State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Rakesh Kumar vs Ifci Infrastructure Development ... on 14 July, 2025
FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025
IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
COMMISSION
Date of Institution:19.05.2025
(Online)
28.05.2025
(Physically)
Date of hearing : 10.07.2025
Date of Decision : 14.07.2025
FIRST APPEAL NO. 258/2025
IN THE MATTER OF
1.MR. RAKESH KUMAR S/O MR. GULAB CHAND BHAGAT AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
2. MRS. RITA KUMAR W/O MR. RAKESH KUMAR AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS BOTH RESIDENTS OF R/O FLAT 401, TOWER-4 CWG VILLAGE, DELHI-110092 ...APPLICANTS/APPELLANTS VERSUS IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT LTD.
REGISTERED OFFICE AT IFCI TOWER, 61, NEHRU PLACE, NEW DELHI-110019 ....NON-APPLICANT/RESPONDENT CORAM:
HON'BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT) HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) Present: Mr. Rakesh Kumar i.e. the appellant no.1 in person (Email:
[email protected] and Mob. 9810691390) PER: HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
1. The present appeal has been filed on 19.05.2025 (through online mode vide reference no. 202505161316) and 28.05.2025 (physically) DISMISSED Page 1 of 13 FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 challenging the impugned order dated 21.03.2025 passed in Complaint Case No.302/2019 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-X (South East District), Udyog Sadan, C - 22 & 23 Institutional Area (Behind Qutab Hotel), New Delhi wherein the complaint was dismissed.
2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.1210/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed along with the appeal. Affidavits of both appellants have been filed along with this application.
3. Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.
4. The application has been preferred under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.302/2019.
5. A bare perusal of the application reflects that it has been moved Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. However, the entire proceedings of the present case took place according to the Old Act. Hence, before delving into the merits of the present application, it is imperative to ascertain whether the present application bearing IA No. 1210/2025 filed along with the appeal on 19.05.2025 (through online mode vide reference no.
202505161316) and 28.05.2025 (physically) is maintainable under the New Act/Old Act.
6. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020. The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section (Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been reproduced below:
"107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.DISMISSED Page 2 of 13
FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal."
7. We may also take the assistance of Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:
"6 Effect of repeal. : Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder"
8. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 wherein the Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid down certain general principles which have been reproduced as under:
DISMISSED Page 3 of 13FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 "28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [Phillips v.
Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new DISMISSED Page 4 of 13 FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later."
(emphasis in original)
9. Similarly, the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra reported in 1994 (4) SCC 602, the court has culled out the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation and has held the following:
"26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended DISMISSED Page 5 of 13 FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication."
10. Taking into account the aforesaid discussion, we conclude that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature. Thus, the cases pending or adjudicated and rights/obligations created before the coming into effect of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will continue to be adjudicated under the Old Act i.e. Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Hence, the applicant cannot resort to the provisions as inculcated in the New Act so far as the present case is concerned this case will be governed by the provisions of the Old Act.
11. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various grounds. Para No. 3 and 4 of the application read as under:
"3. The delay occurred due to a bona fide mistake in calculating the limitation period under the assumption that the appeal would be governed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which permits a limitation period of 45 days for filing an appeal. The Appellants were under the belief that the new Act applied since the appeal was being filed in the year 2025.DISMISSED Page 6 of 13
FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025
4. However, the Appellants were subsequently advised that, since the original complaint was filed in the year 2019, the present appeal is governed by the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which prescribes a limitation period of 30 days for filing an appeal. The said mistake was neither deliberate nor intended to delay proceedings."
12. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees twenty-five thousand, whichever is less]"
13. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of such order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 21.03.2025 and the present appeal was filed on 19.05.2025 (through online mode vide reference no. 202505161316) and 28.05.2025 (physically) i.e. after a delay of 29 days and 38 days respectively.
14. In order to condone the delay, the appellants have to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl.
DISMISSED Page 7 of 13FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."
15. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under:-
"12. .........we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."DISMISSED Page 8 of 13
FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025
16. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054- 2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
17. We deem it appropriate to refer to the broad principles pertaining to the laws of limitation as laid down in the latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025 titled as "H. GURUSWAMY & ORS. Vs. A. KRISHNAIAH SINCE DECEASED By LRS." decided on 08.01.2025, wherein the by the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed DISMISSED Page 9 of 13 FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."
18. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has laid down that;
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras."
19. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the DISMISSED Page 10 of 13 FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
20. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the impugned order was passed on 21.03.2025 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on 20.04.2025. However, the reasons stated for the delay are that the delay occurred due to a genuine mistake in calculating the limitation period as the appellants were under the assumption that the appeal would be governed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 permitting a period of forty five days to file the appeal; and they were later advised that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, prescribing a thirty day limit, governed the case since the original complaint was filed in 2019. This error was bona fide, not deliberate, and was not made with the intention to delay the proceedings.
21. It is pertinent to mention that the present appeal is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No. 302/2019 filed on 18.12.2019 and the repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020.
22. We deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:DISMISSED Page 11 of 13
FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025 [Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees twenty-five thousand, whichever is less]"
23. A perusal of Annexure-1 i.e. the certified copy of the impugned order at page 12 to 16 reveals that the same has been obtained by the appellants on 03.04.2025. Even if we consider that the appellants have received the certified copy of the impugned order on 03.04.2025 and the present appeal has been filed on 19.05.2025 (through online mode vide reference no. 202505161316) and 28.05.2025 (physically), in this circumstance also, the appellants were expected to file the appeal within the limitation period i.e. by 03.05.2025. Still there is unexplained delay of 16 days and 25 days respectively in filing the appeal.
24. No reason has been explained for this delay what to talk of sufficient/cogent reason. Each & every day's delay has to be explained. Assumption of limitation period as forty five days is no excuse to file the appeal after the expiry of period of limitation.
25. It is the duty of the appellants to be aware of statutory period of filing the appeal.
26. The applicants have abused the process of law and filed this appeal after immense delay without any reasonable ground.
27. As per the averments made in the application as well as the record, we are of the considered view that no cogent reason has been explained by the appellants to show the delay in filing the appeal.
28. Having regard to the statutory position discussed in para supra and the facts of the case, the applicants failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellants seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.
DISMISSED Page 12 of 13FA/258/2025 MR. RAKESH KUMAR & ANR. VS. IFCI INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMNET LTD. DOD: 14.07.2025
29. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.
30. The Order be uploaded forthwith on the website of the Commission for the perusal of the parties as well as forwarded to the corresponding E-mail address available on the record.
31. File be consigned to record room.
JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT) PINKI MEMBER (JUDICIAL) Pronounced on 14.07.2025.
DISMISSED Page 13 of 13