which by and large form the weaker and poorer sections of the people in our country, In view of the declared policy of the State, the provisions seeking to nullify such transfers is consistent with the said policy for rendering social and economic justice to the weaker sections of the society. Further in paragraph -15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
15.Any person who acquires such granted land by transfer from the original grantee in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on such transfer must 21 necessarily be presumed to be aware of the prohibition imposed on the transfer of such granted land. Anybody who acquires such granted land in contravention of the prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land cannot be considered to be a bona fide purchaser for value; and every such transferee acquires to his knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land.
The title acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is liable to be defeated by an appropriate action taken in this regard.
If the Legislature under such circumstances seek to intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the community and choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rights of the transferees are affected. Transferees of granted lands with full knowledge of the legal position that the transfers made in their favour in contravention of the terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation 22 governing such grant are liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not have in law or equity, a genuine or real grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands so transferred is, in fact, being defeated and they are being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in law liable to be dispossessed by process of law. The position will, however, be somewhat different where the transferees have acquired such granted lands not in violation of any term of the grant or any law regulating such grant as also where any transferee who may have acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands by the transfer thereof in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by prescription of time or otherwise. We shall consider such cases later on. But where the transferee acquires only a defeasible title liable to be defeated in accordance with law, avoidance of such defeasible title which still remains liable to be defeated in accordance with law at the date of commencement of the Act and recovery of 23 possession of such granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in section 4 and section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be termed as unconscionable, unjust and arbitrary. The first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore overruled. "
While doing so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph - 24 has made it clear that granted lands which have been transferred after the expiry of the period of prohibition do not come within the purview of the Act and cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of the Act. That the Act is applicable only when granted lands transferred in breach of the conditions relating to prohibition on transfer of such granted lands. Granted lands transferred before the commencement of the Act and not in contravention of prohibition on transfer are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the Act.24
14. As already noted, the reason as to why respondents No.3 to 14 herein approached the Assistant Commissioner - respondent No.2 by filing an application under Section 5 of the Act, was on account of there being an infraction of sub-section (2) of Section 4 the Act. In the instant case, after coming in to force of the Act, neither the petitioner nor the respondents No.3 to 14 had approached the State Government seeking permission for alienation before transfer of the land in question to the petitioner in the year 1996. In the absence of there being any prior permission obtained and under sub -section (2) of Section 4 of the Act, the transfer of the granted land was null and void no right, title or interest in such lands was conveyed or deemed to have been ever conveyed by the petitioner.
15. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the latest judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi, to contend that in the instant case when the alienation had taken place in the year 1996 25 within a reasonable time i.e. three years from 1996 the respondents No.3 to 14 could have approached the Assistant Commissioner, but in the instant case they have approached the said authority in the year 2005 which is belated. In the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi, the facts were that the grant was made on 30.06.1965 to one Kariyappa. Kariyappa sold the land to one Narasimhamurthy on 15.12.1977, who in turn sold it to Smt. Nekkanti Ramalakshmi on 27.06.1984 and that the PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The application under Section 5 was filed on 24.03.2004. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the fact that the application was filed approximately 25 years after the Act came into force. It could also be stated that the application was filed after 20 years of the alienation in favour of Smt. Nekkanti Ramalakshmi which was on 27.06.1984.
16. Considering the arguments of learned senior counsel in the light of Section 4 and 5 of the Act, the 26 Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case observed that where a statute does not provide for a period of limitation, then such a limitation must be invoked within a reasonable time. It was held therein that the application was made twenty four years after the PTCL Act came into force i.e., from 01.01.1979 and at any rate 20 years after the alienation was made in favour of appellant therein, Nekkanti Ramalakshmi on 27.06.1984. Therefore, in the context of the facts which arose in that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its order dated 26.10.2017 has held that the application seeking restoration of the land was made after an "unreasonably long period" and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. While saying so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that some judgments of the Karnataka High Court are over ruled, as those judgments state that there was no limitation provided under Section 5 of the Act and therefore, the application could be made at any time.27
17. The object and purpose of the Act is to provide for prohibition of transfer of lands granted by government to persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manchegowda has up held the Act, particularly, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 4(1) is a statutory declaration of annulling any transfer of granted land which is in violation of the terms of the grant or the law providing for such land or sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act, where no previous permission is obtained from the Government while alienating the granted land after the commencement of the Act. No doubt, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in the said case, an application would have to be made within a reasonable time, but in the said case the application was made after two decades after the alienation took place and liable to be dismissed on that ground.
18. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the following decisions; 28
1. Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others v.
Hari Kishore Yadav(D) Thr. LRs and Others reported in 2018 (1) Kar.L.R.1(SC);( Chhedi Lal Yadav).
2. Order dated 30/01/2008 passed in W.P.No.24501/2012(SC-ST) M/s.Shipra Estate Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner and Others;
3. J.Rama v. M.Vittal Bhat reported in LAWS (KAR) 2011-11-24;(J.Rama v.
M.Vittal);
4. Order dated 06/07/2012 passed in W.P.Nos.30545-546/2009 (KLR-
CON);(Sri.R.Sathyanarayana Raju v. Assistant Commissioner & Another);
5. Order dated 25/07/2012 passed in W.A.No.3914/2009 (SC/ST) (Smt.Jayamma v. The Assistant Commissioner & Others);
a) In Chhedi Lal Yadav, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay. 29
b) In the case of J.Rama v. M. Vittal Bhat, where sale had taken place in violation of Section 79-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, although no limitation period was prescribed, it was held that suo motu power ought to be exercised within a reasonable time and that twelve years was too long a period to be termed as reasonable period.
c) In the case of Sri. R.Sathyanarayana Raju and Another referred to above, action under Section 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,1961, was initiated nine years after the impugned sale. It was held that it was belated and as it could not be considered to be reasonable period.
Relying on the aforesaid decisions, he contended that reasonable time would normally be three years from the date of alienation and that in the instant case, the application has been made nine years thereafter and therefore, the Assistant Commissioner ought to have dismissed the application on the ground of delay on latches.
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19. But, however it is noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the observations in the case of Smt.Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, in the context of the delay being reckoned from the date of enforcement of the Act i.e., 01.01.1979. But, in the instant case alienation has taken place subsequent to the enforcement of the Act and apart from that, the sale deed dated 14.10.1996 was not issued to the petitioner till 21.08.2004 on account of there being certain defects and it was only on 21.08.2004 the petitioner was issued the original sale deed by the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar. It is within a few months thereafter i.e. in the year 2005 that the application has been made by respondents No.3 to 14 before the Assistant Commissioner. When the document registering the sale on 14/10/1996 was defective and the defect was removed only on 21/08/2004, the grantee was justified in not approaching the Assistant Commissioner under Section 4 of the Act till the document registering the sale was rectified from all defects. This is because the Assistant Commissioner would have to be satisfied on the application 31 made by the grantee that the transfer of any granted land was null and void. In order to be so satisfied the Assistant Commissioner would have to consider and peruse the documents transferring the granted land. If such a document was defective till 21/08/2004 and was not released from the Sub-Registrar's Office there would have been no purpose in approaching the Assistant Commissioner within a reasonable time from 14/10/1006 on which the sale deed was registered as the sale deed was not in fact released and therefore not available till 21/08/2004. In the absence of availability of the sale deed pertaining to conveyance of granted land the Assistant Commissioner could not have arrived at a satisfaction so as to grant relief on the basis that the same was null and void. Therefore, the grantee was justified in approaching the Assistant Commissioner in the year 2005 and not earlier thereto.
20. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that there was an unreasonably 32 long period that had lapsed before the application was made under Section 5 of the PTCL Act . Therefore, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Smt.Nekkanti Ramalakshmi would not apply to the present case. Similarly in the case of Vivek.M Hinduja and others V/s M.Ashwatha & others, also an order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2166/2009, the alienation had been made by the grantees in the year 1967 and the Act came into force on 01.01.1979. Therefore, the alienation was made prior to the enforcement of the Act and action was initiated suo motu in the year 1998. Under those circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the action initiated in the year 1998 was almost two decades, after the enforcement of the Act and hence, it was not within a reasonable time and hence no relief could have been given to the grantees therein.
21. But having regard to the facts of the present case, after the said orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 33 also would not apply. In the circumstances, I find that the respondents/authority were justified in passing the orders which are impugned in this petition. There is no merit in the writ petition.
22. The writ petition is hence dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE MSU