Karnataka High Court
Sri. D.J. Bhadra vs Shri. S. Srinivasa, 27 Years, on 11 November, 2014
Bench: N.K.Patil, Rathnakala
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2014
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.K. PATIL
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RATHNAKALA
WRIT PETITION NO.47335 OF 2014 (S-CAT)
BETWEEN:
SRI D.J.BHADRA,
THE PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT GENERAL,
(ON LEAVE),
'C' BLOCK, NEW BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001 ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.VASUDEVA RAO, ADV.)
AND:
SHRI S.SRINIVASA, 27 YEARS,
S/O SRI SHIVANNA,
RESIDING AT NO.16,
BETTANAPALYA,
RAMOHALLI POST,
KENGERI HOBLI,
BANGALORE - 560 060 ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI P.A.KULKARNI, ADV. FOR C/R)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 05.09.2014 PASSED BY THE
TRIBUNAL IN C.P.NO.5/2014 VIDE ANN-L, AND DROP THE
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN CP
NO.5/2014 AND ETC.
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THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 30/10/2014 AND COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY,
RATHNAKALA J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
In this Writ Petition, the order dated 5.9.2014 passed in Contempt Petition No.5/2014 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for short), is sought to be quashed.
2. The facts relevant for adjudication of this petition are:
Contempt proceedings (Civil) under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Contempt of Courts (CAT) Rules, 1992 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is initiated against the writ petitioner herein in Contempt Petition No.5/2014 from O.A.No.222/2011 on the file of the Tribunal. The petitioner is alleged to have committed willful disobedience of the order passed by the Tribunal by not complying the direction of the Tribunal passed in 3 O.A.No.222/2011. By order dated 5.9.2014, the Tribunal has called upon him to appear in the proceedings to frame charges against him. Said order is sought to be quashed in the present Writ Petition.
4. Respondent has entered caveat through his learned Counsel and questions the jurisdiction of this Court under its writ jurisdiction for quashing an order passed by the Tribunal in its contempt proceedings.
5. The law on the point is already settled. A Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.37730/1998 D.D.11.7.2001 reported in 2001(5) KLJ 537 in the matter of The Accountant General (A&E), Bangalore & Others -vs- S.Srinivas & Another (seeking quashing of an order passed by C.A.T. in a contempt proceedings), on a reading of Section 17 of the Act and Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act held as follows:
"If the word 'Tribunal' has to be read in place of the word 'High Court' under Section 19 of the 1971 Act, then the right to file an appeal from the order of the two member Bench of the Tribunal 4 would lie to the Supreme Court of India and the writ petition to challenge the order passed in the contempt petition would not be maintainable. Petitioner should have approached the Supreme Court of India by way of an appeal in case the petitioners were aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal in the contempt petition. The writ petition in this Court to challenge the order of the Tribunal in contempt petition No.40/98 would not be maintainable."
6. In the meanwhile, a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in its judgment reported in 2001 SCC (L&S) 263 in the matter of T.Sudhakar Prasad -vs- Govt. of A.P. and others, among others addressed the question "whether the Administrative Tribunal set up under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunal Act do they or do they not have power to punish for their contempt?". Vide detailed discussion concluded as follows at para-17:
"It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323-A (2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like "courts of first instance" and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having 5 been held to be equivalent to courts or Tribunals subordinate to High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) or L. Chandra Kumar (supra) or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of the High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article 323-A specifically empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and 6 powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well- established rules of self- restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of 7 Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of the Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they are, yet while reading the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as to read the word "Tribunal" in place of the word "High Court" wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word "High Court" shall be read as "Tribunal". Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of the Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of the Tribunal holding the contemner guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction 8 between orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14 (1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act, is this : as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself."
7. In a subsequent judgment reported in (2012) 4 SCC 761 in the matter of R.Mohajan and others -vs- Shefali Sengupta and others, following T.Sudhakar Prasad's case (supra), the objection raised by respondents challenging the maintainability of the Civil Appeal, which challenged the order passed by C.A.T., Calcutta Bench in directing the accused (appellants) (calling them to be present in the court on the hearing date for receiving the charges of contempt), was rejected by the Apex Court and the appeal was held maintainable.
8. In view of the above clear position of law, the proper forum for the petitioner herein to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal in its contempt jurisdiction is not before this 9 Court in its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, the writ petition is rejected as not maintainable.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE KNM/-