Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
J D A Jaipur vs M/S Boutique Hotels Indialtd ... on 13 April, 2023
Author: Sameer Jain
Bench: Sameer Jain
[2023/RJJP/003236]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2593/2009
Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur Through Its Secretary, Ram
Kishore Vyas Bhawan, J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur Raj.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. M/s Boutique Hotels India Pvt. Ltd. Through Sh. Sandeep
Katyal S/o Shri H.I.katyal, Business Devel, Registered
Office 3Rd Floor, UCO Building, Parliament Street, New
Delhi-1
2. The Appellate Tribunal Jaipur Development Authority, Ram
Kishore Vyas Bhawan, J.l.n. Marg, Jaipur Raj.
3. Bureau Of Industrial Promotion Through Commissioner,
Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Anant Kasliwal, Sr. Counsel with
Mr. Vaibhav Kasliwal
Mr. Shashank Shah
Mr. Shashank Kasliwal
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
Reportable
Reserved On: 06/02/2023
Pronounced On: 13/04/2023
1. The instant writ petition is filed under Article(s) 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, whereby, a challenge is made against the order dated 14.07.2008, passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur in Appeal No. 117/2008 titled as Boutique Hotel (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Jaipur Development Authority & Ors.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Jaipur Development Authority (hereinafter, JDA) has submitted that the respondent- (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (2 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] company submitted application(s) dated 20.08.2005 and 05.12.2005 before the JDA for seeking allotment of the land in question. Thereafter, on 01.04.2006, the matter was considered by the Board of Infrastructure Development and Investment Promotion (hereinafter, BIDI). Upon paying due heed to the said application(s), BIDI resolved to approve the allotment of the land forming part of Khasra Nos. 8 and 9, situated in Village Ballupura, Patwar Circle Sumel, Tehsil & District-Jaipur. Subsequently, under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, the matter was further considered by the State Level Empowered Committee (hereinafter, SLEC) on 10.08.2006. In pursuance to the BIDI Resolution, it was determined by the SLEC that land admeasuring 20 acres was to be allotted to the respondent-company at a total consideration of Rs. 15.84 crores only.
3. Ensuing the aforementioned decision qua the allotment of land, as duly taken by the BIDI and SLEC, the JDA vide its communication dated 06.09.2006, intimated the respondent- company about the allotment so made at the consideration of Rs. 15.84 crores only, along with the other terms and conditions annexed to the said allotment. Thereafter, upon the acceptance of the said terms and conditions by the respondent-company, an allotment letter dated 11.10.2006 was issued to the respondent- company wherein a demand for the consideration payable was raised. On 08.11.2006, the amount payable was duly deposited by the respondent-company and no objection was raised qua the payment of Rs. 15.84 crores. Accordingly, on 24.11.2006, the lease deed issued by the JDA was executed and registered and (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (3 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] subsequently, possession of the land so allotted was delivered to the respondent-company on 25.11.2006.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after having duly received the possession of the land on 25.11.2006 and without having raised any prior objection(s) qua the consideration so charged/demanded for the said allotment; the respondent-company, merely as an afterthought to contest the rate as charged and deposited without protest, filed a representation before the JDA on 11.12.2006. Furthermore, upon encountering inaction on part of the JDA qua the challenge so raised regarding the amount charged for allotment, the respondent-company filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal challenging the rates charged/consideration demanded in the allotment letter dated 11.10.2006. Upon receiving notice(s), the JDA filed a detailed reply refuting the contentions put forth by the respondent-company. However, vide order dated 14.07.2008, the learned Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the allotment order dated 11.10.2006 to the extent of the rate charged therein. The learned Tribunal also directed the JDA to decide the rates to be charged afresh, which in no case could exceed Rs. 1,500/- per square yards. Aggrieved by the said order, the JDA has preferred the instant writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has extensively argued and submitted that the impugned order dated 14.07.2008, passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, is not just without jurisdiction but is also against the settled and well-established position of the law. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that the entire decision for the allotment of land was taken by BIDI and (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (4 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] the State Government (SLEC) only. Whereas, the JDA, while intimating the respondent-company of the said decision along with the consideration to be paid, was just carrying out a ministerial act, without actually having contributed in the decision-making process. Therefore, the learned Appellate Tribunal was barred from entertaining the appeal filed by the respondent-company, as Section 83(8)(a) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act of 1982 (hereinafter, Act of 1982) expressly casts a limitation/obligation upon the Tribunal to only entertain those appeals, wherein the decision under challenge, has been taken by the JDA. Hence, considering the fact that the decision qua the allotment of land and the rate payable thereto was taken by the State Government and BIDI, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by the respondent-company. It was also submitted that even if it is assumed that the appeal so filed was entertainable before the learned Tribunal, then also the same was liable to be dismissed as it was filed with a substantial delay of 540 days, as opposed to the statutorily limit of 30 days, prescribed under Section 83 of the Act of 1982. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon various judgments reported in RLR 1994 (1) 306 titled as Jaipur Development Authority vs. Shyam Lal Verma; SB. CWP No. 5778/2006 titled as Sudha Parhar vs. Jaipur Development Authority and SB. CWP No. 4679/2017 titled as Krishan Pal Dheer vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition. He has submitted that there is a limited (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (5 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] scope of interference with a well-reasoned order while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel reiterated the well settled position of the law that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is only maintainable when the order impugned suffers from the violation of the principles of natural justice and/or when a palpable error has crept in the order of the learned Tribunal. It was argued that the petitioner-JDA has categorically failed to call attention to any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the judgment dated 14.07.2008. Thus, in absence of the same, the instant writ petition under Article(s) 226 and 227 is not maintainable before this Court. In addition to the said preliminary objection, learned counsel for the respondent-company has also submitted that the learned Tribunal was well within its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by the respondent-company. In this regard, it was also pointed out that no objection qua the jurisdictional limitations of the Tribunal were raised by the petitioner-JDA before the learned Appellate Tribunal.
7. Furthermore, learned counsel also submitted that an excessive rate was charged to the respondent-company at the behest of the petitioner-JDA, who while allotting the land in question, acted in an arbitrary and unjustified manner. Moreover, no objections on the ground of limitation were taken by the petitioner-JDA before the learned Tribunal. Hence, the same is merely an afterthought. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent-company submitted that the order impugned dated 14.07.2008 calls for no interference of this Court, as the Appellate Tribunal, after duly taking note of the Circular dated 17.11.2001 (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (6 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] has quashed and set aside the allotment order dated 11.10.2006, wherein exorbitant rates were charged by the petitioner-JDA for allotment of the land in question. It was submitted that while doing so, the learned Tribunal has balanced key considerations such as the various reserve prices, market value of the land and the appropriate prices in the nearby areas. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondent-company has relied upon the dictum of various judgments including Baldev Singh Dhanju vs. Chandigarh Housing Board: AIR 1990 P&H 41; Rayalseema Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 2002 SC 3699 and Karnataka Industrial Areas Dev. Board vs. Prakash Dal Mills: AIR 2011 SC 1570.
8. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, scanned the record of the case and perused the judgment(s) cited at Bar.
9. At the outset, it is cardinal to take note of the instrumental legal provision, which has the meritorious strength to adjudge the efficacious disposal of the instant writ petition. In the case at hand, Section 83 of the Act of 1982 is key in determining several important issues, including those pertaining to the challenge(s) raised qua the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal preferred by the respondent-company and the incidental limitation of delay and laches, on part of the respondent-company, in filing of the said appeal. Hence, for ready and prompt reference, Section 83 of the Act of 1982 is reproduced herein-under:-
"83. Constitution of Tribunal. - (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (7 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] Gazette, constitute a Tribunal for the purposes of this Act.
(2) The Tribunal shall consist of one person who shall be an officer of the State Government and shall be paid such salary and allowances as may be determined by the State Government. (3) The State Government may, to assist the Tribunal, direct the Authority to appoint such number of servants and of such cadre as may be deemed necessary.
(4) The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by the Authority.
(5) The procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in deciding the appeals or disputes referred to it under this Act shall be such as may be prescribed. (6) The Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) in respect of hearing and deciding of an appeal or any dispute referred to it.
(7) Except as otherwise provided, any dispute arising out of any provision of this Act may be referred to the Tribunal by the Authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto.
[(8) Except as otherwise provided,-
(a) any person aggrieved by an order or notice of the Authority may file an appeal in the Tribunal within thirty days of the communication of such order or notice to him; and
(b) any person aggrieved by any threatened act or injury from the Authority affecting his rights may refer the dispute to the Tribunal with in thirty days of the communication or knowledge of such threatened act or injury;
and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final]
10. On the Issue of Jurisdiction of the JDA Appellate Tribunal to Entertain the Appeal Filed by the Respondent- Company.
(Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (8 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] 10/1. Upon an analysis of Section 83(8)(a) of the Act of 1982, it is observed that any person aggrieved by an order or notice of the Authority may file an appeal in the Tribunal within thirty days of the communication of such order or notice to him. The key and operative part in sub-clause(a) of Clause 8 is the explicit inclusion of the term 'Authority', which aids in propelling clarity upon only those specific kinds of order(s) or notice(s) that may be challenged before the learned Appellate Tribunal. Now, in order to categorically understand which order(s) are eligible to be challenged before the Tribunal, we must divert our attention to Section 2(3) of the Act of 1982, which defines an 'Authority' to exclusively include only the Jaipur Development Authority, as constituted under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the jurisdictional scope of the Act of 1982 limits itself to adjudicating upon only those appeals whereby a challenge is made to orders or notices issued by the JDA exhaustively.
10/2. Now, having established the nature of the order(s) eligible for challenge before the Tribunal, we must analyze whether the decision for allotment of land vide allotment order dated 11.10.2006, was passed by the JDA or not. If the said query is answered in the affirmative, then the ground of jurisdiction shall not stand on its own leg. Whereas, if the same is answered in the negative, then the impugned order dated 14.07.2008 shall lack jurisdiction and accordingly, the same shall be liable to be dismissed. In this regard, it is pertinent to recall certain germane facts pertaining to the instant matter.
10/3. It is noted that the respondent-company had submitted an application before the BIDI seeking allotment of land falling (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (9 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] under Khasra Nos. 8 and 9 in Village Ballupura for the development of a Health and Spa Resort. Thereafter, BIDI, in its meeting which was held under the Chairmanship of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, considered the case for allotment of the respondent-company and thereafter, took a decision to proceed with the allotment. In pursuance to the same, BIDI directed the UDH Department and JDA qua the said allotment and imposed several conditions in addition to deciding upon the rate to be paid, which was fixed by BIDI at Rs. 15.84 crores. Subsequently, on 10.08.2006, the SLEC considered the case of allotment to the respondent-company, while noting that the BIDI had already indicated that the cost of the land to be allotted shall be Rs. 15.84 crores. As a consequence, the SLEC communicated the aforementioned details qua the allotment to the UDH Department, which would subsequently advice the JDA on the allotment so made.
10/4. Hence, only after the determination of the issue by BIDI and the State Government qua the allotment of the land and the rate to be charged therewith, the JDA performed just a ministerial act of intimating the respondent to deposit the amount so agreed upon i.e. Rs. 15.84 crores, by letter dated 06.09.2006. Furthermore, it is noted that on 06.10.2006, after being entirely aware of the consideration/rate to be paid, the respondent- company acknowledged the letter dated 06.09.2006 written by the JDA and thereafter, willfully and without any protest asked the latter for the issuance of the official allotment letter containing the detailed terms and conditions. As a result, only after the determination by BIDI and the State Government qua the (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (10 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] issuance of allotment letter and the corresponding rate to be paid therewith, the JDA on 11.10.2006 issued an allotment letter to the respondent-company. The possession of the land was delivered on 25.11.2006.
10/5. It is further observed that it was only after the issuance of the allotment letter and delivery of the possession of land, merely as an afterthought to contest the rate as charged and deposited without protest by the respondent-company, the respondents filed a representation before the JDA on 11.12.2006. Furthermore, upon encountering inaction on part of the JDA qua the challenge so raised regarding the amount charged for allotment, the respondent-company filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal challenging the rates charged/consideration demanded in the allotment letter dated 11.10.2006. Thereafter, vide impugned order dated 14.07.2008, the said appeal was allowed and the allotment letter so issued was set aside with directions to the JDA to re-evaluate the rate, which in any case, could not exceed beyond Rs. 1,500 per square yards. 10/6. Therefore, by virtue of the observations made herein- above and after duly perusing the order impugned dated 14.07.2008, it is analysed that the learned Appellate Tribunal failed to consider the fact that the JDA, while intimating the respondent-company and issuing the allotment letter, was just performing a ministerial act, which stemmed from the decision on allotment and its corresponding rate, which was wholly determined by the BIDI in consultation with the State Government. Hence, in the appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal, wherein the challenge was made to the allotment letter (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (11 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] issued by the JDA, was for all intends and purposes, a product of the decision as arrived at by the BIDI and the State Government and not the JDA. Therefore, considering the fact that the only task undertaken by the latter was ministerial in nature, whereby the JDA issued the consequential allotment letter, which stemmed from the basic order, as passed by the BIDI and the State Government, this Court is of the view that the respondent- company is not entitled to any relief on the sole count of challenging just the consequential action of the JDA and not the larger order, from which former stemmed/originated. 10/7. It is noteworthy that a challenge to a consequential order without actually challenging the basic order, from which the former originates, cannot be entertained by the Tribunal. Hence, it is a legal obligation on part of the respondent-company to challenge the basic order and only if the said order is found to be wrong or legally perverse, then the consequential order might be adept for re-examination. As a result, it can be conclusively said that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the right of allotment and its corresponding consideration/rate to be paid, which is the central subject under challenge, was determined by BIDI and the State Government and thus, the issuance of allotment letter by the JDA was just a consequential and ministerial task.
10/8. Thus, considering the fact that the basic order, as determined by BIDI and the State Government, was not challenged and that the order passed by the JDA issuing the allotment letter with the rate stipulations was merely consequential, the appeal filed by the respondent-company was (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (12 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] not maintainable against JDA's order of issuance of allotment letter. Therefore, the impugned order dated 14.07.2008, passed by the Appellate Tribunal, is a nullity for lack of jurisdiction and want of competence.
11. On the Issue of Limitation 11/1. Upon a further analysis of Section 83(8)(a) of the Act of 1982, it is observed that any person who is aggrieved by an order of the 'Authority' i.e. Jaipur Development Authority, may file an appeal before the Tribunal. However, in order to file the said appeal, a caveat obtruding a time constraint is imposed, of a period of 30 days from the date of communication of such an order to the appellant.
11/2. Therefore, even it is assumed that the appeal so filed by the respondent-company was with proper jurisdiction, then even under those circumstances, the Tribunal had no authority to entertain the said appeal, which was filed after the lapse of a period of 30 days. In the instant case, the respondent-company preferred an appeal on or about 01.05.2008, whereby the challenge was made to the order dated 11.10.2006. Thus, the appeal was filed with a delay of approximately 540 days. Hence, the same was not maintainable before the learned Tribunal. 11/3. In this regard, even if it is assumed that the payment of the consideration amounting to Rs. 15.84 crores was made under protest, then also the same shall not provide any relaxation on the statutory limitation provided under the Act of 1982. The period of limitation could not be extended by merely submitting the amount under protest and accordingly, it could not wipe out the delay and laches as well.
(Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (13 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] 11/4. It is also pertinent to note that when a relief is sought against the State on an alleged illegality or wrongful action, then under those circumstances, the requirement to explain the laches or undue and bonafide delay on part of the litigant/appellant is more stringent than in other cases, for the want of record on part of the State to ascertain the liability on its officers and investigate the matter qua the alleged illegal action. Hence, in the facts of the instant case, the learned Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal filed by the respondent-company, after an undue delay of approximately 540 days.
12. Non-compliance of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
12/1. It is observed that the learned Tribunal, vide impugned order dated 14.07.2008, allowed the appeal filed by the respondent-company and set aside the allotment letter issued by the JDA with directions to re-evaluate the rate charged for the said allotment, which in any case, could not exceed beyond Rs. 1,500 per square yards. In essence, the learned Tribunal has on its own accord, altered the stipulations under the lease deed entered into between the parties, especially qua the consideration/rate involved therein. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned Tribunal, without paying due consideration to the relevant law as provided under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter, Act of 1963) has passed a legally unsustainable order, especially qua the alteration of the stipulations contained in the lease deed. For ready perusal, the provision is reproduced herein-under: (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM)
[2023/RJJP/003236] (14 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] "26. When instrument may be rectified.--(1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing [not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), applies] does not express their real intention, then--
(a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or
(b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
(c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause
(b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
(2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the court may, in its discretion, direct rectification of the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.
(3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced. (4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section unless it has been specifically claimed:
Provided that where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim"
12/2. It is an established position of law that a lease deed, as entered between the parties, is a registered document. Therefore, as per Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, the said lease deed can only be altered when the litigant i.e. respondent-company (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (15 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] approaches the Tribunal under Section 26 of the Act of 1963 for the rectification to be made in the lease deed. Thereafter, considering that the rectification as sought, is allowed, only then can the same be enforced. Hence, it can be conclusively said that while directing the JDA to re-evaluate the rate to be charged for the said allotment and thereby, assigning an upper-limit for the same i.e. Rs 1,500 per square yards, the learned Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and acted on its own accord, as no challenge was made to the lease deed by the respondent-company under Section 26 of the Act of 1963.
12/3. Accordingly, as the respondent-company did not resort to the only remedy available to them for the rectification of the said lease deed, as provided under Section 26 of the Act of 1963, the order passed by the learned Tribunal is unsustainable in the eyes of the law.
13. Bar of Estoppel In the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, as discussed herein-above, it is abundantly clear that the respondent-company had willfully and with open eyes recognized the decision of BIDI and the State Government qua the rate to be charged, which was communicated to them by the JDA and thereafter, willingly signed the lease deed. Furthermore, no opposition qua the rate charged, was raised by the respondent-company, when the same was communicated to them by the JDA. Hence, the respondent- company was estopped in law to challenge the said allotment letter/deed, after having entered into and/or accepted the same, consensually and of one's own volition. In this regard, reliance is (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (16 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] placed upon Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is reproduced herein-under:
"115 Estoppel.--When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
Illustration A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title."
14. Therefore, in light of the observations made herein- above and upon a consideration of the fact that the appeal filed by the respondent-company did not arise out of an order passed by the JDA; that the JDA was not the author of the allotment order dated 11.10.2006, as it merely performed the ministerial task of intimating the respondent-company of the decision taken by BIDI and the State Government and thereafter issuing deed; that even if it is assumed that the order of BIDI and the State Government could be challenged before the Appellate Tribunal, even then the said appeal was filed with an undue delay of approximately 540 days; that the learned Tribunal, on its own accord, could not rectify the lease deed as entered between the parties, especially when the respondent-company did not resort to the remedy qua rectification as provided under Section 26 of the Act of 1963; that (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) [2023/RJJP/003236] (17 of 17) [CW-2593/2009] the respondent-company was estopped in law to challenge the allotment letter/deed, after having entered into and/or accepted the same, consensually and of one's own volition, without raising any protest against the rate charged therein at the time of issuance of the allotment letter and before taking possession of the land in question and relying upon Section 83 of the Act 1982, this court deems it fit and proper to allow the present writ petition.
15. The judgment(s) cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-company qua the maintainability of the instant writ petition are distinguishable on account of the fact that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal suffers from manifest error(s) of law, as discussed above. Therefore, in light of the same, the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, the instant writ petition is allowed. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 14.07.2008, is quashed and set aside.
17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(SAMEER JAIN),J Pooja /54 (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:55:16 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)