Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief ... on 24 September, 2024

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Jharkhand High Court

Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief ... on 24 September, 2024

1. Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti, Ranchi, having its Office at Ranchi Pahari Mandir, Ranchi, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S:- Sukhdeo Nagar, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand), A Registered Society under Society Registration Act, represented through its Member Rajesh Gadodia, Aged about 53 years, Son of Krishna Murari Gadodia, Resident of Vinayak Enclave, Navin Mitra Road, Burdwan Compound, Lalpur, P.O.& P.S.: Lalpur, District: Ranchi,

2. Sunil Kumar Mathur of Member, Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti, Ranchi, aged about-58 years, Son of Late Rajendra Prasad, Resident of Harmu Road, Kishoreganj, P.O: G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S: Kotwali, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).

...............PETITIONER Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having its Office at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.: Dhurwa, District: Ranchi.

2. The Chairman, Jharkhand State Hindu Religious Board, Headquarters, Qtr. No. E 2/9, Saket Nagar, Hinoo, P.O.& P.S.: Doranda, District: Ranchi.

3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi -cum- President, Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti, P.O.: G.P.O., P.S.: Kotwali, District: Ranchi.

4. The Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi-cum-Secretary, Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti, P.O., G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District-Ranchi

5. Sri Rakesh Sinha, son of not known to the petitioner having its office at Pahari Shiv Mandir Mandir, Ranchi, P.O. and P.S. Ranchi, District-Ranchi ............Respondents

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, Advocate Mr. Anshuman Mishra, Advocate Mr. Krishna Prajapati, Advocate For the State : Mr. Sachin Kumar, A.A.G.-II (through V.C.) Ms. Surbhi, Advocate For the Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate Mr. Bharat Kumar, Advocate Ms. Akriti Shree, Advocate For the Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Sumit Prakash, Advocate ...........

08/24.09.2024 :- Heard Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State through Video Conferencing, Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the Respondent No.2 and Mr. Sumit Prakash Learned counsel for the respondent no.5.

2. At the outset a preliminary objection was made by Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2 with regard to maintainability of the writ petition in the light of provision made under section 29 of the Jharkhand Hindu Religious Trust Act. He submits that only appeal can be maintained before the learned District Judge. This objection will be dealt with by this Court later on in the judgment.

3. The prayer in the writ petition is made for quashing the Notification No. 1204 of 2023 dated 11.09.2023 issued under the signature of the respondent no.2 whereby a validly constituted committee which is running the Pahari Mandir Temple without any rhyme or reason was substituted by invoking the section 29 of the Bihar (Jharkhand) Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 which was headed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. Further prayer is made for quashing the show-cause notice dated 08.07.2023.

4. Mr. Abhay Kr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Pahari Mandir was being maintained by a Committee headed by Deputy Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer and other members in the light of byelaws made under the Society Registration Act and the said society was also registered under the Society Registration Act contained in annexure-6. He further submits that the petitioners are members of the said Society and to buttress this argument he refers to Annexure-10 and the membership contained in annexure-5. He then submits that the member of the society are Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi and Sub-Divisional Officer, Ranchi and other distinguished members including Managing Director of the Public Undertakings. He further submits that the said committee was taking all care of the said Ranchi Pahari Mandir. He then submits that in the year, 1908 the King of Palkot has made a gift to the then Commissioner and thereafter Palkot Park was established and later on the hill which was in dilapidated condition was developed after independence as there was only small shivling and in 1857 during the 1st War of Independence the freedom 2 fighters were hanged on the "Fansi Tungri". He further submits that after the independence on 15 August, 1947 as mark of independence the devotees and the freedom fighters started hoisting National Flag and they also started to re-construct the dilapidated temple which was developed by the superseded committee being known as Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that 1st Committee of Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti was notified vide memo dated 30.07.1992 and subsequently on 22.06.1993 the Adhoc Committee was notified thereafter the committee was working effectively and with utmost perfection of the people/devotees. He submits that whenever land sliding had happened in the Pahari Mandir in the year, 2009 from the south and that Samiti has taken all steps and all measures were taken and land sliding was protected. He then submits that has happened due to district administration as Deputy Commissioner and other higher officials of the district administration were in the Committee. Thereafter further steps have been taken for development of the Pahari Mandir. He submits that renovation work was also made for the facilities of the devotees and staircases were made. He then submits that proposal was moved for registration by the people and devotees for the Pahari Mandir to make out the day to day problems under the Society Registration Act and pursuant to that registration was made in the year, 2011-2012. By way of referring the provisions made in the bye-laws he submits that always the Deputy Commissioner has headed the said committee as a president and the post of secretary was held by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi. He submits that not only that even some of the members also relinquished the post to be headed by S.D.O. and District Forest Officer so that Pahari Mandir will be looked after properly. He further submits that Annexure-11 dated 08.07.2023 is the show-cause which is issued in the name of Pahari Shiv Mandir Vikas Samiti instead of Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti. By way of referring the said show cause he submits 3 that reason is not assigned what has been violated by the said Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti. He further submits that the said show-cause notice is not issued to Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti. He refers to sections 58, 59, 60 of the Bihar (Jharkhand) Hindu Religious Act, 1950 and further sections 60 and 70 of the Act and submits that Section 60 of the said Act is with regard to budget and section 70 of the Act is with regard to fee of the Religious Trust. By way of referring Section 72 of the said Act, he submits that there is special provisions for suits for recovery of immovable property of religious trusts in certain cases. By way of referring section 73 of the said act he submits that there is provision of free inspection by Board of the document, register or record relating to property belonging to a religious trust. He submits that now the Adhoc Committee has taken over in absence of making any scheme in the light of Section 32 of the said Act and in view of that the remedy of the petitioners is only filing the writ petition. He further refers to Section 28 of the said Act and submits that the power of the Board is prescribed therein. By referring Sub-Section (h) of Section of Section 28 of the Act he submits that if whole of the condition made therein is not fulfilled then only supersession can be made. By way of referring section 26 he submits that the said section provides the power of the Board of general superintendence. He further submits that the land was donated by then Maharaja that finds place in the Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers. He then submits that in absence of order no reason is assigned under section 29 of the Act, the writ petition is maintainable that too in the particular facts of the present case as after superseding the earlier committee, all the members are the political party except the Chairman of the said Trust. He further submits that this fact has been disclosed in para 23 to 25 of the writ petition that has not been controverted by the respondent no.2 in the counter affidavit. He relied in the case of "Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others"

reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75. He refers to para 54, 66, 67, 68 of 4 the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"54. The fundamental rights as protected under Article 26 of the Constitution are already indicated for observance in Section 107 of the 1939 Act itself. Such rights cannot be treated to have been waived nor its protection denied. Consequently, the power to Supersede the functions of a religious denomination" is to be read as regulatory for a certain purpose and for a limited duration, and not an authority to virtually abrogate the rights of administration conferred on it.

66. Supersession of rights of administration cannot be of a permanent enduring nature. Its life has to be reasonably fixed so as to be co-terminus with the removal of the consequences of maladministration. The reason is that the objective to take over the management and administration is not the removal and replacement of the existing administration but to rectify and stump out the consequences of maladministration. Power to regulate does not mean power to supersede the administration for indefinite period.

67. "Regulate" is defined as to direct, to direct by rule or restriction; to direct or manage according to the certain standards, to restrain or restrict. The word "regulate" is difficult to define as having any precise meaning. It is a word of broad import, having a broad meaning and may be very comprehensive in scope. Thus, it may mean to control or to subject to governing principles. Regulate has different set of meanings and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation. The word "regulate" is elastic enough to include issuance of directions, etc. (Vide K. Ramanathan v. State of T.N.43 and Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy.)

68. Even otherwise it is not permissible for the State/statutory authorities to supersede the administration by adopting any oblique/circuitous method. In Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. 45, this Court f held: (SCC p. 344, para 21) "21. It is a settled proposition of law that what cannot be done directly, is not permissible to be done obliquely, meaning thereby. whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud. An authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by 'shift or contrivance".

5. Relying on the above judgement he submits that in absence of any scheme the adhoc committee cannot operate in the in view of that impugned action of the Board may kindly be quashed.

6. He further relied in the case of "Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and Another Vs. Vishwanath Prasad Lohia and Others" reported in (2007) 7 SCC 471 and submits 5 that section 29 (2) is required to be read with section 32 and in absence of any scheme in indefinitely adhoc committee cannot be allowed the management of the Pahari Mandir. He refers to para 5 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"5.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the c record and in particular the notices allegedly given to the committee before its supersession as also the scheme framed under Section 32 of the Act. We note the finding of the High Court that there was no evidence to show that the notices had been served under Section 29(2) cannot be seriously challenged. We also find that civil suit with regard to the validity of the trust is pending in the civil court. We accordingly dismiss the appeals but while doing so direct d that the status quo as exists today will continue till the disposal of the appeals. We also direct that a fresh show-cause notice under Section 29(2) will be given to the committee and both parties will be at liberty to produce their documents before the Board within four months from the date of the service of the notice and that status quo as exists today will continue to operate till the final disposal of the matter by the Board in proceedings under e Section 29(2) of the Act."

7. Relying on the said judgment he submits that in view of this fact the writ petition is maintainable. He further relied in the case of "Hindu Public and Another Vs. Rajdhani Puja Samithee and others" reported in (1999) 2 SCC 583. He refers to para 14 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"14. In our opinion, this contention is not well founded. More than ninety years ago, such a contention raised under Act 21 of 1860 was negatived by the Allahabad High Court in Anjuman Islamia of Muttra v. Nasiruddin'. It was contended in that case that the registration of a society called "Anjuman. Islamia" under Act 21 of 1860 was not permissible as the Society was formed for "religious purposes only" and not for charitable purposes. The Allahabad High Court rejected the said contention and held that a society for religious purposes would ordinarily be a society for charitable purposes. A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Khaji Muhammad Hussain Sahib v. Majiday Mahmood Jamait Managing Committee. A Division Bench consisting of Wadsworth and Venkataramana Rao, JJ. held that Act 21 of 1860 was passed in 1860 when, according to English law, a gift for the advancement of religion or promotion of religious worship was treated as a charitable purpose and, therefore, a society formed for such a purpose would be a charitable society under Act 21 of 1860. The only condition was that it should be for the benefit of the public. No doubt, in some statutes enacted subsequent to Act 21 of 1860, the legislature used the words "charitable" and "religious" but the definition of these words was expressly stated to be for the purposes of those Acts. The subsequent legislation, the Madras High Court held, would not be helpful in interpreting the word "charitable" in Act 21 of 1860. The real question was: "What did 9 the term mean in 1860?" We are in agreement with the view of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts. In fact, Lord McNaughten in his celebrated judgment in CIT v. Pemsel said that charitable purposes which came within the language and 6 spirit of the statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz Ch 4) could be grouped into four heads (i) relief of poverty (ii) education, (iii) advancement of religion, and (iv) other purposes beneficial to the community not coming under any of the preceding heads. The words in Act 21 of 1860 are, therefore, to be understood as including religious purposes points 2 and 3."

8. Relying of the above judgment he submits that religious temple can be maintained by the Society also that has been held in the said judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as such this writ petition is maintainable and appropriate order may kindly be passed. On these grounds, he submits that impugned action of the respondent no.2 may be quashed and appropriate direction may kindly be issued.

9. Per contra, Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State through Video Conferencing submits that Annexure-11 is the show cause notice and in view of that compliance is made and the respondent no.2 is having all the authority under the said Act. According to him show cause order is not under challenge. He further submits that the constitution of the committee is not under challenge as well as Act is also not under challenge and that controversy can only be looked into by competent court of civil jurisdiction. He refers to Section 57 of the said Act and submits that any order passed by the Board is a decree which can be looked into by the civil court in view of that writ petition is fit to be dismissed.

10. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that in absence of any authorization to the petitioner by the Society the writ petition has been filed and in view of that this writ petition itself is not maintainable. He refers to sub-section 3 and 4 of Section 29 of the Jharkhand Hindu Religious Trust Act and submits that in view of this provision the only remedy is before the District Judge by way of filing appeal and writ petition itself is not maintainable. He draws the attention of the Court to Section 57 of the Act and submits that the dispute can be only subject of the matter of the Civil Court only. He further refers to sub-section c, d, e, f, g and h of section 28 of the said Act and 7 submits that provisions are made therein of action if such direction of respondent no.2 is not obeyed by religious party. He further draws the attention of the Court to Annexure-A and B and several pages and submits that several notices have been issued to the said committee and no response has been made in view of that contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is not tenable. He further submits that details of account was called by the respondent no.2 however the committee has not replied and for the expenditure of 1999-2000 the said account was provided in the year, 2000. He further draws the attention of the Court of sub- section 2-l of the said Act and submits that in the light of provision made therein the charitable and Religious Board can maintain the maintenance of any temple and in view of that if the petitioners are registered under the Society Registration Act then in the light of section 2 (l)) the petitioners are coming within the purview of Jharkhand Hindu Religious Trust Act. He refers to Section 79 and submits that this Act is having the over-riding effect upon other Acts. He submits that under section 70 there is provision of fee payable by religious trusts to Board and in view of that Board has rightly demanded the fee which has not been done by the said Trust. There is no illegality in passing of the said order. He distinguished the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the cases of "Hindu Public"(supra) and "Dr. Subramanian Swamy (supra). He submits that in the case of "Hindu Public (Supra) it has been held that religious and charitable Board can maintain the temple as has been held in that case and in view of that there is no illegality in the order passed by the respondent no.2. He submits that so far "Dr. Subramanian Swamy"(supra) case is concerned, the whole Act of the Madras state was considered and the fact of the that case is otherwise so far the present dispute is concerned. On these grounds, he submits that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed.

11. In reply, Mr. Abhay Kr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that purport of section 29 is not fulfilled by way 8 of said show cause and in view of that this writ petition is maintainable in view of the fact that the committee headed by Deputy Commissioner has been superseded by the member of the another political party at the behest of respondent no.2. He further relied in the case of " Mahanth Ramautar alias Mahanth Ramautar Barhamchari and others Vs. Bihar State Board of Religious Trust and others" (1997) SCC Online Pat 588. He submits that in that case also at the instance of local M.L.A they have acted and the Hon'ble Patna High Court has entertained.

12. Mr. Sumit Prakash, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 adopted the argument of the learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2.

13. In view of above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the Court has gone has through the materials on record including counter-affidavit. It appears that in the year, 1908 the King of Palkot has made a gift to the then Commissioner and thereafter Park was established and later on the hill which was in dilapidated condition was developed and this fact was in the Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers at page 253 which is as under:-

"Lieutenant-colonel Qusely (1839 to 1848) extended the compound of the house erected by his predecessor to include a coffee garden and the Ranchi hill, and excavated the Sahib Bandh, or Ranchi Lake, a splendid piece of water some fifty acres in extent, fringed by trees, with picturesque islands in the midst, and a pillared bathing ghat and two small temples on one side. On the summit of the pyramid shaped Ranchi hill he erected a summer house as a place of rest during his morning walks. This structure through surmounted with a cross has been annexed by the inhabitants of Ranchi as a Mahadeo Asthan and is a place of worship for both Hindus and Antimist."

14. The averments made in the writ petition with regard to development of the said Pahari Mandir is not denied in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.2. It is not denied that the development of Pahari Mandir has been made by the erstwhile committee which has been superseded. The staircase has been maintained and developed by the said committee and it is not denied in the counter affidavit and when the land slide was there the said committee has taken all pain to maintain the said Pahari 9 Mandir. Prima facie it appears that this has happened because the district administration was heading the committee as the Deputy Commissioner and higher officials of the district administration were members of the said committee. A question to this effect has been put by this Court to learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that if in future such land slide will be there what step they can take and where they will go. The reply has come that they have to take help of district administration and of the Forest Department.

15. Much has been argued on the point of maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of the respondent no.2 as well as respondent -State.

16. Section 29 of the Act has a bearing on the question at the issue before this Court it speaks interalia that where the supervision of a religious trust is vested in any committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent Court or authority, such Committee or association shall continue to function under the general superintendence and control of the Board unless superseded by the Board under sub-section 2 of that section. If an order of supersession is passed the committee or association or any other person interested in the religious trust may within 30 days of the order of the Board under sub-section 2 make an application before the District Judge for varying, modifying or setting aside such order.

17. Section 32 of the Act defines power of Board to settle schemes for proper administration of religious trusts which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"32. Power of Board to settle schemes for proper administration of religious trusts.-(1) The Board may, of its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf by two or more persons interested in any trust,-

(a) settle a scheme for such religious trust after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and giving notice to the trustee of such trust and to such other person as may appear to the Board to be interested therein;

(b) in like manner and subject to the like conditions, modify any scheme settled under this Section or under any other law or substitute another scheme in its stand:

Provided that any scheme so settled, modified or substituted shall be in accordance with the law governing the trust and shall not be contrary to the wishes of the founder so far as such wishes can be ascertained.

(2) A scheme settled, modified or substituted instead of another scheme under this Section shall unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge on an application, if any, made under sub-Section (3), come into force on a day to be appointed by the Board in this behalf and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

(3) The trustee of, or any other person interested in, such trust may within three months from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the scheme so settled, modified or substituted instead of another scheme, as the case may be make an application to the District Judge for varying, modifying or setting aside the scheme; but subject to the result of such application, the order of the Board under sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be final and binding upon the trustee of the religious trust and upon every other person interested in such religious trust.

(4) An order passed by the District Judge on any application made under sub- section (3) shall be final."

18. In view of Section 32 of the said Act if any action is being taken of superseding the earlier Committee scheme is of another required which has not been done in the case in hand.

19. Annexure-11 is show cause notice which is addressed to the Ranchi Pahari Shiv Mandir Vikas Samiti whereas the correct name of the said Samiti is Ranchi Pahari Mandir Vikas Samiti. In the counter affidavit several show-cause notices have been annexed by the respondent no.2 wherein demand has been made for payment of fee and in Annexurre-11 it is disclosed that a sum of Rs. 39,358/- is not paid in the year, 2000-2001. If such a demand is there by way of Annexure-11 the remedy before the Board and respondent no.2 to invoke section 63 and 64 of the said Act which reads as under:-

"63. Audit of Accounts and Recovery of Irregular Expenses.

63. Audit of accounts of religious trusts.-(1) The accounts of every religious trust, other than a religious trust the trustee of which has been exempted from sending a copy of the budget under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60, shall be audited and examined annually by a qualified accountant appointed as auditor by the Board.

(2) The auditor may, by written notice, require the production before him of any document or the attendance before him of any person responsible for the preparation of the accounts to enable the auditor to obtain such information as he may consider necessary for the proper conduct of the audit.

(3) Within a month of the completion of the audit, the auditor shall prepare a report on the accounts audited and examined and shall submit a report to the Board and deliver a copy thereof to the trustee concerned:

Provided that the auditor may submit an interim report at anytime he thinks fit.

(4) The report of the auditor shall include a statement of-(a) any payment which appears to him to be contrary to law or to the 11 provisions of the budget;

(b) the amount of any deficiency or loss which appears to have been incurred by the negligence or misconduct of the trustee; and

(c) the amount of any sum which ought to have been, but is not brought into account by the trustee.

(5) After considering such report, the Board may-

(a) order that any payment referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (4) shall be allowed or that no further action shall be taken as, regards any amount referred to in clause (b) or clause (c) of the said sub-section; or

(b) serve a notice on the trustee concerned requiring him to show cause within one month from the date of the service of such notice why such payment should not be surcharged or such amount should not be charged against him.

(6) After considering such cause as may be shown by the trustee and affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Board may surcharge such payment or charge the amount of any loss or deficiency against him and shall in every such case certify the amount due from him.

(7) A copy of the statement, if any, referred to in sub-

section (4) included in the report of the auditor shall be forwarded by the Board to the Jharkhand Government for such orders as the Jharkhand Government may think fit.

(8)Where there is a conflict between the orders of the Board under sub-section (5) and (6) and the orders of the Jharkhand Government under sub-section (7), the latter shall prevail.

(9). The cost of the audit of the accounts of a religious trust shall be paid from the Trust Fund."

64. Certified amount recoverable as a public demand-(1) Every amount certified under sub-section (6) of Section 63 as due from any trustee shall, if not paid within ninety days next after the date of the certification thereof, be recoverable from him in the manner provided in sub-section (4) of Section 70.

(2) The Board shall pay all certified amounts received or recovered by it to the trustee of the religious trust concerned for being credited to the accounts of such trust.

20. Section 64 of the said Act speaks of certified amount recoverable as a public demand. If such a demand was there the Board is required to invoke section 64 of the said Act and without doing so straightway section 29 has been invoked by the respondent no.2.

21. In the said notice ground is taken for non compliance of certain section as well as demand. In the light of sub-section 2 of Section 29 the ground on which proposed supersession is one of the requirement to pass such order and in the said notice that is lacking. Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him. Therefore, 12 when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. The reference may be made to the case of ÏN RE Presidential Poll" reported in (1974) 2 SCC 33 wherein para 15 it has been held as under:-

"15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(3) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary of invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform, "Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening Impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom's Legal Maxims 10th Edn. at pp. 162-163 and Crales on Statute Law 6th Edn, at p. 268)."

22. If a particular statute is there it states taking action that statute is required to be followed which is not done in the case in hand as ground has not been properly explained in the said show cause. In the light of Section 32 of the Act no scheme is there and indefinitely the adhoc committee cannot look into day to day affairs of the administration of the said Pahari Mandir.

23. In the above background the question of examining the maintainability of the writ petition as a preliminary issue is answered by this Court in affirmative as discussed hereinabove particularly the ground of supersession is not made out in the said show cause in the light of section 29 of the Jharkhand Religious Trust Act and in view of said notice demand of certain fee is there and for that remedy of the religious trust is under section 64 of the said Act. The course of substantial justice cannot be defeated on technicalities. The supersession order passed by the Board without 13 following the procedure prescribed in the statute. Since, the action is initiated for violation of principles of natural justice, the plea of alternative remedy of appeal available to the petitioners before the District Judge is not sustainable.

24. The petitioners are members of the said societies as disclosed in Annexures 5 and 10 of the writ petition and accordingly the petitioners can maintain the writ petition as such argument of respondent no. 2 with regard to representation of the writ petition is not being accepted by the Court.

25. In the light of provision made in the said Act power of respondent no.2 is there however, procedure prescribed therein is required to be followed which has not been done in accordance with law as submitted by the respondent no.2. In view of that the writ petition is maintainable.

26. It is further well settled law that where the matter was governed by the statute the Court should not supplant, ignore or bypass the said statute and statute is required to be followed in its law and spirit which has not been done in the case in hand.

27. In the case of "Andhra Pradesh Financial Corporation Versus Gar Re-Rolling Mills" reported in (1994) 2 SCC 647 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "A Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must to act as to present perpetration of a legal hand and the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, so far per as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to prevent the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law.

28. In the case of "State of Maharashtra and Others Vs. Prabhu" reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ít is responsibility of the High Court as custodian of the Constitution to maintain social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refusing to interfering where it is against the social interest."

29. In view of the above discussions it is the solemn duty 14 of and legal obligation on the State, Administrative Authorities and courts to protect the interest of minor, disabled person and the deity being perpetual minor, physical disable and infirm, is entitled of special protection of law.

30. The Court finds that the earlier committee several distinguished persons of the society including the Managing Director of the Public Undertaking and several officials particularly Deputy Commissioner, Senior Superintendent of Police and Sub Divisional Officer were made members and Deputy Commissioner and Sub Divisional Officer were acting as president and Secretary and they were in a more comfortable position to maintain the sanctity of Pahari Mandir. Whenever the such dispute arises it is well known that district administration are being provided charge to take over the management and the by way of bye-laws of the society the Deputy Commissioner and other higher officials were at the helm of affairs of the said committee.

31. Whenever the land slide was there the said Pahari Mandir was protected by way of taking steps by the said committee and that has happened prima facie as higher officials of the district administration were looking day to day affairs of the said committee.

32. In view of above facts and considering the manner in which the earlier committee has been superseded by the new committee by the respondent no.2 appears to be happened in the arbitrary manner that too all the members are said to be members of the particular political party which is disclosed in para 23 to 25 of the writ petition and has not been denied in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.2.

33. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis, the impugned order dated 11.09.2023 contained in Annexure-12 superseding the earlier committee is hereby quashed and earlier committee position (Annexure-10) is restored and Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and Sub Divisional Officer, Ranchi and other members shall take over the management of the said Committee 15 forthwith.

34. It is open to the respondent no.2 to proceed afresh and after providing full opportunity to the earlier committee and proceed as per said statute.

35. This writ petition is allowed and disposed of in above terms. Pending I.A, if any, stands disposed of.

( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/A.F.R. 16

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Jharkhand High Court