Karnataka High Court
The Principal Secretary vs Shivanagoud S/O Govindappa Vasanad on 25 September, 2025
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
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R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO. 100268 OF 2024 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN
1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT (SERVICE-2),
M. S. BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
Digitally signed by
CHANDRASHEKAR BAGALKOT, DIST. BAGALKOT-587103.
LAXMAN
KATTIMANI
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. G. K. HIREGOUDAR, GOVT. ADVOCATE)
AND
1. SRI. SHIVANAGOUDA VASANAD,
S/O. GOVINDAPPA VASANAD,
AGE: 41 YEARS,
OCC: VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT,
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PRESENTLY WORKING AT: KELAVADI VILLAGE,
TQ. BADAMI, DIST. BAGALKOT-587103.
2. THE LOKAYUKTA,
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY REGISTRAR,
M. S. BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. P. P. HEGDE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. VIJAY K. NAIK, ADV. FOR R1;
SRI. ANIL KALE, ADV. FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A
WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI
TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 12.04.2023 PASSED BY THE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BELAGAVI IN
APPLICATION NO.12621/2020 (ANNEXURE-C TO THE WRIT
PETITION) AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
16.09.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
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CAV ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL)
This writ petition is filed by the petitioner-State challenging
the order dated 12.04.2023 passed by the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal, Belagavi (hereinafter referred to as the
'KSAT', for short) in A.No.12621/2020.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are
that:
The respondent No.1 was working at Belavalkoppa village
as a Village Accountant in the year 2011. A complaint was filed
against him by one Sri. Vijaykumar Hanamappa to the Lokayukta
Police alleging that respondent No.1 had demanded an amount
of Rs. 2,500/- as a gratification for mutation of the complainant's
name in the revenue records. Pursuant to the said complaint, a
trap was organised by the Lokayukta Police and the respondent
No.1 was caught with bribe money of Rs. 2,500/- in his shirt
pocket. A departmental enquiry was held by the respondent No.2
herein and an enquiry report was submitted on 24.10.2019. The
petitioner No.1 based on the recommendation of the respondent
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No.2 order dated 21.10.2020 was passed, wherein the
respondent No. 1 was ordered with a penalty of compulsory
retirement with immediate effect. Being aggrieved, the
respondent No.1 approached the KSAT seeking to quash the
order dated 21.10.2020. The KSAT after considering the
contentions and material available on record, allowed the
application by setting aside the order dated 21.10.2020. Being
aggrieved by the order of the KSAT, the petitioner-State has filed
this petition.
3. Sri. Girish Hiregoudar, learned Government Advocate
appearing for the petitioner-State submits that the KSAT without
considering the difference between the scope of criminal
proceedings and a departmental enquiry has proceeded to allow
the application merely on the ground that respondent No.1 was
acquitted in the criminal case i.e S.C.No.15/2012. It is further
submitted that the standard of proof operating in a criminal case
is that of 'beyond reasonable doubt' whereas in case of a
departmental enquiry, it is a 'preponderance of probabilities', and
the same was not considered by the KSAT while allowing the
application. It is also submitted that the acquittal of respondent
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No.1 is merely on a technical grounds and the same is not an
honourable acquittal, hence, the same cannot be a basis to
interfere with the order of penalty in a departmental enquiry. It
is contended that P.W.2 and P.W.3 in the departmental enquiry,
who have also been examined in the criminal proceedings
supported the case against respondent No. 1, however, the
evidence of P.W.3, who is P.W.2 before the criminal proceedings
is declared as hostile and unreliable. Hence, the evidence on
record in the departmental enquiry is required to be looked into
independently. It is further contended that there is sufficient
evidence against respondent No.1 in the departmental enquiry
which has not been appreciated by the KSAT. It is also
contended that the KSAT exceeded its jurisdiction in appreciating
the evidence and recorded incorrect finding which calls for
interference in this petition. In support of his contentions, he
placed reliance on the following decisions:
1. Pravin Kumar v Union of India and others1
2. State of Karnataka and others v Umesh2
1
(2020) 9 SCC 471
2
(2022) 6 SCC 563
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3. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v
C. Nagaraju and Another3
4. Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
Others v Ajai Kumar Srivastava4
5. Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v S.
Samuthiram5
6. Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force
and others v Rajendra Kumar Dubey6
7. Shashi Bhushan Prasad v Inspector General Centrla
Industrial Security Force and Others7
4. Sri. P.P. Hegde, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Sri. Vijay K. Naik, learned counsel for respondent No.1, supports
the impugned order and submits that the KSAT has rightly
allowed the application after considering the facts and evidence
on hand. It is further submitted that the KSAT has rightly
observed that, mere possession and recovery of currency notes
from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home
the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of the Corruption
3
(2019) 10 SCC 367
4
(2021) 2 SCC 612
5
(2013) 1 SCC 598
6
(2021) 14 SCC 735
7
(2019) 7 SCC 797
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Act, 1988. It is also submitted that the KSAT has rightly
appreciated the law on point that where there are same set of
charges and same set of evidence in both criminal trial and
departmental proceedings, then acquittal in the criminal
proceedings will be a bar to the departmental proceedings and
also exonerate the delinquent employee from the departmental
proceedings. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer in the
departmental enquiry has not considered the evidence of the
complainant in the cross-examination wherein he has deposed
that there was no demand and acceptance of money by
respondent No.1 and without any basis has proceeded to
presume that P.W.1-complainant was merely attempting to
safeguard the interests of respondent No.1. It is further
submitted that total 10 witnesses have been examined in the
criminal proceedings, whereas, only 4 amongst them have been
examined by the Enquiry Officer in the departmental enquiry and
they have also not supported the case of the employer. In
support of his contention, he placed reliance on the following
decisions:
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1. S. Bhaskar Reddy & Another v Superintendent of
Police and Another8
2. Ram Lal v State of Rajasthan9
3. Maharana Pratap Singh v State of Bihar and Others10
4. Ebrahim Aboobakar v Custodian of Evacuee
Property11
5. Aejaz Hussain v State of Karnataka12
6. P V Rudrappa v State of Karnataka13
7. Principal Secretary to Government Department of
Revenue v Somashekar14
8. The State of Karnataka and Ors v N.Gangaraj15
Hence, he seeks to dismiss the petition.
5. Sri. Anil Kale, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 submits that the charges and evidence in both
the proceedings are different and the finding of the KSAT is
perverse to the said effect. It is further submitted that the
8
(2015) 2 SCC 365
9
(2024) 1 SCC 175
10
2025 SCC Online SC 890
11
(1952) 1 SCC 798
12
2020 SCC Online KAR 5552
13
2024 SCC Online Kar 10628
14
2025 SCC Online Kar 4560
15
Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2014 dated 14.02.2020
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complainant has supported the case in his examination-in-chief
and after much delay, cross-examination was conducted where
he, slightly deviated from his version in the examination-in-chief.
However, other witnesses in the enquiry have fully supported the
case and if the entire evidence on record is appreciated, the
charges levelled against the DGO/employee are proved. Hence,
he seeks to allow the petition.
6. We have heard the learned Government Advocate for
the petitioner, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1,
learned counsel for respondent No.2 and meticulously perused
the material available on record. We have given our anxious
considerations to the submissions advanced.
7. The points that arise for our consideration in this
petition are:
"1.Whether the finding recorded with regard to
misconduct in a disciplinary enquiry is sustainable
under law and the interference by the KSAT
warrants any interference?
2. Whether the facts, charges and evidence are
identical or similar in a criminal proceedings and if
yes, whether the acquittal in criminal proceedings
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has a bearing on imposition of penalty in the
departmental enquiry?''
8. The above points are considered together and
answered as follows:
a) The respondent No.1 was working at Belavalkoppa village
as a Village Accountant in the year 2011. A complaint was
filed against him by one Sri.Vijaykumar Hanamappa to the
Lokayukta Police alleging that respondent No.1 had
demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/- as gratification for
mutation of the applicant's name in the revenue records.
Pursuant to the said complaint, a crime is registered in
Crime No.16/2011 for the offences punishable under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'PC
Act', for short). The matter was taken up for investigation
on 02.11.2011, wherein, a trap was organised by the
Lokayukta Police and respondent No.1 was caught in
possession of tainted cash. After completion of the
investigation, charge sheet was filed in Special Case
No.15/2012 before the Principal District and Sessions
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Judge, Bagalkot (hereinafter referred to as the 'Sessions
Court', for short) for offences punishable under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
b) The petitioner vide order dated 08.11.2012 initiated
disciplinary proceedings against respondent No.1 by
entrusting the same to respondent No.2. The Enquiry
Officer framed the Article of Charges against respondent
No.1 for committing misconduct as enumerated under Rule
3(1) (i) to (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct)
Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Conduct Rules',
for short). The Disciplinary Authority examined PW.1 to
PW.4, got marked Exs.P.1 to P.11 and delinquent
Government Official-respondent No.1 examined himself as
DW.1 and another witness as DW.2 and got marked
Exs.D.1 to D.3. After detailed enquiry, the Enquiry Officer
submitted report recording the finding that respondent
No.1 demanded and accepted illegal gratification of a sum
of Rs.2,500/- from the complainant and respondent No.1
failed to offer satisfactory explanation for possession of
tainted cash of Rs.2,500/-, thereby, is guilty of misconduct
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within the purview of Rule 3(1) (i) to (iii) of the Conduct
Rules and charges are proved. The petitioner received the
report of enquiry and the recommendation of respondent
No.2. The petitioner issued second show cause notice to
respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 submitted reply to
the said show cause notice. The disciplinary authority
examined the enquiry report, evidence on record,
explanation offered by respondent No.1 and passed an
order of imposing punishment of compulsory retirement.
c) The Sessions Court in Spl.C.No.15/2012 vide judgment
dated 06.05.2021 acquitted respondent No.1 for the
charged offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
d) It would be useful to consider exposition of law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, as under:
(i) In the case of State of Karnataka v. Umesh,
16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry
are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial.
In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the
criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to
establish the ingredients of the offence beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a
presumption of innocence. The purpose of a
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disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire
into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which
results in a violation of the service rules governing the
relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal
prosecution where the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding,
a charge of misconduct has to be established on a
preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence
which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those
which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of
the accused in a criminal case does not debar the
employer from proceeding in the exercise of
disciplinary jurisdiction.
17. In a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977
SCC (L&S) 298 : (1977) 1 SLR 750] , V.R. Krishna
Iyer, J. set out the principles which govern disciplinary
proceedings as follows : (SCC p. 493, para 4)
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the
strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the
Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply. All materials which
are logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
true that departmental authorities and Administrative
Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material
and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking
not relevant under the Evidence Act. For this
proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text
books, although we have been taken through case-law
and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion
of extraneous materials or considerations and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of course,
fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness,
bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate
the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of
a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However,
the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in
insisting that passengers who had come in and gone
out should be chased and brought before the tribunal
before a valid finding could be recorded. The
"residuum" rule to which counsel for the respondent
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referred, based upon certain passages from American
Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the
passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid
requirement. The simple point is, was
there some evidence or was there no evidence -- not
in the sense of the technical rules governing regular
court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as
men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept.
Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of
the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny.
Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is
certainly available for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We
find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal,
Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which
has relevance to the charge levelled against the
respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the
order is invalid on that ground."
(emphasis in original and supplied )
These principles have been reiterated in subsequent
decisions of this Court including State of
Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [State of Rajasthan v. B.K.
Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455]
; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah
Mazdoor Sangh [Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil
Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 :
2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] ; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd. [Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
(2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020]
and CISF v. Abrar Ali [CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC
507 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 310] .
22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court
does not act as an appellate forum over the
findings of the disciplinary authority. The court
does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis
of which the finding of misconduct has been
arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry.
The Court in the exercise of judicial review must
restrict its review to determine whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some
evidence;
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(iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the
disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority
suffer from perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven
misconduct. [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj,
(2020) 3 SCC 423 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S)
547; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7
SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80; R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab,
(1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424
and CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507 : (2018)
1 SCC (L&S) 310]
(ii) In the case of Deputy General Manager
(Appellate Authority) and Others v. Ajai
Kumar Srivastava
22. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article
32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is
circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law
or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice
or violation of principles of natural justice and it is
not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as
an appellate authority which has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V.
Venugopalan [State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan,
(1994) 6 SCC 302 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1385] and
later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian [State of
T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1995
SCC (L&S) 292] and further examined by the
three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as
under: (B.C. Chaturvedi case [B.C.
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Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , SCC pp. 759-60, para 13)
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole
judge of facts. Where appeal is
presented, the appellate authority has
coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment.
In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof
of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot
be permitted to be canvassed before the
court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel,
(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364]
this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p.
369, para 20) that if the conclusion,
upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is
perverse or suffers from patent error on
the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
be issued."
23. It has been consistently followed in the later
decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh
Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC
768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by
the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin
Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of
India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S)
103] .
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review,
of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the
decision-making process and not the merits of the
decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment
and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The
court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings
held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner,
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
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mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based on
no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached
or where the conclusions upon consideration of the
evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are
perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of
judicial review cannot be extended to the
examination of correctness or reasonableness of a
decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the
court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent
authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence and authority has power and
jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
(iii) In the case of Inspector General of Police v. S.
Samuthiram
Honourable acquittal
24. The meaning of the expression "honourable
acquittal" came up for consideration before this
Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1
SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC
619] . In that case, this Court has considered the
impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with
honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the
disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this
Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle
an employee to reinstatement in service, the
acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The
expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of
blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the
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Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code,
which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define precisely what is meant by the
expression "honourably acquitted". When the
accused is acquitted after full consideration of
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had
miserably failed to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be said that
the accused was honourably acquitted.
25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787]
it was held that even in the case of acquittal,
departmental proceedings may follow where the
acquittal is other than honourable. In State of
Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [1972 SLR 44
(SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views
expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart
Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168]
which is as follows : (Raghava case [1972 SLR 44
(SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8)
"8. ... 'The expression "honourably
acquitted" is one which is unknown to
courts of justice. Apparently it is a form
of order used in courts martial and other
extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our
judgment that we accepted the
explanation given by the appellant,
believed it to be true and considered
that it ought to have been accepted by
the government authorities and by the
Magistrate. Further, we decided that the
appellant had not misappropriated the
monies referred to in the charge. It is
thus clear that the effect of our
judgment was that the appellant was
acquitted as fully and completely as it
was possible for him to be acquitted.
Presumably, this is equivalent to what
government authorities term
"honourably acquitted".'" (Robert Stuart
case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] , ILR pp.
188-89)"
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26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of
any provision in the service rules for
reinstatement, if an employee is honourably
acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred
on the employee to claim any benefit including
reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of
proof required for holding a person guilty by a
criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way
of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a
criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of
the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to
establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled
law that the strict burden of proof required to
establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in
a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of
probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases
where a person is acquitted for technical reasons
or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since
few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In
the case on hand the prosecution did not take
steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on
the ground that the complainant and his wife
turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the
accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not
prepared to say that in the instant case, the
respondent was honourably acquitted by the
criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled
to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu
Service Rules do not provide so.
(iv) In the case of Shashi Bhushan Prasad v. CISF
17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial
proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a
criminal court has been examined by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in A.P. SRTC v. Mohd.
Yousuf Miya [A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya,
(1997) 2 SCC 699 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 548] . The
relevant paragraph is as under: (SCC pp. 704-05,
para 8)
"8. ... The purpose of departmental enquiry
and of prosecution are two different and
distinct aspects. The criminal
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prosecution is launched for an offence
for violation of a duty, the offender owes
to the society or for breach of which law
has provided that the offender shall
make satisfaction to the public. So crime
is an act of commission in violation of
law or of omission of public duty. The
departmental enquiry is to maintain
discipline in the service and efficiency of
public service. It would, therefore, be
expedient that the disciplinary
proceedings are conducted and
completed as expeditiously as possible.
It is not, therefore, desirable to lay
down any guidelines as inflexible rules
in which the departmental proceedings
may or may not be stayed pending trial
in criminal case against the delinquent
officer. Each case requires to be
considered in the backdrop of its own
facts and circumstances. There would be
no bar to proceed simultaneously with
departmental enquiry and trial of a
criminal case unless the charge in the
criminal trial is of grave nature involving
complicated questions of fact and law.
Offence generally implies infringement
of public (sic duty), as distinguished
from mere private rights punishable
under criminal law. When trial for
criminal offence is conducted it should
be in accordance with proof of the
offence as per the evidence defined
under the provisions of the Evidence
Act. Converse is the case of
departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a
departmental proceeding relates to
conduct or breach of duty of the
delinquent officer to punish him for his
misconduct defined under the relevant
statutory rules or law. That the strict
standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a
settled legal position. The enquiry in the
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departmental proceedings relates to the
conduct of the delinquent officer and
proof in that behalf is not as high as in
an offence in criminal charge. It is seen
that invariably the departmental enquiry
has to be conducted expeditiously so as
to effectuate efficiency in public
administration and the criminal trial will
take its own course. The nature of
evidence in criminal trial is entirely
different from the departmental
proceedings. In the former, prosecution
is to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt on the touchstone of human
conduct. The standard of proof in the
departmental proceedings is not the
same as of the criminal trial. The
evidence also is different from the
standard point of the Evidence Act. The
evidence required in the departmental
enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence
Act. Under these circumstances, what is
required to be seen is whether the
departmental enquiry would seriously
prejudice the delinquent in his defence
at the trial in a criminal case. It is
always a question of fact to be
considered in each case depending on
its own facts and circumstances. In this
case, we have seen that the charge is
failure to anticipate the accident and
prevention thereof. It has nothing to do
with the culpability of the offence under
Sections 304-A and 338 IPC. Under
these circumstances, the High Court was
not right in staying the proceedings."
(emphasis supplied)
18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar
Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Ajit Kumar
Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764 :
2005 SCC (L&S) 1020] This Court held as under:
(SCC p. 776, para 11)
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"11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by
a criminal court is concerned, in our
opinion, the said order does not
preclude the Corporation from taking an
action if it is otherwise permissible. In
our judgment, the law is fairly well
settled. Acquittal by a criminal court
would not debar an employer from
exercising power in accordance with the
Rules and Regulations in force. The two
proceedings, criminal and departmental,
are entirely different. They operate in
different fields and have different
objectives. Whereas the object of
criminal trial is to inflict appropriate
punishment on the offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to
deal with the delinquent departmentally
and to impose penalty in accordance
with the service rules. In a criminal trial,
incriminating statement made by the
accused in certain circumstances or
before certain officers is totally
inadmissible in evidence. Such strict
rules of evidence and procedure would
not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which
is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof
necessary to record the commission of
delinquency. The rule relating to
appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In
criminal law, burden of proof is on the
prosecution and unless the prosecution
is able to prove the guilt of the accused
"beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot
be convicted by a court of law. In a
departmental enquiry, on the other
hand, penalty can be imposed on the
delinquent officer on a finding recorded
on the basis of "preponderance of
probability". Acquittal of the appellant
by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does
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not ipso facto absolve him from the
liability under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the
contention of the appellant that since he
was acquitted by a criminal court, the
impugned order [Ajit Kumar
Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., 2004 SCC
OnLine Cal 59 : (2004) 4 LLN 512]
dismissing him from service deserves to
be quashed and set aside."
(emphasis supplied)
19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law
laid down by this Court and it is fairly well settled
that two proceedings criminal and departmental
are entirely different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. Whereas the
object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate
punishment on an offender, the purpose of
enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent
departmentally and to impose penalty in
accordance with the service rules. The degree of
proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to
record the commission of delinquency. Even the
rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law,
burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless
the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be
convicted by a court of law whereas in the
departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on
the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis
of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal by the
court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial
proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the
delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been
considered by the High Court in the impugned
judgment [Shashi Bhusan Prasad v. CISF, 2008
SCC OnLine Ori 544 : 2008 Lab IC 3733] in detail
and needs no interference by this Court.
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(v) In the case of Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited v C. Nagaraju and
Another
9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an
employer from exercising the power to conduct
departmental proceedings in accordance with the
rules and regulations. The two proceedings,
criminal and departmental, are entirely different.
They operate in different fields and have different
objectives. [Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020]
In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is
whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct
as would merit his removal from service or a
lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas
in the criminal proceedings, the question is
whether the offences registered against him under
the PC Act are established, and if established,
what sentence should be imposed upon him. The
standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the
rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases
are significantly distinct and different. [State of
Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 1455]
10. As the High Court set aside the order of dismissal
on the basis of the judgments of this Court in M.
Paul Anthony [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold
Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
810] and G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of
Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
1121] , it is necessary to examine whether the
said judgments are applicable to the facts of this
case. Simultaneous continuance of departmental
proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on
the same set of facts was the point considered by
this Court in M. Paul Anthony case [M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC
679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] . This Court was of
the opinion that departmental proceedings and
proceedings in a criminal case can proceed
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simultaneously as there is no bar. However, it is
desirable to stay departmental inquiry till
conclusion of the criminal case if the departmental
proceedings and criminal case are based on
identical and similar set of facts and the charge in
the criminal case against the delinquent employee
is of a grave nature which involves complicated
questions of law and fact. On the facts of the said
case, it was found that the criminal case and the
departmental proceedings were based on identical
set of facts and the evidence before the criminal
court and the departmental inquiry was the same.
Further, in the said case the departmental inquiry
was conducted ex parte. In such circumstances,
this Court held that the ex parte departmental
proceedings cannot be permitted to stand in view
of the acquittal of the delinquent by the criminal
court on the same set of facts and evidence. The
said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this
case. In the present case, the prosecution
witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial
against Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the
criminal court on the ground that the prosecution
could not produce any credible evidence to prove
the charge. On the other hand, the complainant
and the other witnesses appeared before the
inquiry officer and deposed against Respondent 1.
The evidence available in the departmental inquiry
is completely different from that led by the
prosecution in criminal trial.
11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a
judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank [G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 1121] whereby the writ petition filed by
Respondent 1 was allowed. In the said case, the
delinquent officer was charged for an offence
punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with
Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was
honourably acquitted by the criminal court as the
prosecution failed to prove the charge. Thereafter,
a departmental inquiry was conducted and he was
dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was
upheld [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC
OnLine Guj 487] by the High Court. In the appeal
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filed by the delinquent officer, this Court was of
the opinion that the departmental proceedings and
criminal case were based on identical and similar
set of facts. The evidence before the criminal court
and the departmental proceedings being exactly
the same, this Court held that the acquittal of the
employee by a criminal court has to be given due
weight by the disciplinary authority. On the basis
that the evidence in both the criminal trial and
departmental inquiry is the same, the order of
dismissal of the appellant therein was set aside.
As stated earlier, the facts of this case are entirely
different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due
to non-availability of any evidence before the
criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the
basis of a report of the inquiry officer before whom
there was ample evidence against Respondent 1.
(vi) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PRAVEEN
KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA at para 25, 26 and 28,
in the case of Director General of Police, Railway
Protection Force and others v. Rajendra Kumar
Dubey at Para 21 held the scope of the department
enquiry vis-a-vis criminal proceedings and the scope
of interference by the Constitutional Courts.
(vii) In the case of Maharana Pratap v State of Bihar
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically entitle the accused to have an order
of setting aside of his dismissal from public service
following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-
established that when the charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances in both the
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departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings
are identical or substantially similar, the situation
assumes a different context. In such cases,
upholding the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and
oppressive. This is a position settled by the
decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by
a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of
Rajasthan"
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that
the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt" as both the informant
and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in
court. This discussion confirms that the appellant's
acquittal was based not on mere technicalities.
In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like
"benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted"
should not be treated as formalities. The Court's
duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment,
rather than the terminology used.
(viii) Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1
SCC 175
28. Expressions like "benefit of doubt" and "honourably
acquitted", used in judgments are not to be
understood as magic incantations. A court of law
will not be carried away by the mere use of such
terminology. In the present case, the Appellate
Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original
marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972
and the same has also been proved by the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution.
The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal
proceeding was after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove the charge can only be
arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its
entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to
examine the substance of the judgment and not
go by the form of expression used.
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29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate
Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the
charge against the appellant was not just, "not
proved" -- in fact the charge even stood
"disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As
held by this Court, a fact is said to be "disproved"
when, after considering the matters before it, the
court either believes that it does not exist or
considers its non-existence so probable that a
prudent man ought, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to act upon the supposition
that it does not exist. A fact is said to be "not
proved" when it is neither "proved" nor
"disproved" (see Vijayee Singh v. State of
U.P. [Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC
190 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 378] ).
30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the
finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary
proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot
be allowed to stand. The charges were not just
similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses
and circumstances were all the same. This is a
case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash
the orders of the disciplinary authority and the
appellate authority as allowing them to stand will
be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very
similar to the situation that arose in G.M.
Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC
446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] .
(ix) In the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat16
30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondents are distinguishable
on facts and on law. In this case, the
departmental proceedings and the criminal case
are based on identical and similar set of facts and
the charge in a departmental case against the
appellant and the charge before the criminal court
are one and the same. It is true that the nature of
16
(2006) 5 SCC 446
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charge in the departmental proceedings and in the
criminal case is grave. The nature of the case
launched against the appellant on the basis of
evidence and material collected against him during
enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the
charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the
same. In other words, charges, evidence,
witnesses and circumstances are one and the
same. In the present case, criminal and
departmental proceedings have already noticed or
granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid
conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of
articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr
V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were
the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer
who by relying upon their statement came to the
conclusion that the charges were established
against the appellant. The same witnesses were
examined in the criminal case and the criminal
court on the examination came to the conclusion
that the prosecution has not proved the guilt
alleged against the appellant beyond any
reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by
its judicial pronouncement with the finding that
the charge has not been proved. It is also to be
noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made
after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under
these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair
and rather oppressive to allow the findings
recorded in the departmental proceedings to
stand.
31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the
departmental as well as criminal proceedings were
the same without there being any iota of
difference, the appellant should succeed. The
distinction which is usually proved between the
departmental and criminal proceedings on the
basis of the approach and burden of proof would
not be applicable in the instant case. Though the
finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was
found to be valid by the courts below, when there
was an honourable acquittal of the employee
during the pendency of the proceedings
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challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be
taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony
case [(1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810]
will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed
by the appellant deserves to be allowed.
(x) In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh17
J. The effect of an acquittal
38. I the present case, we have an acquittal in a
criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment
of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries
of the administration of criminal justice. The
judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses,
and of the star witness resiling from his
statements. Our precedents indicate that acquittal
in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not
conclude a disciplinary enquiry. In Southern
Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India [Southern
Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India, (2009) 9
SCC 24 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 552] , this Court
held : (SCC p. 40, para 37)
"37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself
cannot be a ground for interfering with
an order of punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority. The High Court
did not say that the said fact had not
been taken into consideration. The
revisional authority did so. It is now a
well-settled principle of law that the
order of dismissal can be passed even if
the delinquent official had been
acquitted of the criminal charge."
(emphasis supplied)
39. In State v. S.Samuthiram [State v. S. Samuthiram,
(2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 :
(2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] , a two-Judge Bench of
this Court held that unless the accused has an
"honourable acquittal" in their criminal trial, as
opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning
17
(2021) 12 SCC 569
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hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall
not affect the decision in the disciplinary
proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement.
But the penal statutes governing substance or
procedure do not allude to an "honourable
acquittal". Noticing this, the Court observed :
(SCC pp. 609-10, paras 24-26)
"Honourable acquittal
24. The meaning of the expression
"honourable acquittal" came up for
consideration before this Court
in RBI v. Bhopal Singh
Panchal [RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal,
(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S)
594] . In that case, this Court has
considered the impact of Regulation
46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal
by a criminal court on the disciplinary
proceedings. In that context, this Court
held that the mere acquittal does not
entitle an employee to reinstatement in
service, the acquittal, it was held, has to
be honourable. The expressions
"honourable acquittal", "acquitted of
blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown
to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the
Penal Code, which are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define
precisely what is meant by the
expression "honourably acquitted".
When the accused is acquitted after full
consideration of prosecution evidence
and that the prosecution had miserably
failed to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be
said that the accused was honourably
acquitted.
25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [R.P.
Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC
787] it was held that even in the case of
acquittal, departmental proceedings
may follow where the acquittal is other
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than honourable. In State of
Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [State
of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari,
1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted
with approval the views expressed by
Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart
Wauchope v. Emperor [Robert Stuart
Wauchope v. Emperor, 1933 SCC
OnLine Cal 369 : ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168]
which is as follows : (Raghava
case [State of Assam v. Raghava
Rajgopalachari, 1972 SLR 44 (SC)] ,
SLR p. 47, para 8)
'8. ... The expression "honourably
acquitted" is one which is unknown to
courts of justice. Apparently it is a form
of order used in courts martial and other
extra-judicial tribunals. We said in our
judgment that we accepted the
explanation given by the appellant,
believed it to be true and considered
that it ought to have been accepted by
the government authorities and by the
Magistrate. Further, we decided that the
appellant had not misappropriated the
monies referred to in the charge. It is
thus clear that the effect of our
judgment was that the appellant was
acquitted as fully and completely as it
was possible for him to be acquitted.
Presumably, this is equivalent to what
government authorities term
"honourably acquitted".' (Robert Stuart
case [Robert Stuart
Wauchope v. Emperor, 1933 SCC
OnLine Cal 369 : ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168]
, ILR pp. 188-89)
26. As we have already indicated, in the
absence of any provision in the service
rules for reinstatement, if an employee
is honourably acquitted by a criminal
court, no right is conferred on the
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employee to claim any benefit including
reinstatement. Reason is that the
standard of proof required for holding a
person guilty by a criminal court and the
enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary
proceeding is entirely different. In a
criminal case, the onus of establishing
the guilt of the accused is on the
prosecution and if it fails to establish the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is assumed to be innocent. It is
settled law that the strict burden of
proof required to establish guilt in a
criminal court is not required in
disciplinary proceedings and
preponderance of probabilities is
sufficient. There may be cases where a
person is acquitted for technical reasons
or the prosecution giving up other
witnesses since few of the other
witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the
case on hand the prosecution did not
take steps to examine many of the
crucial witnesses on the ground that the
complainant and his wife turned hostile.
The court, therefore, acquitted the
accused giving the benefit of doubt. We
are not prepared to say that in the
instant case, the respondent was
honourably acquitted by the criminal
court and even if it is so, he is not
entitled to claim reinstatement since the
Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide
so."
(emphasis supplied)
(xi) In the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy & Another v
Superintendent of Police and Another the Hon'ble
Supreme Court at para 20 to 22 reiterated law laid
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down in the case of S. Samuthiram, Captain
M.Paul Anthony and G.M.Tank
e) The KSAT interfered with the order of imposition of penalty
of compulsory retirement mainly on three grounds. Firstly,
the KSAT has recorded the finding with regard to the
evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry and
ventured to re-appreciate the evidence which in our
considered view is impermissible unless the finding of the
departmental enquiry is without following the principles of
natural justice, the finding of misconduct is without any
evidence, the statutory rule governing the conduct of
disciplinary enquiry has not been observed, the finding of
the disciplinary authority is perverse and penalty imposed
is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. The KSAT
without even looking into the oral and documentary
evidence in its entirety came to an incorrect conclusion
that the Enquiry Officer has not appreciated the evidence
of PWs.1 to 4 in its proper perspective and further that the
demand and acceptance is not proved. In our considered
view, such a finding of the KSAT was uncalled for as it
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would amount to the KSAT sitting as an Appellate Authority
over the proceedings of departmental enquiry, which is
impermissible. The KSAT has wrongfully recorded the
finding that PW.3 has admitted that he was not present at
the time of the alleged demand and acceptance of the
money and further that he has not heard conversation with
regard to the demand and acceptance of money. The said
finding of the KSAT runs contrary to the evidence on
record. It is the case of the employer that the complainant
files a complaint with the respondent No.2 alleging that, to
do the official favour, the employee has initially demanded
Rs.4,000/- and later he scaled down to Rs.2,500/-. Based
on such a written complaint, which is marked as Ex.P.1
and which has been admitted by the complainant in his
examination-in-chief, the PW.1 in his examination-in-chief
during the enquiry clearly deposed what has been stated in
the complaint at Ex.P.1 and further deposed that as per
the plan, complainant-PW.1 and PW.3 entered the room
and handed over Rs.2,500/- as demanded by the
employee. There is clear evidence with regard to the
procedure followed by the Investigating Officer with regard
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to pre-trap procedure. PW.3, who is a pancha witness fully
supported the case of the employer that he heard the
conversation of PW.1 and the employee that as per the
demand of the employee, PW.1 had brought Rs.2,500/-
which he had handed over to the employee and he
received the said amount, counted the amount with both
hands and put it in his shirt pocket and immediately after
the signal shown by PW.3, PW.2 and the Investigating
Officer entered the room and conducted the trap
proceeding by drawing the Mahazar.
f) The oral evidence of PW.1 and PW.3 when compared with
the complaint at Ex.P.1 and Mahazars drawn during pre-
trap and post-trap clearly demonstrate that the employee
has demanded illegal gratification from PW.1 to do the
official favour, accepted the illegal gratification and that
the Investigating Officer has conducted the trap procedure
in accordance with law. There is sufficient evidence on
record to come to the conclusion that the trap procedure
conducted by the Investigating Officer is in accordance
with law and the employer in order to prove the charges
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levelled against the employee has led oral and
documentary evidence in the departmental proceedings,
which are sufficient to come to the conclusion that the
charges levelled against the employee are proved. The
KSAT has made a feeble attempt to make a distinction with
regard to the examination-in-chief of PW.1 and cross-
examination of PW.1 by recording the finding that there is
inconsistency. In our considered view, the Enquiry Officer
has clearly recorded his finding in the Enquiry Report with
regard to the minor inconsistencies by comparing the other
evidence on record. We fully agree with the finding
recorded in the departmental proceedings with regard to
the appreciation of evidence on record. The KSAT has
failed to keep in mind that the standard of proof required
in the departmental proceedings is that of preponderance
of probabilities. The evidence on record when read in its
entirety, it can be fairly said that the charges levelled
against the employee has been proved by the employer by
leading legally acceptable evidence. The perverse finding
recorded by the KSAT with regard to the appreciation of
evidence is required to be interfered in these proceedings.
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g) It is worth to be noticed that PW.1 has not denied the
complaint lodged by him at Ex.P.1, his signature and that
the official work was pending with the employee. Further,
the Enquiry Officer has recorded the finding that there is
substantial gap between the examination-in-chief of PW.1
and his cross-examination. The Enquiry Officer has
recorded further finding that in cross-examination, the
complainant has made some attempt to protect the
employee by stating that, it was DW.2, who had made the
demand for illegal gratification. The evidence of PW.3,
examination-in-chief of PW.1 and evidence of PW.4 is read
together and compared with the documentary evidence on
record and by which we can come to a definite conclusion
that PW.1-complainant was won over by the employee
during the departmental proceedings which has been
rightly appreciated by the Enquiry Officer and recorded the
detailed finding.
h) The employee has made an attempt to overcome the
evidence of PW.3 by putting number of suggestions during
the cross-examination, which has been referred to by the
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Enquiry Officer at para 31 to 34 of the enquiry report. The
evidence of PW.3 is consistent and nothing was elicited
during the cross-examination. The Enquiry Officer has
rightly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded a
clear finding that charges levelled against the employee
are proved and the said finding ought not to have been
interfered by the KSAT without any justifiable reason.
i) Secondly, the KSAT has recorded in its reasons that the
reply of the employee submitted to the second show-
cause-notice was not considered. We have perused the
impugned order of penalty which clearly indicates that the
Disciplinary Authority has considered the enquiry report,
evidence on record, explanation of the employee and has
come to a conclusion that the objections are not
satisfactory and accepted the finding and imposed the
punishment of compulsory retirement. It is trite law that
the Disciplinary Authority is not expected to assign detailed
reasons to each of the objections raised by the employee.
The impugned order clearly indicates that the Disciplinary
Authority has applied his mind and imposed the penalty by
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overruling the objections, which does not call for any
interference.
j) Thirdly, the KSAT has interfered with the finding of the
departmental enquiry and the order of penalty on the
ground that the employee has been acquitted in the
criminal proceedings. In our considered view, the KSAT has
erred in recording the said finding without considering the
fact that the charges levelled against the employee in the
criminal proceedings and the departmental enquiry are
distinct. Furthermore, even the evidence in both the
proceedings is different. The KSAT has failed to appreciate
that the standard of proof required in the departmental
proceedings is that of preponderance of probabilities and in
the criminal trial, the prosecution is required to prove the
case beyond reasonable doubt. In the case on hand, we
have already recorded the finding with regard to the
evidence recorded in the departmental proceedings that
there is sufficient evidence to uphold the order of
punishment. It is to be noticed that the charges in the
departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are
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different and for the ready reference, they are extracted
herein below:
Charge in the Departmental Charge in the Criminal
Proceedings Proceedings
That, you Sri Shivanagowda s/o You the accused named above,
Govindappa Vasanada, the DGO, being public servant working as
while working as Village village accountant at
Accountant of Belavalakoppa Belavalakoppa village, on
Circle in Badami taluk of 2.11.2011 at about 2.30 p.m. in a
Bagalkote District, the room situated at Badami within
complainant namely Sri the limits of lokayukta police
Vijaykumar s/o of Belavalakoppa station, Bagalkot obtained
village had purchased 3 acres 17 gratification of ₹2,500/- from the
guntas of land in sy.no.150/2 of complainant Vijaykumar in the
Belavalakoppa village under presence of CW.3 Venkoba as a
registered sale deed dtd. 17-10- reward for doing official act and
2011 and after intimation was thereby committed an offence
sent to you from the office of the punishable under S.7 of
Sub-Registrar and the Tahasildar Prevention of Corruption Act.
and on 28-10-2010 you asked for 1988 and within the cognizance of
bribe of Rs.4,000/- to take further this court.
action and on 02-11-2011 you
received bribe of Rs.2,500/- from Lastly you the accused named
the complainant to show official above, on the aforesaid date. time
favour failing to maintain absolute and place, being a public servant,
integrity and devotion to duty, the obtained for yourself pecuniary
act of which was un-becoming of a advantage of ₹2,500/- from the
Government Servant and thereby complainant Vijaykumar and
committed misconduct as thereby abused your position as a
enumerated U/R 3(1(i) to (iii) of public servant and thereby
Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) committed an offence under
rules 1966. S.13(1)(d) punishable under
S.13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and within
the cognizance of this court.
And I hereby direct that you be
tried by this court on the above
said charge.
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k) The aforesaid charges make it clear that the burden is on
the employer to prove the misconduct of the employee and
in the criminal proceedings, the charges are with regard to
the commission of an offence under the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. By no stretch of
imagination can the charges leveled against the employee
in both the proceedings be termed as similar. In the
departmental proceedings, the employer is required to
prove the general misconduct of the employee, however, in
the criminal proceedings, the charges are with regard to
obtaining illegal gratification of Rs.2,500/- from the
complainant as a reward for doing an official act and
thereby committing an offence punishable under Sections
7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The
perusal of the judgment of the Sessions Court in
Spl.C.No.15/2012 clearly indicates that the acquittal of the
employee who was the accused is for the reason that the
prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and the acquittal is not the
honorable acquittal. The enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra makes a clear
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distinction with regard to the honorable acquittal and
acquittal of the accused on the ground of 'benefit of doubt'.
In the case on hand, if the judgment of the Sessions Court
is read in entirety, it clearly indicates that some of the
prosecution witnesses have turned hostile, which resulted
in acquittal due to benefit of doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has clearly held an honorable acquittal is distinct
from an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or due to
technical reasons. Hence, the contention of the learned
Senior Counsel for the employee that the acquittal in the
criminal proceedings is required to be taken note of, has
no merit and accordingly, the same is rejected.
Considering the evidence on record we are of the
considered view that the charges leveled against the
employee are proved, the enquiry was conducted after
providing sufficient opportunity to the employee. The KSAT
ought not to have interfered with the findings recorded in
the departmental proceedings without properly
appreciating the evidence on record. Hence, the impugned
order of the KSAT is required to be set-aside.
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l) We conclude by recording that the court or tribunal should
not lightly interfere in the matter of misconduct arising out
of charges of corruption. Corruption is a menace that not
only threatens the very fundamental principles of
democracy, but also undermines the rule of law and the
institutions that serve as its guardian. In the face of
corruption, the courts are not mere spectators but rather
the last bastion of justice, duty-bound to uphold the rule of
law and ensure that accountability prevails over impunity.
12. In view of the above, we proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 12.04.2023 passed in Application No.12621/2020 by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Belagavi is set-aside.
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(iii) The order dated 21.10.2020 bearing No.PÀAE 109 ©r¦ 2012 ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ, is upheld.
(iv) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL) JUDGE RKM, RH/CT-AN List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1