Calcutta High Court
Mahendra Narayan Ghosh vs Union Of India & Ors on 29 April, 2011
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
1
W.P.1439 of 2008
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
Present: The Hon'ble Justice Dipankar Datta
Mahendra Narayan Ghosh
Versus
Union of India & ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arunava Ghosh, Advocate
Mr. Soumya Majumder, Advocate
Mr. S.N. Ghosh, Advocate
Mr. Debabrata Mondal, Advocate
For the respondents 1 & 2 : None
For the respondents 3 to 6 : Mr. Samaraditya Pal, Sr. Advocate Mr. Kalimuddin Mondal, Advocate Heard on : June 29, August 6, September 3 and 10, November 19 and 30, 2010 Judgment on : April 29, 2011
1. The petitioner, at the material time, was holding the post of Chief Legal Manager in Coal India Limited (hereafter CIL) in M-II grade. By a notice dated February 1, 2008, the Chief General Manager (Personnel) of CIL informed the petitioner that on attaining the age of 60 years on July 5, 2008, he shall retire on superannuation from the services of CIL 'with 2 effect from the afternoon of 31.07.2008'. The said notice was received by the petitioner on February 15, 2008.
2. Thereafter, the Chief Vigilance Officer of CIL, respondent no.6, received a complaint dated June 17, 2008 wherein it was alleged that the petitioner did not have proper qualification required for the post of Chief Legal Manager in M-II grade. On receipt thereof, the Vigilance Division of CIL investigated the matter. Investigation revealed that the petitioner did not possess requisite qualification i.e. bachelor's degree in law at the time he entered service as Law Officer on April 5, 1974 under the erstwhile National Coal Development Corporation Ltd. (NCDC)/Coal Mines Authority Ltd. (CMAL). It was also revealed that after appointment and even during his tenure of service in CIL, the petitioner did not acquire the said qualification, which was a sine qua non for appointment as Law Officer and in higher posts.
3. The report of vigilance investigation was forwarded on July 28, 2008 to the office of the Chief Vigilance Commission (hereafter the CVC) for examination and advice. Upon examination of the entire case, the CVC vide office memorandum dated July 30, 2008 advised as follows :
i) the petitioner should not be allowed to hold the post of Chief Legal Manager till superannuation; and
ii) recovery may be made of illegally derived benefits.
4. To implement the order of the CVC, an order dated July 30, 2008 was issued by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, CIL (hereafter CMD, 3 CIL) directing that the petitioner shall not be allowed to hold the post of Chief Legal Manager, CIL 'with immediate effect till superannuation from service on the afternoon of July 31, 2008'.
5. On the same date, a memorandum was issued proposing to hold an enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 29 of the Coal India Executives' Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1978 (hereafter the CDA rules). The memorandum contained three articles of charges framed against the petitioner, whereby he was charged with misconduct in terms of clauses 5.1, 5.5, 5.17 and 5.25 of the CDA rules. The articles of charges read as follows:
"Statement of Articles of Charge framed against Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, Chief Legal Manager, Coal India Limited.
ARTICLE-I Whereas it is alleged that Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, presently posted as Chief Legal Manager, Coal India Limited, at the relevant period, without possessing requisite qualification of Bachelor's Degree in Law required for appointment to the post of Law Officer in a PSU unduly managed his employment to the post of Law Officer in the erstwhile Coal Mines Authority Limited (CMAL), now Coal India Limited (CIL) vide appointment order No.Apex/Admn./Apptt./L-6 dated 5th April, 1974 of Chief of Administration, CMAL with his posting at the office of the then Director (Marketing), NCDC, 10, N.S. Road, Kolkata and for which he managed to induce recommendation in his favour as allegedly revealed from letter No.Apex/Admn/L-6/2544 dated 18th February, 1975 of Shri K.C. Choudhury, the then Staff Officer (Admn.) OE, CMAL, 15, Park Street, Kolkata to Shri R.G. Singh, the then Manager (Admn.) NCDC, Darbhanga House, Ranchi.
The aforesaid act on the part of Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, Chief Legal Manager, CIL, constitutes misconduct in terms of Clause -5.1, 5.5, 5.17 & 5.25 of the Coal India Executive's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000).
ARTICLE-II Whereas it is alleged that Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, Chief Legal Manager, Coal India Limited at the relevant period despite having knowledge of his educational incompetency to hold the post of Law Officer in the 4 company, enjoyed benefit of successive promotions from the post of Law Officer to the post of Legal Manager and while holding the post of Legal Manager in the pretext of being a departmental candidate, unduly managed forwarding of his application for selection to the post of Dy. Chief Legal Manager (in the then E-6 grade, now termed as M-1 grade) in Coal India Limited against an open advertisement in the newspapers of local and national circulation during August-September, 1990, knowingly that he did not possess requisite educational qualification and professional experience of minimum high 2nd Class Bachelor's Degree in Law and 10 years post qualification experience as legal practitioner in Civil-Criminal and Taxation cases as per the said advertisement in newspapers.
The aforesaid acts on the part of Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, besides being tantamount to non-fulfillment of his duties and obligations as contained under clauses 4.1(i), 4.1(iv) of Coal India Executive's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000), amount to misconduct in terms of Clause-5.1, 5.5, 5.17 & 5.25 of the said Coal India Executive's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000).
Article-III Whereas it is alleged that Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, Chief Legal Manager, Coal India Limited while holding the post of Legal Manager, CCL, Kolkata, after getting his application forwarded in aforesaid manner, unduly managed to get his application screened through the then CGM (Legal), CIL for calling his interview against the aforesaid advertisement and thus strategically created a scope for his selection to the higher post of Dy. Chief Legal Manager for which he neither possessed educational qualification nor the requisite professional experience as per the advertised norms and thereafter, managed his selection to said post of Dy. CLM in Central Coalfields Limited/Coal India Limited knowingly that he was not qualified for the post for the reasons as aforesaid and thereafter also managed advantage of promotion to the post of Chief Legal Manager in M-2 grade though he was not entitled to hold such post for the reasons as aforesaid.
The aforesaid acts on the part of Shri Mahendra Narayan Ghosh, besides being tantamount to non-fulfillment of his duties and obligations as contained under clauses 4.1(I), 4.1(iv) of Coal India Executive's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000), amount to misconduct in terms of Clause-5.1, 5.5, 5.17 & 5.25 of the said Coal India Executive's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000)."
6. The order and the memorandum, both dated July 30, 2008 referred to above, were sought to be served upon the petitioner at his office at 6, Lyons Range, Kolkata at 12.45 hours on July 31, 2008 by a team of 5 vigilance officers of CIL. The petitioner allegedly refused to accept the same; consequently, they were pasted at 14.05 hours on the door of the chamber of the petitioner in presence of all the employees of the legal department. Allegedly, subsequent attempts were again made by the officers of CIL to effect personal service of the order and the memo dated July 30, 2008 on the petitioner but the same were again refused on the ground that in course of hearing of a previous writ petition before this Court preferred by the petitioner, the said order and memorandum had already been accepted by his learned advocate.
7. Propriety, legality and validity of the aforesaid order and the memorandum are challenged in this writ petition dated August 26, 2008.
8. Mr. Ghosh, learned advocate representing the petitioner, argued that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner ought to be interfered with on the following grounds :
I. There has been unexplained delay in drawing up disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The employer from day one was aware of the petitioner's qualifications. Never during the tenure of the petitioner's service was the need felt to proceed against him departmentally for lack of essential academic qualification. Issuance of charge-sheet a day prior to his retirement, after more than three decades of meritorious service, ought to be decried and ruled unsustainable;6
II. As a logical corollary of the above ground, it is clear that the disciplinary proceedings smack of malafide. The only intention is to deprive the petitioner the retiral benefits that have accrued and to which he is legally entitled;
III. In terms of the CDA Rules, there is no provision to continue disciplinary proceedings after retirement of an executive. There was no attempt to serve the charge-sheet while the petitioner was in service. In terms of the notice of retirement, the petitioner had retired in the afternoon of July 31, 2008. From the affidavit in opposition of the respondents 3 to 6, it is clear that the first attempt to serve the charge-sheet on the petitioner was made at 12.45 hours, when the petitioner had effectively retired from service. Rule 34(2) of the CDA Rules does not empower continuation of the proceedings without service of the charge-
sheet till such time the relationship of employer/employee continues. Without service of the charge-sheet, disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have commenced and, therefore, the same ought to be declared illegal;
IV. On a plain reading of the charge-sheet including the imputations of misconduct, no person of reasonable prudence could form an opinion that the charge-sheet discloses any misconduct on the part of the petitioner. In fact, on a conjoint reading of the records produced before the Court together with the affidavits filed by the 7 respondents 3 to 6, it is crystal clear that the qualifications of the petitioner were misconstrued leading to his appointment and subsequent promotions and, therefore, he ought not to be blamed for any act of negligence or omission of either the members of the selection committee(s) or the officers responsible for giving effect to the recommendation(s) of such committee(s); and V. From the records produced by the respondents 3 to 6, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner never projected himself as the holder of a law degree. His application for appointment betrayed whatever qualification he possessed. Despite being aware of the petitioner's qualifications, the selection committee proceeded to consider his candidature, apparently by relaxing the norms. The norms having been relaxed and the petitioner having been appointed and allowed to continue in service even after several orders of promotion for more than three decades, estoppel applies against CIL and it is too late in the day to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.
9. In support of his submission, Mr. Ghosh relied on various authorities.
Decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 1308 (State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh) was relied on to drive home the point that a charge-sheet containing stale charges ought not to be sustained. The decisions in (1993) 3 SCC 591 (M.S. Mudhol vs. S.D. Halegkar) and AIR 1977 SC 112 (The Nayagarh Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. & anr. vs. Narayan Rath & 8 anr.) were relied on to buttress the contention that the respondents having acquiesced in the appointment of the petitioner, it would be unjust and inequitable to proceed against him after his retirement. AIR 1991 SC 2010 (Union of India vs. K.V. Jankiraman) was cited for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings are said to commence on service of charge-sheet on the delinquent. An unreported decision of a learned single Judge of this Court dated February 2, 1999 in C.O. 10626 (W) of 1996 (Smt. Ballari Sarkar vs. DVC & ors.) and an unreported Bench decision of this Court dated November 23, 2004, in W.P. No. 30312 (W) of 1997 (Rudra Pratap Singh vs. Damodar Valley Corporation & ors.) approving the decision of the single Judge in Ballari Sarkar (supra), were cited where this Court (even after holding of domestic enquiry by the employer against employees on identical charges that they were not eligible for appointment on the posts they were ultimately appointed) quashed the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that there was no misrepresentation on their part in projecting their qualifications and, therefore, were not liable to face disciplinary action.
10. Mr. Ghosh, accordingly, prayed that the disciplinary proceedings be quashed and CIL be directed to release the retiral benefits of the petitioner without any delay.
11. Mr. Pal, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents 3 to 6 opposed the writ petition. It was assiduously contended by him that 9 without fulfillment of the requisite criteria, the appointment of the petitioner has to be termed void. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 2177 (K. Ramadas Shenoy vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi & ors.) for the proposition that "illegality is incurable". Relying on the decisions reported in (2007) 4 SCC 54 (Ashok Kumar Sonkar vs. Union of India & ors.), (1998) 9 SCC 395 (Kishorilal Charmakar & anr. vs. Distt. Education Officer & anr.) and (1997) 6 SCC 574 (State of Rajasthan vs. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt), it was contended that since possession of requisite educational qualification is a mandatory condition of appointment, the respondents represented by him acted in accordance with law in proceeding against the petitioner departmentally. It was iterated that the CVC having recommended disciplinary proceedings, the employer had no other option but to take follow up action as per such recommendation.
12. It was next contended that the origin of service is contract and for a contract to be valid, there must be meeting of minds; even though the petitioner's appointing authority had the occasion to look into his qualifications, it committed a mistake in allowing the petitioner to appear at the interview. A mistake had also been committed by the petitioner by offering his candidature despite being ineligible for the post. The situation was such that both the parties laboured under a mistake of fact and both were equally at fault. Since mistake vitiates a 10 contract, it is obvious that there was no valid contract and thus did not give rise to any binding master-servant relationship. The contract between the petitioner and the employer, accordingly, ought to be declared void.
13. In so far as delay in issuance of charge-sheet is concerned, it was contended that there was no delay at all. On receipt of the complaint dated June 17, 2008, the Vigilance Office of CIL had to conduct preliminary investigation regarding veracity of its contents. After correctness of the complaint was revealed, it was bound to refer the matter to the CVC and it did so on July 28, 2008. The CVC, in exercise of its powers conferred by the CVC Act, 2003, rendered its advice on July 30, 2008. Immediately on receipt of the advice, the CMD, CIL issued the impugned order as well as the memorandum of charge sheet. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that there was delay in issuing the charge-sheet.
14. On the issue of delay in issuing charge-sheet, the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570 (State of Punjab vs. Chamanlal Goyal), (2008) 13 SCC 170 (Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir) and (2009) 7 SCC 305 (Secretary, Forest Department & ors. vs. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury) were relied on.
15. Mr. Pal further contended that in any event the petitioner having asked for time to reply to the charge-sheet, it ought to be held that he had 11 submitted to the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority and, thus, precluded from questioning the charge-sheet at this stage.
16. The contention that service of charge-sheet after retirement of the petitioner took effect and hence the proceedings are invalid and inoperative in the eye of law was countered by Mr. Pal by relying on the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 41 (U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. vs. Kamal Swarup Tondon). There, while setting aside the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court had held that service of charge- sheet on the employee after office hours at 6.45 p.m. on January 31, 2000, which was the date of retirement, was not ineffective.
17. By referring to Rule 34(2) of the CDA Rules, Mr. Pal contended that the same was binding on all the executives of CIL, including the petitioner and power conferred thereby authorised the CMD, CIL to initiate disciplinary proceedings. According to him, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is wholly misconceived. The decision in Kamal Swarup Tondon (supra) was again relied on wherein it has been held that proceedings against a retired employee could be continued for recovering the financial loss caused to the employer from the terminal benefits since even after retirement, the relationship of master and servant continues for grant of retiral benefits. The decision reported in (2006) 7 SCC 651 (State of W.B. vs. Haresh C. Banerjee & ors.) was also relied on in support of the contention that disciplinary proceedings could continue even after retirement.
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18. Decisions reported in (1990) 3 SCC 157 ( N.T. Devin Katti & ors. vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission & ors.), (1990) 3 SCC 655 (Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & ors. vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi), (2002) 3 SCC 586 (K. Shekar vs. V. Indiramma & ors.), (2006) 4 SCC 1 [Secretary, State of Karnataka & ors. vs. Umadevi (3) & ors.], (2007) 2 SCC 481 (National Institute of Technology & ors. vs. Niraj Kumar Singh), (2008) 1 SCC 798 (Nagendra Chandra & ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & ors.) and (2008) 5 SCC 241 (Government of Andhra Pradesh & ors. vs. K. Brahmanandam & ors.) were relied on by Mr. Pal in support of his contention that an illegal appointment does not create any right in the appointee to cling on to the post and that it is always open to the employer to take action against such illegality as and when the same surfaces on perusal of records or is brought to its notice aliunde.
19. It was ultimately submitted by Mr. Pal that no case for interference had been set up at this stage and the Court ought to allow the employer to proceed with the departmental enquiry in accordance with law.
20. I have heard the appearing parties, represented by their respective learned advocates. The broad issue that arises for a decision is whether the petitioner ought to be directed to face the enquiry that is supposed to follow or the curtains on the disciplinary proceedings ought to be drawn once and for all, thereby permitting the petitioner to spend the December years of his life peacefully.
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21. Before I consider the merits of the rival contentions, it would be profitable to note the circumstances when the High Court exercising writ powers would be justified in interfering with a charge-sheet issued in connection with disciplinary proceedings.
22. In its decision reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 (Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana), the Supreme Court while dealing with interference at the stage of show cause/charge-sheet held as follows:
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 327, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440, Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore, (2001) 10 SCC 639, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179, etc.
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-
cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.
15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet.
16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
23. Only one out of few exceptions has been spelt out in the aforesaid decision. Apart from the decision in Brahm Dutt Sharma (supra), the 14 other decisions did not deal with charge-sheet issued in connection with disciplinary proceedings. I may, however, observe that the High Courts do not ordinarily interfere at the stage of show-cause/charge-sheet in respect of proposed disciplinary action of the employer against its employee not being bound by any rule of law but in its discretion, a self- imposed restraint on itself in exercise of its jurisdiction, bearing in mind that the delinquent would have opportunity to contest the allegations/charges in consonance with principles of natural justice. There are, however, exceptions and the High Court may justify its interference if the show cause notice/charge-sheet giving rise to the disciplinary proceedings is shown to have been issued palpably without authority of law [see Brahm Dutt Sharma (supra)] or when the charges are vague and lacking in material particulars thereby disabling the delinquent to put forth effective defence [see (1995) 1 SCC 332 (Transport Commissioner v. A. Radha K. Moorthy] or when the proceedings are initiated at such belated stage without reasonable explanation that the charge(s) become stale and lapse of time in the interregnum would prejudice the delinquent materially [see Bani Singh (supra), Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) and (2005) 6 SCC 636 : P.V. Mahadevan v. Managing Director, T.N. Housing Board] or when on reading the charges framed, no misconduct or other irregularity can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law [see (1994) 3 SCC 357 : Union of India & ors. v. Upendra Singh)] or 15 when the appointing authority having acquiesced in appointment of an employee without requisite qualifications for sufficiently long period of time seeks to initiate disciplinary action and the Court on perusal of the materials before it comes to a definite conclusion that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the said employee at the time of seeking appointment [see Narayan Rath (supra), Ballari Sarkar (supra) and Rudra Pratap Singh (supra)]. The decision of the learned single Judge in Ballari Sarkar (supra), I find from the decision of the Division Bench reported in 2009 (4) CHN 357 : Damodar Valley Corporation v. Anup Purakayastha, has since been affirmed in appeal vide judgment and order dated July 28, 2009 passed in F.M.A. 2528 of 2005.
24. I have noted that in its decision reported in A. Radha K. Moorthy (supra), the Supreme Court sounded a caution that the truth and correctness of the charges are not matters for the Tribunal to go into, more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. It was further ruled that even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence, i.e. where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal being akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it enjoys the power of judicial review whereby the procedural correctness of the decision-making process is examined. The 16 Tribunal's order under challenge was, however, upheld on the ground that the charges were vague and lacking in material particulars and no leave to proceed further was granted considering the fact that the charge-sheeted officer had seven or eight months to go for retirement.
25. In the conspectus of the aforesaid authorities, it requires examination as to whether the charge-sheet is a nullity for want of jurisdiction of the authority concerned to even investigate the facts.
26. For a proper and fair decision here, apart from the authorities cited at the bar, a close examination of the records of selection leading to the appointment of the petitioner must be made. Since the steps that were initiated by the officers of the NCDC have a direct bearing on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner, it would be relevant to trace the origin of the selection process that resulted in his appointment way back in April, 1974.
27. An advertisement dated November 11, 1972 was issued by the NCDC, a Government of India undertaking, seeking applications from qualified candidates for appointment to the post of Assistant Law Officer. The qualifications and experience mentioned in the advertisement read as follows :
"Qualification : Candidates must possess a Degree in Arts, Commerce or Science and a Degree in Law with not less than 60% marks in aggregate.
Experience : Candidates must have a minimum of three years experience of working as a lawyer or handling the cases relating to contract, establishment, labour, custom duty, Railway claims and Revenue etc. in a Govt. Department or in a reputed 17 Industrial Organisation and have the knowledge of deeds and conveyancing drafting.
Age : Not more than 35 years (relaxable by 5 years in case of Scheduled Caste/Tribe candidates)."
28. The petitioner responded to such advertisement and offered himself as a candidate for the post. He had graduated in Commerce with Honours. He had also the occasion to acquire the qualification of Attorney-at-Law by succeeding in the examination conducted by this Hon'ble Court. A certificate issued by the Registrar, Original Side of this Hon'ble Court dated March 1, 1972 certifies that the petitioner was admitted and enrolled as an "Attorney of this Court".
29. I have noticed that the qualification of Attorney-at-Law is one that would entitle the possessor thereof to have his name enrolled as an advocate by the Bar Council of India under Section 24(1) of the Advocates Act; but by no stretch of imagination could such qualification be equated with a bachelor's degree in law.
30. The petitioner was subsequently admitted as an advocate and his name entered in the roll of advocates prepared by the Bar Council of West Bengal under Section 17 of the Advocates Act and certificate to this effect was issued on April 18, 1978.
31. Since the petitioner never graduated in law by acquiring a bachelor's degree, there was no question of obtaining 60% marks in the aggregate. Despite the petitioner not fulfilling the requirements mentioned in the advertisement, the officers of NCDC did not reject his application 18 outright; instead, his application was considered along with other candidates who had applied for the post.
32. The records (as evident from File No. 131/NCDC/CA.Rectt/ASSTT L.O.
172) reveal that after receipt of the application from the petitioner for appointment as Assistant Law Officer, the fact that he lacked the basic educational qualification did not go unnoticed. In this connection it would be pertinent to consider the departmental notes that had been prepared.
33. It appears from a file noting dated December 31, 1972 that in all 42 applications were received and that a particular officer, probably Mr. B.P. Shrivastava, Chief of Administration (based on comparison of his signature with those appearing on the documents at pg.s 217-18 of the paperbook), had posted his remarks in respect of each and every application. The note reads thus :
"In response to our advertisement for the post of Asstt. Law Officer, vide P/28c, we have received only 42-applications, which are placed below.
The applications have been tabulated in a Statement form, which is placed below for perusal and selection of candidates to be called for interview, vide P/29-33c.
A preliminary scrutiny has been done in the section and the results of the scrutiny are hereunder :-
(a) Sl.No. 5, 14, 17, 19, : Possess more than 60% marks in their 20, 24, 26 & 36 law examination and have got more than 3-years experience either as a Pleader or an Advocate and as such these 8 candidates are eligible for interview although they have not mentioned about knowledge of Deeds & Conveyancing Drafting as per 19 advertisement.
(b) Sl. No.37 : Possesses 71.3% marks in Law Exam.
but has acquired only 2 ½ years experience as an Advocate. This candidate does not fulfil the requirements of our advertisement i.e., ½ year short in experience.
(c) Sl. No.25 & 34 : S/Sri Krishna Chowdhury & Bhuneshwar Ram belonging to the community of Scheduled Caste. Both the candidates possess less the 60% in their Law Examination.
Sri Bhuneshwar Ram, Sl. No.34 has acquired more than 3 years experience as a Lawyer and Sri Krishna Chowdhury has got no experience at all. It may be decided as to whether these two candidates may be called for interview in view of the fact that they belong to the Scheduled Caste Community.
(d) Sl. No. 31 : Overage
(f) Sl. No.1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, : These candidates either do not possess 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, requisite qualification i.e. less than 60% 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, marks in their Law Examination or 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, experience as per advertisement.
38, 39, 40, 41 & 42 However, the particulars of these candidates may also be seen at F/A for consideration.
In view of the above, the applications along with the tabulated statement are placed below for selection of candidates to be called for interview."
The candidate at Sl. No.32 referred to in the above note under clause (f) was the petitioner. An impression could be created on reading the above remarks that the petitioner is a law graduate, but is ineligible for the post since he did not obtain 60% marks in the aggregate. 20
34. The file was thereafter placed before one Mr. A.N. Sahay, having the designation 'L.A.'. From other documents in the file I have gathered that 'L.A.' stands for 'Legal Advisor'. In his note dated February 1, 2003, Mr. Sahay observed:
"I agree that all the candidates under Clause (a) of the note at page 13/N may be called for interview.........
Regarding the candidates under Clause (f) of the noate (sic note) at page 13/N, I am to suggest that sl.no. 4, 12, 26, 32, 33 & 42 also may be given an opportunity to face the interview, for the reason indicated below :
Sl.No. 4 & 32 and Sl.No. 26.-
They are working under the Soliciter's Firm in Calcutta and hence, it is expected of them that they would be knowing much about the Company Law and procedures of the Calcutta High Court in regard to the steps to be taken in High Court. They also must be having knowledge of drafting, pleading, conveyancing etc. ..............."
35. Soon thereafter, Mr. Sahay in his note dated February 6, 1973 observed that the file should be retained. He had been given to understand by one Mr. U.K. Raja Rao that a very good candidate is employed in NCDC itself having a very good legal approach and a very good academic career. However, he was posted as hostel superintendent in Kathara Washery. The file was directed to be retained awaiting information from Mr. Raja Rao in this regard.
36. The said 'very good candidate' as referred to in the note dated February 6, 1973 was Mr. B. Kumar. Mr. Raja Rao forwarded his application for the post. On perusal of his application, Mr. Sahay found nothing special. It was observed that if the administration so decides, Mr. Kumar may be given opportunity to face interview.
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37. At page 16 of the file, a note was given by an officer on April 24, 1973 which is to the following effect :
"Notes P/13 to 15n ante may please be seen.
L.A. has scrutinised the applications and has recommended to call the following candidates for interview.
a) Sl.No. 5, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 36 & 37 to be called for interview.
b) He has recommended to call Sl. No. 4, 12, 26, 32, 33 & 42 for interview although they do not have either prescribed percentage of marks in the law Exam. or prescribed qualification. Justification for calling the candidates has given by L.A. in his notes at P/14n ante.
c) There are two Schedule Caste candidates at Sl.No. 25 & 34. L.A. has stated that ......................
d) There are two Departmental candidates............... In view of the above, it may finally be decided whether candidates at
(b) (c) & (d) above may be called for interview or not.
Applications are placed below."
38. Thereafter, there appears a handwritten note dated April 25, 1973 of an officer, which reads as follows :
1) Out of 45 applications recd., 9 Nos are eligible in terms of the minimum essential qualifications and the experience prescribed for being called for an interview.
2) L.A. has suggested that we may call 6 more candidates for interview vide his note at p/14N ante although they do not satisfy the minimum essential qualifications. Hence L.A. has suggested to relax the prescribed qualifications. On earlier occasion 13 candidates were called for interview but none of them were found suitable and as a result repeat advertisement was issued with the approval of DA. This repeat advertisement had prescribed the same qualification and experience as was done on the earlier occasion.
Thus thrice we have publicly announced our requirements and to alter the terms might be misconstrued. The suggestion of LA is based on individual merits of the applications but not a general relaxation as such. Hence it is for consideration if such an action may not be considered objective and may challenge our bonafide.
3) As the post is not reserved, the calling of S/C S/T candidates who do not fulfill the minimum qualifications, for an interview, does not arise. Since the criterion of relaxation as proposed by L.A. in individual basis, and even if approved, will not cover the S/C S/T candidates who are 2 in Nos.
4) There are two dep'tal candidates. The same applies to them as stated above in 3.
22Submitted for orders."
39. The officer (probably Mr. B.P. Shrivastava) who gave the note dated December 31, 1972 extracted (supra) again gave a note dated August 12, 1973. The note reads as follows :
"I am sorry this file could not be attended to earlier as it got mixed up with other files & could not be located till date. It was tied up with some other file which remained in movement.
Nevertheless, as recommended by L.A. candidates at a & b of P/16/N may be called for interview.
The schedule caste candidates may also be called for interview as there is general relaxation in their cases.
Other candidates may not be called for interview as no specific recommendation has been made in their favour by the L.A.."
40. As a result of these administrative decisions, call letters were issued in favour of 16 (sixteen) aspirants for the post, including the petitioner, to attend interview before the selection committee comprising of 5 (five) members. The selection committee comprised of Mr. Shamboo Prasad, Senior Solicitor, Mr. S.C. Mallik, Chief Accounts Officer, Mr. M.R.T. Narayanan, Chief Finance Officer, Mr. A.N. Sahay and Mr. B.P. Shrivasatava, referred to above. Broad-sheet was prepared by the selection committee after considering the particulars furnished by the aspirants in their respective applications. It appears that insofar as educational qualifications and experience of the petitioner are concerned, the selection committee noted that he had passed Matric in the 3rd div in 1964, and B.Com with 2nd Class marks in 1968. He had also passed Attorneyship from High Court, Calcutta in January 1971. It was also noted that the petitioner had worked under B.K. Sen & Co., 23 Calcutta as Article and Assistant from 21.9.1969 to 31.12.1972 and that he has been working under B.M Bagaria, Solicitor, Calcutta since 1.9.1972 as an Assistant/Solicitor.
41. From the said broad-sheet, it further appears that the aspirants were assessed in respect of their qualifications and experience on 15 marks each, and personality (in course of interview) on 20 marks. The petitioner was awarded 10+7+12 under different heads, totaling to 29 marks and was placed first in the panel.
42. From the proceedings of the selection committee meeting held on September 25, 1973, it also appears that a panel of four candidates in order of merit was prepared, wherein the petitioner's name figured at the first position.
43. The proceedings of the selection committee dated September 25, 1973 were placed before Mr. J.G. Kumaramangalam, Chairman. By his note dated October 16, 1973, he approved the proceedings and observed that presumably one post is vacant presently and the petitioner having been placed first in the order of merit could be appointed on the post of Assistant Law Officer.
44. Soon thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Law Officer under erstwhile CMAL in pursuance of offer dated April 5, 1974. These are factual aspects gathered from the relevant file. 24
45. After his appointment as Assistant Law Officer, the petitioner earned promotion upto the post of Legal Manager in E-5 grade in September 1988.
46. He had thereafter responded to an advertisement issued in the year 1989-90 for appointment to the post of Deputy Chief Legal Manager in M-1 grade. He was ultimately selected and appointed as Deputy Chief Legal Manager. He was thereafter promoted from M-I to M-2 grade on or about October, 1995.
47. In due course of time, the petitioner was considered for further promotion to the post of Chief Legal Manager of CIL and was granted such promotion. He retired while holding such post.
48. The respondents 3, 4 and 6 in their counter affidavit have attributed the petitioner's appointment in 1974 as one procured by way of recommendation/influence. It is their further claim that the petitioner "managed" a selection in his favour by the selection committee for appointment to the post of Deputy Chief Legal Manager by strategically having his application as a departmental candidate routed for consideration despite being ineligible. It is also their case that "the so- called Screening committee might have misconstrued that a departmental candidate to the post of Legal Manager at the relevant time must have possessed Law Degree which is the basic ingredient of qualification for a Law Officer......" and that his promotion to the post of Chief Legal Manager was "on the basis of the misconstruction of his educational 25 qualification as Law Graduate ......" (see paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit, at pg.s 84-85 of the paperbook).
49. It has been alleged in paragraph 16 of the writ petition that paragraph 4.13 of the Common Coal Cadre specifically provides for vigilance clearance before giving effect to an order of promotion and that clearance is a sine qua non for giving effect to such order. Each time the petitioner obtained promotion, it is alleged, vigilance clearance was obtained.
50. The respondents 3, 4 and 6 have dealt with paragraph 16 in paragraph 8 of their counter affidavit while dealing with the contents of paragraphs 12 to 21 of the writ petition. Apart from bare denials of the various statements in the paragraphs under reply, there is no material to suggest that vigilance clearance, as alleged, was not a sine qua non or that implementation of the recommendation for promotion granted to the petitioner was not preceded by vigilance clearance.
51. Certain facts, evident from the narrative as above, are undisputed, viz.
that (i) the petitioner offered his candidature for the post of Assistant Law Officer in 1972 despite being ineligible; (ii) there was full and complete disclosure of the petitioner's qualifications and he did not misrepresent facts by claiming to be a law graduate; (iii) the petitioner's ineligibility for the post was not considered on the touch stone that he did not acquire a law degree but as if he was a law graduate without obtaining 60% marks in the aggregate and by misconstruing his 26 qualifications, the departmental officers made a mess of the matter; (iv) the petitioner was short-listed in view of his experience of working with solicitors in this Hon'ble Court; (v) several other ineligible candidates were also short-listed for interview; (vi) one officer had expressed his reservations in respect of grant of relaxation in individual cases as suggested by Mr. Sahay, Legal Advisor intending to widen the zone of consideration; (vii) other officers of the NCDC/CMAL were eager to make recruitment on the post of Assistant Law Officer through the process that was initiated with the advertisement published in November, 1972 since earlier attempts had failed; (viii) the educational qualifications of the petitioner were duly reflected in the broad-sheet that was prepared for the occasion; (ix) despite the ineligibility of several aspirants, members of the selection committee did not raise any objection and proceeded to prepare a panel wherein the petitioner figured at the top;
(x) the recommendation of the selection committee was approved by the Chairman and the petitioner offered appointment in clear deviation of the requirements for the post mentioned in the advertisement, which was nothing but a fraud on public having regard to the absence of any clause in such advertisement reserving the right of the appointing authority to relax essential eligibility criteria; (xi) the petitioner's qualifications were misconstrued even while he was considered for promotion; (xii) the petitioner was promoted more than once with clearance of the Vigilance Department; and (xiii) till such time report of 27 investigation into the complaint dated June 17, 2008 was available, everyone in CIL seem to have turned a blind eye to the petitioner's ineligibility to hold the posts he held during his long service career spanning thirty-four years.
52. The big and relevant question in the circumstances is why was charge-
sheet not issued earlier against all the erring officers of NCDC/CMAL/CIL who by their irresponsible, indolent, and lackadaisical approach (no evidence of nepotism is, however, forthcoming) enabled an utterly ineligible candidate to steal a march over other eligible candidates and serve the public for so long a time. Mr. Pal could provide no answer.
53. Apropos the contention of Mr. Ghosh, I now intend to examine whether the charge-sheet discloses any misconduct or not.
54. The allegation in Article of Charge No. I is on the premise that the petitioner had managed to obtain appointment because of a purported recommendation contained in U.O. No. DA/GL/L.Asstt/70/61/19285 dated November 8, 1974 issued by Mr. R.G. Singh, Manager (Administration), NCDC, which is revealed from letter No. Apex/Admn/L-6/2544 dated February 18, 1975 of Mr. K.C. Choudhury, the then Staff Officer (Admn), OE, CMAL. The letter dated November 8, 1974 has not been placed before me. However, nothing turns on it. What is relevant is that whatever recommendation the said letter dated November 8, 1974 might have contained and if at all the 28 same is construed by the respondents as a document that arms them to proceed against the petitioner for "managing" his selection for the post of Assistant Law Officer, it is neither material nor significant. This is because of the simple reason that the petitioner was offered appointment on April 5, 1974, whereas the purported recommendation was issued later in November, 1974. The letter of November 18, 1974 did not exist at all when the process of selection was in progress and came to its logical conclusion with the appointment of the petitioner in April, 1974. On reading Article of Charge No. I, I find that the statement together with the imputations do not disclose any misconduct warranting departmental action.
55. Regarding Articles of Charges II and III, the situation is equally not favourable for the respondents 3 to 6. While reserving judgment on November 30, 2010, I had called upon the respondents to place the entire records of the case. However, apart from File No. 131/NCDC/CA.Rectt/ASSTT L.O. 172, no other document or record in respect of Articles of Charges II and III were produced. Be that as it may, could any person of reasonable prudence hold the petitioner guilty of the said charges having regard to the clear admission made in the counter affidavit dated September 22, 2008 by the respondents 3 to 5 that the educational qualifications of the petitioner were "misconstrued"? I think not. True it is, that the petitioner has been alleged to have indulged in acts by which he could have his application 29 routed through the official channel for consideration despite being ineligible. However, since the ineligibility of the petitioner could have been detected by exercise of due diligence, I do not consider such act, even if it is assumed to have been committed by him, to be a misconduct in terms of the CDA Rules. Having been appointed on the post of Assistant Law Officer without a law degree, it is natural for the appointee to believe that his qualification of Attorney-at-Law has been viewed to be equivalent to a law degree, thereby conferring him the right to offer his candidature. In any event, the lapses of the officers of CIL cannot be passed on to the petitioner to nail him. While being of the firm opinion that allowing such important posts to be manned by an ineligible individual is nothing but a deceit, resulting from utter apathy and indifference, and total lack of sincerity and devotion to work, I am of the further view that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner at the fag end of his career to obliterate any impression one may wish to carry that a wrong was never sought to be corrected.
56. I would have ended my judgment here but since certain other points have been argued and the same have exercised my consideration, I intend to deal therewith now.
57. Heavy reliance has been placed by Mr. Pal on the decision in Chaman Lal Goyal (supra). It has been held therein, inter alia, as follows: 30
"*****It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.*****"
(underlining for emphasis by me)
58. As cautioned by the Supreme Court, whether disciplinary proceedings containing stale charges ought to be interfered with or not must depend on the facts of a given case. When a process of balancing is to be adopted, one has to weigh the competing interests of maintaining a clean and honest administration on the one hand and the vitiating effect of inordinate unexplained delay on the disciplinary proceedings qua the prejudice that non-interference with a belated charge-sheet containing stale charges would result to the delinquent on the other.
59. The fact that the petitioner was ineligible for the post of Assistant Law Officer must have been known to the respondents during the time he served CIL. In the counter affidavit of the respondents 3 to 6, there is no material based whereon it could be agitated that the ineligibility of the petitioner to hold the post of Assistant Law Officer and the higher posts 31 subsequently held by him were under wraps and by exercising due diligence the same could not have been discovered. It is not a case where the ineligibility of the petitioner was discovered only recently after investigation into the complaint dated June 17, 2008 was complete. On the contrary, the admission referred to above is explicit. The facts were there for the taking, yet, none holding responsible posts woke up from slumber. The recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceedings was made by the CVC couple of days prior to the petitioner's retirement on superannuation, resulting in the CMD, CIL issuing the impugned charge sheet against the petitioner more than thirty-four years since his entry in service in April, 1974, and after years of apparent blemishless service in CIL.
60. Insofar as Article of Charge No. I is concerned, the file notings are eloquent to suggest relaxation of essential eligibility criteria, albeit on a mistaken notion, thereby enabling not only the petitioner (but other aspirants for the post too) to enter the zone of consideration and face interview. Once relaxation has been granted to a class and that too in deviation of the published norms, it is the officers granting the relaxation, the members of the selection committee selecting an ineligible aspirant for appointment on the post advertised, and the superior officer who approved the recommendation of the selection committee who are primarily accountable. Had they been pulled up, the petitioner being the beneficiary of an illegal act could not have avoided 32 departmental action. The respondents, however, appear to have missed the woods for the tree.
61. In disciplinary proceedings, facilities for putting up defence that are fair, adequate and reasonable have to be given. A delinquent is entitled to claim that he ought not to be made to face stale charges, particularly when it is established that nothing of worth prevented the disciplinary authority to initiate proceedings earlier. Due to delay in initiating proceedings, a lot of complications are bound to arise. It is quite possible that relevant evidence might have been lost; material witnesses who could have testified as to what had actually happened and what is true may have expired; and those witnesses who are alive might not be in a position to recapitulate incidents which are decades old. If the delinquent is exposed to serious prejudice in facing disciplinary proceedings that are drawn up years after the alleged misconduct committed by the delinquent, the Courts should proceed with care, caution and circumspection.
62. One aspect is absolutely clear in the present case i.e. the petitioner in no way was responsible for the delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against him. On facts, having regard to the departmental notes extracted supra, it can reasonably be concluded that the respondents had relaxed the requisite eligibility criteria relating to educational qualifications vis-à-vis the petitioner and some others. Although I have no hesitation to hold that such action amounted to a 33 fraud on public and the officers at the helm were quite unjustified in relaxing the essential eligibility criteria not only for the petitioner but other aspirants for the post as well, such matters ought to have been investigated at the point the illegality occurred or immediately thereafter. No Court of Law ought to allow the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to be violated by arbitrary administrative action. The petitioner was appointed in the seventies, yet, nothing was done to initiate departmental action despite facts being known to the respondents. In a situation like this, the mandate of Article 14 is clear, - that if all facts are or should be known to the respondents on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings could be initiated or enquiry made, such proceedings should be initiated or enquiry made within a reasonable time of the offending action. It is not open to the respondents to choose their own time for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. If the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent is writ large. Receipt of the complaint dated June 17, 2008 cannot be used as a shield to defend the inaction of not proceeding earlier, if at all the petitioner had indulged in any misconduct. The whims of the respondents cannot override the mandate of Article 14. If the respondents, in two similarly circumstanced cases, were to be free to proceed departmentally - in one case immediately after occurrence of an illegality resulting in accrual of an unlawful benefit to an aspirant for the post (read appointment) and in another case immediately before his 34 retirement after long years of service since the time of objectionable appointment that was offered years before and acted upon and was known for all times, it would pave the way to arbitrariness and ways of ruining the successful career of the appointee when it is about to end only to deprive him his retiral benefits. This, Article 14 does not permit. The inordinate long gap of time in the instant case in issuing charge sheet containing charges which by efflux of time have become stale, is neither reasonable by any standard nor could be justified by the respondents. The respondents 3 to 6 having allowed the petitioner to continue in service as well as to retire despite due knowledge that from day one the petitioner was short on educational qualifications, they have acquiesced in the appointment having allowed him to work for all these years and it is not open to them to initiate proceedings at this stage. Balancing the competing interests of the parties on the touchstone of Article 14 i.e. the need to maintain purity in administration and the right that is guaranteed to the petitioner by law, I am of the considered view that this is a fit and proper case deserving judicial interference for setting things right.
63. The contention raised by Mr. Pal that the contract of service was void because of mistake has failed to impress me because of two reasons. First, the respondents 3 to 6 have not taken this plea in their counter affidavit. Secondly, as noticed above, they now say that the qualifications of the petitioner were misconstrued at the time he was 35 initially appointed and later on, when he was promoted. Despite being aware of the ineligibility of the petitioner, the parties to the contract went ahead with their rights and obligations thereunder. One party to the contract cannot now be allowed to resile and take a stand that the contract is vitiated by mistake. The vitiating effect stands obliterated once the contract was allowed to be worked out till the petitioner's retirement from service, thereby amounting to ratification of any mistake that might have crept in. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 12 SCC 91 (Ganga Retreat & Towers Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan) is a complete answer to the point. It had the occasion there to observe as follows:
"*****Here, the vitiating effect of the alleged mistake shall stand obliterated no sooner it is found that the appellants have, in spite of the so-called mistake being discovered, yet, chosen to stand by the contract, ratifying the same by their conduct and went ahead to exercise the rights which accrued to them under the same contract which they are pleading to be vitiated by the mistake."
64. There is one other aspect that deserves consideration here. Even if the contract between the parties were held to be void at the instance of the respondents, they would be obliged in terms of provisions contained in Section 65 of the Contract Act, having derived advantage therefrom, to either restore the petitioner to the position that prevailed prior to the contract or to compensate him. The respondents can never return the petitioner the golden years of his life that he spent while in service in CMAL/CIL. If at the inception the petitioner were told of his ineligibility to hold the post of Assistant Law Officer and asked to quit or removed, 36 he could have most certainly searched for greener pastures. That is now impossibility. The amount of compensation that the petitioner would have been entitled in a case of the present nature, in my opinion, far outweigh the quantum of retiral benefits that he has earned by putting in meritorious service. Holding the contract to be vitiated by mistake would result in more harm than good to the respondents. The issue ought to rest here.
65. The further contention that the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority and hence is disentitled to relief is also not well conceived. An action that is void cannot be validated by mere submission of a letter seeking more time to reply. There is thus no reason to hold that the petitioner should be denied relief on this specious ground.
66. Since I propose to interdict on the ground that the decision making process of the respondents 3 to 6 is flawed and suffers from perversity as discussed above, I refrain from dealing with the aspect as to whether the disciplinary proceedings could continue or not after the petitioner's retirement.
67. For the foregoing reasons, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner (more than thirty-four years after his appointment in relation to incidents, both pre and post appointment, a day prior to his retirement) are quashed including the charge-sheet and the memorandum, both dated July 30, 2008. The petitioner shall be entitled 37 to full retiral benefits together with interest @ 10% p.a. thereon. The same shall be released immediately, but not later than a month from date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to further interest @ 2% until full payment is released. He shall also be entitled to costs of proceedings assessed at Rs.10,200/.
68. The writ petition, accordingly, stands allowed.
69. File No. 131/NCDC/CA.Rectt/ASSTT L.O. 172 shall be returned to the learned advocate for the respondents 3 to 6 upon proper receipt. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.
(DIPANKAR DATTA, J.) Later :
Mr. Mondal, learned advocate for respondents 3 to 6 prays for stay. Having regard to the fact that the respondents 3 to 6 have been given one month's time from date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment and order for releasing payment, I find no reason to grant stay. Prayer for stay is refused.38
(DIPANKAR DATTA, J.)