Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Pushpa vs Sumit Narang on 17 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 45335 of 2019
SMT. PUSHPA
Versus
SUMIT NARANG AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Yogesh Kumar Mittal, advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rishiraj Trivedi, advocate for respondent No.1.
Shri B.S. Gandhi, advocate for respondent No.2.
.....................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is filed for quashing of the private complaint and the summoning order dated 13.04.2018 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ujjain regarding registration of complaint for offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of IPC.
2. The exposition of facts, in brief, giving rise to present petition, is as under:-
A. Sumit Narang filed a private complaint against Aadarsh Vikram Sahakari Grah Nirman Samiti, Ujjain through its President Yogesh Sharma (respondent No.1), Yogesh Sharma (respondent No.2), Pushpa Maheshwari (respondent No.3) and Shyamsundar Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 2 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 Rathi (respondent No.4) inter-alia alleging that the he (complainant Sumit Narang) had purchased plot No. 120, Shivaji Park Colony, Ujjain from Pushpa Maheshwari through registered sale deed dated 26.2.2003. Pushpa Maheshwari had purchased said plot from respondent No. 1/ society through registered sale deed dated 2.5.2000. Pushpa Maheshwari had informed the complainant that respondent No.1 society had earlier sold the plot to Rajesh Rathi.
Rajesh Rathi had executed a power of attorney in favour of his nephew Shyamsundar Rathi. Shyamsundar Rathi had surrendered the plot on 31.3.1995. Thereafter, respondent no.1 society had transferred the plot to Pushpa Maheshwari.
B. The complainant had mutation of the plot from Municipal Corporation, Ujjain on the basis of registered sale deed. The adjacent plots No. 121 and 15 belong to the complainant and his mother. The complainant had applied for permission to construct which was granted vide letter dated 2.6.2003. The complainant and his mother had taken loan of Rs. 25 lacs from ICICI Bank and constructed a house thereupon.
C. Rajesh Rathi filed a civil suit No. 66A/2004 for declaration of title, permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed. The Xth Additional District Judge, Ujjain vide judgment dated 25.1.2016 decreed the suit in favour of Rajesh Rathi and declared the registered sale deed executed in favour of Pushpa Maheshwari dated 2.6.2000 and the registered sale deed in favour of complainant Sumit Narang dated 26.2.2003, null and void. It was Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 3 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 further declared that the construction on the plot is illegal. The appeal against the judgment and decree is pending before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
D. It is alleged that all the respondent conspired to defraud and cheat the complainant. The respondents had knowledge that they did not have any right, title or interest over the disputed plot. The respondents no. 1, 2 and 3 have conspired and executed a forge surrender deed of the disputed plot to cheat the complainant. Pushpa Maheshwari/respondent No.2 did not file any written statement and remained ex-parte in the civil suit. Therefore, all the accused have committed offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC.
E. The Judicial Magistrate First Class. Ujjain recorded statement of the complainant/Sumit Narang under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. on 30.10.2017. On the basis of statement of complainant, the Judicial Magistrate First Class vide impugned order dated 13.4.2018 took cognisance for offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC against respondents No. 1 to 4 mentioned in the complaint and directed issuance of summons to secure their presence.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds mentioned in the petition, submitted that the petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari was a bonafide purchaser of the plot in dispute. Learned counsel referring to the timeline of the litigation submits that plot No. 120 Shivaji Park Colony was purchased by Rajesh Rathi vide registered sale Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 4 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 deed dated 13.9.1985. Rajesh Rathi executed a general power of attorney dated 18.8.2019 in favour of his nephew Shyamsundar Rathi. Shyamsundar Rathi surrendered the plot in favour of Aadarsh Vikram Sahakari Grah Nirman Samiti Ujjain vide surrender deed dated 31.3.1995 and handed over the possession of plot to the society. The petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari purchased the disputed plot through registered sale deed dated 2.5.2000 from the society. Later, she sold the plot to the complainant Sumit Narang vide registered sale deed dated 26.2.2003. Thereafter, the civil suit No. 66A/2004 was filed before IIIrd Additional District Judge, Ujjain by the first purchaser Rajesh Rathi on 10.11.2004. The judgment and decree granting relief in favour of Rajesh Rathi in civil suit No. 22A/2003 was passed on 25.1.2016. The present complaint was filed on 2.7.2017 alleging conspiracy for cheating and forgery against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Randheer Singh Vs. State of UP and others reported in (2021) 14 SCC 626 contended that the petitioner was a bonafide purchaser for value. She had purchased the plot through registered sale deed executed by the society. There was no intention to cheat from inception. The petitioner cannot be prosecuted for making a false document in view of law laid down in case of Randheer Singh (supra). Learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court without considering the fact that the forgery of surrendered deed has not been established by the complainant, proceeded to take cognisance against the petitioner for criminal conspiracy of forging the document. The surrender deed was executed in the year 1995, whereas the complainant had purchased the plot in dispute in year 2000. Therefore, there cannot be any Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 5 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 intention to defraud the complainant from inception by executing a registered sale deed in his favour. The dispute is predominantly civil in nature. The competent court of civil jurisdiction had passed the judgment and decree, therefore, the present private complaint is not maintainable. It deserves to be quashed.
4. Per-contra learned counsel for respondents submitted that respondent is defrauded by executing the sale deed in his favour. The respondent was misrepresented about title of petitioner on the plot in dispute. He purchased the plot and construct a house thereupon. The petitioner did not appear in the civil suit to support the claim of Rajesh Rathi. It goes to show her involvement in the conspiracy to defraud and cheat the complainant. Learned counsel referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of C.S. Prasad Vs. C. Satya Kumar and others reported in 2026 INSC 39 contended that mere existence of civil litigation cannot absolve the petitioner from criminal liability. The civil liability and criminal liability may arise from same set of facts. The conclusion of civil proceeding does not bar the prosecution where the ingredients of criminal offences are prima facie disclosed. Learned counsel contends that the Judicial Magistrate has taken cognisance on the basis of the complaint and the statement recorded under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and found prima facie sufficient grounds to proceed under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner instead of assailing the order in criminal revision has resorted to inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Availability of adequate alternate relief bars the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The petition is meritless.
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5. Heard both the parties. Perused the record.
6. The Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 has held as under:
"12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few-- Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.
[(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283].
The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 7 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b)purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. (emphasis added)
7. In case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690, it was laid down that-
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) (1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and (2) The person entrusted:
(a) Dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
(b) Dishonestly used or disposed of the property or wilfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of:
(i) Any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see : S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 ).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420IPC, the essential ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission; (2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or (3) The consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 ).
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception.
39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 8 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha, (1973) 2 SCC 823 as under :
"4. We have heard Mr Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondent had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs 35,000. There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating."
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 9 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
8. In matter of C.S. Prasad Vs. C. Satya Kumar and others reported in 2026 INSC 39, it was held that-
25. Testing on the aforesaid parameters, we find that the complaint dated 08.01.2020 made by the appellant contains categorical allegations that respondent Nos. 1 to 3, by abusing the advanced age and medical vulnerability of the executants, caused the execution and registration of the three settlement deeds to their unlawful advantage, and thereafter used such documents as genuine for the purpose of deriving proprietary benefits. The allegations in the complaint also disclose dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction as well as fabrication and wrongful use of documents. At this stage, we must note that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is bound to take the allegations on its face value. Whether these allegations can ultimately be proved is a matter strictly within the province of the Trial Court.
26. In the impugned order, the High Court has quashed the proceedings primarily on the ground that the validity of the settlement deeds has been upheld in the proceedings before the Civil Court. We are of the view that this approach adopted by the High Court is not correct. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed. In Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy, this Court had made it crystal clear that "pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter, involving the same parties is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons."
27. Adjudication in civil matters and criminal prosecution proceed on different principles. The decree passed by the Civil Court neither records findings on criminal intent nor on the existence of offences such as forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents. Therefore, civil adjudication cannot always be treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment. Moreover, in the case at hand, the civil proceedings have not attained finality.
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28. Adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. Therefore, there cannot be any general proposition that whenever dispute involves a civil element, a criminal proceeding cannot go on. Criminal liability must be examined independently. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled to acquittal only upon failure of proof in the trial and not at the threshold jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. To permit quashing on the sole ground of a civil suit would encourage unscrupulous litigants to defeat criminal prosecution by instituting civil proceedings.
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31. It is a settled proposition that when a factual foundation for prosecution exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited by invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Where allegations require adjudication on evidence, the proper course is to permit the trial to proceed in accordance with law. In the present case, the issues relating to the state of mind of the executants at the time of execution of the settlement deeds, the role of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the execution and the use of the settlement deeds, the existence of fraudulent intent, and the manner in which proprietary advantage was obtained by them, all require a full-fledged trial on evidence."
9. In matter of Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2021) 14 SCC 626, the Supreme Court, while considering the precedents on the issue, observed as under-
24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed which was not actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a power of attorney authorising the sale of property knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is another thing to say that the power of attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom how the investigating authorities could even have been prima facie satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without even examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been cited as a witness.
27. In Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, this Court held as under :
"19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security).
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.
A clarification
23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.
24. The term "fraud" is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of "fraud" is 'deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage'. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines "fraud" with reference to a party to a contract. ***
27. The term "fraudulently" is mostly used with the term "dishonestly" which is defined in Section 24 as follows:
Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 12NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 '24. "Dishonestly".--Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing "dishonestly".'
28 [Ed. : Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009.] . To "defraud" or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include:
(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421 and 424).
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section 207).
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (Sections 246 to
253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to 261).
(vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section
422).
(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration (Section 423).
(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to 471 and 474).
(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (Section 477).
(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (Section 496). It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law. Section 504 of the Penal Code
29. The allegations in the complaint do not also make out the ingredients of an offence under Section 504 of the Penal Code. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 13 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an "insult with intent to provoke breach of peace". The statement attributed to the accused, even if it was true, was merely a statement referring to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the first appellant in favour of the second appellant. Conclusion
30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do not make out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code, but may technically show the ingredients of offences of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing hurt under Section 323IPC."
28. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court held that :
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336, this Court found that the complaint, in that case, did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any offence under Section 420 or Section 120-BIPC. The case was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lay before the civil court.
30. In Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, this Court held :
"13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420IPC. In our view Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 14 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court [Maniprasad v. State of Kerala, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4251] committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings."
31. In Robert John D'Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes, (2015) 9 SCC 96, this Court held "12. As far as the offence of cheating is concerned, the same is defined in Section 415IPC, for which the punishment is provided under Section 420IPC. Section 415 reads as under:
'415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat". Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations ***' From the above language of the section, one of the essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is deception, but in the present case, from the contents of the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver the property by deception. What was done, was so reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds.
13. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482CrPC as follows :
'7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 15 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.'
15. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 has observed as under :
'25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR 857 (HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved.
***
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.'
16. In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 16 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court [Walter D'Mello v. Stephen V. Gomes, 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 12058] and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed by Respondent 1, in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420IPC, also stands quashed."
33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge-sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra extracted above.
10. The material is examined in the light of aforestated prepositions of law.
11. Petitioner Puspa Maheshwari is prosecuted for executing a sale deed dated 26/02/2003 of Plot no. 120, Shivaji Park, Ujjain (hereinafter referred to "the disputed plot") in favour of complainant Sumit Narang, which was declared null and void vide judgment dated 25/01/2016 passed in Civil Suit no. 22-A/2003.
12. The material on record reveals that Rajesh Rathi had purchased the disputed plot from the Society vide registered sale deed dated 13/09/1985.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 17NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 Shyamsunder Rathi surrendered the disputed plot in favour of Aadarsh Vikram Sahakari Gruh Nirman Samiti, Ujjain vide surrender deed dated 31/03/1995 on the basis of general power of attorney dated 18/08/1990 executed by Rajesh Rathi in favour of his nephew Shyamsunder Rathi. The validity of this transaction is subject matter of appeal before the First Appellate Court.
13. Be that as it may, Petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari purchased the disputed plot almost five years after the transaction with regard to surrender of the disputed plot. The contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner has substance that petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari is a bonafide purchaser for value. The recitals of sale-deed and long time gap of five years substantiates the contentions.
14. The material on record and the averments in the complaint show that petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari had purchased the disputed plot through registered sale deed dated 02/05/2000 from Aadarsh Vikram Sahakari Gruh Nirman Samiti, Ujjain. She was in possession of the disputed plot from 02/05/2000 till she executed the sale deed in favour of complainant Sumit Narang on 26/02/2003. No objection was raised regarding transfer of the disputed plot in favour of Puspa Maheshwari for almost three years.
15. Rajesh Rathi filed a civil suit for declaration of title and for declaring the sale deeds dated 02/05/2000 and 26/02/2003 as null and void. This civil suit was filed on 10/11/2004 without impleading the general power of attorney Shyamsunder Rathi, who has allegedly surrendered the disputed plot on behalf of Rajesh Rathi and executed the surrender deed dated 31/03/1995 without consent of Rajesh Rathi.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 18NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804
16. There is no allegation in the complaint and the evidence of the complainant recorded under section 200 of the Cr.P.C that petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari was acquainted with Shyamsunder Rathi or she has connived with Shyamsunder Rathi for surrender of the disputed plot on behalf of Rajesh Rathi. There is general allegation that all the accused conspired to defraud the complainant. They had knowledge that the disputed plot was already sold to Rajesh Rathi. It is alleged that petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari had deliberately refrained from appearing in civil suit. Mere refraining to participate in the civil litigation, when petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari had already transferred the property and left with no interest in it, cannot be inferred as mens-rea for defrauding the complainant. The complainant, in para-9, specifically stated that Pushpa Maheshwari was in possession of the disputed plot at the time of transfer of the said plot in his favour. It shows that Pushpa Maheshwari had purchased and was in possession of the disputed plot from the Society therefore, no inference of intention to defraud the complainant can be drawn from the material on record against Pushpa Maheshwari. The dispute with regard to ownership of the disputed plot and the effect of surrender deed dated 31/03/1995 are the disputed questions to be determined by the Civil Court on the basis of evidence. The validity of the transaction is subject matter of challenge before the First Appellate Court. It goes to show that the dispute is necessarily civil in nature.
17. There is no allegation that the petitioner impersonated some other person or dishonestly interpolated or forged the sale deed to defraud the complainant. Therefore, necessary ingredient to constitute the offence of making false document is not prima-facie made out against the petitioner Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05 19 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804 in view of the law laid down in cases of Randheer Singh and Mohd. Ibrahim (supra).
18. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the continuation of prosecution against the petitioner in aforestated scenario would be an abuse of process of Court. Therefore, the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is invoked for the ends of justice and the private complaint and the summoning order dated 13.4.2018 passed by JMFC, Ujjain are quashed with reference to the petitioner- Smt. Pushpa.
19. Petition is accordingly allowed.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR) JUDGE BDJ Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 17-02-2026 19:55:05