Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Rohtash Singh vs Comm. Of Police on 7 November, 2024
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 2266/2017
Orders reserved on : 07.10.2024
Orders pronounced on :07.11.2024
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Shri B. Anand, Member (A)
Rohtash Singh, age -55 years,
Group C, Post- Constable
S/o Late Sh. Subey Singh
R/o-276, Hastsal Village
Uttam Nagar, Delhi ...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan)
VERSUS
1. Govt. of NCTD through
The Chief Secretary
Govt. of NCTD
A-Wing, 5th Floor
Delhi Secretariat
New Delhi-110113
2. The Commissioner of Police
Delhi Police
Police Headquarters, MSO Building
IP Estate, New Delhi
2
OA No. 2266/2017
3. The Spl. Commissioner of Police
Armed Police, Delhi through
The Commissioner of Police
Delhi Police
Police Headquarters, MSO Building
IP Estate, New Delhi.
4. The Joint Commissioner of Police
Armed Police, Delhi through
The Commissioner of Police
Delhi Police
Police Headquarters, MSO Building
IP Estate, New Delhi.
5. The Addl. Deputy Commissioner of Police
North West District, Delhi through
The Commissioner of Police
Delhi Police
Police Headquarters, MSO Building
IP Estate, New Delhi.
6. The Dy. Commissioner of Police
5th Bn. DAP
Through the Commissioner of Police
Delhi Police, Police Headquarters, MSO Building
IP Estate, New Delhi
7. The Dy. Commissioner of Police
III Bn. DAP
Vikas Puri Police Complex
New Delhi-110018
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Rajnish Prasad)
3
OA No. 2266/2017
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J):
In the present Original Application (OA), filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has challenged the order dated 22.12.2003 vide which a departmental inquiry was initiated against him, an order dated 30.11.2011 vide which a major penalty i.e. forfeiture of one year of his approved service permanently entailing proportionate reduction in pay has been imposed, an order dated 21.06.2012 vide which his statutory appeal has been rejected and further orders dated 11.02.2016, 14.06.2016 and 28.04.2017 which have been passed by the respondents in view of the applicant's representation after his acquittal in the criminal trial. The applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
"8.1 To quash and set aside the order of disciplinary authority dated 30.11.2011 whereby the major punishment i.e. forfeiture of 1(one) year of approved service has been forfeited permanently entailing proportionate reduction in pay is being imposed upon the applicant, order dated 21.06.2012 whereby the appeal of the applicant has been rejected and to further direct the respondent that forfeited year of service be restored as it was never forfeited with all consequential benefits which has been held due to the present D.E. including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances.4 OA No. 2266/2017
8.2 To quash and set-aside the order dated 11.02.2016 and order dated 14.06.2016 whereby the request of applicant regarding re- visit the punishment order dated 30.11.2011 has been rejected, order dated 28.04.2017 whereby the representation of the applicant regarding re-visit the punishment order has been rejected.
8.3 To quash and set-aside the order dated 22.12.2003 whereby a Departmental Enquiry was initiated against the applicant. 8.4 To quash and set aside the finding of Enquiry Officer dated 02.11.2011. Or/and Any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper may also be awarded to the applicant."
2. In response to notice and in opposition to the claim of the applicant, the respondents have filed counter reply wherein they have disputed and contested the claim of the applicant and the applicant has filed rejoinder and has reiterated his claim and the grounds pleaded in support thereof.
3. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and with their assistance, have perused the pleadings available on record. We have also gone through the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the applicant. Learned counsels for the parties, with leave of the court have filed written submissions. We have gone through the same as well.
5OA No. 2266/2017
4. Undisputed facts are that the applicant was appointed as Constable under the respondents in the year 1982. He was promoted to the rank of Head Constable in the year 2016. On 28.07.2003, he was performing duty as a driver on a Government vehicle, his name was involved in a case FIR No. 440/03, registered with PS Shalimar Bagh, Northwest District, Delhi, under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. He was dealt with departmentally vide order dated 22.12.2003 on the allegation that while performing duties on Government vehicle, Tata 407 No. DL 1LC 9989, he drove the said Government vehicle negligently and hit a cyclist namely Mohd. Islam and the injured person was declared brought dead by the doctors in the Hospital. The Inquiry Officer submitted the summary of allegations along with a list of witnesses which was supplied to the applicant and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report concluding the charge levelled against the applicant as fully substantiated beyond any shadow of doubt, holding the applicant guilty of the charge. The applicant submitted his reply to the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 30.11.2011 vide which penalty of 6 OA No. 2266/2017 forfeiture of one year of approved service permanently without prejudice to the outcome of the final verdict in the above criminal case. The applicant's statutory appeal was rejected vide the impugned Appellate Order dated 21.06.2012. The applicant was acquitted in the aforesaid case FIR No. 440/03 by the Learned Trial Court vide order/judgment dated 09.09.2015. Subsequent to the judgment of the Learned Trial Court under reference, the respondents had issued an order dated 11.02.2016 vide which the decision of the respondents has been conveyed that no further departmental action is warranted against the applicant as the Departmental Inquiry against him vide order dated 22.12.2003 has already been decided vide order dated 30.11.2011 and the name of the applicant has been deleted from the list of police personnel involved in criminal cases. The applicant made a representation dated 15.12.2015 requesting the respondents to revisit the punishment imposed upon him vide order dated 30.11.2011 and upheld by the Appellate Authority vide his Appellate Order dated 21.06.2012 in the light of the judgment dated 09.09.2015 of the Learned Trial Court in the said case FIR No. 440/03. The respondents rejected such 7 OA No. 2266/2017 representation of the applicant vide the impugned order dated 14.06.2016. The said representation was also rejected by the respondents vide impugned order dated 28.04.2017.
5. Though in the OA, the applicant has pleaded various grounds in support of the relief sought in the present OA, however, learned counsel for the applicant orally as well as in written has pleaded only one ground in support of the claim of the applicant i.e. the penalty imposed upon the applicant vide the impugned disciplinary orders and other orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law in view of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Learned counsel has prayed that all other grounds as available to the applicant, in law, to be kept open.
5.1 The impugned orders passed by the respondents subsequent to the applicant's acquittal by the Learned Trial Court vide order/judgment dated 09.09.2015 are not sustainable inasmuch as the punishment awarded to the applicant by way of the disciplinary inquiry has not been revisited in spirit of 8 OA No. 2266/2017 provisions of the Rules as only mentioning of the Rule 12 would not be sufficient.
5.2 The provision of Rule 12 of the Rules is very clear to the effect that if at all any punishment by way of departmental inquiry has to be imposed or to be retained, subsequent to acquittal of the applicant in the criminal case, then a specific case under any of the five exceptions of Rule 12 of the Rules has to be made out whereas in the impugned orders passed by the respondents subsequent to the acquittal of the applicant in the criminal trial, no exception as such has been mentioned and thus, such impugned orders are result of non application of mind and therefore, not sustainable in law. In support, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the judgment dated 10.03.2011 of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 2064/2010 titled Constable Raj Pal Singh v/s The Commissioner of Police & Ors.
5.3 That even if the Learned Trial Court has in its order/judgment recorded benefit of doubt being given to the accused employee, the same does not mean to fall within any of the exceptions of Rule 12 of the Rules. In support of his such 9 OA No. 2266/2017 argument, he places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 21.04.2005 in WP(C) No. 4431/2005 titled Govt. of NCT of Delhi &Ors. vs. Satya Dev Singh. 5.4 that even in case of technical acquittal, the same is to be defined and considered in terms of Rule 12 of the Rules. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 12.08.2011 in WP(C) No. 4941/2000 titled George N.S. vs. Commissioner of Police.
6. On the other hand, Sh. Rajnish Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents has though not disputed the factual matrix of the case, however, he has submitted that the charge against the applicant in the departmental inquiry was that the criminal case against the applicant was under Section 279 IPC i.e. rash or negligent driving and under Section 304-A of IPC i.e. causing death by negligence whereas charge in the departmental inquiry was more broader including carelessness as a member of the disciplined police force. In this context, he has submitted that it cannot be lost sight of that in the departmental inquiry, the standard of proof is one of preponderance of probability, however, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved beyond 10 OA No. 2266/2017 all reasonable doubt. He has submitted that the standard of proof in criminal case is more stringent than that in the disciplinary proceedings. He has further argued that the matter which required consideration was whether the case of the applicant would fall under any of the exception clauses of Rule 12 of the Rules. He has added that the question as to which exception clause of the said Rule is attracted in the case of the applicant, is a pure question of law based on the facts of each case and in the present case, exceptions (a), (c) and (e) of the Rule 12 of the Rules are attracted thereby disentitling the applicant to get the benefit of Rule 12. It is immaterial whether specific exception clause of the Rule is mentioned in the impugned order(s) or not.
7. To elaborate, by referring to the judgment of the Learned Trial Court, he has submitted that out of the three questions raised in the criminal case, though the Learned Court has given finding to the question no. 2 and 3 as "no" however, with regard to the question no. 1, the court has given its finding in "yes". In this background, he has argued that though the applicant got acquitted for want of stringent proof in the criminal trial, however, in the departmental proceedings on the basis of 11 OA No. 2266/2017 preponderance of probability, the applicant was rightly found guilty and thus, in the case of the applicant, acquittal should be considered as one on technical ground and thus, falling under exception (a) of Rule 12.
7.1 Again, by referring to the judgment of the Learned Trial Court, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in paragraph 16-18 of the judgment at different places, the Learned Trial court has recorded that "circumstantial evidence is not complete to form the full chain of events" and further that "the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of probability or presumptions". Suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of proof. Thus, observations of the Learned Trial Court indicate that the suspicion was resting upon the applicant as contemplated in exception (c) to Rule 12.
7.2 He has further added that the applicant's defence in departmental inquiry and in the criminal trial were distinct and contradictory and the same as well raise suspicion against the applicant for the purposes of clause (c) of the Rule 12. 12 OA No. 2266/2017 7.3 Learned counsel has further submitted that as evident from the order/judgment of the Learned Trial Court, internal page 6 thereof, PW-7 has stated that public persons stated that police vehicle caused accident and internal page 8 indicates that there was damage to the vehicle and this is also sufficient to attract clause (c) of the Rule 12 in the case of the applicant. 7.4 Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that in departmental inquiry, there were four additional witnesses i.e. PW-3, PW-6, PW-7, and PW-11. Secondly, in the departmental inquiry, the applicant had filed a written defence statement wherein he had stated "there is evidence on record that steering shaft of the vehicle had broken and due to which, the accident had taken place". From this additional evidence in departmental inquiry, it is clear that the applicant had accepted that while he was driving the vehicle, the accident took place. In this background, the exception clause (e) of the Rule 12 is attracted in the case of the applicant, learned counsel has argued. 7.5 Learned counsel for the respondents has also made submissions to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. He has submitted that in the 13 OA No. 2266/2017 case of Constable Raj Pal Singh (supra), issue was reopening of the departmental inquiry after acquittal in the criminal case on the ground that in the relevant order, it was not even mentioned as to under which clause of Rule 12, departmental inquiry was being opened after the acquittal of the applicant in the said OA. 7.6 With regard to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Satya Dev Singh (supra), one of the prosecution witnesses had turned hostile however, the Hon'ble High Court relied upon the fact that in cross examination, he supported the prosecution case and so held that exception (b) or any other exception to Rule 12 is not attracted. 7.7 In light of the preceding paragraphs, the judgments referred and relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, do not support the claim of the applicant and are not applicable at all, learned counsel for the respondents has argued. 7.8 Lastly, he has argued that in the case in hand, the applicant's misconduct was proved in the departmental inquiry, though, order of acquittal was passed by the Learned Trial Court in the criminal case, however, the respondents have taken a 14 OA No. 2266/2017 holistic view of Rule 12 and also considered the decision of a Larger Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 2816/2008 titled Sukhdev Singh & another vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & others dated 18.02.2011, therefore, interference by this Tribunal is not warranted.
8. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.
9. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the issue for adjudication before us is as to whether the impugned orders in the light of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules are sustainable in law.
10. Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 reads as under:
"12. Action following judicial acquittal.-When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:-
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or
(b) in the opinion of the court, or on the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or 15 OA No. 2266/2017
(c) the court has held in its judgment than an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case disclose facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available."
11. In view of the aforesaid Rule, it is necessary to see as to what were the charges against the applicant in departmental proceedings and those in the criminal trial. In this view of the matter, for clarity, we reproduce the summary of allegations dated 29.04.2011 as available on page 74 of the paper book:
"SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS It is alleged against Constable. Rohtash Singh No. 1806/NW(Now 2169/DAP) that on 28/07/2003 while you were performing driver duty on Govt. vehicle Tata 407 No. DL1LC-9989 and were proceeded to PTC Jharoda Kala, vide DD NO 51 Dated 28/07/2003, Distt. Line Ashok vihar to collect the force from PTC, on the way you driven the govt. vehicle negligently and hit one cyclist namely Mohd. Islam S/O Sh. Sumera R/O village Rath, Distt. Hamir pur UP at the present K-428 Shakur pur, Delhi near Rameshwar Restaurant, Ring Road, Shalimar Bagh Delhi resulting which above mentioned person sustained injuries and later on succumbed to his injuries vide MLC No. 06961 dated 28/07/2003. Post Mortem of deceased was got conducted through PM Report No. 567/03 BJRM Hospital Jahangir Puri Delhi and body was handed over to relatives after completing the formalities.16 OA No. 2266/2017
The above act of Ct. Rohtash Singh No. 1806/NW (Now 2169/DAP) amounts to gross negligence, carelessness dereliction to discharge of your assigned official duties reason best known to him which renders him liable for department enquiry under the relevant provision of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rule 2010 under the section 21 of Delhi Police Act 1978."
11.1 From the aforesaid, it is evident that the alleged delinquency of the applicant was that (i) on the date of the incident, he had driven the Government vehicle negligently and
(ii) he had hit one cyclist resulting into the said person sustaining injuries who had later succumbed to his injuries. 11.2 Admittedly, the applicant underwent criminal trial for the offences under Sections 279/304-A of the IPC vide FIR No. 440/03, PS Shalimar Bagh, New Delhi. The Learned Trial Court in its order/judgment dated 09.09.2015, in paragraph 11 has enumerated the questions arising for consideration before it and given its findings on such questions as under:
Questions Findings
1. Whether the accused was driving the Yes
offending vehicle bearing no. DL-1LC-9989 on the day of incident?
2. Whether the accused was driving the No offending vehicle in rash and negligent manner?
3. Whether the accused caused the death of No deceased Mohd. Islam by driving rashly or negligently?
17OA No. 2266/2017 11.3 From the offence alleged against the applicant and questions framed by the Learned Trial Court as noted hereinabove, it is evident that the accusation in the criminal trial against the applicant was of rash and negligent driving of the Government vehicle and that he has caused death of the said cyclist by driving rashly and negligently.
12. The Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings had given his findings dated 02.11.2011 (Annexure A-6) and had concluded the charge levelled against the applicant as fully substantiated beyond any shadow of doubt and holding the applicant guilty of the charge.
13. The Learned Trial Court, as noted hereinabove, has found it as proved that the applicant was driving the vehicle bearing No. DL 1LC 9989 on the day of the incident however, with regard to the second question before it, the Learned Trial Court has recorded in paragraph 15 of the order/judgment dated 09.09.2015 that "there is absolutely no evidence on the record to suggest rashness or negligence on the part of the accused" and has answered to question no. 2 in negative. Further, in paragraph 18 OA No. 2266/2017 16 of its order/judgment dated 09.09.2015, the Learned Trial Court has categorically recorded that "there is no evidence to suggest that the offending vehicle has collided with the cycle of the deceased. There is no eye witness of the incident and the circumstances evidence is not complete to form the full chain of events." The Learned Trial Court has answered the question no. 3 before it also in the negative.
14. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the allegations against the applicant in the departmental proceedings as well as those in the criminal trial were same i.e. negligently driving the government vehicle and causing death of the cyclist by such rash and negligent driving. The applicant being on duty of driving the said government vehicle on the fateful day is not under dispute. Moreover, the same has been found as proved in both the departmental as well as criminal proceedings but driving government vehicle while on assigned duty cannot be construed as misconduct.
15. The Disciplinary Authority vide its impugned order has inflicted the penalty without prejudice to the final outcome of the said criminal case FIR. The Learned Trial Court had finally 19 OA No. 2266/2017 acquitted the applicant for the offences under Section 279/304-A of the IPC i.e for rash and negligent driving and causing death by such negligent and rash driving after categorically recording absence of absolutely no evidence to suggest rashness or negligence on the part of the applicant herein and also on finding nothing to suggest that the offending vehicle has collided with the cycle of the deceased. Further, in the absence of any eye witness of the incident and the circumstantial evidence to complete the full chain of events, has answered in the negative about the question regarding the applicant causing death of the cyclist by driving the vehicle rashly and negligently.
16. In the light of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules, the respondents were duty bound to revisit the impugned orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings however, on representation of the applicant, they have passed the impugned order dated 14.06.2016 which reads as under:
"Ref. No. 2/'I' Coy CPR, Tilak Marg Dated 1.1.2016 & 264/'I' Coy CPR Tilak Marg Dated 21.4.2016, on the subject cited above.
The application submitted by Const. Rohtash Singh, No. 4512/DAP has been examined in view of the judgement passed by the Hon'ble CAT in OA No. 2816/2008 with 20 OA No. 2266/2017 OA 1273/2006 etc. in the matter of Sukhdev Singh & another Vs C.P. Delhi & ors. for re- visiting in major punishment awarded to him in D.E. He has also heard in OR on 10.6.2016. The matter has been considered under Rule 12 o Delhi Police Appeal & Punishment Rules- 1980 and found that the case is not covers under the above Rules as his acquittal is not on merits and he has been acquitted by the Hon'ble Court of Sh. Sushil Anuj Tyagi, M.M., Rohini Courts, Delhi on benefit of doubt.
Let the Constable be informed
accordingly."
17. Further, on appeal of the applicant, the respondents have passed the impugned order holding that in terms of the provisions of Rule 23(2) of the Rules, that there shall be only one appeal from the original order and the order of the Appellate Authority shall be final however, in view of the acquittal of the applicant, his representation has been gone into by the then Appellate Authority once again and he has held that the impugned Disciplinary and Appellate Authority orders have been passed on the basis of the evidence accrued during the disciplinary inquiry proceedings and the same to be sufficient to hold the applicant guilty of the charge and thus, disposed of the representation by the impugned order dated 28.04.2017. In none of these two orders dated 14.06.2016 or 28.04.2017, the respondents have held as to under which exception to Rule 12 of 21 OA No. 2266/2017 the Rules, the case of the applicant falls. However, a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Constable Raj Pal Singh (supra) has observed in paragraph 11 thereof that:
"11. In the instant case the respondents have not stated under which clause applicants case would be covered, therefore, order dated 28.4.2010 is quashed and set aside...."
18. We further find that though in paragraph 17, the Learned Trial Court in its order/judgment dated 09.09.2015 has recorded as "The evidence apparent on record is insufficient for basing the conviction for the accused. The benefit of doubt goes in favour of the accused and he is entitled to be exonerated", however, in the same judgment, the Learned Trial Court has answered the two questions referred to hereinabove, which were identical to the allegations against the applicant in the disciplinary proceedings, in negative. Moreover, the benefit of doubt is not an exception clause under Rule 12 of the Rules.
19. We find that the Learned Trial Court has though recorded benefit of doubt going in favour of the applicant, however, it has examined the evidence before it and has not found any evidence against the applicant in support of 22 OA No. 2266/2017 accusations against him. Therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Satya Dev Singh (supra) supports the claim of the applicant.
20. As recorded hereinabove, though the respondents in their impugned orders have nowhere recorded as to under which exceptions to the Rule 12, the case of the applicant falls to sustain the impugned orders passed against him, however, Sh. Rajnish Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents has extensively argued that the case of the applicant falls under the exception clause (a), (c) and (e). The exception (a) of Rule 12 i.e. "the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds" is considered and interpreted by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in George N.S. (supra), paragraph 12 of which reads as under:
"12. The acquittal on account of prosecution failing to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt or on account of lack of evidence or no evidence cannot be termed as acquittal on technical ground. Such grounds i.e. technical ground, would be, to illustrate a few, limitation which has now been prescribed by recent amendment in Cr.P.C or trial without obtaining sanction as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C in cases where it is required and the trial being held without obtaining such sanction. If the legislature intended that acquittal on account of benefit of doubt or prosecution failing to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt etc. were not to 23 OA No. 2266/2017 be a bar in the departmental proceedings, it would have so specifically provided as Exception in Rule 12. The legislature could not be oblivious of the situation as mentioned above, particularly when we know that most of the acquittals are based on the failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt or on account of benefit of doubt. The legislative wisdom only refers to acquittal on technical grounds as one of the exceptions for holding departmental proceedings. By any means we cannot hold that failure of the prosecution to lead evidence per se, would amount to acquittal on technical ground. The acquittal resulting on account of prosecution not leading evidence or leading insufficient evidence would definitely stand on different footing than acquittal resulting on technical ground. In the former case, the acquittal would be clean acquittal and even the words like "benefit of doubt" or "failing to prove beyond reasonable doubt" would be superfluous. The petitioner was acquitted by learned MM because there was no evidence led by the prosecution for many years and even the case property was also not produced for any justifiable reason. Such acquittal could not be said to be on a technical ground since the charges were not proved and the decision was arrived at on the basis of no evidence to prove the criminal charge, mere mention of "benefit of doubt" by a criminal court is superfluous and baseless and such an acquittal is an "honourable acquittal". Another Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashikumari vs. Uttari Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam 2005 (1) ATJ 154 has taken the same view. The instant case, however, appears to be on a better footing. Thus, (a) to the prohibition was not attracted in the present case."
21. As in the case in hand, the acquittal of the applicant is not on account of lack of necessary sanction under Section 197 24 OA No. 2266/2017 CrPC and/or violating any other mandatory technical requirement. Moreover, in the case of George N.S. (supra), mere mention of benefit of doubt by a criminal court is held to be superfluous and baseless and honourable acquittal. We find that the case of the applicant cannot be held to be falling under clause
(a) of Rule 12. As the Learned Trial Court has in no manner held in its said order/judgment that the offence was actually committed and for the suspicions raised upon the applicant herein, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that though not written in the impugned order, however, the case of the applicant falls under clause (c) of the Rule 12, is also not found to be sustainable in law.
22. So far the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents that the case of the applicant will fall under clause
(e) of the Rule 12 is concerned, at the cost of repetition, we may record that the respondent in its impugned order has nowhere claimed as such. However, keeping in view the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents, we have also gone through the statements of the prosecution witnesses noted and considered by the Inquiry Officer, however, we do not find that 25 OA No. 2266/2017 any of the witnesses have proved that the applicant was driving vehicle rashly or negligently and/or by such negligent driving the applicant hit the victim resulting into injuries to him on account of which he unfortunately expired. In this view of the matter, we do not find the case of the applicant falling under the provisions of clause (e) of Rule 12 of the Rules.
23. Before parting, we may further record that a Larger Bench of this Tribunal in Sukhdev Singh & another vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & others (supra) has considered the provisions of Rule 12 and various case laws on the issue and in paragraph 9 has ruled that "the judicial verdict would have precedence over decision in departmental proceedings and the subordinate rank would be restored to his status with consequential reliefs."
24. As in the present case, the allegations against the applicant in the departmental proceedings are identical to that in the criminal trial against the applicant, in view of the discussion as above and the aforesaid binding precedents, we are of the view that the impugned orders of penalty passed against the 26 OA No. 2266/2017 applicant in the departmental proceedings are not sustainable in law. Thus, the answer to the issue in paragraph 9 above is "no".
25. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned orders dated 30.11.2011 vide which major punishment has been imposed (Annexure A-3), 21.06.2012 vide which appeal has been rejected (Annexure A-4), 11.02.2016, 14.06.2016 and 28.04.2017 vide which applicant's representation regarding revisiting the punishment order has been rejected (Annexure A- 2, A-2(A) and A-5 respectively). The applicant shall be entitled for all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules, law and instructions on the subject. The respondents shall implement these directions as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
26. Ordinarily, when the impugned orders passed by the respondents by referring to the provisions of Rule 12 are found to be non-est, we would have remanded the matter to the respondents for reconsideration however, as on behalf of the respondents all possible grounds available to them have been 27 OA No. 2266/2017 pleaded and argued extensively, we do not find it necessary to remand the matter and therefore, the issue is put to quietus.
27. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Shri B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ns/