Allahabad High Court
Ganesh Prasad Sahu vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal ... on 10 December, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 2328
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
RESERVED
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 25976 of 2018
Petitioner :- Ganesh Prasad Sahu
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal Lko.Throu.Chairman & Anr.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Alok Saxena
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 26141 of 2018
Petitioner :- Smt. Raj Kumari Verma And Ors.
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Throu.Prin.Secy.Transport Deptt.Lko.And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 37781 of 2018
Petitioner :- Danish Javed
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy. Transport Lucknow And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 22208 of 2018
Petitioner :- Smt. Parveen
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. Thru. Chairman & Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Alok Saxena
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 21936 of 2019
Petitioner :- Smt. Safina Bano
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal Up Lko. Thru. Chairman&Or
Counsel for Petitioner :- Smt. Pushpa Saxena,Alok Saxena
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ambika Prasad
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 32211 of 2018
Petitioner :- Mohd. Shameem Khan
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal,Lucknow And Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Moti Chand Yadav
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 29968 of 2018
Petitioner :- Mohd. Shameem Khan
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal Thru.Chairman & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Moti Chand Yadav
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 37754 of 2018
Petitioner :- Gazala Danish Javed
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy.Transport Lucknow And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 37778 of 2018
Petitioner :- Liyaqat Ali
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy. Transport Lucknow And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 22471 of 2018
Petitioner :- Atul Singh & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. (Transport) & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Zubair Hasan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 28638 of 2018
Petitioner :- Shamsuddeen
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru.Prin.Secy.Transport Deptt.Civil Sectt.&Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Govind Prasad Yadav
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 7078 of 2019
Petitioner :- Parvez Karim Siddiqui & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy., Transport Deptt. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 20935 of 2018
Petitioner :- Yatish Kumar Sharma & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy., Transport Deptt. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd Nazish Iqbal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 30228 of 2018
Petitioner :- Mohd. Naseem Khan
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P.Lucknow & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Moti Chand Yadav
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 23461 of 2018
Petitioner :- Saleem Kureshi
Respondent :- The State Of U.P Thru The Prin. Secy. Transport Deptt. & Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Govind Prasad Yadav
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 15602 of 2019
Petitioner :- Mohd. Saleem & Anr.
Respondent :- State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. Lko. Thru. Chairman&
Counsel for Petitioner :- Smt. Pushpa Saxena,Alok Saxena
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
*****
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.
These are a bunch of writ petitions which involve similar questions of law and facts. In all the connected petitions, the order passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow has been assailed whereby the appeals of the respective writ petitioners purporting to be under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been dismissed on the ground of being barred by beyond limitation by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
Since, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal while passing the impugned orders rejecting the in various appeals, has taken a similar line of reasoning and the respective orders reflect the same reasons, accordingly, all the above writ petitions were connected and have been heard and are being finally decided by this common judgment, which shall be applicable in all the connected petitions.
This Court before dealing with the respective submissions finds it convenient to briefly narrate the facts of the Writ Petition No.25976 (M/S) of 2018 while in respect of the other connected petitions, only the relevant dates are being mentioned as the grounds in the other petitions are more or less the same.
The petitioner of the Writ Petition No.25976 (M/S) of 2018 has challenged the order dated 20.04.2018 whereby the appeals preferred by the petitioner bearing No.70/2016 and 71/2016 have been dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal holding the same to be barred by limitation.
The petitioner had made two separate applications for the grant of permit of Vikram Tempo Taxi before the Regional Transport Officer, Lucknow on two routes (i) Dubagga-Chowk and (ii) Awadh Hospital-Dubagga.
The Regional Transport Officer by means of the order dated 12-14.06.2008 granted 368 permits, to the applicants, who were selected by a draw of lottery. By the aforesaid reason, the applications of the petitioners were rejected against which the petitioner preferred two separate appeals before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal which was registered as Appeal No.70/2008 which was in respect of the rejection of his application for the route "Dubagga-Chowk" and Appeal No.54/2008 in respect of rejection of his application for the route "Awadh Hospital-Dubagga".
Both the appeals came to be allowed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the order dated 30.06.2009 and the matter was remanded to the Regional Transport Authority for reconsideration. The Regional Transport Authority did not take any decision rather kept the matter pending for years. Thereafter, the Regional Transport Authority after a lapse of considerable time in its meeting dated 29.09.2012 considered the applications of 72 persons which also included the petitioner and all the applications were rejected for want of vacancy and it did not consider the application of those grantees whose permits were set aside by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the order dated 30.06.2009.
The petitioner again challenged the order dated 29.09.2012 by filing two separate appeals bearing No.23/2014 and 43/2014 and both the appeals once again were allowed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 17.04.2014 and after setting aside the order dated 29.09.2012, the matter was once again remanded to the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow with a direction to comply with the earlier order dated 30.06.2009.
Thereafter, it appears that though the directions of remand was for the Regional Transport Authority to reconsider the matter but instead it constituted three Members Committee comprising of Deputy Transport Commissioner (Zonal, Lucknow), Regional Transport Officer, Lucknow and a Member nominated by the District Magistrate, Lucknow. The aforesaid Committee so constituted conducted the hearing on 16.05.2015. It is the specific case of the petitioners that they were not served with any notice for the date fixed for hearing of the application i.e. 16.05.2015 by the said Committee.
It also transpires that the report of the said Committee was placed before the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow in its meeting held on 05.06.2015 and the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow after considering the report of the Committee granted permits to all the appellants, who were present before the Committee and the applications of the present petitioner was rejected only on the ground that the petitioner was not present before the Committee for hearing.
It is the specific case of the petitioner that he had no notice regarding the meeting to be held either on 05.06.2016 or 16.05.2015. The petitioner after obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 05.06.2015 preferred two appeals under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 21.09.2016, which was admitted on 21.09.2016 and was registered as Appeal No.70/2016 and Appeal No.71/2016. It is also stated by the petitioner that the appeal which was filed on 21.09.2016 was within 30 days of the receipt of the order dated 05.06.2015 and as such the appeals were within the period of limitation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
It is the case of the petitioner that the Chairman, U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 20.04.2018 while the appeals were at the stage of final hearing only heard the appeals on the question of maintainability and limitation and by means of the impugned order dated 20.04.2018 dismissed the appeals on the ground that they were preferred with delay of one year, two months and seventeen days and the ground shown was not sufficient and accordingly the appeals were dismissed.
Writ Petition No.26141 (M/S) of 2018 - Smt. Raj Kumari Verma & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the aforesaid petition, the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the order dated 11.06.2018 has dismissed 7 appeals of the petitioners of the aforesaid writ petition. The petitioners of the instant writ petition had preferred Appeals No.16 to 22 of 2016 which were directed against the impugned order dated 21.03.2016. The said appeals of the petitioners were admitted by means of the order dated 06.05.2016. The record of the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow was called for, however, the record was not produced despite 15 reminders. The above appeals were also dismissed by the Tribunal holding they were barred by limitation of two months and thirteen days by means of the order dated 11.06.2018.
Writ Petition No.37781 (M/S) of 2018 - Danish Javed vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant petition, the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the impugned order dated 19.09.2018 whereby the Appeal No.61/2010 was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by twenty one days of limitation. In the instant petition, it was categorically pleaded that the petitioners were not aware of the impugned order and further that the aforesaid order was not even published as per the Rule 60 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1988 and as such the petitioners preferred an appeal within the limitation provided i.e. within 30 days from the date receipt of the order.
Writ Petition No.22208 (M/S) of 2018 - Smt. Parveen vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
In this writ petition as well, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed on the ground of limitation whereas the petitioner had clearly stated that the information regarding the meeting dated 07.07.2017 was issued by means of the letter No.1817/Permit/RTA/2017 dated 01.08.2017 and the said letter was received by the petitioner on 06.08.2017. Thereafter, she applied for the certified copy of the order, which was sent to her by post on 14.08.2017 and received by her on 16.08.2017 and the petitioner had filed the Appeal No.34/2017 on 07.09.2019 i.e. within the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. However, the appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal by means of the order dated 16.04.2018 holding that the appeal is barred by one month and one day.
Writ Petition No.21936 (M/S) of 2019 - Smt. Safina Bano vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
In the aforesaid captioned petition, the impugned order was passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 12.08.2016. The petitioner was not communicated the impugned order, however, it has only on gaining information and did the writ petitioner applied for the certified copy on 16.09.2016, which was prepared and issued to the petitioner on 29.09.2016 and the petitioner thereafter preferred an Appeal No.75/2016 on 30.09.2016. The said appeal was also admitted by the Court Munsarim vide order dated 03.10.2016, however, the appeal has been dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the impugned order dated 08.07.2019 being barred by 23 days.
Writ Petition No.32211 (M/S) of 2018 - Mohd. Shameem Khan vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
The petitioner of the instant writ petition had preferred Appeal bearing No.19/2008, which were directed against the impugned order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Devi Patan Division, Gonda dated 03.01.2008. It was specifically stated that the order of the rejection was not served on the petitioners nor they had any knowledge of the same. It is only on 25.06.2008 that they became aware of the order and thereafter applied for the certified copy, which was provided to the petitioners on 28.06.2008 and thereafter the appeal was preferred. The aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal after being admitted on the ground of delay of three months and eight days by means of the impugned order dated 09.08.2018 which is under challenge in the aforesaid petition.
Writ Petition No.29968 (M/S) of 2018 - Mohd. Shameem Khan vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the petitioner had filed an appeal against the order dated 03.03.2008 passed by the Regional Transport Authority before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal which was admitted and registered as Appeal No.18/2008. In this petition as well it was specifically pleaded that the petitioner did not have notice or the the knowledge of the impugned order which came their knowledge only on 25.06.2008 where after they obtained the certified copy which was issued to them on 28.06.2008. Thereafter, the appeal was preferred which has came to be dismissed holding that the appeal is barred by three months and eight days by means of the impugned order dated 09.08.2008.
Writ Petition No.37754 (M/S) of 2018 - Gazala Danish Javed vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the appeal of the petitioner bearing No.6/2011 has been dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the order dated 19.09.2018 despite the statement made by the petitioner that they were not aware of the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 by which the application for renewal of the stage carriage permit was rejected. It is further stated that they became aware of the order dated 16.12.2010 and thereafter, the petitioner applied for the certified copy, which was made available on 16.12.2010, but issued on 22.01.2011 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 19.01.2011 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. However, the appeal has been dismissed on the ground of limitation being barred by 2 months and 8 days.
Writ Petition No.37778 (M/S) of 2018 - Liyaqat Ali vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the appeal of the petitioner bearing No.21/2011 has been dismissed on the ground of limitation by means of the impugned order passed by U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 19.09.2018 holding that the appeal is barred by two months and twenty one days. In the aforesaid case, it had specifically been pleaded by the petitioner that the petitioners were not aware of the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 and it only when the petitioner had appeared in the office of the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 16.12.2010 that the petitioner became aware of the impugned order. Thereafter, it applied for the certified copy, which was issued on 28.01.2011 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 02.02.2011 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order.
Writ Petition No.22471 (M/S) of 2018 - Atul Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, two appeals preferred by the petitioners bearing No.17/2017 and 18/2017, were dismissed as barred by limitation by means of the impugned order dated 07.06.2018 passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In the aforesaid case also, it was specifically pleaded that it had no information regarding the ex-parte order dated 26.08.2013, which was taken in the meeting, which was held on 26.08.2013. In this case, it was further pleaded that some permit holders in respect of the impugned meeting dated 26.08.2013 had preferred writ petition bearing No.62151 of 2013 - Barelliey Auto Chalk vs. RTO, Barelliey before the High Court at Allahabad, which was disposed of with a direction to consider and redress the grievance of the petitioner within six weeks, however, the petitioners of this petition were not given any communication and it was only when the petitioner became aware of the order, it preferred the appeal, which was admitted by the order of the Munsarim, however, by means of the impugned order dated 07.06.2018, the Appeals No.17/2017 and 18/2017 were dismissed as being barred by limitation of three years, nine months and twenty eight days.
Writ Petition No.28638 (M/S) of 2018 - Shamsuddeen vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the petitioners had assailed the impugned order dated 19.02.2014. It was specifically stated that the subject matter of the said petitioner was scheduled to be considered in the meeting fixed for 14.02.2014. However, the meeting was postponed and it is only on 16.06.2017 when the counsel for the petitioner appeared in the office of the Regional Transport Authority, did it became aware of the order impugned. Thereafter it applied for the certified copy, which was issued on 30.06.2017 and thereafter the Appeal No.20/2017 was preferred within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the said order. However, by means of the impugned judgment and order dated 27.06.2018 the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal has rejected the appeal on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation of 3 years; 1 month and 20 days.
Writ Petition No.7078(M/S) of 2019 - Parvez Karim Siddiqui & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the Appeal No.7/2017, preferred by the petitioner has been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 13.12.2018 passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal holding that the appeal to be barred by 1 year, 1 month and 14 days. In this case also, the petitioner had specifically pleaded that they had no informant regarding the impugned order dated 07.01.2016, however, the petitioner became aware of the impugned order only when the petitioners contacted the office of the respondent, they became aware of the order dated 20.02.2017 on which date, the petitioner applied for a certified copy, which was issued on 06.03.2017. Thereafter, the appeal was filed on 20.03.2017 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order, however, the appeal was dismissed on the ground it was barred by limitation by 1 year, 1 months and 14 days.
Writ Petition No.20935 (M/S) of 2018 - Yatish Kumar Sharma & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the Appeal No.36/2015 has been dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the impugned order dated 23.04.2018 holding that it was barred by 7 months and 8 days whereas the petitioner had specifically pleaded that it was not aware of the impugned order dated 17.10.2014 and it was only when the petitioner became aware of the order, it applied for a certified copy on 22.05.2015 which was issued to the petitioner on 30.05.2015 and thereafter the appeal was preferred on 24.06.2015 within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order.
Writ Petition No.30228 (M/S) of 2018 - Mohd. Naseem Khan vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the Appeal No.20/2008 was dismissed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal by means of the order dated 09.08.2018 holding that the appeal to be barred by 3 months and 8 days. In this petition also, it was specifically pleaded that the petitioners were not aware of the impugned order dated 03.03.2018 passed by the Regional Transport Authority and it is only on 25.06.2008 when the petitioner went to enquiry about his case, did he became aware of the order dated 03.03.2008 for which he applied for a certified copy of the order dated 25.06.2008 and thereafter the appeal was preferred within 30 day within 30 days from the receipt of the order.
Writ Petition No.23461 (M/S) of 2018 - Saleem Kureshi vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the Appeal No.10/2017 preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by means of the impugned order dated 27.06.2018 being barred by 543 days. It is also the case of the petitioner that he had specifically pleaded that he was not aware of the impugned order dated 19.02.2014 and that it is only on 03.05.2017, the petitioner became aware of the order for which he applied for the certified copy, which was made available on 05.05.2017 and thereafter, the appeal was preferred on 11.05.2017 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order.
Writ Petition No.15602 (M/S) of 2019 - Mohd. Saleem & Anr. vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
In the instant writ petition, the Appeal No.37/2011 and Appeal No.56/2011 was dismissed by means of the impugned order dated 11.12.2018 passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal holding that the appeal was barred by 24 days. In this case, it was specifically pleaded that the petitioner was not aware of the impugned order dated 17.03.2011 and it is only when the petitioner applied for the certified copy of the order dated 13.04.2011, which was made available on 27.04.2011 that the appeals were preferred within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order.
From the above, it would be seen that similar orders were passed dismissing all the respective appeals on the ground of limitation and it is in light of the above that all the petitions were connected as all the petitions involve similar questions and are being decided by this common judgment.
The Court has heard Shri Alok Saxena, Shri Govind Prasad Yadav, Shri Moti Chand Yadav, Mohd. N. Iqbal, Shri Zubir Hasan for the respective petitioners and Shri Rajesh Tiwari, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents-State.
The issue involved in all the connected petitions and before this Court is, whether the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal was justified in passing the orders impugned in the respective writ petitions where by the respective appeals of the said writ petitioners have been dismissed being barred by limitation.
At this juncture, it will be relevant to point out that from the perusal of the impugned orders passed, practically in all the writ petitions, there is similarity in the manner in which the impugned orders have been passed and it has a very set, distinct pattern. The U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal has also relied upon the particular set of case laws in order to support its findings regarding the appeals being time barred and also coming to the conclusion that no sufficient cause was made out by the petitioners and consequently dismissing the appeals.
Learned counsel for the petitioners have primarily submitted that the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal has adopted a pedantic view while considering the phrase "sufficient cause". It has also been submitted that the Tribunal did not notice the relevant case laws especially relating to the provisions of limitation and its constructions in context of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inasmuch as where the Act itself provides that the period of limitation was to run from a particular point of time, it was not open for the Tribunal to read something into the provisions of the Act which did not exist and moreover while the statements were given by the petitioners in their affidavits while filing the appeals before the Tribunal indicating the date on which they became aware of the order impugned and when they applied for the certified copies and when the same were made available. Once the specific dates were mentioned on the affidavits and were not controverted by the respondents, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to have doubted the averments which were made on oath. Thus, this exercise of power by the Tribunal in disbelieving the version of the claimants without any basis reflects the arbitrariness of the Tribunal in the impugned orders.
It was also submitted that the State could not dispute the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the Act and the Rules contain a phraseology which provides the date from which the limitation would commence for filing an appeal. Unless and until it could be shown by controverting that the facts disclosed by the petitioners in their appeals, was false, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to have disbelieved the version of the petitioners.
In view of the above, it would be gainful for the court to notice the relevant provisions regarding the limitation for filing of appeal as well as whether the appeals were in time or even if delayed then whether the cause shown could be construed to be sufficient for condoning the delay and if so found by the Tribunal.
From the perusal of the record, this Court finds that so far as all the appeals are concerned, which are the subject matter of the above writ petitions, they were all filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. It is also not disputed that all the appeals were admitted after the Munsarim report noted that the appeals were in order including the fact that no objection had been noted by the Munsarim regarding limitation.
In this backdrop, it would been apposite to notice certain relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act relating to appeals. Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides the right to appeal to a person who is aggrieved by the orders which fall within the category of (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 89.
"Section 89. Appeals.--
(1) Any person--
(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or
(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or
(c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit under section 82, or
(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit, or by any condition attached to such countersignature, or
(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or
(f) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under section 83, or
(g) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final.
[(2) The State Government shall constitute such number of Transport Appellate Tribunals as it thinks fit and each such Tribunal shall consist of a judicial officer who is not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court and it shall exercise jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by that Government.] (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), every appeal pending at the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be proceeded with and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.
Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that when any order is made by the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority in pursuance of a direction issued by the Inter-State Transport Commission under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 63A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), as it stood immediately before the commencement of this Act, and any person feels aggrieved by such order on the ground that it is not in consonance with such direction, he may appeal under sub- section (1) to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against such order but not against the direction so issued."
Insofar as the Section 89 is concerned, it does not provide for limitation. It only refers that the appeal may be filed within the prescribed time and in prescribed manner to the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. At this stage, it will be also relevant to point out that Rule 91 framed under the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 provides for the limitation of appeals which reads as under:-
"Rule: 91. Appeal against the order of State or Regional Transport Authority;-
(1) The authority to decide an appeal against the order of the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in respect of matters dealt with in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 89 shall be the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89.
(2) Any person aggrieved by an order referred to in sub-rule (1) may prefer an appeal within thirty days of the receipt of the order to the Chairman of the said Tribunal in the form of memorandum alongwith the requisite number of envelopes and necessary postage stamps for making service of notices through registered post on the respondents other than the State and Regional Transport Authorities. The memorandum shall set-forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the order appealed from. The memorandum shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents and shall also be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against.
(3) (I) The appeal may be filed and argued by the appellant himself or by an agent or an Advocate, duly authorised in this behalf. On behalf of the respondent, other than the transport authority, the appeal may be argued by the respondent himself, by an agent or an Advocate duly authorized in this behalf.
(ii) On behalf of the transport authority, the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Tribunal) or an officer of the Transport Department, an agent or an Advocate duly authorised in this behalf by the Transport Commissioner may argue the appeal and may generally appear, act and plead before the Appellate Tribunal.
(4) Upon receipt of an appeal in accordance with sub- rules (1), (2) and (3), the Tribunal may fix a date within the office hours, for hearing of the appeal giving the transport authority on the address given in the memorandum of appeal or at any other address that may be filed by them for the purpose. The notice to the transport authority shall be given through the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Tribunal) or through such other person who may be appointed to argue the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
(5) The notice of the date of the hearing shall be given by registered post to the appellant and the respondent, other than the transport authority on the address given in the memorandum of appeal or at any other address that may be filed by them for the purpose. The notice of the transport authority shall be given through the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Tribunal) or through such other person who may be appointed to argue the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
(6) The Appellate Tribunal may, for sufficient reason, restore an appeal dismissed in default or for want of prosecution on an application moved by an appellant within fifteen days from the date of the knowledge of the order of dismissal of the appeal.
(7) The appellant shall, within fourteen days of the receipt of the intimation of the date of hearing, submit to the Tribunal copies of the documents upon which the appellant proposes to rely. The respondent shall have a right to file papers, on which he relies, within a week of the filing of the documents by the appellant.
(8) The Secretary, State Transport Authority, or Regional Transport Authority, may give copies of any document connected with an appeal preferred under sub-rule (2) on payment of fee as specified under Rule 125.
(9) The Secretary, State Transport Authority, or Regional Transport Authority, may allow any person interested in an appeal to inspect the file connected with such appeal on payment of fee as specified under Rule 125.""
From the perusal of the aforesaid, it would indicate that sub-rule (2) of Rule 91 indicates that any person aggrieved by an order referred to sub-rule (1) may prefer an appeal within 30 days of the receipt of the order, to the Chairman of the said Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied by the Court) Thus, it would be clear that insofar as the appeal contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned, the same has to be filed before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. The words used by the Legislature are of utmost importance. It also gives an insight as to the starting point of limitation. Apparently, the appeals have to be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order and from the matter at hand, all the appeals were preferred within 30 days of the receipt of the order. It is for the aforesaid reasons that while the Munsarim scrutinized the appeal to point out if they are in order or, not, it did not report any objection that the appeals were barred by limitation. Since, upon scrutiny, it was clear that the date which was mentioned on which the certified copies of the impugned orders were received and that the appeals had been preferred within 30 days thereof and for the said obvious reason the Munsarim also did not make any such reporting regarding the limitation and it admitted all the said appeals.
From the record, it transpires that the Tribunal suo-motu fixed the matter for hearing on the question of maintainability and limitation and on its own it has imputed knowledge and presumption to the facts to indicate that the dates mentioned in the facts narrated in the memo of appeals has been incorporated only for the purposes of seeking the benefit of the limitation.
At this juncture, it will be relevant to state that where the Legislature provides a manner to do a particular thing or an act then it has been done in that manner and not otherwise. The Legislature has provided that appeal would be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order then neither the Tribunal nor the Court can take view other than what has been provided for.
From the perusal of the provisions relating to the grant, revocation, suspension, cancellation and renewal of permits which is part of Chapter-V of the Motor Vehicles Act, it would indicate that there is no provision or Rule for providing free copies of the order passed by the Regional Transport Authorities or the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunals.
Rule 93 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules only refers to supply of copies and it states that the Tribunal may give to any person interested in the appeal copies or documents connected with the appeal. This Rule is specifically relating only to the grant of copies and is applicable to appeals and it does relate or apply to the grant of copies by or before the Regional Transport Authorities. The petitioners have also specifically mentioned that the orders of cancellation of the permits was not even published nor was it made known to the appellants/petitioners. In absence of any particular mode of making known or communicating the orders, it is for the said reasons it appears that the Legislature has provided a window that the appeals can be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order.
Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh, reported in AIR 1966 SC Page 1313; The Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow & Ors. vs. Nand Singh, reported in AIR 1980 SC 15. A decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Dhanna Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior, reported in AIR 1973 MP 218 (FB). A decision of the Single Judge of this Court, reported in Chhotey Lal Singh vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow & Anr., AIR 1975 Alld 393.
On the strength of the aforesaid decisions, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that merely passing of the order cannot be made effective unless it is published and communicated to the person concerned. Any order passed by the authority and kept on its own file without communicating the same to the person concerned will not have any meaning and it will take effect only when the order is effectively communicated to the party concerned.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case The Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow & Ors. vs. Nand Singh (supra) while considering the provisions of U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act has held as under:-
"2. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and cannot be interfered with by this Court. Apart from the reasons given by this Court in the earlier judgment to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date."
Similarly, before the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Dhanna Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior, reported in AIR 1973 MP 218 (FB), the Rule came to be considered wherein it provided that the appeal can be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid decision reads as under:-
"8. ... It must, however, be noted that under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act an appeal can for preferred not only by the persons whose applications for permit have been refused but also by objectors whose objections have been rejected and inasmuch as one common rule for all these appeals has been framed by the State Government; it is not open to us to say that any different limitation has been prescribed by the State Government in the case of objectors as asserted by the other side. The language of the rule is clear. It says that the appeal shall be filed within thirty days of the receipt of the order, and not from the knowledge thereof. In the case of those persons for whom there is no obligation on the Regional Transport Authority to serve a copy of the order the limitation shall start running on the date they obtain a certified copy of the order because that would be the date on which the order in writing would be deemed to have been received by them. The conception of ''knowledge' cannot be introduced in face of the clear wording of the rule. It is in this connection that the further observations of the Full Bench in 1968 MPLJ 707 : (AIR 1968 Madh Pra 215 (FB)) (supra) may be relevant it was observed in that cases:
"......... provisions relating to limitation are more or less, arbitrary so that one cannot seek to justify any one of them on the basis of reason. In construing such provisions, equitable considerations are altogether out of place and the only safe guide is the strict grammatical meaning of the words employed. We have already noted that it is not for us to supply any lacuna left by the legislature. If the words are unambiguous, there is no question of any interpretation. The words "within thirty days of the receipt of such order" in Rule 80 in question are unambiguous. The receipt of the order may be on the order being served on the person concerned by the Regional Transport Authority or on his own application for a certified copy, but till such an order is received no limitation starts against the person who wishes to prefer an appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We do not, therefore, find that there is any scope for re-consideration of the decision in 1968 MPLJ 707 = (AIR 1968 Madh Pra 215 (FB)) (supra). In this view of the matter, we must hold that the State Transport Appellate Authority rightly relied on the abovesaid decision in coming to the conclusion that the appeal filed by the third respondent Sardar Dhar ram Singh was within limitation.
9. We would, therefore answer the question referred to us as follows:
"The date of obtaining the copy of the order would for the date for commencement of limitation under Rule 80 of the United State of Gwalior. Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) Motor Vehicles Rules, 1949 (Samvat 2006) in the case of an objector to whom Section 57(7) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is not applicable because that would be the date of the receipt of the order.""
It would been seen that the aforesaid decisions have not been taken note of by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. It is also to be noted that in another matter, a similar order was passed by the Chairman, State Transport Appellate Tribunal which came to be assailed before the Single Judge of this Court in the case of Mansoor Beg vs. State of U.P., in Writ Petition No.13158 (M/S) of 2019 and after considering the relevant provisions and Rules, the Court found that the reasoning and the decision making process of the Tribunal was faulty and it set aside the same. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:-
"Before proceeding to consider the validity and lawfulness of the impugned order dated 07.01.2019, I am compelled to observe that the very approach of the learned Tribunal in considering the application seeking condonation of delay of 8-9 days in filing revision petition, which is reflected from the impugned order itself, cannot, in any manner, be appreciated. This observation is being made by this Court not on consideration of the fact that there was delay of only 8-9 days but Court finds itself constrained to make such observation for the reason that the manner in which the application seeking condonation of delay in this case has been approached and decided by the STAT is against the all known cannons of law as pronounced and enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments where issue relating to limitation and prescriptions and its condonation has been considered.
The STAT in its order has exhaustively quoted a judgment pronounced by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in [(2013)14SCC 81]. It has also quoted yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in [(2014) 11SCC 351]. After quoting certain extracts of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the STAT has stated in the impugned order that it is the burden on the revision-applicant to show "sufficient cause" for seeking condonation of delay in filing revision petition and that revision-applicant has miserably failed to establish any sufficient cause for not filing the revision petition within the prescribed period of limitation of 30 days under Section 90 of MV Act.
If the order dated 07.01.2019, passed by the Chairman, STAT is scrutinized closely, the Court finds itself at loss of words to describe the approach and the manner in which the STAT has proceeded and considered the issue regarding condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. I have no hesitation to observe that the order under challenge herein clearly shows that it is based on complete wrong notion and on gross misconception of law relating to condonation of delay."
Thus, from the above, it would be clear that the manner in which the Tribunal has dealt with the orders is flawed and is not supported by the proper reason. The Tribunal has not considered the effect of the language used in the Rule 91 of U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. Even assuming if the appeals were not found to be within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order then the explanation given by the petitioners ought to have been considered for condonation of delay. On the contrary, the reasons given by the Chairman, U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal is with an intention of defeating the ends of justice and has quoted portions from various decisions without considering what the judgments rendered by the Apex Court have held regarding the phrase "sufficient cause" which came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in various decisions which are being noticed hereinafter.
In the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Moideen Kunhi and others reported in 2009 (13) SCC page 192 wherein it has been held as under:-
"19. The expression `sufficient cause' as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the `Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (AIR 1988 SC 897). Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows:
"16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning -- of course, within reasonable limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. (1899) 2 Ch. 629 at p.673 observed, though in a different context:
"Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. MST Katiji and others reported in 1987 (2) SCC page 107:-
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and others Vs. Gobardhan Sao and others reported in 2002 (3) SCC page 195, has held as under:-
"In the case of N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123, there was a delay of 883 days in filing application for setting aside exparte decree for which application for condonation of delay was filed. The trial court having found that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay, condoned the delay but when the matter was taken to the High Court of Judicature at Madras in a revision application under Section 115 of the Code, it was observed that the delay of 883 days in filing the application was not properly explained and it was held that the trial court was not justified in condoning the delay resulting into reversal of its order whereupon this Court was successfully moved which was of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with order passed by trial court whereby delay in filing the application for setting aside exparte decree was condoned and accordingly order of the High Court was set aside. K.T.Thomas, J., speaking for the Court succinctly laid down the law observing thus in paras 8, 9 and 10 :
"8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences.
9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.
10. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time- limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause."
[Emphasis added]
11. The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:-
"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. "
[Emphasis added]
12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."
Similarly the Apex Court once again considered the issue of condonation of delay in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein it held as under:-
"Before the Court delve into the factual scenario and the defensibility of the order condoning delay, it is seemly to state the obligation of the court while dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while considering the grounds for condonation of such colossal delay.
In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172], a two-Judge Bench observed that: (SCC p. 108, para 3) "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ''sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts."
(emphasis in original) The learned Judges emphasised on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated."
It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice.
In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause".
In G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142], Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus: (SCC pp. 147-48, para 14) "14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361 : (1962) 2 SCR 762] , Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006] , Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : (1979) 3 SCR 694] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : (1970) 2 SCR 90] and Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172], etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ''sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay."
In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] the Court was dealing with a fact situation where the interim order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated order and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was made. The said order was under appeal before the District Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said view was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand, there would be failure of justice and, accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein observing that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard on merits.
In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906], the Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840], N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222], State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634], came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief.
In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. [Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn., (2010) 5 SCC 459 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 448 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1291 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 50], where a two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 465, para 14) "14. ... The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time."
Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.
In Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh [(2010) 6 SCC 786 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 798] it has been held that: (SCC p. 789, para 16) "16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not."
It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves.
A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh [(2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537] would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan [AIR 1964 SC 215] , P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao [(2009) 11 SCC 183 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 496] and stated thus: (Balwant Singh case [(2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537], SCC p. 696, paras 25-26) "25. We may state that even if the term ''sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ''reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24], the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [(2001) 9 SCC 106] wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: (Maniben Devraj Shah case [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24], SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) "23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.
24. What colour the expression ''sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."
Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.
In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy [(2012) 12 SCC 693 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 546] the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful.
From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
In light of the above principles as enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court and while the same are applied in the present case at hand, there can be no doubt that the orders passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal suffers from the vice of the non-application of the judicial mind. The manner in which it has construed, the word 'sufficient cause' is also contrary to the settled principles. Once the Legislature had provided a starting point of limitation then unless and until it could be shown by cogent evidence that the dates of receiving the order as has been mentioned by the petitioners is incorrect it could not be held that the petitioners only to gain the benefit of the limitation have incorporated those dates.
This Court upon reading the impugned orders passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal finds that it is passed purely on surmises and conjectures without there being any factual material available on record, thus such finding as returned by the Tribunal that the petitioners were aware of the dates of the passing of the orders which were impugned in the respective appeals and only to take the benefit of limitations, is not appreciable, and needless to say the approach is against the dictum and ratio of the various Supreme Court Judgments which are binding precedents and ought to have been followed by the Tribunal. In any case, even if the Tribunal found the appeals to be barred by limitation even then the delay in light of the above discussions, ought to have been condoned.
In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the clear opinion that the impugned orders passed by the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained.
Accordingly, all the petitions are allowed. The impugned orders passed in the respective appeals dismissing them on the ground of limitation is set aside. Though all appeals are within thirty days from the date of receipt of orders but even if at all there is any delay in filing the appeals before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and which are subject matter of the various writ petitions connected in this bunch, is hereby condoned by this Court.
All the appeals filed before the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal which are covered by these bunch of writ petition shall stand restored on the board of the U.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal shall hear and decide all the appeals on merits after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. With the aforesaid, the writ petition succeed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 10.12.2019 Rakesh/-
[Jaspreet Singh, J.]