Karnataka High Court
Dr K T Subhas Chandra vs The Commissioner Of Collegiate on 17 December, 2013
Equivalent citations: 2014 LAB. I. C. (NOC) 180 (KAR.), 2014 (1) AKR 776
Bench: Mohan.M.Shantanagoudar, K.N.Phaneendra
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2013
:PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAN.M.SHANTANAGOUDAR
:AND:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.N. PHANEENDRA
WRIT PETITION NO.47197/2013 (S-KAT)
C/W.
WRIT PETITION NO.47198/2013 (S-KAT)
C/W.
WRIT PETITION NO.47199/2013 (S-KAT)
IN WRIT PETITION NO.47197/2013 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
DR. K.T. SUBHAS CHANDRA
S/O.LATE K.G. THIMMAIAH,
AGED 51 YEARS,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
COMMERCE & MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT R.C.COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE-560 001. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE COMMISSIONER OF COLLEGIATE
2
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE PRINCIPAL
GOVERNMENT R.C. COLELGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
3. DR. NAGARAJ. G.
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
GOVERNMENT FIRST GRADE COLLEGE,
BAGEPALLI,
KOLAR DISTRICT.
4. THE DIRECTOR
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
5. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. CHANDRE GOWDA GB FOR C/R-3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING
TO QUASH THE ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED
10.10.2013 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.4398/2013
VIDE ANN-A AND ALLOW THE APPLICATION AS PRAYED
FOR AND ETC.,
3
******
IN WRIT PETITION NO.47198/2013 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
DR. VISHWA MURTHY
S/O.LATE NANJUDACHAR,
AGED 58 YEARS,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
COMMERCE & MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT R.C.COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE-560 001. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE COMMISSIONER OF COLLEGIATE
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE PRINCIPAL
GOVERNMENT R.C.COLELGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
3. SMT. TAHASEENA,
AGED MAJOR,
WORKING AS ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
GOVERNMENT FIRST GRADE COLLEGE,
TARIKERE,
CHIKMAGALUR DISTRICT - 577 101.
4
4. THE DIRECTOR
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.B. CHANDRE GOWDA FOR C/R-3)
SRI P.B. BAJENTRI AGA FOR R1, 2 & 4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING
TO QUASH THE ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED
10.10.2013 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.4408/2013
VIDE ANN-A AND ALLOW THE APPLICATION AS PRAYED
FOR GRANT AN INTERIM ORDER TO STAY THE ORDER
OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 10.10.2013 PASSED IN
APPLICATION NO.4408/2013 VIDE ANN-A
*******
IN WRIT PETITION NO.47199/2013 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
1. DR. H. PRAKASH
S/O.LATE N.T.H. GOWDA,
AGED 51 YEARS,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
COMMERCE & MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT R.C.COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE-560 001. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, ADV.)
5
AND:
1. THE COMMISSIONER OF COLLEGIATE
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE PRINCIPAL
GOVERNMENT R.C.COLELGE OF
COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
3. SMT SACHITA N BOPAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
GOVERNMENT FIRST GRADE COLLEGE,
MULBAGAL,
KOLAR DISTRICT - 560 076.
4. THE DIRECTOR
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
5. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. CHANDRE GOWDA GB FOR C/R3)
SRI P.B. BAJENTRI AGA FOR R1, 2 & 4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING
TO QUASH THE ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED
10.10.2013 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.5778/2013
6
VIDE ANN-A AND ALLOW THE APPLICATION AS PRAYED
FOR AND ETC.,
*******
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN
'RESERVED FOR ORDERS' ON 05.12.2013, COMING ON
FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER', THIS DAY, K.N.
PHANEENDRA, J. MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Dr. K.T. Subhas Chandra, the Writ Petitioner in WP No.47197/2013, Dr. Vishwa Murthy, the Writ Petitioner in WP No.47198/2013 have challenged the transfer order passed by respondent No.1 dated 10.7.2013 in order No.KA.SHI.YI.37 VARGAVANE 2013-14 in transferring them to Government I Grade college, Bagepalli, to Government I Grade College, Tarikere respectively and Dr. H. Prakash, the Writ Petitioner in WP No.47199/2013 has challenged the order of the first respondent dated 4.9.2013 in order No.KA.SHI.YI.65 VARGAVANE 2013-14, transferring him to the Government I Grade College, 7 Mulbagilu, from Government RC College of Commerce and Management, Bangalore.
2. All the Writ Petitioners have challenged the above said respective Orders before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (in short KAT) and the KAT has dismissed their Applications holding that the transfer order passed by respondent No.1 is valid. Being aggrieved by the same, on several grounds, the petitioners have approached this court.
3. Heard the Learned Counsels respectively appearing for the parties. Almost common grounds are urged by the petitioners, except some additional grounds urged by the Petitioner in WP No.47199/2013, which are briefly enumerated below.
(a) The transfer orders are passed with a malafide intention to cause injustice and inconvenience to the writ petitioners.8
(b) Transfer orders made after 30th of June without the permission of the Chief Minister in violation of the Transfer Rules dated 7-06-2013.
(c) In order to accommodate respondent No.3, the Govt. has passed the transfer Orders ignoring all the procedural and legal aspects required to be followed in the transfer policy.
(d) It is further contended that according to the rules the transfer orders shall only be through counseling, the Government has ignored this aspect in passing the impugned transfer orders.
(e) The writ petitioners are the guides to Ph.D students, their continuation in the Institution in which they were working is absolutely required; otherwise it will affect the prospects of Ph.D students.
(f) The wife of the Petitioner in W.P. No 47199/2013 is working in Bangalore as such the husband and wife as far as possible to be accommodated at the same place, this has not been taken into consideration. The petitioner 9 in WP No.47197/2013 has taken up a special contention that the petitioner's mother is aged 85 years and is a heart patient suffering from Diabetic and BP. She needs personal care and frequent checkup and treatment.
Hence, the petitioner needs to be retained in Bangalore.
(g) The transfer is made on the complaint lodged by the Principal of R.C. College though no charges framed or any Disciplinary Inquiry is initiated against the petitioners.
Therefore, it is contended that the transfers are made with malice and are not in Administrative or public interest.
4. Though before the tribunal, the contention that their transfers were premature had been taken by the petitioners, but before this court it appears has not been pressed into service because of the reason, all the petitioners have over crosssed their tenure at a particular place (i.e. more than three years as per rules) and the tribunal has given a specific finding that the transfers are 10 not premature, perhaps that may be a reason that they have given up their contention before this court.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioners are over shot their stay at Bangalore and they are not only the persons transferred in the transfer order but so many other persons have also been transferred on the ground of Administrative and public interest after following the due procedure. It is also argued that all the allegations made by the petitioners are untenable and the same are properly appreciated by the Tribunal. Therefore, the petitions are not maintainable and the same are liable to be dismissed.
6. Having heard the arguments of the learned counsels, the point that would arise for consideration is:
"Whether the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has committed any serious legal or factual error in dismissing the contentions of the 11 petitioners and in any manner is liable to be quashed and consequently the impugned transfer orders?
7. Before adverting to the grounds urged in this case it is just and necessary to bear in mind that the learned counsel for the petitioners tried to persuade us that the transfer orders called in question are passed with a malafide intention and there existed malice in law and fact, therefore, the court has to look into the facts to ascertain the existence of such malice. In this regard the learned counsel for the petitioners has cited innumerable rulings on the point of 'Malice in fact' and 'Malice in law' and argued how it has to be determined. He further argued that there is existence of 'malice in law' as the transfer rules dated 7-6-2013 are violated and there is existence of 'malice in fact' as the government has relied upon unnecessary and extraneous materials to transfer the petitioners which are evident on the face of the record. Though the learned counsel has cited innumerable 12 decisions on this particular point, in our opinion, no ruling is required on this point because of the simple reason the court on the basis of the factual aspects of the cases on hand has come to such conclusion that there existed some 'malice'. We would like to quote one decision which covers all the principles. This Court in a decision reported in ILR 2006 KAR 1122 in the case of Dr.M. Sumithra Vs The Bangalore University Jnana Bharathi and another, has held:
"If the exercise of power by the employer to transfer the employees is based on extraneous considerations or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive, it would amount to malafide and colorable exercise of power. A transfer is malafide when it is made not for processed purpose, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose when it is liable to be interfered with.
Malice in law is however, quite different. Malice in its legal sense means malice such as 13 may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. It is trite law, that if a discretionary power has been exercised for an unauthorized purpose, it is generally immaterial whether its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith. If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account matters which the Courts consider not be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the law, they have not exercised their discretion."
8. The above decision and other decisions cited by the learned counsel enunciated the principle that "unless the order of transfer is shown to be the out come of malafide exercise of power, such transfers cannot be interfered, conversely it is also true that if any existence of malice in law or fact is proved and that too, the same would affect the career prospects of the persons affected by such transfer, then only it can be interfered by the 14 courts. We also remind ourselves that, there cannot be any precedent on facts; each case has to be decided on its own peculiar set of facts and circumstances. In this back ground let us see the grounds urged by the petitioners.
9. There is absolutely no dispute and it requires no ruling on the point that when the Government brings any rule regulating the policy of transfer, providing guidelines therein, by way of executive order in exercise of power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any statute to that effect will have statutory force and such rules can be enforced. However this principle is re-iterated in the case reported in ILR 2011 KAR 1585 between Mr. Chandru H.N. and State of Karnataka & Others.
10. On perusal of the records, the same reveals that the Government of Karnataka in fact till date not given effect to the Karnataka State Civil Services (Recruitment and Transfer of Staff of Department of 15 Collegiate Education) Act, 2012, but issued an Executive Order, re-iterating the contents of the Act vide Government Order dated 7.6.2013. It is argued that, the transfer of the petitioners are not in consonance with the said Executive Order, therefore, it amounts to existence of malice in law, apart from that other grounds urged also show that there exist malice in fact, therefore, transfer orders are liable to be quashed. In this regard the Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following rulings.
(1) (1993) 4 SCC 357 - Union of India and others Vs. S.L. Abbas AND (2) AIR 1998 SC 308 - Pavan Kumar and Others Vs. State of Haryana.
The sum and substance of the above said decisions are:
"unless an order of transfer is shown to be the out come of malafide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory 16 provisions prohibiting such transfer, the courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such Order as a matter of routine as if they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management even if there is violation of any rule or guidelines or instructions. Unless the orders of transfer are shown as malafide and/or in violation of statutory provisions, the court/tribunal cannot interfere with such orders. Not following the guidelines or instructions, are not sufficient to quash the Orders as being malafide. Transferring authority is not obliged to justify the transfer by adducing any reasons thereon. So merely because some irregularity occurs in transferring the Government servants, that is not sufficient to quash the order.
(Gist extracted by supplying the
emphasis)
Keeping in mind the principles laid down in the above rulings and the factual context of the case we bestowed our attention to the Rules dated 7-6-2013, it reveals that 17 the transfer of Government employees for the year 2013 shall be made according to Rule 2, within 30th of June 2013 if not, permission of the Chief Minister, as provided under Rule 9B of the said Rules is necessary. Admittedly the present transfers have been made after the said date, But the question is whether on this ground alone, transfer order can be set aside, unless it is shown to the court that the transfer is malafide.
11. The question whether the Chief Minister's permission had been taken or not is a question of fact, that has to be proved by the petitioners by means of convincing and cogent materials. Merely saying that the authority has not taken the permission of the Chief Minister is not sufficient when it is denied by other side, and we cannot draw any inference only on pleadings.
12. In this regard it is worth to refer a decision reported in 2008(6) AIR KAR 7 Between K.V. 18 SREENIVASA MURTHY and C. MUNISHAMAIAH AND OTHERS, wherein the court observed that:
"A transfer order was challenged before the Court, the Court at the instance of the parties has secured the entire records from the Government pertaining to the transfer after perusal of the file on facts came to the conclusion that the Chief Minister has not accorded permission in that particular case."
In so far as this case is concerned, it appears, no effort has been made by the petitioners to secure the entire file pertaining to the petitioners in order to establish the same, what is there in the file not made know to the Tribunal or to this court. This court while exercising power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot venture upon to do that exercise, when the parties themselves have not interested in doing so at the appropriate stages. Unless it is shown to the court on the basis of records, that the said procedure is not followed, the court shall proceed with the presumption under 19 section 114 of the Evidence Act that the official acts have happened as per the common course of business. Section 114 of the Evidence Act states that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court can draw an inference with the official acts have been regularly performed in accordance with the procedure contemplated unless it is shown that the same has not been performed by cogent and convincing materials. Therefore, no inference can be drawn to the effect that, Govt. has violated the Rules as stated by the learned counsel. Therefore, existence of malice in law on the part of the authorities cannot be presumed, assumed or inferred by this court.
13. The next common question raised by the petitioners is that the transfer shall be made as far as 20 possible by means of counseling of the candidates as per the rules but that has not been done in this case by the Government. So far as this aspect is concerned, when the word 'as far as possible' is used by the rule itself, it gives discretion to the authority to take appropriate decision in this regard. That contention holds good only when the petitioners are transferred prematurely or violating any statutory provisions, but only on the ground that it has not been done through counseling, the same cannot be countenanced, when the authorities have exercised their discretion properly and taken the decision to transfer the petitioners on the ground of administrative and public purpose, who were long standing at a particular place. In this regard it is worth to note here, a decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners himself reported in AIR 2004 AP 94 in the case of P. Mohan Reddy and Others V/s. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai and others, the court held thus:
21
"The use of phrase 'as far as possible' provides discretion to the concerned officer to the State to follow the procedure with necessary modifications.
Therefore, this word or phrase will not create any absolute right in favour of the petitioners and if such guidelines are not followed also, it is not sufficient to set at rest the transfer made by the Government as there is no proof to show the malafides on the part of the authorities established, or any career prospects of the petitioner is affected.
14. The contention of the writ petitioners that they are the guides to Ph.D students at R.C.College and number of Ph.D. students are undergoing training under them, abruptly in the middle of the year if they are transferred, the students will suffer. This contention of the petitioners in our opinion cannot be considered because of the simple reason that in order to obviate the 22 rule and frustrate the transfer policy and rules therein, the petitioners can undertake to train the Ph.D students every year so that they can retain their places as long as possible even till their retirement. It is also worth to note here that, the responsibility of good administration is that of the Government. The maintenance of efficient, honest, experienced professors and heads of the Departments is a must for the due discharge of this responsibility by the Government. Our view gains support from the following observations made by the Apex Court in a case reported in (1994) 6 SCC 98 in the case of N.K. SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS and para 9 of the decision read thus:
"9. Transfer of a public servant from a significant post can be prejudicial to public interest only if the transfer was avoidable and the successor is not suitable for the post. Suitability is a matter for objective assessment by the hierarchical superiors in administration. To introduce and rely on the element of prejudice to public interest as a vitiating factor 23 of the transfer of a public servant, it must be first pleaded and proved that the replacement was by a person not suitable for the important post and the transfer was avoidable. Unless this is pleaded and proved at the threshold, no further inquiry into this aspect is necessary and its absence is sufficient to exclude this factor from consideration as a vitiating element in the impugned transfer. Accordingly, this aspect requires consideration at the outset."
15. In the above said context it can be safely said that, the Government alone is the best judge to ascertain the existence of exigencies for such services of efficient persons and place them suitably by means of transfers, while doing this exercise the Government need not give any reasons for the transfer. Perhaps the Government must have felt that the services of these efficient persons like petitioners shall also be made available to other parts of the State, and also considering the fact that, they have completed their tenure of service at one place, in fact they have exhausted/overshot such period and that may be the 24 reason the Government might taken decision to transfer them. Normally, the courts should not interfere with the discretionary powers exercised by the Government under the transfer policy. It should also be borne in mind that the efficient professors, lecturers are more required in the rural areas rather than in cities. It should be the ambitious and magnanimous policy of the Government that the students who prosecute their studies in rural areas also to be effectively educated so as to make them to compete with the students who study in good reputed well equipped Colleges in cities. Therefore, the ground alleged by the petitioners in so far as this aspect is concerned cannot be taken note of and on that ground the transfer Order cannot be interfered.
16. The next contention taken by them is that, the DO letter dated 20.6.2013 written by the Principal of RC College making allegations against the petitioners that the petitioners are not showing any interest in the Institution 25 and they are indulged in political activities have been heavily relied upon by the Government in transferring the petitioners. It is also argued that, no charges are framed or departmental Inquiry has been initiated on the basis of that letter and the record also disclose that subsequently the Departmental Inquiry was initiated against the Principal himself on some other grounds. We are of the opinion that, merely because the Departmental enquiry has not been initiated against the petitioners, it cannot be said that the Government cannot take note of the Principal's letter at all, moreover the transfer orders reveal that the transfer orders are not made on that sole ground. Even considering that the said letter is relied upon by the Government is true, it may be only by way of additional ground for transfer, when the petitioners have over shot their term in a particular place. The Petitioners cannot expect the Government to continue them in a particular place for a long term as per their wish. Therefore, the letter cannot be termed as a foundation or a motive for the 26 transfer of the petitioner but the Government after taking into consideration all the materials must have taken a decision to transfer the petitioners from the places where they were working. Therefore, on that ground, the discretion exercised by the Government cannot be interfered.
17. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.47199/2013 has contended that his wife Smt M.N. Uma is working as Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Society at Ali Askar Road Bangalore, therefore the Govt could have accommodated the petitioner at Bangalore itself, he further contends that the transfer guidelines protect the petitioner in this regard. He draws our attention to Rule 9(4) of the said Rules which says that, the Government has to take appropriate steps to transfer one spouse to the same place or to the nearest place where the other spouse is working. But in our view this claim of the petitioner is not an absolute right, when particularly the petitioner has 27 already served a long term at Bangalore and now he was transferred, he cannot on this ground claim that because his wife is working at Bangalore, he should also be retained at Bangalore. If Converse principle is applied he could get the transfer of his wife to the place where he is presently working. Even other wise the place Mulbagilu to which the petitioner is transferred is not far away from Bangalore, and it is informed to us that it is at a distance of 70 kms from Bangalore. Therefore it cannot be said the employer of the petitioner has violated the said rule and unreasonably with any malafide intention transferred the petitioner.
18. It is also relevant to note a ruling in this regard. In a decision of the apex court in Abbas's case cited supra, the apex court also clarified on facts that:
"the transfer of the respondent from Shillong to Puri (Uttar Pradesh) on administrative ground was not violative of any 28 rule merely because his wife is working in Shillong, his children are studying at Shillong and his health was not in good condition, the court held - that cannot be a ground to interfere with the transfer order of the Government.
In view of the above facts and circumstances, the transfer order cannot be disturbed unless it is shown to the court existence of malafides on the part of the Government.
19. The last but not least contention taken up by the Petitioners to show malice in fact on the part of the Government is that, the Government in order to accommodate the Respondent No.3 in all the above writ petitions passed the impugned transfer orders. On perusal of the records it reveal that Respondent No.3 in all the cases were brought back to Bangalore in the places of petitioners within short span of time from the date of their previous transfers, but this cannot be a ground for nullifying the transfers of the petitioners. The petitioners 29 in fact have to show that the intention of the Government is to bring back certain persons to Bangalore, and for that reason alone the petitioners were illegally transferred. There must be some illegality committed by the Government. Even at the cost of the repetition we may say that the petitioners have already overshot the tenures in their previous places of work, and they are liable to be transferred even in the absence of any exigencies, by the Government. On the other hand, it is not the criteria as to who would occupy the places of the petitioners, unless any illegality or irregularity is committed by the government in transferring the petitioners or existence of any malice in transferring the petitioners, otherwise it cannot be ground to quash the transfer orders.
20. At the time of arguments, the learned Government Advocate brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the petitions by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, the transferees have been relieved and they have 30 reported to their duties in the respective places and they are discharging their duties. On this ground also we do not want to disturb the said position after a long length of time.
21. Before parting with this judgment, though we are not interfering with the transfer order passed by the Government, but we are not happy with the practice of the Government in implementing the transfer policies, inasmuch as transferring the Government servants often in the midst of the year without strictly following certain procedures. It is most unfortunate that some of the Govt officials are transferred for nominal sake to bring them back to their original places within short spans of time, some of the officials though were long standing at a particular place have been retained in the same places, and some are transferred before the completion of their statutory term at a place, on the guise of administrative exigencies or public interest. This has to be taken care of 31 by the Government in future transfers. The Government who is the maker of the rules, if it does not follow the said rules, then the rules looses its sanctity. The Government shall adhere to the rules framed by them and they should strictly and meticulously follow the rules with regard to the transfer of its servants.
22. In this particular case, though we are affirming the transfer order due to paucity of time and on the other grounds narrated above, we find some of the officers have been brought back to Bangalore within few months from their earlier transfer, and the Government has also not properly considered the grievances of the transferees. This has to be taken note of by the Government in the coming general transfers.
23. Looking from any angle, the transfer orders of the Government cannot be interfered with by this court in exercise of power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, though the Tribunal has not in 32 detail dealt with the grounds urged by the petitioners nevertheless, the orders do not suffer from any illegality Therefore, the orders of the tribunal have to be confirmed and the same are confirmed.
24. In view of our aforesaid discussions, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The Writ Petitions are hereby dismissed.
Consequently, the orders passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal are hereby confirmed. The Learned Government Advocate is directed to bring it to the notice of the Government the observations made in the body of the Judgment.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE PL