Madras High Court
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., ... vs Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition And ... on 7 April, 1989
Equivalent citations: (1989)1MLJ533
ORDER Ratnam, J.
1. These Civil Revision Petitions Under Section 115, C.P.C. have been preferred by M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as 'N.L.C' for short)questioning the correctness of the common order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Virdhachalam dismissing the applications filed by it under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. read with Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') praying that it should be impleaded as party second respondent, in addition to the Referring Officer, who is the first respondent, in a batch of references Under Section 18 of the Act, now pending before the Sub Court, Virudhachalam at the instance of numerous claimants whose lands have been acquired.
2. For purposes of expansion of its productive programmes, N.L.C. requested the state of Tamil Nadu to acquire about 5,200 and odd acres of land and it is not now in dispute that a vast extent of land belonging to the respondents herein had been acquired under the provisions of the Act and possession of the lands so acquired, had also been taken over by N.L.C. In respect of the compensation payable to the owners of the lands so acquired, awards were passed by the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyveli, fixing the quantum of compensation payable to them on the basis of such materials as were placed, at the time of the award enquiry. Dissatisfied with the determination of the quantum of compensation under the awards the claimants whose lands had been acquired prayed for and obtained references Under Section 18(1) of the Act to the Civil Court (Sub Court), Virudhachalam and those references are now pending adjudication. According to N.L.C., in some of the references earlier disposed of, the quantum of compensation had been enhanced and if that was followed or applied in the other cases also, the amount that may eventually become payable by N.L.C. for the acquisition of the lands for its use would far exceed its budgeted outlay and it would, therefore be necessary for N.L.C. to implead itself as a necessary and proper party to the pending references so as to enable the Court to arrive at the true and correct market value of the lands, for purposes of fixing the quantum of compensation/This was opposed by the claimants, inter alia, on the ground that N.L.C. is neither a "person interested" for purposes of the Act nor a party to the award and indeed not in any manner interested in the references obtained by the claimants and that its interest, if any, could be adequately safeguarded by the Referring Officer and that it was therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party to the references. A further objection was also raised that Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. is inapplicable and cannot be invoked and at best N.L.C. can appear and adduce evidence in terms of Section 50(2) of the Act and no more and for that purpose, N.L.C. need not be impleaded as a party to the pending references.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge, Virudhachalam, on a consideration of the claim so put forthy by N.L.C. and the objections raised by the claimants refuting that claim, found that N.L.C. cannot claim any interest in the compensation payable by it in relation to the lands acquired, in which the persons who had been deprived of their lands alone were interested and that N.L.C. could not project its claims to be impleaded either as a necessary or a proper party in the pending references obtained by the claimants Under Section 18(1) of the Act and that the only limited right available to N.L.C. was Under Section 50(2)of the Act, which would enable it to appear before court, if it so chose, and adduce evidence in order to assist the Court in fixing the compensation awardable to the claimants in a just and fair manner. On the conclusions so arrived at, the Court below dismissed the applications filed by N.L.C. negativing its claim to be impleaded as a party to the references.
4. Dr. Y.S. Chitale appearing on behalf of N.L.C. while accepting that N.L.C. cannot seek a reference Under Section 18 of the Act and challenge the awards passed, submitted that N.L.C. would fall within the ambit of the expression "person interested" occurring in the first part of Section 3(b) of the Act and would also be a person interested in the objection within the meaning of Section 20(b) of the Act and would, therefore, be entitled to come on records as a party in pending references, in order to contain the quantum of compensation that may be ultimately found payable. Strong reliance in support of the above contention was placed by learned Counsel upon the decisions in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas ; Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho , N.G.E.F. Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1045 of 1977, decided on 31.7.1980 by the Supreme Court of India), Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madovallappa Kulkarni (S.L.P. (Civil) No. 6288-92 of 1982 decided on 14.1.1985 by the Supreme Court of India), Toshiba Anand Lamp Ltd. v. Verghes and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 722-35 of 1974, decided on 6.5.1987 by the Supreme Court of India), Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, Etc. 99 L.W. 221 : 1986 Writ L.R. 146 and The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) 1986 Writ I.R. 494. Learned Counsel also invited attention to the decisions in Vasant v. Dikkaya , Govindanaik v. West Patent Press Co. A.I.R. 1980 Karn. 92 and the majority view in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umrao A.I.R. 1981 P. and H. 213(F.B.) as regards the course to be adopted by this Court where there is a conflict between two Division Bench decisions of the Supreme Court of equal strength Reference was also made to Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibai in support of the claim made by N.L.C. and as to how to give effect to conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court it was thus submitted that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho , N.L.C. could seek the relief prayed for by it with reference to the opportunity afforded to N.L.C. Under Section 50(2) of the Act, learned Counsel pointed out that the words "appear and adduce evidence" occurring in Section 50(2) of the Act contemplate "appearing as a party and leading evidence" and referred in this connection to the meaning of the word 'appearance' in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, at page 125. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the different contesting respondents in these Civil Revision Petitions, drawing attention to the scheme of the Act as well as its several provisions, which will be noticed later in the course of this order, pointed out that N.L.C. cannot claim to be a "person interested" either Under Section 3(b) or even Under Section 20(b) of the Act and that the only limited right conferred on N.L.C. is that provided Under Section 50(2) of the Act and further that when N.L.C. is debarred from demanding a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, it cannot be permitted to circumvent it, by resorting to an application either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or even under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. which would inapplicable as well. Attention in this connection was drawn to Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Kukerjee I.L.R. 34 Cal. 451; Kottaiyru Nattar's Estate represented by its Receiver. Sri. S.R. Govindaiyer, Advocate, Devakottai v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer for Cooperative Housing Schemes, Madras and Anr. 1954 M.W.N. (S.N.) 78; Municipal Corporation v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1951)3 S.C.C. 821, The Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University v. Mahoodunnisa Begum , Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devastham v. Abalavana Sannadhi Santhosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation . Learned Counsel further submitted that the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are all distinguishable and inapplicable in the situation obtaining in these cases and in view of the decision in Santhosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation . Referring to Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector etc. 99 L.W. 221 : 1986 Writ L.R. 146 and The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) 1986 Writ L.R. 494, counsel submitted that they run counter to the principles laid down in Issardas S. Lulla v. Smt. Hari and Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation . According to counsel, the decisions in Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam v. Abalavana Sannadhi and Santhosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation would govern these cases and there is no need whatever to consider the course to be adopted in the event of a conflict of decisions rendered. The expression "appear and adduce evidence" occurring in Section 50(2) of the Act, according to learned Counsel, meant no more than the conferment of an optional limited right on N.L.C. to lead evidence only for the purpose of assisting the court to arrive at a quantum of compensation, which would be just and fair and such a right cannot either be enlarged or equated into one of enabling N.L.C. to claim that only as a party to the proceedings, it could have the benefit of appearing and adducing evidence, for purposes of Section 50(2)of the Act.
5. Before proceeding to embark upon a consideration of the contentions thus raised, it would be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act to which attention was drawn and their scope Section 3(b) of the Act, in suo far as it is relevant for a consideration of the contentions raised, stated that the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. The latter part of Section 3(b) of the Act declares that a person interested in an easement affecting the land, would be a person interested in land. The expression 'Court' is defined in Section 3(d) of the Act as the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the (appropriate Government) has appointed (as it is empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Though Under Section 5-A(1) of the Act any person interested in any land notified Under Section 4(1) of the Act is entitled to object to the acquisition, Under Section 5-A(3) of the Act, a person shall be deemed to be "interested in land", who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation, if the land were acquired under this Act. Under Section 8 of the Act the Collector is empowered to cause the land proposed to be acquired to be marked out and measured and also prepare a palan thereof Section 9(1) of the Act provides for the issue of a public notice by the Collector specifying the intention of the Government to take possession of the land and inviting claims to compensation for all interests in such land, i.e. the land proposed to be acquired Section 9(2) enumerates the contents of such a notice. Besides stating the particulars of the land, all persons interested in the land should be required to appear before the Collector at such time and place as may be specified to state the nature of their respective interests in the land, as well as the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests and their objections, if any, to the measurements. Section 9(3) enables the Collector to serve a notice to the same effect on the occupier of the land proposed to be acquired and on all such persons, known or believed to be interested therein or to be entitled to act for persons so interested. Section 10 of the Act empowers the Collector to require any such person to whom a notice has been issued Under Section 9 of the Act, to deliver to him a statement containing the name of every other person possessing any interest in the land or any part thereof as co-proprietor sub-proprietor mortgagee, tenant or otherwise and of the nature of such interest and of the rents and profits received or receivable Section 2 of the Act provides for the award enquiry by the Collector. Thereunder, the Collector is enabled to proceed to enquire in to the objections which any person interested has set out pursuant to a notice given Under Section 9 of the Act to the measurements made Under Section 8 of the Act and to the value of the land and also in to the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation After making such enquiry, the Collector makes an award with reference to the area of the land, the compensation allowable for the land and the apportionment of the allowable compensation among persons known or believed to be interested in the land of whom or whose claims he has information Section 12 of the Act declares the finality as well as the conclusiveness of the award between the Collector and the persons interested with reference to the area and the value of the land and the apportionment of compensation among persons interested. However, Under Section 12(1), the finality of the award is declared subject to the exceptions provided in the Act. Section 16 of the Act enables the Collector to take possession of the acquired land after the award is made Under Section 2 and only then, the acquired land would vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 18(1) of the Act, occurring in part-III of the Act relating to Reference to Court and procedures thereon, provides for a reference to the Court at the instance of a person interested, who has not accepted the award. Such a person may by written application to the Collector that the matter be reffered to the collecter require for determination by the Court relating to his objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation and persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Section 13(2) requires that such an application should set out the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. Section 19 of the Act outlines the requirements of the Statement to be made by the Collector, while making a reference for the opinion of the Court. Therein, the collector is enjoined to state the situation and extent of the land, with particulars of any trees, building or standing crops, the names of persons whom he has reason to think are interested in such land, the amount awarded for damages and paid or tendered Under Sections 5 and 17 of the Act, or either of them, and the amount of compensation awarded Under Section 11 of the Act, the amount paid or deposited under Sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act and if the objection be to the amount of the compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. A schedule giving particulars of notices served upon, and of the statements in writing made or delivered by the parties interested should also be appended to the statement. After a reference is made in the manner contemplated Under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, the Court, Under Section 20 of the Act, to which the reference is made, should cause a notice, specifying the day on which the court will proceed to determine the objection and directing appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the applicant all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any)of them, as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation. Section 21 of the Act lays down the scope of the enquiry in a reference before the Court and such enquiry shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Section 26(1)of the Act requires the award passed under Part III of the Act to be signed by the Judge and to specify the amount awarded under the first clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act and also the amount respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same Sub-section together with the grounds for awarding each of the said amounts. Every such award, Under Section 26(2) of the Act, is deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award, a judgment within the meaning of Section 50(1)of the Act occurring in part VIII, relating to the acquisition of land for companies, provides that where the provisions of the Act are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring lands at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority of any company, the charges of land incidental to such acquisition shall be destroyed from or by such fond or company. Section 50(2)is important and it states that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases, the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The proviso to Section 50(2) prohibits such local authority or company to demand a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. Section 53 of the Act enacts that except to the extent to which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, its provisions shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. Section 54 of the Act provides for the preferring of appeals to the High Court against the award of Court or any part thereof and to the Supreme Court against the decree of the High Court passed on appeal.
6. It is in the background of aforesaid resume of the important provisions of the Act that the applicability of the expression "person interested" occurring in the first part of Section 3(b) of the Act, to N.L.C. in the circumstances of this case, has to be considered. Under Section 3(b) of the Act, all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land, would be persons interested. The use of the word "claiming" in Section 3(b) of the Act connotes a demand as a matter of right or in the exercise of or on assertion of a right or in the exercise of or on assertion of a right in the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land. Such interest claimed or asserted is in the compensation payable and not in the matter of payment of compensation. The right or interest should be in the compensation and to its receipt and not the payment thereof. On a plain construction of the expression "person interested" occurring in Section 3(b) of the Act. N.L.C. cannot project any claim to or assert any right or interest in the compensation payable on account of the acquisition of the lands and cannot fall within the first part of Section 3(b) of the Act. A right to prefer an objection to the intended acquisition conferred Under Section 5-A(1) of the Act, is again confined to a "person interested" in the land notified Under Section 4(1) of the Act and the objection is to the acquisition. Though Section 5-A(1) of the Act confines the objection to any "person interested in any land" notified Under Section 4(1) of the Act, the amplitude of the expression "person interested" occurring in Section 5-A(1) of the Act is expanded Under Section 5-A(3) for purposes of Section 5-A only, to include a person, who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation. This expansion, though for purposes of Section 5-A only, to include a person, who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation. This expansion, though for purposes of Section 5-A, clearly brings out the distinction between" person interested in the land" and a "person interested in compensation" for the land acquired. It is not difficult to conceive of cases of acquisition of interest in the compensation without an interest in the land proposed to be acquired, in the legal sense of the term. For instance, a person might have attached in execution a piece of land proposed to be acquired and though by reason of such attachment, may not be a "person interested in the land", yet by reason of such attachment, on the acquisition of the land, he would be a person entitled to claim an interest in the compensation. There may also be an instance, where a person may be interested in the land and also in the compensation, as in the case of acquisition of property subjected to an easement affecting it. The dominant owner is at once interested in the land within the latter part of Section 3(b) of the Act and also in the compensation in relation to the deprivation of his easementary right. However, the expansion of the content of the expression "person interested in land" to cover a person interested in compensation Under Section 5-A(3) of the Act, is limited to Section 5-A of the Act and not other provisions. After the measuring and making out of the land Under Section 8 of the Act, notices are issued by the Collector informing the owners of the lands about the intention of the Government to take possession and stating that claims to compensation for all interesting such land may be made to the Collector. Under Section 9(2) of the Act, the interest contemplated enabling the making of claims is with reference to the land and the claim should also specify the nature of the interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claim to compensation for such interests, again referring only to the interest in the land. Thus, for purpose of Section 9 of the Act, a person in the position of N.L.C., for whose benefit the acquisitions are made, is not contemplated at all as a "person having an interest in the lands". The further steps to be taken in the course of acquisition Under Section 10 of the Act relate to the statements containing the name of every other person possessing any interest in the land or any part thereof and also of the nature of such interest. This again is confined only to the interest in the land and not any other interest. The enquiry Under Section 11 of the Act is with reference to the objections raised by any person interested pursuant to a notice given Under Section 9 of the Act. Under Section 9(2) of the Act, only persons interested in the land are entitled to put in their claims for compensation with reference to their interest in the land and their objections as well to the measurements Under Section 8 of the Act. The enquiry Under Section 11 and the passing of an award is with reference to the objections referred to Under Section 9(2) and in turn, those objections should necessarily be at the instance of persons interested in the land and the objections must relate to the measurements, besides setting out their claims for compensation for the interest in the land. Thus, during the course of the award enquiry, what is adjudicated upon is the interest of a person who had put in an objection Under Section 9 to the measurements, the value of the land and also the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation. It is thus seen that the award enquiry Under Section 11 of the Act is confined to the consideration and adjudication of the interests of persons with reference to the land, submitted pursuant to the notice Under Section 9(1) of the Act. The award also should take into account not only the area of the land and the compensation, which, in the opinion of the Collector, should be allowed, but also the apportionment of the compensation among the persons known or believed to be interested in the land This again has no reference whatever to the person for whose benefit the acquisition is made. Section 12 of the Act declares the award to be final between the Collector and the persons interested with reference to the area and the value of the land, as well as the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. Here again, the conclusiveness statutorily declared, is between the Collector and the persons interested, i.e., persons claiming compensation for the acquisition of their interests in land or others interested in the compensation on the one hand and the person for whose benefit the lands are acquired on the other. Further, the award passed Under Section 12 of the Act is declared to be final between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they had appeared before the Collector or not, in relation to the matters set out therein, like the area and value of the land, the apportionment of compensation, etc. It is difficult to accept, in this statutory back-ground of Sections 9 to 12 of the Act, that the person for whose benefit the acquisition is made, is a party to the award, as a person interested in the payment of compensation. The provision Under Section 6 of the Act for taking possession of the Acquired land after the passing of the award Under Section 11 of the Act and the vesting of the land in the Government free from all encumbrances is without any reference whatever to the beneficiary of the acquisition. Section 18(1) of the Act reinforces this by providing that any person interested, who has not accepted the award, (italics ours) may require that the matter be referred for the determination of the court. The non-acceptance of an award passed by the Collector Under Section 11 of the Act, as envisaged Under Section 18(1) of the Act, could, if at all, arise between the parties thereto interested in the receipt of compensation. There is, therefore, no question of N.L.C. not accepting the award, because it was not a party to it as one interested in the receipt of compensation. Only the erstwhile owners of the acquired lands, respondents herein, had sought and obtained references, Under Section 18 of the Act, regarding quantum, as, undoubtedly, they were parties to the award, and as persons interested in the receipt of compensations, they had not accepted it. N.L.C. not being entitled to claim any right or interest, in the receipt of compensation referable to the acquisition, within the meaning of the first part of Section 3(b) of the Act, could not seek a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. That is the reason why an interdict is laid on N.L.C, under the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act, which prohibits a company, at whose cost lands are acquired, to demand a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. To permit N.L.C. under the guise of applications under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. to implead itself as the second respondent in the pending reference, would be, to enable it to indirectly and circuitously have the benefit of a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, which, it cannot secure under the Act and to render the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act a dead-letter. The argument that Under Section 20(b) of the Act, N.L.C. would be entitled to notice as a person interested in the objection and therefore, its presence would be necessary in the pending references, lacks substance. By reason of the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act, N.L.C. could not demand a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, as it was not a "person interested" in the receipt of compensation and no question of the not accepting the award arose. Even in the statement Under Section 19 of the Act, N.L.C. had not been shown as a person interested Under Section 19(1)(b) of the Act in the land to be acquired. The objection to the quantum of compensation was by the claimants, falling Under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act. The service of notice contemplated Under Section 20 of the Act is in relation to the reference Under Section 18 of the Act. If N.L.C. cannot be regarded as a person interested in claiming as of right or in assertion of a right, the receipt of compensation awardable, than, it cannot claim that notice should be served on it as a person "interested in the objection". The objection referred to is found in Section 19(1)(d) of the Act and that relates to the amount of compensation, in which case, the Collector should also state the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined, on the reference to Court, and the objection contemplated Under Section 20(b) of the Act is at the instance of persons entitled to receive payment of compensation, excepting those who have accepted or consented and without protest to receive the compensation awarded.
The exception provided under the latter part of Section 20(b) is a clear pointer to the category of persons interested in the objection contemplated therein. It excludes persons who have received the compensation awarded without protest thereby keeping alive for adjudication in a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, objections at the instance of persons interested in the receipt of compensation, who have either not received it or received it under protest. In these cases, N.L.C. had not declined to receive the payment of compensation awarded. Section 29(b) of the Act cannot, therefore, at all contemplate a person like N.L.C. Section 29(c) of the Act is also significant. Under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, in making a reference Under Section 18, the Collector should also set out, in a case where the objection is to the amount of the compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. Even Under Section 20(c) of the Act, when the objection is in regard to the amount of compensation, the Collector is the only person entitled to be issued a notice by the Court. This would also establish that where the objection is with regard to the amount of the compensation, it is the Collector only who is to be served with a notice by Court and not the person for whose benefit the land is acquired. Thus, Under Section 20(b) and (c) of the Act. N.L.C. cannot claim that it is entitled to a notice and a hearing in the references made to the Court Under Section 18(1) of the Act with reference to the particulars set out in Section 19. A consideration of the scope of the enquiry Under Section 21 of the Act before Court in a reference Under Section 18 of the Act also indicates that it is confined to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. In these cases, by the objections in the references, the interest of claimants, alone is affected in the matter of receipt of compensation by them for the acquisition of lands and no question of the consideration of the interest of N.L.C would arise. The only limited yet optional statutory right conferred on persons like N.L.C. for whose benefit the land is acquired, is found in Section 50(2) of the Act. Where resort to the provisions of the Act is had for the purpose of acquisition of lands for a company at the cost of its funds, the company has a very limited and restricted role to play and that is, in a proceeding held before Collector or Court, the company concerned may appear and adduce evidence, for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation and no more. The conferment of the very restricted right in the course of the acquisition proceeding on the company and the negation of the opportunity to avail further remedies are indicative of almost an identification of the interest of the company with that of the Government which sets in motion the provisions of the Act, though for the benefit of the company. That perhaps is also the reason why the company for whose benefit the land is acquired is not enabled to seek a reference, for, the interest of the company could be well taken care of by the Government, which initiates the proceedings for the acquisition of the land for the benefit of the company. It is perhaps the recognition of this identity of interest that has led to the denial of a right to N.L.C. to seek a reference and prefer appeals, but to confer a limited right with a view to contain the quantum of compensation by placing such evidence before Court, as would be relevant for arriving at a fair and a just compensation in respect of the lands acquired. Statutorily, the person for whose benefit the land is acquired, at its option, is made a witness and no more and this right cannot be enlarged into a claim to be impleaded as a party to a reference, which, the person seeking to get impleaded, is prohibited from securing. Again, Section 53 of the Act, while generally making the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings in Court, cautions that the provisions therein, inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, shall not apply. Earlier, it has been seen how neither Under Section 18 of the Act nor even under the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act, N.L.C. cannot seek a reference to the Court as such Under Section 18(1) of the Act. By resorting to Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C.N.L.C., seeks to achieve the result of becoming a party to the pending references Under Section 18 of the Act, in the face of the prohibition contained in the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act that it shall not be entitled to demand a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. When Section 50(2) of the Act expressly bears N.L.C. for whose benefit the acquisition is made, from demanding a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, notwithstanding that it is allowed to appear and adduce evidence Under Section 50(2) of the Act, it is clearly not permissible for N.L.C. to invoke Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. to circumvent the prohibition in the Act and to secure a reference, which is contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. In other words, to apply Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. invoked by N.L.C. would lead to a situation, which is not only inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, but also totally destroy the prohibition enacted in the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act. To that extent, Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. has to be regarded as being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, but also totally destroy the prohibition enacted in the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act. To that extent, Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. has to be regarded as being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act Under Section 53 of the Act and could not, therefore, be invoked by N.L.C. Thus, on a consideration of the scheme of the Act, as disclosed by its provisions, N.L.C. cannot get impleaded as a party to the references.
7. The decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner may now be considered. In Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 366, the Supreme Court considered the claim of an attaching decree-holder as a "person interested" within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. It was pointed out that in order to fall within the definition of a "person interested" Under Section 3(b) of the Act, it is unnecessary that such a person should claim an interest in the land acquired, but that a person may become a "person interested" if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. That conclusion was arrived at in the context of the facts of that case and it would, therefore, be necessary to briefly notice the facts which gave right to the decision. Certain lands belonging to the appellant before the Supreme Court had been leased out to one Khushal Singh for a period of five years and those lands were later acquired by the Government under Provisions of the Act. An award was passed fixing the total compensation and apportioning the amount of compensation equally between the appellant and his lessee. In so far as the compensation so apportioned to Khushal Singh and payable to him, the Land Acquisition Officer took note of an order for attachment from the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khamgaon and directed that the amount to be paid to Khushal Singh be kept in Revenue Deposit. The appellant as well as Khushal Singh sought references Under Section 18 of the Act and while the appellant claimed that more compensation should be awarded and the apportionment of a moiety of the compensation in favour of Khushal Singh was not in order, as he was not a protected tenant and the period of his lease had also expires, Khushal Singh claimed enhancement of compensation and challenged the basis of apportionment adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer. The appellant had also instituted a suit against Khwshal Singh for recovery of rents and that was referred to the Revenue Court Under Section 16-A of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 and it was held that Khushal Singh was not a protected lessee. On appeal, the status of Khashal Singh as a protected lessee was declared and that was also affirmed by the Revenue Tribunal, Challenging which the appellant before the Supreme Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that proceeding, a compromise was sought to be entered into, by which it was agreed that Khushal Singh would not dispute the claim of the appellant before the Supreme Court that the status of a protected lessee had not been acquired by Khushal Singh and that the order of the Revenue Tribunal may be quashed. It was at that stage that one Paramsukhdas filed an application in the writ petition claiming that he should be heard as he had obtained a decree against Khushal Singh and levied execution also and that the amount to be paid to Khushal Singh as compensation had also been attached by him for the realization of the dues under the decree against Khushal Singh and that the proposed compromise was mala fide, as its object was to set at naught the execution and attachment of the compensation. When that application came up for hearing, at the instance of Paramsukhadas, it was adjourned and by the time the matter again came up, Paramsukhdas reported that he had withdrawn the amount apportioned already to the share of Khushal Singh and attached and that as an interested party, he should be joined as a party in the proceedings. Thereupon, the Court directed the parties to file the compromise petition in the pending references Under Section 18 of the Act and in that view, the compromise was directed to be returned to the appellant. The appellant and Khushal Singh thereupon filed applications for compromise in the land acquisition references pending and it was at that stage that Paramsukhadas filed an application under Order 22, Rule 10 read with Section 151, C.P.C. praying that his name should be substituted or added as an applicant. That was on the footing that the compromise was a fraudulent one and as an attaching creditor of Khushal Singh, he was entitled to be added as a party so that the amounts payable to Khushal Singh, may instead, be paid to him, as an attaching creditor of Khushal Singh, entitled to enforce his rights against the compensation. The application filed by Paramsukhdas was rejected on the ground that he was not a party before the land Acquisition Officer and he was also not a person interested in the land or the compensation and, therefore, he would not be interested in the objections Under Section 20(b) of the Act and that having regard to the scope of a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, the claim of Paramsukhdas could not be countenanced. On revision petitions filed by Paramsukhdas before the High Court, the High Court over ruled the objection raised by the appellant and Khushal Singh and held that though paramsukhdas was not claiming any interest in the land, he was claiming an interest in the compensation for the land, which had been deposited in the Court for payment to the person concerned and as such, he was a "person interested" as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act and would be entitled to claim that he should be allowed to join as a party. It was the correctness of the view so taken that was challenged before the Supreme Court and it was in the context of the aforesaid factual background, the Supreme Court pointed out that Paramsukhdas was a person interested in the objections pending before Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest was affected by the objections within Section 21 of the Act and was entitled to be made a party. In so holding, the Supreme Court referred to Dr G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar to the effect that disputes bout the rights of owners to compensation, being ancillary to the principal dispute, should also be decided by the Court, to which power is entrusted and such power extends to adjudication of disputes as to the persons, who are entitled to receive compensation and there is nothing in Section 30 of the Act excluding a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award, devolved. Reference was also made to the decision in Siva Prataps Bhattadu v. A.E.L. Mission A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 307 : 49 Mad. 38 : 97 T.C. 496 to the effect that an attaching creditor would be a person interested within Section 3(b) of the Act. The decisions in Govinda Kumar Roy v. Debendra Kumar 12 Cal. W.N. 98 and Mahatma Safi v. Haran Chandra 12 Cal. W.N. 985 following Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukherjee I.L.R. 34 Cal. 451, relied on by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents in these cases, were distinguished as cases of persons, who, having a right to seek a reference, failed to secure that reference, but sought to raise the point in a reference made at the instance of another party. Carefully considering the reasoning upon which the decision of the Supreme Court has proceeded, it is clear that the Supreme Court was concerned with the case of an attaching decree-holder, who had attached the compensation amount apportioned and payable to his judgment-debtor, who was a party to the reference and it was in that context, it was held that though the attaching decree-holder had no interest as such in the land, he had secured a decree against the lessee and had also looked to the compensation amount for obtaining satisfaction of his decree and would thus be entitled to claim an interest in the compensation, though not in the land. The interest of the attaching decree-holder recognized and given effect to, was to get paid the compensation amount, apportioned as payable to Khushal Singh, by stepping into his place by reason of the execution proceedings levied and almost succeeding to his interest as if under Order 22, Rule 10, C.P.C. The position of N.L.C. in these cases is very interest, there is no question of N.L.C. claiming any interest in the receipt of compensation amount at all, either as a result of attachment proceedings or even otherwise. N.L.C. remains a person, be whom compensation is payable in respect of the acquired lands. Further, Paramsukhdas having attached the amount, the question would also rise, as to whom the amount either as determined or as may be enhanced, as a consequence of the adjudication in the references, should be paid, whether to the decree-holder Paramuskhdas or the judgment-debtor Khushal Singh, for, if any amount should have been paid contrary to the attachment, such a payment would have been rendered void under the provisions of Section 64, C.P.C. In addition, the application was made under Order 22, Rule 10 read with Section 151, C.P.C. and that provision contemplates the devolution of an interest and presumably the decision proceeded on the footing that by reason of the attachment effected, the decree-holder Paramasukhdas stood in the position of Khushal Singh himself, to whom the compensation was payable and it was in that context, Paramusukhdas was held to be a person entitled to be impleaded as a party to the references as a person interested in the receipt of compensation and also affected by the objections of Sunderlal. Such is not the situation at all in these case and the decision in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas cannot, therefore, have any application and be of any assistance to the petitioner.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner very strongly relied upon the decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinoho . That case arose out of proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the owner of the land and the challenge was to the notification relating to certain land acquisition proceedings on the ground of its invalidity, as the acquisition was stated to be not for any public purpose. That plea was accepted by a learned single Judge and the acquisition proceedings were quashed. The company, for whose benefit the lands were to be acquired, preferred an appeal and that was dismissed on the ground that it had no locus standi to prefer the appeal, as it was not a "person interested" within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Act. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court was in error in holding that the Company, for whose benefit the lands were to be acquired, had no locus standi to file the appeal. In considering this pleas, the Supreme Court referred to Section 18(1) of the Act and held that under the terms of the agreement entered into between the company and the Government, the land, after acquisition, would stand transferred to the company and it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land and, as, under the agreement, the company was obliged to pay compensation, it was interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed in order to avoid payment of a heavy amount by the company towards compensation. In so holding, the Supreme Court also stated that for this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of quantum of compensation. This is no nothing but a recognition and reaffirmation of the limited optioned statutory right conferred on the company, for whose benefit the acquisition is made, as per Section 50(2) of the Act. However, the Supreme Court also observed that the words "person interested" in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed. In so doing, the view was rested upon the expression "any person interested" and the words following those words in Section 18(1) of the Act had not been taken note of, apparently because they had not been brought to the notice of the Court. Under Section 18(1) of the Act, "any person interested, who has not accepted the award may, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court". On the facts of the case, there was no question of the company, in that case, not accepting the award and attention to the significance and scope of the words "who has not accepted the award" does not appear to have been drawn for consideration. Reliance was also placed upon Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas and the interest of the company had been considered to be akin to that of the attaching decree-holder and on that footing, the conclusion Was arrived at that the company, for whose benefit the land was to be acquired, would be a "person interested" within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. As pointed out earlier, Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas dealt with a case of an attaching decree-holder and the factual considerations adverted to therein are different and that decision is in applicable to the facts of these cases. Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho has purported to follow the principles laid down in Suderlal v. Paramsukhdas and since Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas is inapplicable, it follows that the decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho would also be equally inapplicable. Even in the decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho , there is a recognition of the principle that the company, for whose benefit the acquisition is to be made, has only a limited optional right to appear and adduce evidence on the question of compensation and the court in that case was not concerned with the question, whether in a pending reference, as we have in these cases, the company, for whose benefit the acquisition is to be made, is entitled to claim to be impleaded as a party interested. Further, the controversy in that case was regarding the validity of the notifications and the acquisition itself was pursuant to an agreement between the company and the State. Besides, the decision, as noticed earlier, has not considered the scope and effect of the expression "who has not accepted the award" occurring in Section 18(1) of the Act. It is also further significant that a reference has been made to Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd., Bahadurgarh v. The State of Harayana , Comilla Electric Supply Ltd. v. East Bengal Ltd., Comilla A.I.R. 1989 Cal. 669 and M. Kupuswami v. Special Tahsildar (1967)1 M.L.J. 329 all of which refer as seen from the report only to the right on the part of the company for whose benefit the acquisition is to be made, to lead evidence, having a bearing on the amount of compensation to be awarded, and not any other right to be impleaded as a part to any pending reference as such. Therefore, the decision in Himalaya Tiles Marble P. Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho be taken to have decided that even in a case like this, where references Under Section 18 of the Act are pending, the company, for whose benefit the lands are to be acquired, is entitled to come on record, invoking Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. There is also one other circumstances which requires to be noticed and that is, though there is a reference in Himalaya Tiles & Marble P. Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho , decided on 28.3.1980, to Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas , the earlier decision in Municipal Corporation v. Candhulal Shamaldas Patel , rendered on 8.1.1970, relied on by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, has not been brought to the notice of the Court. In that case, notifications Under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act for the acquisitions for School and Neighbourhood Work were challenged on several grounds and that plea was accepted. To that proceeding the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad was impleaded as the fourth formal respondent, though no relief was prayed for against it, and in an appeal preferred by it before the Supreme Court, a preliminary objection was raised against the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Municipal Corporation on the ground that the Municipal Corporation was not aggrieved by the Order. Upholding that objection, the Supreme Court pointed out that it may be that the notification for acquisition by the State Government was for the use and benefit of the Municipal Corporation after acquisition, but that did not confer any interest on the Municipal Corporation to enable it to file on appeal and when not even an order for costs had been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, it did not have any interest, which would have enabled it to sustain the appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the Writ Petition. It is thus seen that in the decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles & Marble P. Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho , the view expressed in Municipal Corporation v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel has not been noticed, presumable because the attention of the Court had not been drawn to it. Even so, the reasoning in Himalaya Tiles & Marble P. Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho based on Sunderlal v. Pramsukhdas and the other cases referred to therein recognizing the right of the company, for whose benefit the acquisition is made, to appear and adduce evidence and not considering the effect of the words "who has accepted the award" occurring in Section 18(1) of the Act, does not appear applicable in these case, where, as pointed out earlier, there is no question of the non-acceptance of the award by N.L.C. as a person interested in the receipt of the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition. The decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marble P. Ltd v. F.V. Countinho therefore, cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner in these cases. Reliance placed by the learned Counsel upon the decision of the Supreme Court in N.G.E.F. Ltd., v. State of Mysore and Ors. (C.A. No. 1045 of 1977, decided on 31.7.1980 also does not advance the case of the petitioner, for, that decision turned on the special provisions of Section 20 of the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 17 of 1961). Under Section 20(c) of that Act, provisions is made to the effect that the Court shall cause notice, prior to proceeding to determine the reference, directing the appearance of the person or authority, for whom the acquisition is made, if the acquisition is not made for the Government. There is not such provision in the Act, as applicable in this State and hence this decision is of little assistance to the petitioner, as its applicability should be confined to cases arising under the specific provisions noticed earlier. Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madivallappa Kulkarni, S.L.P. (Civil Nos. 6288-92 of 1982, decided by the Supreme Court of India on 14.1.1985) is also of no assistance to the petitioner. While dismissing the Special Leave petitions, it was stated that as the acquisition was made for purposes of construction for Civil Aviation, the Union of India, which was to put up the construction and ultimately liable to pay the compensation., was clearly interested in the determination of the amount of compensation and was therefore, entitled to appeal against the award. However, the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on the conclusion that the market rate awarded by the Civil Judge was just, reasonable and fair. This decision also appears to have turned on the specific provisions of the Karnataka Act, referred to earlier. Further, from the judgment, it also does not appear that the Court has occasion to consider whether the Union of India could be considered to be a "person interested" in the determination of the amount of compensation in the light of the other provisions of the Act, as there is no discussions or a reference to any statutory provision or decision on that question. In any event, it does not deal with a situation arising out of the invoking or Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., as here. This decision also cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. Likewise Toshiba Anand lamp Ltd v. Verghes and Ors. (C.A. Nos. 722-35 of 1974, decided by the Supreme Court of India on 6.5.1987 also does not advance the case of the petitioner any further. There is no doubt a reference in this case to the decision in Himalayan Tiles & Marble P Ltd. v. F.V. Countinho A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1118 : (1980)3 S.C.R. 235 and the principle of that decision is merely applied without any reference whatever to the basis on which the decision has been rendered. It is also further seen that there is no reference to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Chandhulal Shamaldas Patel . It is also not possible to gather from the order passed by the Supreme Court whether the proceeding before it arose out of any reference Under Section 18 of the Act or out of proceedings challenging the validity of the notifications under the Act. In the absence of any reference to the facts giving rise to the appeals, it cannot be construed to be a decision on the point that the person, for whose benefit the acquisition is made, is a necessary or a property party, to a pending reference Under Section 18 of the Act. In my considered view none of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, upon which strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, would, in any manner, assist it.
9. It would be appropriate at this stage to make a brief reference to the cases relied on by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents and also those relied on by the leaned counsel for the petitioner not discussed before. Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee I.L.R. 34 Cal. 451, relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents, considered the scope of the enquiry in a reference Under Section 18 read with Section 21 of the Act. The dispute therein related to the apportionment of compensation among zamindar, permanent tenants and under-tenants. In the course of the award, the Collector awarded six annas share in the compensation referable to the land to the zamindar and apportioned the rest between the tenants and under-tenants. A sum of Rs. 997-4 was awarded to the zamindar in respect of the value of the trees and the tenants objected that that amount was far in excess of what was allowed under the law and at the instance of the tenants, a reference was made Under Section 18 of the Act. In the course of the enquiry in that reference, the Court allowed the zamindar to raise an objection that the amount awarded in respect of the trees to the tenants ought not to have been so awarded and that the entire amount for the trees should have been so awarded only to him. The court divided the compensation for the trees equally between the zamindar on the one hand and the tenants and the under-tenants on the other. On appeal therefrom by the under-tenants an objection was raised that it was not open to the Court to go into the question as to who was entitled to the compensation for the trees, as the zamindar has not raised any objection to that. In upholding that objection, it was held that only the tenants took objection to the apportionement of the compensation and not the zamindar and the reasonable inference to be drawn from the language employed was that the Court can only deal with the objection which has been referred to it Under Section 18 of the Act and that questions and objections not referred to, could not be dealt with within the scope of the enquiry Under Section 21 of the Act. It was also further pointed out that reading Sections 18, 20 and 21, the conclusion is irresistible that all that the Court could deal with was the objection which has been referred to it and that would also be consistent with common sense as well as the ordinary method of procedure in civil cases. It is established by this decision that the person, who has not secured a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, cannot, in the course of the enquiry on such a reference, at the instance of another person, Under Section 21 of the Act, put forth objections not agitated by him by means of a reference and that only such objections as have been put forth by the party, who had obtained a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, could be considered in the course of the enquiry Under Section 21 of the Act. Though in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas a reference to this decision has been made and it has been distinguished on the ground that it related to the case of a person, who has not obtained a reference, yet, afortiori, in these cases, that principle would be applicable, as, N.L.C. under the proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act is debarred from seeking a reference and that disability is the same as N.L.C not having obtained a reference. It, therefore, follows that N.L.C. cannot be permitted to agitate the question of quantum of compensation in the reference obtained by the erstwhile owners of the lands acquired. In Kottaiyur Nattar's Estate, Represented by its Receiver Sri S.R. Govinda Iyer, Advocate Devakkottai v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer for Co-operative Housing Schemes, Madras and Anr. (C.R.P. No. 1235 of 1954, dated 24.9.1954:1954 M.W.N. (S.N.)78) the question arose whether the co-operative society, for whose benefit the lands had been acquired, could be permitted to participate in the course of an enquiry in a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. Rajamannar, C.J. after referring to Section 50(2) of the Act, observed as follows:
... In most unambiguous language, it provides that the local authority or Company may appear and adduce evidence for one particular purpose, namely, the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The learned Judge was therefore wrong in overruling the objection raised on behalf of the claimant and in permitting the Society to appear and take part in the arguments on the petition....
From the aforesaid, it follows that the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, is given only a limited right and that right so conferred is adequate to protect its interest in the matter of containing the compensation. This decision also supports the stand taken by the respondents. Municipal Corporation v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel has already been noticed and it is therefore, unnecessary to make any further reference to it. Suffice it to say that that decision also holds that the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired under the provisions of the Act, cannot sustain an appeal, as a person interested in the acquisition. In Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum , a Full Bench ruled that Under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act, only a person, who is entitled to compensation, can claim an interest in the compensation and not a person, who is liable to pay it, irrespective of whether the acquisition is for a company or a local authority, the lis is only between the claimants to the land and the Government and none else and the person, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, has no place in the actual acquisition proceedings, except to the limited extent of adducing evidence for the purpose Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) (1986) Writ L.R. 494) merely follows the judgment of the Division Bench in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L.W. 221:1986 Writ L.R. 146 and cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. Whether the absence of a right of reference or an appeal against an award passed by the Court on a reference, in favour of the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, would justify interference with awards for compensation, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may also be considered. The person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, is precluded from seeking a reference Under Section 18 of the Act. If so, he cannot also prefer an appeal against the adjudication in the reference by the Court. That would not, however cause any prejudice to him, as such a person, Under Section 50(2) of the Act, is enabled to appear and adduce evidence in the reference Under Section 18 of the Act and in an appeal therefrom, though not at the instance of the party, for whose benefit the acquisition was made, the Court will proceed to decide the quantum of compensation on the basis of the evidence placed before Court, while dealing with the reference Under Section 18 of the Act The absence, therefore, of a right of appeal against the judgment and decree of determining the amount of compensation. It has further been laid down that Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. cannot be invoked. Irrespective of whether the acquisition is for the Government or by the Government on behalf of a local authority or company, the procedure for acquisition is as outlined in Part-II of the Act and the reference to Court and the further procedure thereon would be governed by Part III of the Act owing to the omission of Section 38 of the Act. The decision of the Full Bench, therefore fully supports the stand of the respondents. A Division Bench in Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devesthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi considered the question whether the Devasthanam, for whose benefit certain lands were acquired, had the locus standi to come on record in appeal with a view to set aside the judgment given in an appeal. The Division Bench, after examining the provisions of the Act and referring to the decisions in Kottaiyur Nattar's Estate, represented by its Receiver Sri. S.R. Govinda Iyer, Advocate, Devakkottai v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer for Co-operative Housing Schemes, Madras, and Anr. C.R.P. No. 1235 of 1954, dated 24.9.1954 : 1954 M.W.N. (S.N.) 78) and Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum held that under the scheme of the Ar, Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.c. could not be invoked by the Devasthanam. This decision of the Division Bench squarely applies to these cases. It is further seen that in Santosh Kumar v. Central Ware Housing Corporation A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 164, decided on 11-3-1986, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scheme of the Act, in the context of the competence of the company to question the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector Under Section 11 of the Act for the acquisition of the land by the Government at the instance of the company.
While holding that under the scheme of the Act, apart from cases of fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector Under Section 11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the company or local authority, at whose instance the acquisition is made, from demanding a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, it is clearly not permissible for the company or the local authority to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced. In so holding, the Supreme Court referred to Municipal Corporation v. Chandulal Shamladas Patel and approved of the upholding of the preliminary objection in that case and in that view, the Supreme Court rules that the High Court was in error in even entertaining the writ petition challenging the awards made by the Collector under the Act claiming that the amount awarded was excessive. The Court also pointed out that the Collector making an award was in law making an offer on behalf of the Government and it is difficult to appreciate how the Government or anyone, who could but claim through the Government, would be entitled to question the award apart from fraud, corruption or collusion. The view so expressed by the Supreme Court appears to cover the cases on hand, though there is no reference to the decision in Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd v. F.V. Countinho A.I.R. 1980 S.c. 1118 = . Even so, N.L.C is a person, who can claim the benefit of acquisition of the lands only through the Government when the lands vested in it Under Section 16 of the Act, and there is no whisper of any fraud, corruption, collusion etc., and under those circumstances, N.L.C. cannot be permitted to challenge the award in the pending references, through instrumentality of an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. or even under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Reference may now be made to the decisions in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L.W. 221:1986 W.L.R. 146 and The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu v. The Special Tahsildar, (Land Acquisition) 1986 W.L.R. 494, relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In both the cases, writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the awards had been entertained at the instance of persons, for whose benefit the lands has been acquired. In view of the clear and categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Santhosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1164 it doubtful whether the writ petitions could have been entertained at all. Besides, the decision in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L.W. 221:1986 Writ L.R. 146 has proceeded on the footing that a civil Court to which a reference is made Under Section 18 of the Act, is a Tribunal of Special Jurisdiction amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this is plainly opposed to the definition of 'Court' occurring in Section 3(d) of the Act, where it is defined to mean a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. The award passed by the Court on a reference is deemed Under Section 26(2) of the Act to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of the awards, a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(2) and 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is difficult to appreciate how a writ petition would lie at all to quash the judgments and decrees of civil Courts, declared to be so Under Section 26(2) read with Section 3(d) of the Act. It would be useful in this connection to refer to Issardas S. Lulla v. Smt. Hari A.I.R 1962 Madras 458. A Writ petition was filed to quash the order of i appointment of a Receiver in a pending suit passed by the City Civil Judge at Madras. On an objection raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, considering the question of the competence of the Court to issue prerogative writs with reference to orders passed by civil Courts, the Bench, after tracing the history of prerogative writs in England and here and the circumstances under which such writs could be issued, observed at page 470 as follows:
The position may now be summed up as follows. The Court of King's Bench in England had not the jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs against judgments and orders of Civil Courts where a writ of error or a procedure by way of appeal lay. The Supreme Court of Madras established under the Charter Act of 1800 which had the same jurisdiction in respect of prerogative writs as the Court of King's Bench in England could not exercise jurisdiction in respect of orders of Subordinate Civil Courts. The High Court of Madras, formed under the Letters patent of 1862, which took the place of the Supreme Court in respect of the writ Jurisdiction, has no further or greater powers than that of the Supreme Court conferred under the Letters Patent. The authoritative pronouncement of the Parlakimedi case, 70 I A 129 : AIR 1943 PC 164 was that the writ jurisdiction of the Madras High court was confined to its ordinary original limits and did not extent to the mofussil, outside the City of Madras. It was never claimed that judgments and orders of subordinate Civil Courts even within the City limits of Madras were amenable to prerogative writs of prohibition and certiorari. A writ of mandamus is however the subject-matter of a specific provision Under Section 45 of the Indian Specific Relief Act. The Constitution has extended the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to issue writs even outside the City Limits but limited to the confines of the State territory. The Constitution has not in any way enlarged the scope and content and nature and operation of prerogative writs. The phraseology adopted in Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution would seem to indicate that judgments of subordinate courts should not form the subject-matter of writs under Article 226 presumably because the suitor or party aggrieved by such judgments and orders has got remedies by way of appeal and revision as efficacious as the remedy by way of writs In the light of aforesaid observations and also in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1164, writ petitions seeking to quash the awards could not at all have been entertained at the instance of the person, for whose benefit the lands had been acquired. This decision of the Division Bench has not been noticed in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L W 221 : 1986 Writ L.R. 146. What is more significant is that in the course of the judgment, the Division Bench has accepted, referring to Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi , the position that in a reference Under Section 18 of the Act, there can only be two parties, viz., the Collector and the claimant, who has raised the objection to the award, and the person, for whom the land is acquired, has no locus standi to demand a reference Under Section 18 of the Act and he can only appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation and Section 50(2) of the Act makes that position clear. If this statement of law as laid down in Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi has been accepted, then, it would follow that having regard to the very restricted scope of a reference Under Section 18 of the Act as well as the limited right conferred on the person, for whose benefit the acquisition is made, Under Section 50(2) of the Act, such a person cannot at all figure as a party or even as a person interested, in the course of the proceedings Under Section 18 of the Act. The decision reported in The State passed on a reference Under Section 18 of the Act to the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, cannot justify interference, at its instance, with the award, passed Under Section 18 of the Act, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. An award given by the Court on a reference Under Section 18 of the Act is appealable Under Section 54 of the Act. The person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, is not a party to the reference Under Section 18 of the Act before Court and an appeal also could not be preferred by such a person, for, an appeal is normally considered to be a continuation of the proceedings initiated in the lower Court and a person, who had no place in the proceedings before the lower Court, cannot be permitted to prefer an appeal in view of such a right of appeal Under Section 54 of the Act being only available to the parties, who figured in the reference proceedings. The person, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, has no place in the reference proceedings and he cannot prefer an appeal either with or without the leave of the Court, as any provision in civil procedure under which such leave may be sought and granted, would again, be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Though the remedy by way of an appeal may not be available to a person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, yet, such a person has been given an effective opportunity to adduce evidence and that would be sufficient to safeguard its interests in the matter of fixation of the compensation payable. It is unnecessary for a person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, to prefer an appeal, for, in any such appeal that may be preferred either by the Government on its behalf or by the claimants, the evidence let in on behalf of the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, would be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing adequate compensation. Thus, the absence of a right of appeal to the person, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, cannot be pressed into service as a justification or excuse for resorting to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The judgment and decree of the Civil Court Under Section 18 of the Act, declared to be so Under Section 26(2) of the Act, cannot form the subject matter of a writ proceeding and if the beneficiary of the acquired land cannot seek a reference Under Section 18 of the Act and also cannot prefer an appeal Under Section 54 of the Act, such a person cannot be permitted to seek the remedy of a writ to quash the award or the judgment and decree, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or circumvent the provisions of the Act by resorting to Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. the application of which would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Earlier, it has been noticed how even in the course of the decision in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L.W. 221.1986 Writ L.R. 146, the principles laid down in Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi have been referred to with approval It would, therefore, follow that without in any manner disapproving the ratio of the decision in Sri. Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi , the Division Bench, Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc., 99 L W 221 :1986 Writ L.R. 146, has proceeded to consider the maintainability of the writ petition on the other grounds referred to earlier, which are not sustainable, especially in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation AIR 1986 S C 1164.
Reliance upon the decision in Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai A.I.R. 1986 Guja 81 in support of the claim made by N.L.C. would not avail it. In that case, the Court considered the question whether a person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, is an interested party and can claim to be added as a party-defendant to a suit praying for setting aside the notifications issued Under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. It was in that context the Court considered the applicability of order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. In these cases, the claim of N.L.C. is to get itself impleaded as a party to the reference Under Section 18 of the Act, obtained at the instance of persons, whose lands had been acquired. That was not the situation considered and dealt with by the decision in Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai AIR 1986 Guja 81. Even on the question of a "person interested", in view of the considerations already adverted to, that decision cannot be applied in the circumstances of these cases. The aforesaid considerations render inapplicable the decisions in Indian Rare Earths Limited v. The Sub Collector, etc. 99 L W 221 : 1986 Writ L.R. 146, The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) 1986 Writ L.R. 49 and Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai AIR 1986 Guja 81 to these cases.
10. A question may still arise as to which of the decisions of the Supreme Court should be applied in the event of the expression of a conflicting opinion in them. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal v. Param sukhdas A.I.R. 1968 S.C 366, rendered by a Bench consisting of three learned judges is concerned, that is clearly distinguishable on the peculiar facts of that case in the context of the attachment of the apportioned, compensation amount by the decree-holder and, therefore, it is it had earlier been pointed out that the principle of that decision cannot have any application. Among the other decisions N.G.E.F. Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1045 of 1977, decided on 31.7.80 by the Supreme Court of India), Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madivallappa Kulkarni (S.L.P.(Civil) Nos. 6288-82 of 1982, decided on 14.1.1985 by the Supreme Court of India) and Toshiba Anand Lamp Ltd. v. Verghese and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 722-35 of 1974, decided on 6.5.1987 by the Supreme Court of India), though they appear to proceed on the basis that the person, for whose benefit the land is acquired, has locus standi to maintain an appeal to question the quantum of compensation determined, yet, there has been no reference whatever to any of the prior decisions in the first two cases and in the last case, reference is made only to Himalaya Tiles and Marble (p) Ltd. v. F.V. Coutinho A.I.R. 1980 S C 1118 : (1980)3 SCR 235. With reference to the last of the decisions, it has already been pointed out that Himalaya Tiles & Marble (p) Ltd., v. F.V. Countinho A.I.R 1980 S C 1118 : 1980 3 SCR 235 has been merely applied and it is also not possible to gather