Punjab-Haryana High Court
Patiala Golden Cooperative Transport ... vs The State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 5 August, 2013
Equivalent citations: AIR 2013 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 221
Bench: Hemant Gupta, Ajay Kumar Mittal
LPA No.888 of 2013 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANAAT
CHANDIGARH
LPA No.888 of 2013
Date of decision: August 05, 2013
Patiala Golden Cooperative Transport Society Limited, Patiala
Appellant
Versus
The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others
Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL
Present: Mr. Baldev Kapoor, Advocate for the appellant.
Ajay Kumar Mittal,J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 13.2.2013, whereby the writ petition filed by it has been dismissed.
2. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved, as available on the record, may be noticed. The appellant, a Cooperative Transport Society filed a writ petition in this Court impugning the order dated 27.3.2009 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab (STAT)whereby the appeal filed by it was dismissed being time barred. Order dated 10.4.2001 passed by State LPA No.888 of 2013 2 Transport Commissioner has also been challenged whereby the application filed by the appellant for the grant of a regular stage permit on Pathankot to Ludhiana route was rejected. In pursuance to the surveyor report, a notice was published in the Motor Transport Gazette dated 22.4.2000 inviting applications for grant of six regular stage carriage permits for plying buses on six return trips. In response thereto, 170 operators including the appellant and private respondents submitted their applications seeking their claim for grant of permit. Contents of the applications were published in the Motor Transport Gazette dated 8.8.2000. No objection was preferred to oppose the grant of permits to the route in question. After hearing all the applicants in the meeting held on 22.1.2001, respondent No.2 passed the order dated 10.4.2001 without notice or intimation to the appellant. The said order was not communicated to the appellant. It was only on 14.2.2008 that the President of the appellant society came to know that its application had been rejected. The appellant submitted application for obtaining certified copy of the order which was prepared and supplied on 1.4.2008 and the appeal under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, "the Act") was filed before the STAT on 30.4.2008 within a period of 30 days from the date of supply of certified copy of the order within the limitation prescribed. The said appeal was dismissed on 27.3.2009 being time barred on the ground that it had been filed after a lapse of about six years. Counsel for the appellant before the learned Single Judge contended that since the appellant did not receive the copy of the LPA No.888 of 2013 3 order nor it was aware of the fact that the decision had been taken on its application, there was no occasion for the appellant to file an appeal prior to the date on which the same had been actually filed. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Jagtar Singh vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, CWP No.8229 of 2007, decided on 30.1.2009 to contend that even if no formal communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority had been done, the period of limitation for filing the appeal would start running from the date the aggrieved party acquired actual or constructive knowledge of the making of the said order. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties agreed with the findings recorded by the STAT and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court through the instant Letters Patent Appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the STAT as well as learned Single Judge had erred in holding that there was constructive knowledge of order passed by the State Transport Commissioner to the appellant which was reserved on 10.4.2001. Relying upon judgments of the Apex Court in Bhagwan Das and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 3 SCC 545, State of Maharashtra and others v. M/s Ark Builders Pvt. Limited, AIR 2011 SC 1374 and Single Bench judgments of this Court in CWP No.15186 of 2010 (Jain Motors Regd. Patiala v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others) decided on 12.12.2011 and Manjit Kaur v. State transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and LPA No.888 of 2013 4 another, CWP No.3423 of 2012, decided on 19.9.2012, it was contended that the view of the learned Single Judge being contrary to the aforesaid judgments was unsustainable. Referring to the meaning of the word "constructive", it was urged that as per the Law Lexicon, constructive knowledge means "if one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had constructive knowledge of such fact; e.g. matters of public record." On the above premises, the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Jagtar Singh's case (supra) was sought to be distinguished.
4. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the record, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
5. In Jagtar Singh's case (supra), a Full Bench of this Court after examining the scope of Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (in short, "the Rules") and also Second Proviso to Section 80(2) and Section 89 of the Act had observed that wherever the order passed by the State or the Regional Transport Authority had not been actually communicated to the persons concerned, the aggrieved party could file an appeal from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the order and the period of limitation would start running from the said date. It was held that the date of actual or constructive knowledge would depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. It was recorded as under:-
"The case at hand as noticed above presents a converse situation. Here the statute makes the period of limitation to start not from the date of the making of the order but from the date of the receipt of the same by the party affected by LPA No.888 of 2013 5 it. The question is whether knowledge about the making of the order against the party concerned should like the cases referred to earlier also give rise to start of limitation even when there is no formal communication of the order. Our answer to that question is in the affirmative. Knowledge whether actual or constructive of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority should, in our opinion, result in commencement of the period of limitation. Decisions rendered by the Division Benches of this Court in Jaspal Singh vs. State of Punjab and others Civil Writ Petition No.14874 of 2000 disposed of on 29.8.2001, Capt. Amrit Pal Singh and others Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others, Civil Writ Petition No.3544 of 2002, disposed of on 15.7.2002, Mavi Bus Service Registered, Khanna Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and another, Civil Writ Petition No.7451 of 2005, disposed of on 21.5.2007 and in Indian Bus Service (Regd.) Malerkotla Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others, Civil Writ Petition No.3114 of 2003, disposed of on 4.8.2006 in our view correctly hold that in cases where the State or Regional Transport Authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. We may, however, point out that the said decisions do not elaborate whether a person, who knows about the order made by the State or Regional Transport Authority, can still wait for a formal communication of the same before filing an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. That aspect has been noticed only in Banda Bahadur's case (supra) referred to by us in the earlier part of this judgment. The Court had in that case formulated the following question:-
"Can a person who knows about the order, can still LPA No.888 of 2013 6 wait for orders and suddenly come up with the plea that since the order had not been communicated, he would file the appeal giving any date to his convenience as the date of the knowledge of the order."
Relying upon Raja Harish Chandra's case (supra), the Court answered the question in negative and held that since the application made by the petitioner had been rejected and a permit granted to the opposite party in November, 1988 and since the successful party had started plying on the route concerned, it was not possible to believe that the petitioner did not know or could not have had the knowledge of the making of the order for more than two years. When the route was being operated, observed the Court, the petitioner must be presumed to know that permit had been granted to the other party and not to it, thereby giving to the aggrieved party the constructive knowledge about the rejection of his request for a permit. We respectfully approve the reasoning given in the decision rendered by this Court in Banda Bahadur's case (supra) and hold that even in cases where there is no formal communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority, the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal would start running from the date the aggrieved party acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the making of the said order. Whether or not the aggrieved party had any such knowledge will, however, be a matter to be seen by the Tribunal in each case depending upon its peculiar facts and circumstances. It will not, therefore, be necessary or proper for us to enumerate exhaustively situations in which such knowledge can be imputed to the party aggrieved, while examining whether or not the appeal is within limitation."
6. Examining whether the appellant had actual or LPA No.888 of 2013 7 constructive knowledge of order dated 10.4.2001 passed by State Transport Commissioner, respondent No.1 while dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant had noticed as under:-
"In Jagtar Singh's case (supra), it has been specifically held that even in cases where there is no formal communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority, the period of limitation prescribed for filing the same, shall start running from the date the aggrieved party acquired actual or constructive knowledge of making of the said order. Whether or not the aggrieved party had any such knowledge will, however, be a matter depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In this case, the applications made by the appellants were rejected about six years before filing of these appeals. The successful parties had been found plying on the route in question. In these circumstances, it is not possible to believe that the appellants did not know or could not have had the knowledge of passing the order of all these years. When the route was being operated, the appellants must be presumed to know that the permits had been granted to the other parties and not to them, meaning thereby that they had the constructive knowledge about the rejection of their request for permit.
16. In these circumstances, the appeals filed by them after lapse of about six years, are badly time barred and on this score also, the same are also liable to be rejected."
7. Agreeing with the findings of respondent No.1, learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant vide order dated 13.2.2013.
8. The word "constructive" means inferred rather than directly expressed. In the present case, it has been concurrently LPA No.888 of 2013 8 recorded by respondent No.1 as well as by learned Single Judge that there was constructive knowledge of the order in as much as the successful parties had been found plying on the route in question for the last six years. In such circumstances, it could not be concluded that the appellant had no constructive knowledge of the order dated 10.4.2001 passed by respondent No.2. Applying the judgment in Jagtar Singh's case (supra), no infirmity could be found in the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
9. Adverting to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be noticed that Bhagwan Das's case (supra) was relating to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, "1894 Act"). The question was whether the period of six months under clause (b) of proviso to Section 18 of the 1894 Act should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the Collector or from the date of award itself. It was held that if award is made in the presence of person interested, he has to make application within six weeks from the date of Collector's award itself and in his absence, he has to make application seeking reference within six weeks of receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the 1894 Act. It was further recorded that if the person interested was not present when the award was made and no notice under Section 12 (2) of the 1894 Act was received from the Collector, an application is to be made within six months from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award. In M/s Ark Builders Pvt. Limited's case (supra), it was held that if the law prescribes that a copy LPA No.888 of 2013 9 of the order/award is to be communicated to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. In Jain Motors Regd, Patiala's case (supra), it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the prescribed period of limitation would only commence from the date on which the order was received by the party concerned unless and until there is a strong and positive evidence of acquisition of knowledge of the order. Similar was the position in Manjit Kaur's case (supra). These cases being on individual fact situation, no advantage can be derived by learned counsel for the appellant.
10. Accordingly, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed.
(Ajay Kumar Mittal)
Judge
August 05, 2013 (Hemant Gupta)
'gs' Judge